Jainism from the View Point of Vedantic Acaryas

Author(s): Yajneshwar S Shastri
Publisher: B J Institute
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/001366/1

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Sheth Shri Popatlal Hemchand Adhyātma Vyākhyānamālā, No. 8
Jainism from the view point of
Vedāntic Acāryas
(with special reference to Nimbārka,
Sankara and Rāmānuja)
by Prof. Dr. Yajneshwar S. Shastri
BASE
B. J. Institute of Learning & Research H. K. Arts College Compound, Ashram Road,
Ahmedabad-380 009

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Sheth Shri Popatlal Hemchand Adhyātma Vyākhyānamala, No. 8
Jainism from the view point of
Vedāntic Ācāryas
(with special reference to Nimbārka,
Sankara and Rāmānuja)
by Prof. Dr. Yajneshwar S. Shastri
Professor and Head, Department of Philosophy, Gujarat University, Ahmedabad.
B. J. Institute of Learning & Research H. K. Arts College Compound, Ashram Road,
Ahmedabad-380009

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Jainism from the view point of Vedāntic Acāryas
© Prof. Dr. Yajneshwar S. Shastri
Published by Dr. Bharati Shelat Director, B.J. Institute of Learning & Research Ashram Road, Ahmedabad-380009, Gujarat (India)
First Edition : 2003
Copies : 500
Price : Rs. 45-00
Printed by :
Krishna Griphics 966, Naranpura Old Village, Ahmedabad-380013 Ph. : (079) 7494393

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શેઠશ્રી પોપટલાલ હેમચંદ
જન્મ સં. ૧૯૨૮, શ્રાવણ સુદ ૫ ને શનિવાર
તા. ૨૨-૭-૧૮૭૧
-
સ્વર્ગવાસ સં. ૨૦૦૧ આસો વદ ૫ ને ગુરુવાર
તા. ૨૫-૧૦-૧૯૪૫

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Publisher's Note Under the terms of the donation made by Shri Chimanlal Popatlal Shah in 1946 in the name of his father Shah Popatlal Hemchand, it was decided to organize series of lectures on the subject of Ātman-Paramātman with special reference to Jain Philosophy under the auspices of B.J.Institute of Learning and Research, Ahmedabad. It was decided to name the series 'Sheth Shri Popatlal Hemchand Adhyātma Vyākhyānamālā'.
Under this lecture-Series, Dr. R.D. Ranade delivered inaugural three lectures on 'Spiritual life in Mahatma Gandhi and Hindi Saints, Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi on ‘Adhyātmavicāraņā', Dr. Padmanabh Jaini on ‘Liberation, Incarnation and Rebirth in Jainism', Dr. Bhogilal Sandesara on ‘Yoga, Anuyoga and Mantrayoga', Dr. R.N. Mehta on Jainism and Archaeology', Muni Sumermalji on 'Importance of Character and Meditation in Indian Culture and healthy life and Preksādhyāna', Svami Shri Atmanandaji on 'Inspiring sources of Gandhiji's Ahimsā, Shrimad Rājachandra and Jain Religion and Mahāvira-darśana in modern context', Dr. N.J.Shah on 'concept of Shraddhā (Samyak-darshan), Matijñāna and Kevalajñāna in Jain Philosophy and Dr. Jitendra Shah on ‘Naya in Jain Philosophy with special reference to Ācārya Devasena and Upā. Yaśovijaya' respectively. Most of these lectures have been published in the book-form by the Institute.
Dr. Yajneshvar Shastri is an eminent scholar of Indian Philosophy and Sanskrit studies. He has contributed to the field of Hindu, Jain and Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy. His scholarly works include Mahāyānasātrālarikāra of Asanga, Traverses on less Trodden path of Indian Philosophy and Religion, Foundations of Hinduism and the Salient Features of Hinduism. He has also edited with studied introduction Praśamarati-prakaraña of Umāsvāti Vācaka, Ātmabodha of Padma-nandi and has been the general editor of Munisuvratasvāmicarita and Nyāyamañjari (IV-Vth Āhnika).
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Dr. Shastri has organized several national and international seminars and he is the visiting professor of Philosophy in the Loyola Merymount University at Los Angeles and Cleveland State University at Cleveland, Ohio. Thus he has contributed immensely to the fields of teaching and research. I have a great pleasure in publishing the three lectures delivered by Dr. Yajneshvar Shastri on 'Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas' in the book form and I hope the publication will prove to be interesting and illuminative not only to the students of Indian Philosophy, but also to those who are interested in the subject.
Ahmedabad
22nd Jan., 2003
1.
3.
Publisher's Note
Preface
Jainism from the View point of Śri Nimbārkācārya
Date of Nimbārka
Works of Nimbārka
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2. Śri Sankarācārya's views on Jainism Presentation of Jainism Criticism of Syādvāda
Refutation of Dehaparimāṇavāda

CONTENTS
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Śri Rāmānujācārya and Jainism
Presentation of Janism
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Refutation of Syadvāda, grace of Siddhas and Dehaparimāṇavāda of Jainism.
Criticism of Syādvāda and
Dehaparimāṇavāda
In defence of Anekāntavāda or Syādvāda
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Bharati Shelat Director

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Preface
This book is a collection of my three lectures delivered under the auspices of Sheth Shri Popatlal Hemachanda Adhyatma Vyākhyānamālā, at B.J. Institute of Learning and Research, Ahmedabad, in September 2002. These lectures are based on Brahmasutrabhāṣyas of respective Vedantic Acāryas.
Jainism is one of the three major religio-philosophical systems of India, which made manifold contributions to Indian society through its literature, religion and philosophy. Anekāntavāda is a special contribution of Jainism to Indian thought. This Anekāntavāda is an expansion of principle of non violence (ahimsa) at intellectual level. The principle of respect for the life of others was transformed by the Jaina philosophers at the intellectual level. The attitude of tolerance, which is hallmark of this system, inspired Jaina thinkers to make a unique attempt to harmonise, reconcile, all conflicting view points in the field of philosophy. Learned Jaina thinkers thought that various systems of philosophy being dogmatic in their assertions created bitterness among the followers of different philosophical schools. The age-old philosophical disputes and controversies between the various philosophical schools are on account of their conditional assertion in regard to philosophical propositions. On account of this rigid attitude, each school asserts its view to be true and thus, philosophers of these schools do not really try to understand the view points of others, which gave rise to hatred an rivalry towards other systems of thought. This is also a kind of intellectual intolerance and violence in the realm of thought. To avoid such kind of intellectual violence Jaina thinkers evolved a unique, synthetic, philosophical methodology, which is technically known as Anekāntavāda i.e. Doctrine of Many-sidedness of reality, consisting of dual doctrine viz. Nayavāda (the doctrine of different partial view points) and Syādvāda or Saptabhanginaya

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(sevenfold predication). Anekānta denotes that reality is manifold, each entity consists of may forms and modes of innumerable aspects. We are all imperfect human beings. We cannot comprehend an object or reality in its totality and our view of it is limited. We are wrong when we emphasize and say that our view is perfect and final. Our view towards reality is always partial. Anekāntavāda or Syādvāda allows all different viewpoints in it and reveals complete picture of reality. Thus, this Anekāntavāda is accepted to co-ordinate, unify and harmonize the divergent, seemingly disagreeing philosophical viewpoints into a practical whole. When an object which is possessing many characteristics (anekāntātmaka) is expressed in a particular form of judgment the expression is known as Syādvāda. We can express the characteristics of an object from different points of view and those points of view are expressed by the word Syāt. Thus the judgment. about an object possessing many characteristics is called Syādvāda. Syādvāda is neither a doctrine of doubt nor a doctrine of probability.
This Jaina's Anekāntavāda or Syādvāda as a philosophical method is criticized by the Buddhists as well as by all the Vedāntic Ācāryas. The superficial understanding of Syādvāda seems to be the main reason behind their criticisms. The word ‘Syāt in Syādvāda is taken in the sense of probability (sambhāvanā) or may be (not in the sense of certain point of view or in certain respect) by all these non-Jaina Philosophers. So, this kind of understanding led them to criticize Syādvāda as a doctrine of doubt or probability. Another principle of Jainism which is a subject of severe criticism of Vedāntic Acāryas is Dehaparimāņavāda (the doctrine according which size of the soul is body size). Their criticism is centered round on these two principles of Jainism. While criticizing these two doctrines of Jainism, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Madhva and Vallabha followed Sanskarācārya (borrowing almost same arguments) except pointing out some minor defects.

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It is a general misconception that, Sankarācārya and other Vedāntic Ācāryas have misrepresented Jainism in their writings. But this is far from the truth. Vedāntic Ācāryas following the Indian philosophical tradition have presented Jainism as Parvapakşa (prior view). They have presented Jaina doctrines very authentically. While presenting Jainism, Vedāntic Ācāryas have not done any injustice to it. Their criticism of Syādvāda is on account of superficial understanding of it.
Special study has not been done so far to give complete picture of Vedāntic Acāryas' views on Jainism. In these lectures, an attempt is made to fill up this gap, giving detailed arguments given by all these three Vedāntic Ācāryas. In the first lecture Sri Nimbārkācārya and his views on Jainism have been discussed in detail.. Nimbārka is very neglected philosopher in the history of Indian Philosophy. Antiquity of his school is concerned, lots of injustice has been done to this great thinker. Proper attention has not been given by the historians of Philosophy, even to date and works of Nimbārka. On the basis of recent research I felt it necessary to throw some light on Nimbārka's date and works, before presenting his views on Jainism, in this lecture. Nimbārka's commentary is very brief. So, we do not find detailed account of Jainism in his commentary. His immediate follower, Śrinivāsa in his commentary on Vedāntapārijātasaurabha (Brahmasūtra-bhāsya of Nimbārka) presents Jaina doctrines in detail and justifies Nimbārka's criticism of Syādvāda and Dehaparimāņa-vāda, giving detailed arguments. I have covered Śrinivāsa's views also in this lecture. The second lecture is devoted to Śarkarācārya's presentation of Jainism, refutation of Syādvāda and Dehaparimāņavāda. Sri Sankarācārya has presented Jaina doctrines as a prior view (pūrvapaksa) very authentically. He, as a great philosopher criticizes both Syādvāda and Dehaparimāņavāda with logical rigour. Like Dharmakirti and Śāntarakṣita, he took the word 'Syāť in the sense of probability or may be and criticizes it. It seems that Sankara was not familiar
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with the meaning of the word 'Syat' taken by the Jainas in the sense of 'in certain respect' or in certain point of view.' There was not much literature in defense of Syādvāda prior to Sankara. Whatever literature developed in defence of Syādvāda is postSankara development. Jaina philosophers who came after Sankara, gave proper answers to objections raised against Syādvāda. Surprisingly, these Jaina philosophers did not give any reply to criticism of Dehaparimāṇavāda made by Sankara. In the third lecture Rämänuja's views on Jainism are discussed. In conclusion, in defence of Syādvāda, meaning of Syāt, purpose of Syādvāda and possible answers given by Jaina thinkers against criticism of Anekāntavāda are discussed in detail. In appendix, views of Śri Bhaskarācārya, Madhvācārya and Vallabhācārya are given quoting from their respective bhāṣyas.
B.J. Institute of Learning and Research is doing yeoman service to the field of Indology through its research, teaching, editing and publishing and arranging learned lecture series. I am very much grateful to Dr. Bharatiben Shelat, Director, B.J. Institute of Learning and Research, for inviting me to deliver these three lectures under the prestigious Vyakhyānamālā. I am also thankful to all those who helped to bring out these lectures in book form.
Ahmedabad
23rd January, 2003

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Dr. Yajneshwar S. Shastri

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Jainism from the view point of Vedāntic Acāryas
(with special reference to Nimbārka, Sankara and Rāmānuja).
Intoduction
Jainism is one of the oldest religio-philosophical systems of India. Jainas emphasize on principle of Ahimsā (non-violence) and their Anekāntavāda or Syādvāda is expansion of this principle at intellectual level. But unfortunately, this Anekāntavāda (doctrine of many-sidedness of reality) or Syādvāda (theory of seven-fold judgement) has become subject of severe criticism of the Buddhists as well as Vedantic Teachers. The superficial understanding of this principle, seems to be main reason behind this criticism. It is also important to note that, almost all these critics of Jainism, mention only Digambara Jainas by name. Probably, they were not familiar with Śvetāṁbara sect. Prior to Vedāntic Acāryas, Buddhist logicians like Dharmakirti and Śāntarakṣita, bitterly criticise the Anekāntavāda or Syādvāda. Dharmakirti states that, the shameless and naked Jainas make such non-sensical and contradictory remarks that reality is both existence and non-exist

