Jainism from the View Point of Vedantic Acaryas

Author(s): Yajneshwar S Shastri
Publisher: B J Institute

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Śri Rāmānujācarya and Jainism स्यादस्ति च अवक्तव्यम् ६. स्यान्नास्ति चावक्तव्यम् ७. स्यादस्ति च नास्ति 7 3tamaj a, çfa Ho 999t adia I (Śrībhāsya, II. II.31). Criticism of Syādvāda :
Rāmānuja does not deal in detail with Syādvāda doctrine except pointing out to the inherent improbability of opposite attributes staying together. He states that, Syādvāda is not proper reasoning, because of on account of the impossibility of simultaneous existence of contradictory things like existence and non-existence in the entity like shadow and light (एकस्मिन् वस्तुनि 37fFramfetarafa base et OP 1149 G H9ata Śrībhāsya, II. II.31). Substance and its modifications (paryāyas) are two different things. Paryāyas are objectives being particular state of substance. They are (substance and its modifications) different like clay and pot. So, contradictory attributes in one and the same thing, at the same time not possible. Same clarified butter (Ghrta) cannot be solid as well as liquid form at the same time. There is no possibility of the inclusion of two different things (like pot and clay), though they are substance and paryāyas of the same thing. Water is a substance, but it cannot be solid as ice and flowing liquid at the same time and at same place. When the particular thing is described as existent it cannot be described as nonexistent at the same time, which is quite opposite of existence. Non-eternality (anityatva) of particular substance is, its being the resort of particular modifications called origination and destruction. If it is the case,