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2 Jainism from the view point of Vedāntic Acāryas ence, unity and plurality, inclusion and exclusion. If it is so, then, curd is curd as well as a camel. Then, when a person is asked to eat curd, he should run to eat a camel :
एतेनैव यदहीकाः किमप्ययुक्तमश्लीलमाकुलम् । प्रलपन्ति प्रतिक्षिप्तं तदप्येकान्तसम्भवात् ॥ सर्वस्योभयरूपत्वे तद्विशेषनिराकृतेः चोदितो दधि खादेति किमुष्टं नाभिधावति ॥*
Pramāņavārtika, III. 180-182 śāntaraksita says that Syādvāda which combines the real and the unreal, the existent and non-existent, the one and the many, the identity and the difference, and the universal and the particular, is like a mad man's cry and suffers from fault of Sarkara i.e. intermixture (परस्परस्वभावत्वे स्यात् सामान्यविशेषयोः । सायँ तत्त्वतो नेदं द्वैरूप्यमुपपद्यते ।। Tattvasangraha, Part II. 1721.) Saikara and other Vedāntic Ācāryas, point out that, you cannot blow hot and cold in the same breath. Unity and plurality, permanence and momentariness, reality and unreality, cannot remain at the same time and in the same thing, like light and darkness. The Buddhists and the Vedāntins, taking the world Syāt in its popular sense of probabil
* In reply to this kind of harsh utterances of Dharmakirti.
against Jainas, Jainācārya Akalanka calls Dharmakirti as a fool, mad and unbalanced minded who shamelessly talks non-sensically-[ज्ञात्वा विज्ञप्तिमात्रं परमपि च बहिर्भासि भावप्रवादं, चक्रे लोकानुरोधात् पुनरपि सकलं नेति तत्त्वं प्रपेदे । न ज्ञाता तस्य तस्मिन् न च फलमपरं ज्ञायते नापि किञ्चित् इत्यश्लीलं प्रमत्तः प्रलपति जडधीराकुलं व्याकुलाप्तः ।।
न्यायविनिश्चय, I.172 ]

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Jainism from the view point of Vedāntic Acāryas ity, criticised the Syādvāda as a self-contradictory doctrine. They criticise this doctrine on the ground of the impossibility of contradictory attributes co-existing in the same thing.
The Vedāntic Ācāryas present Jainism as Purvapaksa (prior view) in their Brahmasūtrabhāsya and refute it. They have presented Jaina principles in authentic way. They have not done any injustice to Jainism while presenting it as Purvapaksa. But they took the world Syād either in the sense of probability or 'may be' or 'somewhat' and criticise it. There are total four sūtras in second Adhyāya of second pāda of Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyana, which Vedāntic Acāryas consider as a refutation of Jainism. In the versions of Brahmasūtras, accepted by Sankara and Nimbārka, The Sūtras are numbered as thirty-three to thirty-six (Brahmasutra, II.II. 33-36), while in Rāmānuja's version of Brahmasūtra, they are numbered as thirty-one to thirty-four (B.S. II.II. 31-34). The Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa takes note of only two Jaina doctrines, viz., Anekāntavāda or Syādvāda and the Dehapramāņavāda (the doctrine according to which size of the soul is, body size) of the Jiva. Among these four Sūtras, only one Sūtra is concerned with criticism of Syādvāda and remaining three are devoted to refutation of the concept of size of the soul of Jaina. Thus, these Vedāntic Ācāryas' criticism is centered round on refutation of Syādvāda and the concept of the size of the soul of Jainism. Now, let us see, how Nimbārka, Sarikara and Rāmānuja refute these doctrines of Jainism.

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Jainism from the view point of Vedāntic Ācāryas Jainism from the View point of Sri Nimbārkācārya :
Śri Nimbārkācārya (cir. 600 A.D.) is one of the important Vedāntic teachers in the history of Indian Philosophy. He is considered as the founder of Svābhāvika-bhedābheda (the doctrine of natural difference and non-difference) school of Vedānta. He has written a commentary on Brahmasūtras of Badarāyaṇa which is known as Vedāntapārijātasaurabha (=VPS), in which he has expounded his doctrine of Svābhāvikabhedābheda. Nimbārka is most neglected philospher in the history of Indian thought. Lots of works have been done on Advaita, Viśistādvaita and Dvaita, but very little attention has been paid to Nimbārka School. Proper attention has not been given, even to date and works of Nimbārka. Recent research tells that antiquity of this school is concerned lot of injustice has been done to this great thinker. I feel it necessary here to throw some light on Nimbārka's date and works, before I start the subject. Date of Nimbārka :
There is uncertainty about the date of Nimbārka, because he has not left any historical evidence about his date. Traditional works which provide account of life and activities of Nimbārka are full of legends and myths. There are lots of controversies an disputes among the modern scholars about his date. In such circumstances it is very difficult to say with certainty of his date.

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acāryas
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We get traditional account of his date in Acāryacaritam (=A.C.) which is written in 17th or 18th century A.D. Tradition on the basis of Paurāņic reference believes that he lived in the 15th year of Kali age i.e. 3100 B.C. (A.C. pp. 34-35, 42-48; Kathiyababa, pp. 93-143), which does not seem to be reasonable. If this view is true then we have to accept that Nimbārka flourished prior to Bādarāyaṇa. Historians tell that, Bādarayaṇa composed Brahmasūtra not earlier to 200 B.C. Nimbārka who wrote commentary on Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa cannot be earlier to him. Another traditional source for date of Nimbārka is Guruparamparā of this tradition, which is prepared in the 15th or the 16th century A.D. Work of such late date, can not be considered as authentic to decide his date. This list is unable to provide any chronological or historical data concerning all the Acaryas of the tradition. Many of the Acaryas listed in Guruparampară have left no evidence about their existence nor their names have been mentioned in the works of their immediate followers.
Modern scholars, due to uncertainty of any historical evidence, are very much confused in deciding the date of Nimbärka. Several views are expressed by modern scholars in this respect. Some scholars think that Nimbārka lived after Rāmānuja and prior to Madhva. Some other scholars consider him to be postMadhva and still some place him even after Vallabha. Another group of scholars places him after Bhaskara. Some scholars considered him to be pre-Bhaskara. Some other scholars belonging to Nimbārka tradition believe

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Jainism from the view point of Vedāntic Acāryas
that he is prior to Sankara and even earlier to Gaudapāda. R. G. Bhandarkar thinks that Nimbārka lived shortly after Rāmānuja. Even scholars like Rādhākrishnan, R. Ghosh, P. Chaturvedi, P. Bhattācārya also consider him to be post-Rāmānuja commentator (Kathiyababa, p. 47-55). S.N.Dasgupta, dates him roughly about the middle of the 14th century A.D. (H.I.Philo., Vol. III, pp. 399-402). Some scholars think that Nimbārka refers to the Srisampradāya and Brahmasampradāya of Rāmānuja and Madhva, respectively in his Brahmasūtrabhāsya, so, he must have lived after Rāmānuja and Madhva. (H.I.Phil., Vol. II. J. Sinha, p. 70; C.D.Sharma, Critical Survey of Indian Philo., p. 375).
It seems, on the basis of several works attributed to Nimbārka of which their authenticity is in question in which there are references to Srisampradāya of Rāmānuja and Brahmasampradāya of Madhva, concept of prapatti and Gurūpasatti, and cult of Rādhākrsņa worship, several scholars are forced to assign Nimbārka to post-Rāmānuja and post-Madhva period.
Scholars who think that Nimbārka is post-Madhva Vedāntin, argue that, the work Madhvamukhamardana (Ms of which is not available at present) is attributed to Nimbārka. He might have refuted Madhva in this work, so, he flourished after Madhva. Secondly, Madhavācārya (14th A.D.) in his sarvadarśana-sangraha does not mention Nimbārka school, though he deals with all the then existing important schools of Vedānta

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Jainism from the view point of Vedāntic Ācāryas (S.N. Dasgupta, H.I.Phil., Vol. III, pp. 399-402). Again, Nimbārka refers to Brahmasampradāya of Madhva in his Brahmasütrabhāsya. On account of these reasons, he can be placed somewhere in the middle or later half of the fourteenth century A.D. (S.N.Dasgupta, H.I.Phil., Vol. III, pp. 399-402; J.Sinha, H.I.Phil., Vol. II, p. 702).
These reasons given by scholars do not conclusively prove that Nimbārka flourished after Madhva. First of all, manuscript of Madhvamukhamardana which is attributed to Nimbārka is not available till-to-day, so, in such circumstances, it is very difficult to say whether Nimbārka refuted Madhva of the Dvaita school of Vedānta or Madhva of the Sānkhya Philosophy, who flourished in 6th century A.D. (E. Frauwallner. H.I.Philo. pp. 320-321). Nimbārka has refuted Sānkhya school in his Brahmasūtrabhāsya, so, in all probability, he might have criticised Madhya of Sānkhya School. We will be able to decide only after discovery of this manuscript. Secondly, Nimbārka does not refute Dvaita school of Vedānta in his Brahmasūtrabhāsya. Certainly, he could have refuted Madhva, to establish his view, if he is after Madhva. It is also possible that, Nimbārka school was not popular or prominent school at the time of Madhavācārya of Sarvadarśana-sangraha, to be mentioned. The writer of Sarvadarśana-sangraha has not included many prominent schools, such as Ajātivāda of Gaudapāda and Aupādhikabhedābheda of Bhāskara. It does not mean that they were not in existence prior to Madhavācārya.

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Jainism from the view point of Vedāntic Acāryas
Nimbārka is not certainly post Rāmānuja also, because, there is no reference in Vedāntapārijātasaurabha (V.P.S.) of Nimbārka (=Brahmasūtrabhāsya), of Visiştādvaita doctrine of Rāmānuja nor reference to Srisampradaya. There is no influence of lengthy, logical and polemical style of Rāmānuja on Nimbārkabhāsya. His commentary on Brahmasūtra is very brief, free from all dialectical controversies. It does not refute any other Vedāntic School. Another important thing is that, Rāmānuja in his Srībhāsya as well as in Vedārthasangraha refutes the doctrine of difference and non-difference (bhedābheda), which is certainly refutation of view of Nimbārka not aupādhikabhedabheda of Bhāskara (Śrībhāsya, I.I.1). Again, though Nimbārka recognises grace of God (bhagavatprasāda) and importance of guru, the doctrine of prapatti (selfsurrender to God) and gurūpasatti (self-surrender to spiritual teacher), which are found in Rāmānuja and post-Rāmānuja Vaisnava Vedāntins, are not found in Brahmasutrabhāsya of Nimbārka. Nimbārka is not follower of Pañcarātra Agamas like Rāmānuja and Madhva. Nimbārka does not make any defence of Pañcarātra like Rāmānuja has done against the attacks of Advaitins nor defend Pañcarātra Agamas as authoritative texts as Madhva has done (Madhvabhāsya, I.I.3). There is neither mention of Vyühavāda nor Nārāyaṇa cult of Pañcarātra in Nimbārkabhāsya. For Rāmānuja, Nārāyaṇa. is the ultimate reality. Nimbārka avoids even the reference of Nārāyaṇa while quoting from Mahābhārata (V.P.S., II. III. 46). It seems, Nimbārka is a follower of

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Jainism from the view point of Vedāntic Acāryas 9 Bhāgavata tradition (V.P.S., I.1.4), of early phase of Vaisnavism, i.e. prior to merging of the Pañcarātra into the Bhāgavata tradition. Terminologies and concepts of Vaişņavism used by Nimbārka are more primitive one (V.P.S., III. III. 30, 40-41). In Vedāntapārijātasaurabha we find less developed form of Vaisnavism compared to works of Rāmānuja and others. We do not find any sectarian element in Brahmasūtrabhāsya of Nimbārka. He nowhere in this text mentions later developed Vaisnava concept such as Vaikuntha or Goloka, instead he speaks of Brahmaloka (V.P.S., III.III.31; IV.III.1). There is no reference to Srisampradāya of Rāmānuja or Brahmasampradāya of Madhva in entire Vedāntapārijāta-saurabha as mentioned by some scholars (J. Sinha., H.I.P., Vol. II, p. 702, C.D. Sharma, pp. 375376). On the basis of these reasons, we can definitely draw a conclusion that Nimbārka is not post-Rāmānuja. Nimbārka was not even worshipper of Rādhākrsņa. It is surprising to note that there is no reference or trace of Rādhākļşņa cult and philosophy in Vedāntapārijātasaurabha though present day Nimbārka followers are worshippers of Rādhākrsna. This worship seems to be later development in Nimbārka school. Even Śrīnivāsa, the first commentator on the V.P.S. does not mention Rādhā although he mentions Krsņa in several places while in his comentary Vedāntakaustubha.
Nimbārka seems to be even pre-Bhaskara Vedāntin on the basis of internal evidences. Bhāskara was aware of the position of Nimbārka expounded in

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Jainism from the view point of Vedāntic Ācāryas
Vedāntapārijātasaurabha on several issues. He was also well aware of the doctrine of Svābhāvikabhedābheda (natural difference and non-difference) of Nimbārka [Brahmasütrabhāsya of Bhāskara, I.I.15, 31, 32; II. III. 29, 32). Again, Bhāskara while commenting on sūtras I.1.31-32, clearly mentions that 'Others read'. This reading is actually found in Nimbārka's Brahmasūtrabhāsya. Vācaspati Miśra, who is earlier or contemporary to Bhāskara refutes bhinnābhinnavāda or bhedābhedavāda (doctrine of difference and non-difference) in number of places in Bhāmati. His criticism is certainly Nimbārka's view not of Bhāskara. (Bhāmati, I.1.4; I.IV.22; II.III. 43-46; III.II. 27-30).
Influence of Vaisnava Vedāntins such as Bhāskara, Rāmānuja and others are not found in Brahmasūtrabhāsya of Nimbārka. On the contrary, Bhāskara and Rāmānuja are familiar with views of Nimbārka established in his bhāsya. These internal evidences, suffice to prove that Nimbārka flourished prior to Rāmānuja and Bhāskara.
Some scholars believe that Nimbārka is preŚankara Vedāntin. According to these scholars Vedāntapārijātasaurabha is the only genuine work of Nimbārka and other works attributed to him are not works of Nimbārka, because, doctrines found in these works either differ from his view expounded in Brahmasūtrabhāsya or go against its teachings. If we accept this view then there is all possibility, that Nimbārka might have flourished before Sankara, be

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cause Nimbārka does not refute Advaita Vedāntic doctrines of Māyāvāda, Jīvabrahmaikyavāda, and non-dual nature of Brahman. If he is aware of Śankara's view, he might have refuted it as other Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins like Bhaskara, Rāmānuja, Madhva and Vallabha have done in their bhāṣyas. It seems that Nimbārka was aware of only Sankhya, Jaina, Bauddha, Śaiva and Śākta views and refuted them, but unaware of views of other Vedāntic Acāryas including Sankara. Śankara in several places in his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, puts forth opponent's view (as Pūrvapakṣa) and refutes without naming the opponent, which certainly seems to be Nimbarka's view, (Brahmasūtraśāṁkarabhāṣya, II. III. 1931, 50; and Vedāntapārijātasaurabha, II. III. 19-31, 50). Even some scholars think that Gauḍapādācārya refers to Dvaitadvaita view in his Advaita-prakaraṇa of Māṇḍūkyakārikā (Kārikā. 18), which is none other than Nimbārka's view. From all these references, we can draw rough conclusion that, if Nimbārka is pre-Śankara Vedāntin, then he might have flourished in the 6th century A.D., because he refutes highly developed form the Saiva and Śākta Schools which were very powerful and popular in the Gupta and post-Gupta period. Works of Nimbārka :
Nimbārka's commentary on Brahmsūtras of Bādarāyaṇa is known as Vedāntapārijātasaurabha (=V.P.S.). This is the basic work in which he expounded his philosophy of Svābhāvikabhedabheda. Thorough study of other works attributed to Nimbārka makes us

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Jainism from the view point of Vedāntic Ācāryas
to believe that, this is the only genuine work of Nimbārka. In addition to this, tradition ascribes several works to Nimbārka viz., Daśaśloki (also known as Vedāntakāmadhenu and Siddhāntaratna), Prapannakalpavalli; Mantrarahasya-sodasi, Savisesanirvisesaśrikrsnastavarāja, Rādhāstaka, Krsņāstaka and Prātaḥsmaraṇastotra. (N.D. Sharma, p. 22; Kathiyababa, p. 44).
But all these works are not accepted as works of Nimbārka, even by his own followers. Some scholars on the basis of doctrinal difference between his Brahmasūtrabhāsya and these works, believe that, Vedāntapārijātasaurabha is the only undisputed work of Nimbārka. This is the basic work of Nimbārka and whatever view he expressed or doctrine he expounded as a Vedāntin in it should be accepted as touch-stone for judging the authenticity of any other works ascribed to him. There seems to be truth in it. Several works attributed to Nimbārka, either contradict the doctrines established in Vedāntapārijātasaurabha or in no way in confirmity with his general teachings. These works may not be authentic works of Nimbārka. These works are attributed to the founder of the school in order to claim authenticity and acceptability, and consequently make them popular among the followers of this tradition. Judging from this point of view, it seems that except Vedāntapārijātasaurabha (i.e. Brahmasūtrabhāșya), all other works attributed to him belong to later stage in the development of Vaisnava Bhakti movement, be

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cause, these works contain those doctrines which are not found or referred to in Vedāntapārijātasaurabha, such as doctrines of prapatti, gurūpasatti, Rādhākṛṣṇa worship, premalakṣaṇābhakti etc. Works like Rādhāṣṭaka, Kṛṣṇāṣṭaka, Prātaḥsmaraṇastotra are certainly not of Nimbārka because, the content of these works is the Rādhākṛṣṇa worship, while Nimbārka is worshipper of Ramākānta Purusottama or Bhagavān Vasudeva and he nowhere mentions Rādhākṛṣṇa in Vedāntapārijātasaurabha. Secondly, none of the earliest Acāryas or commentators of Nimbarka school have mentioned them or commented upon them. Thirdly, all the sects developed within the Nimbarka tradition are not unanimously accept them as the works of Nimbārka. Even the works which are held in high esteem in the Nimbārka tradition such as Daśaśloki, Prapannakalpavalli, Mantrarahasyaṣoḍaśī and Saviśeṣanirvisesaśrikṛṣṇastavarāja seem to be works of later writers of this school.
Daśaśloki (=D.S.) also known as Vedāntakāmadhenu or Siddhäntaratna attributed to Nimbārka occupies prominent place in the Nimbārka tradition. It propagates Rādhākṛṣṇa worship, considers Śrikṛṣṇa attended by Radhā as the highest Brahman, advocates, special kind of love for Lord Kṛṣṇa, (Premaviseṣalakṣaṇābhakti) and grace of Lord Kṛṣṇa as a chief means of liberation (=D.S. 4-5, 8-9). Again, it refutes (D.S. 7) Advaita of Śankarācārya. Nimbārka, nowhere mentions Rādhākṛṣṇa by name in entire Vedānta

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the view point of Vedāntic Ācāryas
pārijātasaurabha. His loved God is Sri Ramākānta Purusottama, who is also called Bhagavān Vāsudeva, not Lord Krsna. For Nimbārka, Brahmopāsanā (meditation on Brahman) is the chief means of liberation not grace of Lord Krsna. Nimbārka nowhere refutes Advaita of Sankara in his Brahmasūtrabhāsya. If Nimbārka was well aware of the Advaita of Sankara he could have refuted it in his Brahmasūtrabhāsya itself as he refuted the Sānkhya, Bauddha, Jaina, Pāśupata and Sākta. Even some of the scholars of Nimbārka sect believe that Harivyāsadeva is the real author of Daśaśloki (L.K. Goswami, p. 51). Thus, this work which advocates Rādhākļşņa cult is the work of later period.
Prapannakalpavalli (P.K.) propagates the doctrine of self-surrender to God. i.e. Prapatti and Mantrarahasyaşodasi (M.R.S.) advocates, self-surrender to spiritual preceptor i.e. gurūpasatti, as chief means of liberation. Nimbārka, does not mention these doctrines in his Brahmansūtrabhāsya. According to Nimbārka knowledge (Vidyā) obtained through meditation on Brahman (dhyāna) is the unique means of liberation (V.P.S., III. II. 24-25; III.IV.1). Mantrarahasyaşodasi prescribes most secret gurumantra viz. eighteen syllabled Gopālmantra, (M.R.S., 3-5, 17) of which no reference is made by Nimbărka in his Brahmasūtrabhāşya. If it is secret mantra and essence of Nimbārka Vedānta, he could have mentioned it in his major work (i.e. in V.P.S.) without fail. Another work attributed to Nimbārka viz. Saviśeșanirviseşaśrikrýnastavarāja (S.N.K.S.) can

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15
not be the work of Nimbārka, because, it contains refutation of Advaitic Nirgunabrahmavāda, Drstisrstivāda, doctrine of Avidyā and so on, which Nimbārka does not deal with in his Brahmasūtrabhāsya. Secondly, it contains polemics and sectarian controversies. Nimbārka's Vedāntapārijātasaurabha is completely free from polemics and sectarianism. Thirdly, several followers of Nimbārka, consider it as spurious work. (J. Satyananda, pp. 45-46). Judging from the contents of D.S., P.K., M.R.S., S.N.K.S., we can safely say that these works are of later period in the tradition and attributed to Nimbārka- the founder Ācārya for the sake of gaining acceptance and authority for the doctrines contained therein. Refutation of Syādvāda :
Nimbārka, in his Brahmasūtrabhāşya (i.e. Vedāntapārijātasaurabha, II. II. 33-36), refutes, Syādvāda and Dehaparimāņavāda of Jainism. Taking the word 'Syāt' in the sense of somewhat (Kiñcidasti), he criticises Syādvāda, by stating that, Jainas apply both existence and non-existence to one and the same thing. Contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot belong to same thing just as light and darkness cannot remain together. (stat: 49sfintraनास्तित्वादिना विरुद्धधर्मद्वयं योजयन्ति, तन्नोपपद्यते । एकस्मिन् वस्तुनि Hall : falhas note ratsa4a6 41746 3791979 I (V.P.S., II. II.33). Nimbārka's commentary is very brief and he does not give principles of Jainism in detail. He, does not, even eleborate the doctrine of Syādvāda except point

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ing out the inherent improbability of opposite attributes staying together. But, Śrīnivāsa, a commentator on Vedāntapārijātasaurabha, presents almost all philosophical principles of Jainism in an authentic manner and then eleborates and justifies Nimbärka's refutation of Syādvāda. He states that, 'Jainas accept two fundamental categories viz., Soul and non-soul. They do not accept existence of God and believe that atoms are the cause of the world. ते हि जीवाऽजीवात्मकं निरीश्वरं जगदाहुः । परमाणूनां जगत्कारणत्वञ्चाहुः । (V.K., II. II.33).
16
-
They apply contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence, etc., to all things. faf fagfgei yarèfy acupuf | (V.K., II.II.33). They also admit seven categories viz., the soul (Jīva), nonsoul (ajiva), inflow of Karma (āsrava), stoppage of Karma (Samvara), annihilation of accumulated Karma (nirjarā), bondage of Karma (bandha) and liberation (mokṣa). There are eight kinds of Karma of which four are destructive karmas (ghātīya) and four are aghātīya (non-destructive). When all karmas are destroyed, ātman (soul) shines in its own purity by the grace of Siddhas and Arhat. It is Mokṣa or liberation. ( संवरनिर्जरबन्धमोक्षा इति तेषां शास्त्रसङ्ग्रहभूताः सप्त पदार्था: । (V.K., II.II.33).
They also accept five kinds of astikaya (which occupy space); such as Jivāstikāya, pudgalāstikāya, dharmāstikāya, adharmāstikāya and ākāśāstikāya. (බ अपरः प्रपञ्चः पञ्चास्तिकायो नाम । तथाहि जीवास्तिकाय: पुद्गलास्तिकायः धर्मास्तिकायः अधर्मास्तिकायः आकाशास्तिकायश्चेति । ( V. K., II.II. 33)

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The Jainas admit that all things have infinite characters and reality is one and many. Everything as a substance, is one eternal and existent and as a modifications (such as pot, cloth etc.) is many, non-eternal and non-existent. (सर्वं वस्तुजातं द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकमनैकान्तिकं द्रव्यरूपस्य चैकत्वात्स्थिरत्वात्सद्बुद्धिबोध्यत्वात्तदात्मना सत्त्वैकत्वनित्यत्वादुपपद्येत । पर्यायाश्च द्रव्यस्यावस्थाविशेषाः घटत्वपटत्वादिरूपास्तेषां चानेकत्वादस्थिरत्वादसद्बुद्धिबोध्यत्वात्तदात्मना हि असत्त्वानित्यत्वादिकमुपपद्यतेति । (V. K., II. II.
33).
These Jainas apply sevenfold judgement everywhere and to everything, such as:
(1) somewhat a thing is existent (Syādasti)
(2) Somewhat a thing is non-existent (Syānnāsti)
(3) Somewhat a thing is existent, as well non-existent (Syādasti syännāsti ca).
17
(4) Somewhat a thing is indescribable (Syādavaktvyam). (5) Somewhat, a thing is existent and indescribable (Syādasti avaktavyaśca).
(6) Somewhat a thing is non-existent and indescribable (Syānnāsti avaktavyaśca).
(7) Somewhat, a thing is existent, non-existent and indescribable (Syādasti, Syānnāsti, ca avaktavyaśca)
(इमञ्च सप्तभङ्गीनयं सर्वत्र योजयन्ति - स्यादस्ति, स्यान्नास्ति, स्यादस्ति च नास्ति च स्यादवक्तव्यः स्यादस्ति चावक्तव्यश्च, स्यान्नास्ति चावक्तव्यश्च, (V.K., II.II. 33). Śrīnivāsa
fifa

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takes the word 'Syad' in the sense of somewhat or somehow (किञ्चिदस्ति किञ्चिन्नास्तीत्येवं योजनीयम् । V. K., II.II.33).
18
He criticises this view by saying that, seven-fold judgement is impossible fact, because contradictory attributes like existence and non-existence, real and unreal are not possible in one and the same thing. Existence of light and darkness is neither seen nor heard by any one in same place. Application of such dual contradictory attributes to same thing is unreasonable (एकस्मिन्पदार्थे किञ्चिदस्ति किञ्चिन्नास्तीत्यादिसप्तभङ्गयुक्तेरसंभवात् । न हि तमः प्रकाशयोर्युगपदेकत्रोपलम्भो दृष्टः श्रुतो वा एवमेकत्रास्तित्वनास्तित्वादिविरुद्धधर्मद्वयस्यासम्भव एव । V. K., II. II. 33 ).
Vedāntakaustubha also refutes the view of the Jainas that atoms are the cause of the world by saying that, atoms are being unconscious, cannot function without the guidance of an intelligent cause. Therefore, the Brahman the intelligent principle alone is to be accepted as the cause of the world. Again, it is faulty (gauravadosa) or improper to accept many unconscious atoms as cause of the universe, when there is one single intelligent cause the Brahman which is proved by valid means of knowledge. (एकस्मिन् जगत्कारणे प्रमाणप्राप्ते बहूनां परमाणूनां कारणत्वं नोपपद्यते, गौरवात्तेषां जडत्वेन कारणत्वासंभवात् । Criticism of Grace of Siddhas :
Śrīnivāsa in his Vedantakaustubha, surprisingly criticises the concept of grace of Siddhas and Arhats in attaining liberation. He says that we believe in one Godthe Brahman, knwon through Vedas, whose grace is es

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19
sential to attain liberation. But by the grace of Siddhas, liberation is not possible, because Jainas accept, existence of countless Siddhas which cannot be proved by any valid means of knowledge. Suppose, this is accepted that grace of Siddhas is possible, then the question naturally arises is : whether this grace of Siddhas is possible through worship (ārādhanā) or not? If it is possible through worship, then by merely worshipping one single Siddha, liberation may not be possible, because there are many Siddhas having same nature, and one has to worship all Siddhas which is practically impossible. If you do not worship all, then there is a fault of showing disrespect to other Siddhas. If Jainas accept that there is only one supreme Siddha, then, they are admiting one supreme God like followers of Vedānta, which is not acceptable to Jainas. If it is said that obtaining grace of Siddhas, no worship is required, then every one will be entitled to get grace of Siddhas and consequently, all will be liberated without worship (एकस्मिन्वेदवेद्ये मोक्षप्रदे सति सिद्धानुग्रहान्मोक्षो दुर्घटः, असम्भवात् । सिद्धानुग्रहः आराधनसापेक्षः न वा ? आद्ये, सिद्धानां समानस्वभावानामेकतमस्याराधनेन मोक्षो न भवेत्, बहूनां सिद्धानामुपेक्षादोषात् सर्वेषामाराधने गौरवं स्यात्, अस्ति 26 HER ARÉ Àre ufael val i fanita, 19946: IV.K., II.II.33).
The Jainas generally do not talk about the grace of Siddhas to obtain liberation. Liberation is attained through destruction of all karmas, which is mainly dependent on individual's efforts. The concept of grace is, specially a Vaişņava concept. Srinivāsa, might have

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come across with certain Jainas who believed in the grace of Siddhas and Arhats. Criticism of Debaparimāņavāda :
Nimbārka and his followers reject the Jaina doctrine of dehaparimāņavāda. The most important and noteworthy feature of Jaina doctrine of soul is that the size of the soul changes, according to the size of the body which it occupies. If the body that it occupies is big, the soul becomes even big as an elephant, and if the same enters the body of an ant, it compresses itself and assumes the smallest size of the ant. Thus, sizes of the souls are variable and they depend upon the sizes of the bodies which they occupy. The same soul, thus, becomes small or great as the case may be. The soul is of the size of the body. The soul substance is regarded as so much subtle that it is infinitely compressible and infinitely expansible, so that it can fill any body that it happens to occupy as a result of its deeds. It is neither atomic (aņu) nor all-pervasive (Vibhu). The soul (Jiva) is called Jivāstikāya, which means that occupies space. It occupies innumerable space-points. It has a capacity to expand and contract itself according to the dimension of the body which it occupies at any time. It occupies the whole of the body in which it lives, so that from the tip of the hair to the nail of the feet, whenever there may be cause of sensations, it can at once feel it. The manner in which the soul occupies the body is often explained as being similar to the manner in which a lamp illumines the whole room (Tattvārthasūtra, V. 16-MariErfahrfezi 14aal)

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21 Nimbārka rejects this view because he believes in atomic size of the soul. According to him accepting the view that soul is of the size of the body, involves incompleteness on the part of Jiva (एवं शरीरपरिमाणत्वेन 315łane 31164A: TEETH 374UCI BUCL I V.P.S., II.II.34). If we accept this view, then the size of the soul of an elephant will be as huge as the body of the elephant and the size of the soul of an ant will be as small as the body of an ant. The difficulty is, when the soul of an elephant will obtain the body of an ant or when the soul of an ant will obtain the body of an elephant due to its own deeds (Karmas), it will be rather impossible for both of them to enter into the body of one another. (ga 7 EYRAUT gasfy alas I. 219: ? Tu ! देहपरिमाण आत्मा कर्मवशात्पिपीलिकाशरीरं विहाय गजशरीरं यदाऽऽप्नोति तदा तस्याऽकात्स्यं स्यात् । गजशरीरानुरूपं परिपूर्णत्वं न स्यात् । गजाकारदेहानिर्गतस्य चात्मनः सूक्ष्मशरीरे प्रविष्टस्य तदनुरूपं सूक्ष्मत्वञ्च न Pufgref: 1 V.K., II.II.34). To avoid this difficulty Jainas maintain that ātman (soul) is possessed of attributes of contraction and expansion. The soul has infinite number of parts (avayava). So, in the body of an elephant, its parts increase and in an ant body, its parts are decreased. Nimbārka says that the soul (ātman) cannot be said to possess parts (avayavas), which are subject to increase and decrease, because of the resulting fault of change, etc., on its parts. (34€41452e4091 37475T 7 fantas, sfat a 7 aj prakty, fachfraifaci994: 1 V.P.S., II.II. 35).
Increase and decrease of parts of soul (jiva)

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22 Jainism from the view point of Vedāntic Acāryas means, it becomes subject to change. Whatever is changing, is subject to destruction. So, the Jiva will become non-eternal, like a body (7 a ajaj Hidual fe Grae4164, तस्यावयवानां गजशरीरे उपचयः सूक्ष्मशरीरे अपचयश्चेत्येवं पर्यायादविरोध sfat i pa: ? "falorfaz21: \” faolufcala HFTO i afa 4a4d 311641 Arayaafé Telfcafert PICTANT PITT I V.K., II.II.35).
Intended meaning of Nimbārka is that, in case a body loses some of its parts or in case it gets deformed, it will result in a damage to the soul also, because, the soul is co-terminus with the body. Just as the body is subject to birth and death and various modifications (vikāra), the soul also will be subject to these alternations and may share many deformities along with the bodily alternations and may share many deformities along with the bodily substance (pudgala).
Again, the Jainas hold that the size of the soul at the time of release is permanent (nitya). It is little less than size of the body which it occupies. If we accept the constancy of the final size of the soul, then there must be the eternality (nityatva) of the initial and intervening size of the soul on account of the non-distinction (avisesa), everywhere (37pte Are Ferraga अङ्गीकृत्यादिमध्ययोरपि नित्यत्वमस्तीति चेत्तर्हि सर्वत्राविशेषः स्याद्विनष्टो defimara: 1 V.P.S., II. II.36).
What is the dimension of the soul in the state of liberation is the natural dimension of the soul and permanent, because, no more taking of body afterwards. In other words when liberation is attained, the possibility

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Jainism from the view point of Vedāntic Acāryas 23. of rebirth is completely brought to an end. There would be non-difference of the size of the soul in gross body, in subtle body, in bondage and liberation. If we accept this view, then, the doctrine of the size of the soul is of body size, is completely demolished (चरम-देहविनाशानन्तरं यन्मोक्षदशायां परिमाणं स्वरूपञ्च तद्धि नित्यम्भवति । तदा सूक्ष्मस्थूलशरीरपरिग्रहाभावात्तस्य संकोचविकासाभावो भवति । एवम्भूतस्यान्तस्य परिमाणस्य स्वरूपस्य चावस्थितेरुभयोराद्यमध्ययोरवस्थयोरपि नित्यत्वम् इष्यते आर्हतैस्तस्माच्च सर्वत्राविशेषः स्यादित्यर्थः । स्थूलशरीरे सूक्ष्मशरीरे बद्धावस्थायां मोक्षावस्थायां च नित्यनियतपरिमाण आत्मा स्यात्, शरीरपरिमाणप्रतिज्ञा बालभाषिता स्यात् । V.K., II.II.36).
Nimbārka rejects Jaina's view of the size of the soul on these above mentioned ground and upholds the atomic size of the soul. The jiva (soul) is atomic in size (जीवोऽणुः- V.P.S., II.III. 19). The knowledge is both essence and the attribute of the soul. The Jiva is extremely minute and is a minute as the hundredth part of the extremity of a hair, when divided into hundred parts (एषोऽणुरात्मा, "बालाग्रशतभागस्य शतधा कल्पितस्य च, भागो जीव" इति स्वशब्दोन्मानाभ्यां जीवोऽणुः । (V.P.S., II.III.22).
The individual soul is atomic in size because of its action of going to another world (V.P.S., II.II.19-22). It is atomic in size in bondage as well as in the state of liberation (V.K., IV.IV.15). Its seat is in the heart. Although, this atomic Jiva occupies only a small point in the body, it spreads all over the body by means of its knowledge or consciousness, which is its attribute, just as the light of a lamp placed in the interior of a

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room spreads in all the corners of the room ( जीवगुणादेव, कोष्ठे दीपालोकादिवत् । V.P.S., II. III. 25). It experiences the various sensations of pleasure and pain of the entire body through its all pervasive quality of consciousness, just as the sandal-paste gives delight to the whole body though applied to one part of the body (देहैकदेशस्थोऽपि कृत्स्नं देहं चन्दनबिन्दुर्यथाऽऽल्हादयति तथा जीवोऽपि प्रकाशयति, अतः कृत्स्नशरीरे सुखाद्यनुभवो न विरुध्यते । V.P.S., II. III. 23).
24
Nimbārka also criticises the view of all-pervasive (Vibhu) nature of the soul. He seems to be unaware of the view of Śankara. He says that the doctrine of all-pervasive size of the soul is upheld by the Kapila and others which is delusory (ābhāsa) and is to be rejected. (परेषां कपिलादीनां व्यतिकरप्रसङ्गात्सर्वगतात्मवादाश्च आभासा ga | V.P.S., II.III.49). Śrīnivāsa while commenting on this sūtra, states that it is a view of Kapila an Kaṇāda (कपिलकणादादीनां सर्वगतात्मवादास्तु आभासा एव । V. K., II. III.49). According to Nimbārka, the view of the all-pervasive nature of the soul, contradicts Śruti (Scripture) which talks about the soul going out of the body (utkrānti), its travelling to the higher world like world of moon etc. (gati). Such kind of movement is not at all possible in all-pervading Jīva. Again, if jīva is all-pervasive, then there will be either eternal contact with all objects. In the first case, there will be eternal perception of all objects and the later case, there will be eternal non-perception of all objects. Since there is no third principle outside of all-pervasive soul to bring about the contact. As a result, there will be the consequence

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of either eternal release or eternal bondage of the souls (V.P.S., II.III. 19-28, 31, 48-49). Again, if the souls are all-pervasive, they will be in contact with all the deeds of the souls, so, there, will be confusion of Karmas. (V.P.S., II.III.50-52). So, in this way Nimbārka criticises both the view of all-pervasive nature of the soul and the doctrine which holds that the size of the soul is of body size.

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Śrī Śankarācārya's views on Jainism Presentation of Jainism
Śri Śankarācārya (788-820 A.D.) is one the outstanding philosophical personalities in the history of Indian thought. He is the chief exponent of Advaita Philosophy (non-dualism). He was familiar with main principles of Jainism. His presentation of Jainism as Purvapaksa (prior view) in Brahmasūtrabhāsya is very authentic. His criticism of Syādvāda may not be acceptable to many. He presents Jainism in the following way : The Jainas admit seven categories viz., the soul (jiva); non-soul (ajiva); inflow of Karma (āsrava), stoppage of inflow of Karma (samvara); annihilation of accumulated Karma (nirjarā), bondage of Karma (bandha) and liberation (moksa). In brief, they believe that, these can be broadly divided into two groups, the soul and the non-soul. Other categories can be included in these two only (FH a Tai Taterf: Hal: 312-37510आस्रवसंवरनिर्जर-बन्ध-मोक्षा नाम । संक्षेपतस्तु द्वौ एव पदार्थों जीव-अजीव310, 741 cura sarafara sfa plast Brahmasūtra Śārkarabhāsya = B.S.B., II.II.33). They describe these two categories (Soul and non-soul) in another way also. They call this division of categories by the word astikāya (i.e. a category which occupies space). There are five astikāyas (categories) viz., the category of soul (jivāstikāya), the category of Pudgala (body)- combination of atoms, (pudgalāstikāya), the category of principle of motion (dharmāstikāya), the category of prin

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27
ciple of rest (adharmāstikāya), and the category of space (ākāśāstikāya). All these varities are subdivided into various ways, according to the assumption of their own doctrine (cent: $44 37424 4454 3798d Toffoli 779, जीवास्तिकायः, पुद्गलास्तिकायः धर्मास्तिकायोऽधर्मास्तिकाय आकाशास्तिकायश्चेति । सर्वेषामपि एषाम् अवान्तर प्रभेदान् बहुविधान् स्वसमयपरिकल्पितान् वर्णयन्ति । B.S.B., II.II.33). : The speciality of the Jainas is, application of reasoning known as seven-fold-judgement to all things, such as : (1) may be it exists, (2) may be it does not exist, (3) may be it exists and may be it does not exist, (4) may be it indescribable, (5) may be it exists and indescribable, (6) may be it does not exist and indescribable and (7) may be it exists, does not exist and is indescribable. In this way they predicate seven different views as regards the reality of everything. They apply this logic even to such concepts as unity, and eternality as well. Everything according to them, may be real, unreal, both real and real, one and many, indescribable and so on. (Ha a SH 45 R 14 7244 अवतारयन्ति-स्याद् अस्ति, स्यान्नास्ति, स्यादस्ति च नास्ति च, स्यादवक्तव्यः, स्यादस्ति चावक्तव्यः, स्यान्नास्ति च अवक्तव्यः स्यादस्ति च नास्ति च अवक्तव्यः afa, Taha Tahrafricaifay Bufu SH 9451784 of B.S.B., II.II.33). Criticism of Syādvāda :
We have already pointed out that Sankara took the word 'Syāť in the sense of probability or ‘may be’ and criticises Syādvāda. It seems that Sankara was not

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very familiar with the meaning of the word 'Syāť taken by the Jainas in the sense of 'in certain respect or in certain point of view. There was no much literature in defence of Syādvāda prior to Śarkara. Whatever literature developed in defence of Syādväda, is, post-Sankara development.
Śankara, while criticising Syādvāda, states that, this reasoning of application of sevenfold judgement to everything is faulty and unjustifiable. Sanksara, like Buddhists logicians, bitterly criticises this view by stating that contradictory attributes, like existence and nonexistence, unity and plurality, eternality and momentariness, cannot belong to the same thing, just as light and darkness cannot remain at the same place, or just as the same thing cannot be hot and cold at the same time. (Franqu14 : çfa i gra: | Bohf 1991 i afe एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि युगपत् सदसत्त्वादिविरुद्धधर्मसमावेशः संभवति, शीतोष्णवत्। B.S.B., II.II.33). This view about things cannot be accepted as it is absord to think of the same thing of endowed with these contradictory attributes of reality, unreality etc.
Śankara levels another charge against Syādvāda by saying that no theory can be sustained by mere probability. If everything is probable, then Syādvāda, by its own assertion, becomes only probable. If all truth is partial, then Syādvāda itself is only partially true and, therefore, partially false.
The seven categories (Soul, non-soul etc.) are definitely ascertained and said that they are seven in
they are seen in

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Sri Sankarācārya's views on Jainism
number, and have specific in character. Then, when we apply seven-fold judgement (Syādvāda) to these, there will be confusion about them. Such as, they may be just as they are described or they may not be. These categories described in Jainism, in reality, may not be so, or may be, as it is described. So, this kind of knowledge about the objects will be uncertain. All assertion about them will end in doubt and cannot give definite knowledge. It will certainly be unauthoritative like doubt. (ये एते सप्त पदार्था निर्धारिताः, एतावन्त एवंरूपाश्चेति, ते तथैव वा स्युः, नैव वा तथा स्युः, इतरथा हि तथा वा स्युः, अतथा वेति अनिर्धारितरूपं ŞLİ ÁRPşınaq Sy | B.S.B., II.I.33). Jainas may say that, reality has many aspects is a definite knowledge, it cannot be invalid like doubt (ननु अनेकात्मकं वस्तु इति निर्धारितरूपमेव ज्ञानमुत्पद्यमानं संशयज्ञानवत् न अप्रमाणं भवितुमर्हति । B.S.B., II.II.33). Śankara argues that, to say like this, that cognition of a thing can assume manyness or more than one nature and is a definite piece of knowledge, is itself untrue, for applying same reasoning, this socalled definite knowledge, may or may not be definite. In other words, if you apply Syādvāda unrestrictedly for every object without exception, the definiteness of knowledge itself being equally an object of knowledge, would come under the application of such alternations as 'may be it exists', 'may be it does not exist' and so on and hence, this knowledge would have an indifinite nature all the same (निरङ्कुशं हि अनेकान्तत्वं सर्ववस्तुषु प्रतिजानानस्य, निर्धारणस्यापि वस्तुत्वाविशेषात्, स्यादस्ति, स्यान्नास्ति इत्यादि विकल्पोपनिपातात् अनिर्धारणात्मकता एव स्यात् । (B.S.B., II.II.33)

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30 Jainism from the view point of Vedāntic Acāryas
Similarly, the ascertainer, as also the knowledge that result from ascertainment would somehow partially existent and somehow partially non-existent. In short, if this indefiniteness belongs to all things, without exception, that is, if it belongs to knowledge and the means of knowledge, as also to the knowing subject and the objects of knowledge, how can it be said that, Tirtharikara (Spiritual teacher of Jainism) teaches anything which is undoubtable or definite ? In this circumstances, how can you consider, the teacher of the Jainism as an authority, who imparts instruction, when the means of knowledge, objects of knowledge, the knower and knowledge remain indefinite in nature ? Also, how can those who rely on his views act upon his instruction about things which remain indefinite in their nature ? This Jaina view, being thoroughly indefinite, appear to be uttered by a madman or a drunken person (एवं निर्धारयितुः निर्धारणफलस्य च स्यात् पक्षे अस्तिता, स्यात् च पक्षे नास्तिता इति । एवं सति कथं प्रमाणभूतः सन् तीर्थंकरः प्रमाणप्रमेयप्रमातृप्रमितिषु अनिर्धारितासु उपदेष्टुं शक्नुयात् ? कथं वा तदभिप्रायानुसारिणः तदुपदिष्टे अर्थे अनिर्धारितरूपे प्रवर्तेरन् । एकान्तिकफलत्वनिर्धारणे हि सति तत्साधनानुष्ठानाय सर्वो लोकोऽनाकुलः प्रवर्तते, नान्यथा । अतश्च अनिर्धारितार्थं giliai yupne HT48199 349444927: PIT I B.S.B., II.II.33).
Again, if we extend the application of the same reasoning (Saptabhanginaya) to the five astikāyas, then the difficulty is that they may be seen to be more or less than five i.e. they may be five or more than five or less then five, they may not be five, hence these things can be greater or less in number. (तथा पञ्चानाम् अस्तिकायानां

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Śri Sarkarācārya's views on Jainism पञ्चत्वसंख्या अस्ति वा नास्ति वेति विकल्प्यमाना, स्यात् तावत् एकस्मिन् पक्षे, पक्षान्तरे तु न स्यात्, इत्यतो न्यूनसंख्यात्वम् अधिकसंख्यात्वम् वा 91974 I B.S.B., II.II.33).
Again, Jainas say, when the intention is to speak of existence and non-existence-simultaneously, the two states being inexpressible at the same time, it is called indescribable(avaktavya). Sankara points out that these categories cannot be indescribable, for if they be indescribable, they cannot be expressed in words. To call them indescribable and yet to describe them in words is to contradict oneself. Even when they are expressed in words, they may either be understood as such or may not be understood. (7 a Pai Ygref14a Tourai Syafa! अवक्तव्याः चेत् न उच्येरन् । उच्यन्ते च अवक्तव्याः च इति विप्रतिषिद्धम् । 32447418 geta 3taaring maarfat sfat a 1 B.S.B., II.II.33).
Similarly, the perfect knowledge arising from the comprehension of all this, may exist or may not. So also its opposite false knowledge, may or may not exist. To go on saying that they can be known or not-known, that their knowledge is perfect or imperfect, inspite of its being imperfect or not, is certainly to talk like a mad person. (721 HG ER07460 HRYGGHET AT 71 ai, vai तद्विपरीतम् असम्यग्दर्शनमपि अस्ति वा नास्ति वा, इति प्रलपन् मत्तोन्मत्तपक्षस्य Ta FITCL 7 T AGET I B.S.B., II.II.33).
Nobody will ever to act or no-body will be inspired to follow or achieve his relase or to attain heaven, if these things mean nothing definite, so far as their existence or duration are concerned. Similarly that they

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are eternal from one point of view and impermanent from another. Even the nature of the Arhats, whose nature have been determined, in Jaina scriptures, will tend to have an indefinite nature. (Fauftaufit: a cat a:, पक्षे च अभावः, तथा पक्षे नित्यता, पक्षे च अनित्यतेति अनवधारणायां प्रवृत्ति-अनुपपत्तिः । अनादिसिद्धजीवप्रभृतीनां च स्वशास्रावधृतस्वभावानामयTayata taraya: B.S.B., II.II.33).
Thus, Jaina doctrine is illogical, for it is not possible for any of the categories, starting from the souls, to have such contradictory attributes as existence and non-existence. In the presence of the attribute of existence, there can be no possibility of the presence of the other attribute of non-existence, just as much as existence is not possible in the presence of non-existence. As a matter of fact, being excludes nonbeing, and non-being excludes being, but nothing definite can be said, regarding soul, real or unreal, separate or non-separate. To say, the very same thing is one and many, permanent and impermanent, different and nondifferent at the same time is to ascert indeterminateness and which is certainly illogical. So, this kind of doctrine is not acceptable. (एवं जीवादिषु पदार्थेषु एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि सत्त्वासत्त्वयोः विरुद्धयोः धर्मयोः असंभवात्, सत्त्वे च एकस्मिन् धर्मे असत्त्वस्य धर्मान्तरस्य असंभवात्, असत्वे च एवं सत्त्वस्य असंभवात्, असङ्गतमिदं 37eri Ha4 | B.S.B., II.II.33).
According to Śankara the Jaina doctrine of Syādvāda, in the ultimate analysis is useless even for practical purposes, being but uncertain or, indefinite

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Sri Sankarācārya's views on Jainism knowledge. He tried to show that, entire spectrum of Jaina principles can be subjected to the Syädvāda idea and no definite guidance can be had from it. Refutation Dehaparimāņavāda :
Śankara critically considers the various possible size of the soul and then came to the conclusion that the soul cannot have any particular finite size. The soul is according to him, infinite, all-pervasive and omnipresent. He criticises the both view of atomic size of the soul and the Jaina view which considers the size of the soul is of body size. He states that, if the soul is of the size of an atom, if it emits knowledge out of it as its quality, the quality (knowledge) will remain restricted only to the space of the atom; it cannot spread outside of it, as the quality and the substance remain in the same place. Similarly, if the soul were of atomic size, it could not experience the various sensations extending over the whole body, for, the soul would then be localised in some part of the body, due to its atomicity. If again, intelliegence of the soul pervades the whole body, the soul cannot be atomic, since intelligence constitutes the proper nature of it, just as heat and light constitute the essential nature of fire. The qualities cannot be separated from the objects whose qualities they are. For the above mentioned difficulties the soul cannot be atomic (B.S.B., II.III.29). Sankara further points out that, now this is appropriate only in the case of the atomicity of the soul being mataphysical while its infinity is real; for both statements cannot be taken

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Jainism from the view point of Vedāntic Acāryas
in their primary sense, at the same time. Hence, the statement of aņutva (subtle, atomic) mentioned in the Śruti (scriptures) has to be understood as referring either to the difficulty of knowing the soul or else to its limiting adjuncts (B.S.B., II.III.29).
Similarly, Sankara points out the defects in the view of Jaina doctrine of size of the soul. He gives ten arguments to prove that size of the soul cannot be body size. If soul is of body size, it would be limited in extension, non-permanent and so like the pot, and other material things, it will be subject to destruction. If it becomes non-eternal then the question is who is bound and who is got liberated, because destruction of the body will be end of everything (शरीरपरिमाणतायां च सत्याम अकृत्स्नः असर्वगतः परिच्छिन्न आत्मा इत्यतः घटादिवत् अनित्यत्वमात्मनः
ARI B.S.B., II.II.34). Again, another difficulty would be, all bodies, in the world (i.e. human, animals, insect. etc.) have no fixed dimensions. The soul born as a man will asume the size of a human body. If the soul of a man is born as an elephant, as a consequence of its previous deeds, it will not pervade the whole of the elephant body, and when it is born as an ant or small insect, it will not be wholly contained in the body of the ant. (PruMTN a 3779fceraftiMaTa oitat Home परिमाणो भूत्वा पुनः केनचित् कर्मविपाकेन हस्तिजन्म प्राप्नुवन् न कृत्स्नं हस्तिशरीरं प्राप्नुयात् । पुत्तिकाजन्म च प्राप्नुवन्, न कृत्स्नः पुत्तिकाशरीरे F AI B.S.B., II.II.34). Similar will be the difficulty if we take into consideration the bodies of one and the same person, in his childhood, youth and old age. (417

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Śri Sankarācārya's views on Jainism
एष एकस्मिन्नपि जन्मनि कौमारयौवनस्थविरेषु दोषः । B.S.B., II.II.34). The Jainas may explain away this difficulty by saying that the soul has infinite parts which are capable of being compressed in a small body and of being expanded to fill the space in a large body like a light of a lamp, which is kept in a small pot, comprises itself and kept in a big hall is expanded ( स्यादेतत् । अनन्तावयवो जीवः । तस्य ते एव अवयवा अल्पे शरीरे संकुचेयुः, महति च विकसेयुः fa B.S.B., II.II.34).
Śankara argues that the Jainas have to explain, whether there is any obstruction to the different parts of the soul becoming concentrated at the same place or not. Should there be any impediment, the infinite parts will not be contained in the same limited place, and even if there is no obstruction, then all the parts can very well be accommodated in the place occupied by a single part, so that there will be no possibility of increase in magnitude. As a result, the predicament will arise of the embodied soul becoming atomic in dimension. In other words, if the infinite particles of the soul occupy different places, they cannot be contained in a small body, and if they occupy the same place, that is the place occupied by one particle only, the size of the soul will always in all cases, be very minute or atomic (तेषां पुनः अनन्तानां जीवावयवानां समानदेशत्वं प्रतिहन्यते वा न वा इति वक्तव्यम् । प्रतिघाते तावत् न अनन्तावयवाः परिच्छिन्ने देशे संमीयेरन् । अप्रतिघातेऽपि एकावयवदेशत्वोपपत्तेः सर्वेषामवयवानां प्रथिमानुपपत्तेः जीवस्य YES: B.S.B., II.II.34). Besides, there is no reason why should one believe in the particles being

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infinite in number, when the soul has a limited extent of the body. It cannot be even imagined that the soul that is limited by the size of the body should have infinite parts. ( अपि च शरीरमात्रपरिच्छिन्नानां जीवावयवानामानन्त्यं न
36
fg4f | B.S.B., II.II.34). The Jainas may say in reply that the particles join or fall away as the occasion for the soul is to enter into a large or a small body. (अथ पर्यायेण बृहत् शरीरप्रतिपत्तौ केचित् जीवावयवा उपगच्छन्ति तनुशरीरप्रतिपत्तौ च केचित् अपगच्छन्ति इति उच्येत । B. S.B., II. II. 34 ) .
Śankara argues that, even by admitting the increase and descrease of parts of the soul in succession, it is not possible to establish beyond contradiction the fact that the soul confirms to the size of the body. This view implies that soul is capable of undergoing change. In the first instance, mutability becomes unavoidable for the soul that increases and decreases for ever through the accession and deplation of parts. And if it be mutable like a piece of leather (or skin), it will be subject to impermanence. If it is non-eternal, impermanent, subject to destruction, everchanging, then bondage and liberation cannot be predicated of it. This view would go against the Jaina doctrine of bondage and liberation of the soul. Jainas believe that the soul surrounded by eight kinds of Karma (aṣṭavidha karma) remains sunk in the sea of this world (Samsara) like a bottle ground and it floats upward when that bond is snapped (न च पर्यायेणापि अवयवोपगमापगमाभ्यामेतद् देहपरिमाणत्वं जीवस्य अविरोधेन उपपादयितुं शक्यते । कुत: ? विकारादिदोषप्रसङ्गात् । अवयवोपगमापगमाभ्यां हि अनिशमापूर्यमाणस्य अपक्षीयमाणस्य च जीवस्य

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Śrī Sarkarācārya's views on Jainism
37 विक्रियावत्त्वं तावदपरिहार्यम्, विक्रियावत्वे च चर्मादिवत् अनित्यत्वं प्रसज्येत । ततश्च बन्धमोक्ष-अभ्युपगमो बाध्येत, कर्माष्टकपरिवेष्टितस्य जीवस्य अलाबुवत् संसारसागरे निमग्नस्य बन्धनोच्छेदात् ऊर्ध्वगामित्वं भवति इति । B.S.B.II.II.35). Besides the parts that come and go (while increasing and decreasing) will be other than the soul, precisely, because they are adventitious like the bodies etc.
'In other words, like the body which comes into being and is destroyed, similarly, these particles too have got origin and destruction and therefore cannot be said to be of the nature of the soul. In that case, some part that is everlasting will be the soul. But that cannot be pin-pointed to be so and so. If some one permanent part is to be said as the soul, we do not know, which one is meant. Nor do we know whence the particles come, when they join the soul and wither they go, when they fall away. It will be not possible to know from where these incoming, parts emerge, and where the outgoing ones submerge. It cannot be that they come out of the elements and merge into elements, for the soul is not material. The soul being immaterial, these parts cannot be said to have sprung from the material elements, so that they can return back into them. There is no way to know their common or uncommon source of the parts of the individual soul. Further more, the incoming and outgoing parts will have no definite measurement. In such case, the nature of the soul will remain indeterminate. Thus, due to such defects, it is not possible to accept a successive increase and de

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crease in the parts of the soul. (किंचान्यत् । आगच्छताम् अपगच्छताम् चावयवानाम्-आगम-अपायधर्मत्वादेव अनात्मत्वं शरीरादिवत् । ततश्च अवस्थितः किश्चद् अवयव आत्मा इति स्यात् । न च स निरूपयितुं शक्यते अयमसौ इति । किञ्चान्यत् । आगच्छन्तः च एते जीवावयवा: कुत: प्रादुर्भवन्ति, अपगच्छन्तः च कुत्र लीयन्ते इति वक्तव्यम् । न हि भूतेभ्यः प्रादुर्भवेयुः भूतेषु च निलीयेरन्, अभौतिकत्वात् जीवस्य । नापि कश्चिदन्यः साधारणोऽसाधरणो वा जीवानाम् अवयवाधारो निरूप्यते, प्रमाणाभावात् । किंचान्यत् । अनवधृतस्वरूपश्च एवं सति आत्मा स्यात् । आगच्छतामपगच्छतां चावयवानाम् अनियतपरिमाणत्वात् । अत एवमादिदोषप्रसङ्गात् न पर्यायेणापि अवयव-उपगम-अपगमौ आत्मनः आश्रयितुं शक्येते । B. S.B. IIII.35).
Śankara says that the Jainas may say like some Buddhists that, the soul may be considered as permanent inspite of its changes, just as a stream of water is said to be permanent inspite of the changing water. But the difficulty is, if the stream is not real, there will be the theory of non-existence of the soul, which is not acceptable to Jainas. If the stream is real, the soul will be subject to such defects as mutability. Hence, this view is unjustifiable (पुनः पर्यायेण परिमाण - अवस्थानेऽपि स्रोत - संताननित्यतान्यायेन आत्मनो नित्यता स्यात् । यथा रक्तपटानां विज्ञानअनवस्थानेऽपि तत्संताननित्यता तद्वत् विसिचामपि इति आशङ्कय अनेन सूत्रेण उत्तरमुच्यते । संतानस्य तावद् अवस्तुत्वे नैरात्म्यवादप्रसङ्गः, वस्तुत्वेऽपि आत्मनः विकारादिदोषप्रसङ्गात् अस्य पक्षस्य अनुपपत्तिः इति । B.S.B., II.II.35).
Again, the Jainas believe that the final size of the soul is permanent during its state of release. Now, if this final size is permanent, it cannot have been created, for nothing created is eternal or permanent. If it is not created, it must have existed in the beginning

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and middle as well. If the size of the soul in the condition of release is permanent, it logically follows that the initial and the intervening (before release) sizes also must be permanent, otherwise, there will be three different conditions of one and the same soul. Thus, the soul will have the size of one single body only, and it will not acquire any other inflated or deflated body. In other words, that the different bodies of the soul will have one and the same size and that the soul will not be required to enter into bigger and smaller bodies. The dimensions of the soul being the same in its three conditions, it must be either atomic (aņu) or large (mahān) and must not very according to the size of the body. In this way, the Jaina doctrine is inadequate and therefore, deserves to be rejected (अपि च अन्त्यस्य मोक्षावस्थाभाविनो जीवपरिमाणस्य नित्यत्वमिष्यते जैनैः । तद्वत् पूर्वयोः अपि आद्यमध्यमयोः जीवपरिमाणयोः नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् अविशेषप्रसङ्गः स्यात् । एकशरीरपरिमाणता एव स्यात् न उपचित- अपचित- शरीरान्तरप्राप्तिः । अथवा अन्त्यस्य जीवपरिमाणस्य अवस्थितत्वात् पूर्वयोः अपि अवस्थयोः अवस्थितपरिमाणः एव जीवः स्यात्; ततश्च अविशेषेण सर्वदैव अणुर्महान् वा जीवोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यो न शरीरपरिमाणः । अतः सौगतवत् आर्हतमपि मतमसंगतमिति
B.S.B., II.II.36).
In this way, by disapproving the possibility of the souls having the atomic size or the size of the body, Śankara is naturally driven further to the last alternative which states that the soul is all-pervading and infinite. It being all-pervading, it can both be atomic and infinite at the same time without any contradiction. The same supreme self appears to assume various forms of

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varying magnitudes due to the adjuncts with which it is associated. Sankara states as light, either, the Sun and so on appear differentiated as it were through their objects such as fingeres, vassels, water and so on which constitute limiting adjuncts, while in reality they preserve their essential non-differentiatedness, so the distinction of different selves is due to limiting adjuncts only, while the unity of selves is natural and original (यथा प्रकाशाकाशसवितृप्रभृतयोऽङ्गलिकरकोदकप्रभृतिषु कर्मसूपाधिभूतेषु सविशेषा इवावभासन्ते, न च स्वाभाविकीमविशेषात्मतां जहाति, एवं उपाधिनिमित्त qarTurcia: Partita I (B.S.B., II.II.25).

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Śri Rāmānujācarya and Jainism Presentation of Janism
Śri Rāmānujācārya (1017-1137 A.D.) is the chief exponent of Vaisnava school of Philosophy. His philosophical system is known as the Višiştādvaita (qualified Monism). He was familiar with almost all principles of Jainism. He gives detailed account of Jainism. His presentation is very similar to that of Sankarācārya. He says, 'According to Jainas, there is no God, the world consists of Jiva (Soul) and ajiva (non-soul). The world is made up of six substances, viz., the soul, which has knowledge, faith happiness and valour, and all other five substances are unconscious. Pudgala (matter) is that substance which possesses colour, smell, flavour and touch. It is of two kinds, of the nature of atoms and of the nature their aggregate i.e. the elements and the things elemental-air, fire, water, earth, body, world etc. The Kāla (time) is again, a special kind of substance, atomic, the cause of practical dealing in the form of, was, is, would be etc. Ākāśa (Space) is also one and infinite in extension. They also accept another division among these substances viz., five astikāyas known as jīvāstikāya, dharmāstikāya, adharmāstikāya, pudgalāstikāya and ākāśāstikāya. The word astikāya refers to a substance residing in many regions. These Jains also accept another divisions, which is useful for liberation of Jivas viz., Jiva (soul), ajīva (non-soul), āsrava (inflow of karmas), bandha (bondage), samvara (stoppage of inflow of Karma), nirjară (annihilation of

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accumulated Karma) and moksa (liberation). Moksa is the appearance of one's own natural form, annihilating all kind of passions and Karmas. (जीवाजीवात्मकं जगदेतन्निरीश्वरम् । तच्च षद्रव्यात्मकम् । तानि च द्रव्याणि जीवधर्माधर्म-पदगलाकाशाख्यानि । तत्र जीवा बद्धा योगासिद्धा मुक्ताश्चेति त्रिविधाः । धर्मो नाम गतिमतां गतिहेतुभूतो द्रव्यविशेषो जगद्व्यापी । अधर्मश्च स्थितिहेतुभूतो व्यापी। पुद्गलो नाम वर्णगन्धरसस्पर्शवद्रव्यम् । तच्च द्विविधं, परमाणुरूपं तत्संघातरूपं च पवनज्वलनसलिलधरणीतनुभुवनादिकम् । कालस्त्वभूदस्ति-भविष्यतीति व्यवहारहेतुणुरूपो द्रव्यविशेषः । आकाशोऽप्येकोऽनन्तप्रदेशश्च । तेषु चाणुव्यतिरिक्तद्रव्याणि पञ्चास्तिकाय इति च संगृह्यन्ते, जीवास्तिकायो धर्मास्तिकायोऽधर्मास्तिकायः पुद्गलस्तिकाय आकाशास्तिकाय इति । अनेकदेशवर्तिनि द्रव्येऽस्तिकायशब्दः । जीवानां मोक्षोपयोगिनमपरमपि संग्रहं । कुर्वन्ति जीवाजीवास्रवबन्धनिर्जरसंवरमोक्षा इति । मोक्षसंग्रहेण मोक्षोपायश्च गृहीतः । (Sribhāsyam, II. II. 31).
They uphold the Anekāntavāda. According to them all things have many characteristics. Everything in the universe is existent as well non-existent, eternal as well non-eternal, difference and non-difference. As a substance a thing is existent or real, but from the point of view of modification same thing is non-existent or unreal. In this respect, they apply seven- fold judgement everywhere and to everything, such as (1) May be is, (2) may be is not, (3) may be is and is not, (4) may be, indescribable, (5) may be is and indescribable (6) may be is not and indescribable and (7) may be, is, is not, and indescribable (सर्वं च वस्तुजातं सत्त्वासत्त्वनित्यत्वानित्यत्वाभिन्नत्वाभिन्नत्वादिभिरनैकान्तिकमिच्छन्ति - १. स्यादस्ति २. स्यान्नास्ति ३. स्यादस्ति च नास्ति च ४. स्यादवक्तव्यम् ५.

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Śri Rāmānujācarya and Jainism स्यादस्ति च अवक्तव्यम् ६. स्यान्नास्ति चावक्तव्यम् ७. स्यादस्ति च नास्ति 7 3tamaj a, çfa Ho 999t adia I (Śrībhāsya, II. II.31). Criticism of Syādvāda :
Rāmānuja does not deal in detail with Syādvāda doctrine except pointing out to the inherent improbability of opposite attributes staying together. He states that, Syādvāda is not proper reasoning, because of on account of the impossibility of simultaneous existence of contradictory things like existence and non-existence in the entity like shadow and light (एकस्मिन् वस्तुनि 37fFramfetarafa base et OP 1149 G H9ata Śrībhāsya, II. II.31). Substance and its modifications (paryāyas) are two different things. Paryāyas are objectives being particular state of substance. They are (substance and its modifications) different like clay and pot. So, contradictory attributes in one and the same thing, at the same time not possible. Same clarified butter (Ghrta) cannot be solid as well as liquid form at the same time. There is no possibility of the inclusion of two different things (like pot and clay), though they are substance and paryāyas of the same thing. Water is a substance, but it cannot be solid as ice and flowing liquid at the same time and at same place. When the particular thing is described as existent it cannot be described as nonexistent at the same time, which is quite opposite of existence. Non-eternality (anityatva) of particular substance is, its being the resort of particular modifications called origination and destruction. If it is the case,

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then how can the permanency or permanent nature opposed to that come in there ? Being different is being the locus of opposite attributes or qualities, then how can its opposite non-difference come in there. In other words, how can quite opposite attributes such as difference and non-difference can exist in one and the same thing, just as it is not possible for the nature of
-aboon nf , huffalo to exist simultaa horse ana ine naime vo v neously in one entity. (द्रव्यस्य तद्विशेषणभूतपर्यायशब्दाभिधेयावस्थाविशेषस्य च पृथक्पदार्थत्वात्, मैकस्मिन्विरुद्धधर्मसमावेशः संभवति । तथाहिएकेनास्तित्वा-दिनावस्थाविशेषेण विशिष्टस्य तदानीमेव न तद्विपरीतनास्तित्वादिविशिष्टत्वं संभवति । उत्पत्तिविनाशाख्यपरिणामविशेषास्पदत्वं च द्रव्यस्यानित्यत्वं तद्विपरीतं च नित्यत्वं तस्मिन्कथं समवैति ? विरोधीधर्माश्रयत्वं च भिन्नत्वं तद्विपरीतं चाभिन्नत्वं कथं वा तस्मिन्समवैति ? यथाश्वत्वमहिषत्वयोर्युगपदेकस्मिन् 37449: 1 (Sribhāsya, II.II.31). Rāmānuja points out that Kāla (time) is considered as one of the substances by the Jainas. But in case of Kāla, it being apprehended as only a qualifying attribute (visesana) of objects (dravya), its separate existence and non-existence, etc., are neither capable of being described, nor capable of being-refuted. Ideas like existence and non-existence referring to time are always associated with a object and can be hardly thought of independently. In this case, how can you apply saptabhanginaya ? (folcthy पदार्थविशेषणतयैव प्रतीतेस्तस्य पृथगस्तित्वनास्तित्वादयो न वक्तव्या न च परिहर्तव्या । कालोऽस्ति नास्तीति व्यवहारो व्यवहर्तृणां जात्याधस्तित्वनास्तित्वव्यवहारतुल्यः । जात्यादयो हि द्रव्यविशेषणतयैव प्रतीयन्ते । Sribhāsya, II.II.31).

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45 Jaina may argue that learned Brāhmins say that Brahman is one and is alone, ātman of all. He is one and many. It is said like that, Rāmānuja argues, because, Brahman is one. He is omniscient, omnipresent, all-powerful with all desired fulfilled and sentient (cit) and non-sentient (acit) constitute His body. We accept only one Brahman as the ultimate truth. But, the Jainas accept six different substances as the real entities and hence, they cannot properly account for oneness (ekatva) as well as manyness (anekatva) etc., in one place, because substance lack identity with one another. (कथं पुनरेकमेव ब्रह्म सर्वात्मकमिति श्रोत्रियैरुच्यते ? सर्वचेतनाचेतनशरीरत्वात्सर्वज्ञस्य सर्वशक्तेः सत्यसंकल्पस्य पुरुषोत्तमस्य, इत्युक्तम् । préterefiunt: Massfori alimentariu 404664 I (Śrībhāșya, II.II.31).
Moreover six substances such as Jiva and ajīva are not modifications of one single substance. It is very difficult to propound in their case being one or being many etc., owing to the substance being one and owing to its being constituted of modes. (किञ्च जीवादीनां षण्णां द्रव्याणामेकद्रव्यपर्यायत्वाभावात्तेषु द्रव्यैकत्वेन पर्यायात्मना चैकत्वानेकत्वादयो 54994141: 1 (Śrībhāşya, II.II.31).
If it is argued that, these six substances would become like that i.e. one and many, by their own modes and by their respective natures, the reply is, even thus there would be contradiction with Anekāntavāda, i.e. everything is many-sided, on account of the absence of mutual identity. (378113ia asal Golfo 50014: pra: स्वेन चात्मना तथा भवन्ति, इति । एवमपि सर्वमनैकान्तिकम् इति 3724 TARTET:, 3RTRAGIKAAaa I (Śrībhāsya, II.II.31).

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from the view point of Vedāntic Ācāryas
Criticism of Dehaparimāņavāda :
Similarly, Rāmānuja rejects the Jaina view of Dehaparimāņavāda of the soul by stating that, this view is nothing but absurd. (Ffè 37457H 3A4CH 1 Śribhāsya, II.II.34). Here, his criticism is very similar to that of Śankara. According to the Jainas, the size of the soul is of the size of the body having innumerable parts. (Gastenayah GEYRAT sfa fe yani feefa: 1 (Śribhāsya, II. II.32). They also believe in rebirth. Their view about the size of the soul is unteneble, because, when a soul abiding in the body of an elephant is reborn in the next life as an ant, how can the huge dimension of an elephant find entrance into the tiny body of an ant ? The soul will not have sufficient space in an ant body. That means, only a fraction of the jīva can enter into the ant which is absurd ( Erfgent fee chatta 2446 HOT पिपीलिकाशरीरे प्रविशतोऽल्पदेशव्यापित्वेनाकात्स्न्यं प्रसज्यते । अपरिपूर्णता yhoed Śribhāsya, II.II.32).
The Jainas may say that, the soul is capable of contraction and expansion, according to the size of the body, so, there is no absurdity here. (3781 Ficharacteधर्मतयात्मनः पर्यायशद्वाभिधेयावस्थान्तरापत्या विरोधः परिहियते, इत्युच्यते । Sribhāsya, II.II.32). Even if we admit that the soul assumes a different condition through expansion and contraction, yet they will not get over the inconsistency. For the soul, would then be subject to change with all its concomitant imperfections like impermanence, modifications etc., like pot. If there is a change, it will become non-eternal, and in no way superior to

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material things like pot, etc. ( न च संकोचविकासरूपावस्थान्तरापत्यापि विरोधः परिहर्तुं शक्यते, विकारतत्प्रयुक्तानित्यत्वादिदोषguacefalfagmuraiflqugia | Śribhāṣya, II.II.33). The Jainas believe that the size of the soul in the state of release is permanent, because, it has not to take another birth. Liberation is end of cycle of birth and death. The soul and its size on release are both eternal. It is its natural size. If we accept this view, then the size of the soul cannot be different in the state of bondage also. Then, the size of the soul may not be the size of the body. (जीवस्य यदन्त्यं परिमाणं मोक्षावस्थायां तस्य पश्चाद्देहान्तरपरिग्रहाभावादवस्थितत्वादात्मनश्च मोक्षावस्थस्य तत्परिमाणस्य चोभयोर्नित्यत्वात्, तदेवात्मनः स्वाभाविकं परिमाणमिति पूर्वमपि तस्माद् अविशेष: स्यात् । अतः देहपरिमाणत्वमात्मनो न स्यात् । Sribhāsya, II. II.34).
Rāmānuja, in this way rejects the Jaina view and maintains that, the jiva is atomic in size. It is also not all-pervasive, otherwise, it would experience simultaneously the various pains and pleasures of all persons. It is one and single for each person and extremely minute like a monad or atom in size and it dwells in the heart of each person (Śrībhāṣya, II.III.25). Though the soul is very minute, and dwells in the heart, it extends through the whole body by means of its quality, viz., consciousness or knowledge. The soul spreads all over the body, not actually, but by the means of its quality, just as the light of things abiding in one place, such as gem, the Sun, and so on is seen to extend to many places, so the consciousness of the soul, dwelling in the heart pervades the entire body. Rāmānuja,

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does not identify the soul with knowledge (Jñāna) like Sankara who identifies soul with knowledge. Rāmānuja, on the contrary, makes a distiction and maintains that the knowledge is a quality (guma) that belongs to the subject (soul-guņin). The soul is frequently designated as knowledge, simply for the reason that knowledge is its essential quality and it cannot appear without knowledge (Sribhāsya, II.III.29). The soul is thus not consciousness itself but the knower (jñātā), the knowing subject. He states that 'to be a knowing subject is the essential character of the soul and the soul is atomic size' (Śribhāsya, II.III.31). The objection may be raised that, if soul is atomic and occupies an extremely minute portion of the body how can it remain in touch with all the parts of the body and can simultaneously experience, so many sensations ? Rāmānuja, like Nimbārka, replies that, as a drop of sandal-ointment, although applied to one spot of the body only, produces a refreshing sensation extending over the whole body, similarly, the soul also, dwelling in one part of the body only, is conscious of sensations taking place in any part of the body (Sribhāșya, II.III.24).
Another famous Vaişņava Philosopher Śri Vallabhācārya and his followers have also criticised Syadvāda and Dehaparimāņavāda of Jainas. Their criticism is more or less similar to earlier Vedāntic Acāryas. They point out that application of contradoctary attributes to same thing is an impossibility (TFFT Fift अवक्तव्यानां प्रत्येकसमुदायाभ्यां स्यात् पूर्वकः सप्त प्रकारो भवति, तदेकस्मिन्

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het, afgehaara 3y757 1 (Aņubhāşya, II.II.33), and if we apply this method of seven-fold judgement to all things, we cannot have definite knowledge of a single substance. Everything will be subject to probability and Jainas own theory, Syādvāda proves only that nothing is certain. (Hoz tereta HH991-fon 440 gach lif yererea 20954 7 piffa Marina oda: 7967: 1 II.II.33 Pradipatikā). Vallabhaites point out that, accepting Dehaparimāņavāda is embressing materialistic view. If we accept that, the soul has nature of expansion and contraction, means, it is, subject to change. Change (vikāra) or parts (avayava) of the souls means, nonpermanency of the soul. So, destruction of the body will be end of the soul. So, bondage, liberation, means of liberation etc., will become meaningless. To avoid this, Jainas have to admit the view that the soul is either atomic or great or vibhu. That means giving up the view of Dehaparimāņa. (1. विकारसावयवत्वानित्यत्वानां प्राप्तेः लोकायतमतात् अविशेषप्रसङ्गात् ।
II.II.35, Pradipaţikā. 2. anafanteracrustanto itafanirati II.II.36, Pradipatikā. 3. पूर्वदोषपरिहाराय चोभयनित्यत्वम् भवेदणुत्वं वा महत्त्वं वा, उभयथाऽपि
PriceRAUT 7 wafar far 7 Tareffufas: 1 Anubhāsya, II.II.36.).
This Jaina's Anekāntavāda or Syādvāda, as a philosophical method has been criticised by many other philosophers of Indian Philosophy. Šāntarakṣita (a Buddhist Philosopher) says that, Anekāntavāda suffers from

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50 Jainism from the view point of Vedāntic Ācāryas intermixture or confusion (Sankara), which consists in the incidence of opposite attributes in the same substratum. The substance in which difference is posited will have difference and identity both as its traits and likewise, the aspect in which identity is asserted will have identity and difference as its predicate and this means intermixture or Sarkara (Tattvasangraha, verse1722). In Pramāņavārtikālankāra it is mentioned that existence and non-existence cannot go together. Either thing must be existent or it must be non-existent, both positive and negative cannot be possible in same thing. (p.142). It is also said that, if we accept anekānta of all things, then nature of one element will have nature of another element, such as water, earth etc., will have the nature of fire and fire would have the nature of water and so on. In that case, one who is desireous of water, may go for fire and vice-versa, so whole practical life will be disrupted (HCICII 3770IfH641 Şaddarśanasamuccayatikā, pp. 557-8.). Vyomaśiva has pointed out the defects of Anekāntavāda by stating that, if we accept Anekāntavāda, then liberated (mukta) will not be really liberated (Vyomavati, p. 20). For he will be considered from one point of view, both liberated and not liberated and from another point of view, simply not liberated. Besides, if the statement "the thing has anekānta nature” involves an unconditional predication, then it falsifies the anekānta doctrine, for according to the Anekāntavāda, no philosophical predication should be unconditional or unqualified. But if the above predication is conditionalised with the ‘Syāt operator fol

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lowing the Jaina anekānta doctrine viz., "in a certain sense, the thing has anekānta nature "and" in a certain sense, it does not have anekānta nature and so on, then we will be led into a Paradoxical situation or circularity (The central Philosophy of Jainism, p.57).
Another general objection against the Syādvāda or Saptabhanginaya (Seven-fold Predication) is that, why should we accept only seven predicates, why not accept several altenatives ? Instead of accepting only seven alternative predicates, we can go upto a hundred or an unlimited number. Kumārila Bhatta has pointed out that 'even one hundred alternatives can be generated through generous use of the method used by the Jainas to generate only seven alternatives (A9F1YHIGH TT957 379 Gear Mimāṁsāślokavārtika).
Jaina philosophers, beginning from Akalanka and Vidyānanda, were aware of these criticisms of Anekāntavāda and they have tried to answer them all in their writings. Akalanka in Pramāṇasangrah mentions seven demerits of the Anekāntavāda pointed out by the critics, such as doubt (Samśaya), contradiction (virodha), lack of conformity of bases (vaiyadhikaraṇya), joint fault (ubhayadosa), infinite regress (anavasthā), intermixture (sankara) and absence (abhāva). Vidyānanda notes eight faults of Anekāntavāda shown by the critics. He omits 'joint fault' from the list of Akalanka but adds two more viz., cross-breading (vyatireka) and the lack of comprehension i.e. arthāpatti (Astasahasrī, p. 227). Prabhācandra, also mentions eight defects of anekānta pointed by the opponents (Prameyakamal

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amārtaṇḍa, p. 156). Vādidevasūri (Syādvādaratnākara, p.738) and Gunaratnasūri (Şaḍdarśanasamuccayaṭīkā, p. 357-58) were also aware of these objections raised by the opponents. Most of these defects of anekāntavāda pointed out by the critics are only minor variations of three major defects viz., contradiction, doubt and intermixture.
52
In defence of Anekāntavāda or Syādvāda :
We have seen that Jaina's Anekāntavāda or Syādvāda as a philosophical method has been the subject of criticism of all non-Jaina philosophers. But certainly, these are not fair criticisms of the Jaina method. These criticisms do not satisfactorily meet the contention of the Jainas. The Anekāntavāda or Syādvāda of the Jainas, is neither a doctrine of doubt or even uncertainty, nor a doctrine of probability. These, criticisms are based on misunderstandig of the word 'Syad' used by the Jainas. To understand the Jaina position, it is important to know, in what sense, the word 'Syat' is used by the Jaina philosophers and how they present the doctrine of Syādvāda or sevenfold predication (saptabhangi). The speciality of the Jainas lies in its use of the 'Syať' particle in the predication. That is why saptabhangïnaya (Sevenfold predication) is called Syādvāda.
Generally, the word 'Syat' is used to mean 'perhaps' or 'may be' or 'somehow' or 'somewhat', in Sanskrit language. It is also used sometimes to express probability (sambhāvanā). In Indian philosophical text the

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word 'Syat' is often used in the sense of 'let it be so' (but-syādetad). Here it is used to show the speaker's provisional acceptance of the opponents view to raise different kind of objections against it and to refute it finally.
But the word 'Syat' used by the Jaina thinkers, is different from all these meanings. In the Jaina philocophical tauts the word 'Syat' means a conditional yes.
WIV VT VA W
Prof. B.K. Matilal has rightly pointed out that 'It is like a saying', in a certain sense yes. It amounts to a condition approval. The particle 'Syat', in fact, acts a categorical 'A is B' into a conditional: 'if P then A is B'. (The central Philosophy of Jainism, p.52). The use of the particle 'Syať' is to show more concession to opponents' thesis and at the same time, it persuades the opponent to see another point of view or carefully consider the other side of the case (Ibid., p.52).
53
Jaina philosophers like Samantabhadra, Akalarka, Vidyananda, Amṛtacandra and others have tried to show that the word "Syat' is used to remove, one sided view. Samantabhadra notes that the word 'Syať' is ordinarily equal to such expressions as somehow or sometimes. But even these terms do not have in this context, such vague meaning as somehow or sometimes (kadācit or kathañcit). They mean in certain respect or under a certain condition or from a certain point of view (P सर्वथैकान्तत्यागात् किंवृत्तचिद्विधिः । सप्तभङ्गनयापेक्षो हेयादेयविशेषता ॥ Aptamimämsä, 104).

FROM

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Samantabhadra, while commenting on the word ‘Syāt says that “When the particle ‘Syāt is used by you (O Mahāvīra) as well as by a Srutakevalin (a realised one), in a sentence, it indicates in connection with other meanings, non-sidendness, it qualifies (since it is a partical nipāta) the meaning of the sentence concerned” area of Icela TELİ afa farqUFT Pirachsefalarci na wafan || Aptamimāṁsā, 103). Hemacandrācārya says that 'in the term' 'Syādvāda', the word ‘Syāť expresses many aspects of an object, hence, Syādvāda is called Anekāntavāda
(आदीपमाव्योम समस्वभावं स्याद्वादमुद्रानतिभेदि वस्तु । तन्नित्यमेवैकमनित्यमन्यदिति त्वदाज्ञाद्विषतां प्रलापाः ॥
. Anyayogavyavacchedikā, 5). Again, it is essential to understand the doctrine of Syādvāda presented by the Jaina thinkers. The Jaina philosophers say that Anekānta is the name of the ontological nature of reality, according to which every object possesses indefinite aspects. When an object, which is anekāntātmaka (possessing many characteristics) is expressed in a particular form of judgement, the expression is known as Syādvāda. We can express the characteristics of an object from different points of view and these points of view are expressed by the word
Syāt.' Akalanka points out : ‘The judgement about an object possessing many characteristics is called Syādvāda (37 cm 64 chef2714 PIGTG: | Laghīyastraya, p.83). This doctrine of Syādvāda is also called Anekāntavāda, because, the relativity of judgement is

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nothing but a relative judgement about an object that possesses indefinite qualities or aspects. Hence, the judgment that stands for an object possessing many characteristics is also known as anekāntavāda. (Outline of Jaina Philosophy, p. 118). This doctrine of Anekāntavāda or Syādvāda is explained by all the great Jaina philosophers in the following Sevenfold formula : 1. From a certain point of view or in a certain re
spect, the pot exists. 2. From a certain point of veiw, the pot does not exist.
From a certain point of veiw, the pot exists and
from another point of view, it does not exist. 4. From a certain point of view, the pot is inexpress
ible. 5. From a certain point of view, the pot both exists
and is inexpressible. 6. From a certain point of view, the pot both does not
exist and is inexpressible. 7. From a certain point of view, the pot exists, does
not exist, and is also inexpressible.
((1) Āptamīmāṁsā. 14-21; (2) Syādvādamañjari, pp. 209-212; (3) Pramāṇanayatattvālokālarikāra, IV).
Jainas say that, each philosophical proposition is subjected to this sevenfold formulation in order to avoid the danger of one-sidedness (ekāntavāda). It consists of seven kinds of expression regarding one and the same thing with reference to its particular aspects, one by one, without any inconsistency, by means of affirmation and negation made either separately or together (Traverses on Less Trodden Path of Indian Phi

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56 Jainism from the view point of Vedāntic Acāryas losophy and Religion, pp. 232-234).
This Syādvāda or Anekāntavāda is said to be the foundation of Jaina philosophy. Jaina thinkers have given equal status to this doctrine with omniscience (Kevalajñāna). Ācārya Samantabhadra in his Aptamimāṁsā clearly says that “both Syıdvāda and Kevalajñāna illuminate the whole reality. The difference between them is only this much that while the fouiner illuminates the objects indirectly, the latter illuminates them directly. (PIIGIG G5 HodoohTI I 96: HTAN-GHT Elafrar varai Aptamimāṁsā, 105)
Vedāntic Ācāryas and others, criticise the Syādvāda on the ground of the impossibility of contradictory attributes co-existing in the same thing. To attribute both existence and non-existence, permanency and change to one and the same thing involves law of contradiction.
In defence of their doctrine of Syādvāda, Jainas say that there is no contradiction involved and no violation of law of contradiction in applying opposite predicates to the same thing in different capacities, because, they are applied to its different aspects, such as matter, state, space and time (Faly-25-01T-91a: Ara 2698151016
d: 374774 1 - Syādvādamañjari, p. 130). It is seen that mutually contradictory elements can exist in one and the same thing in different capacity such as the same man is a father to his son, son to his father, husband to his wife, and so on. (1) 491 Taher care fail, FT, FILM, भागिने यः इत्येवमादयः सम्बन्धाः जनकत्वजन्यत्वादिनिमित्ताः न

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विरुध्यन्तेऽर्पणाभेदात् । पुत्रापेक्षया पिता, पितृपेक्षया पुत्रः इत्येवमादिः । Sarvārthasiddhi. V.32). (2) अर्पणाभेदादविरोधः पितापुत्रादिसंबंधवत् । -Tattvärtharājavārtika, p. 36). The so-called opposites such as existence and non-existence, permanence and change, oneness and maniness, etc., can be attributed to an object from various points of view. They can remain in the same object without contradicting each other. Samantabhadra gives beautiful anology to show that, opposite attributes, such as origination, destruction and permanence can exist in one and the same thing without contradicting each other. He says, ‘if a golden pot is destroyed and a golden crown is made out of it, destruction, origination and permanence (as a gold) happen simultaneously and give rise to sorrow, joy and indifferent attitude respectively in the minds of three different kinds of people, those in favour of the pot, those in favour of the crown and those in favour of the gold itself (घटमौलीसुवर्णार्थीनाशोत्पादस्थितिष्वयम् । शोकप्रमोदमाध्यस्थ्यं जनो याति सहेतुकम् | Aptamīmārsā, 59 ) .
Jaina philosophers never say that contradictory attributes belong to the same thing at the same time and in the same sense. It is said that everything exists in its own individuality and does not exist in the individuality of another. Were it not so, everything would be alike existent and thus, there would possibly be no individuality. (सर्वमस्तिस्वरूपेण पररूपेण नास्ति च । अन्यथा सर्वसत्त्वं Tattvärtharājavārtika, p. 24).
:
A thing is regarded as a real from the point of view of its own matter (substance), form, space and time and it is regarded as unreal, not from the same

57

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stand point, but from the point of view of other matter, form, space and time. There is no room for contradiction (Syādvādamañjari, p. 176-177). When the Jainas say that from the standpoint of persisting substance, the person is eternal but from the stand point of model changes (paryāyas), the person is non-eternal, they do not make any self-contradictory assertion.
Again, there is no contradiction if we consider primary and secondary meanings of the speaker in each statement (37farfaffet: Tattvārthasūtra, V.31). In the sevenfold predication (Saptabhanginaya), existence and non-existence, both existence and non-existence successively and indescribability are attributed to a thing from different points of view. In all these cases, we have to consider primary and secondary meanings of the speaker. When the intention is to speak of a thing as successively existing and non-existing, the third mood is to be used i.e. syādasti syānnāsti ca). But when the intention is to speak of existence and nonexistence simultaneously, the two states being inexpressible at the same time, then it becomes indescribable. Because, language lacks an expression which can adequately express the simultaneous and combined application of both of the positive and the negative characters of an object.
Again, there is no place for contradiction in a thing which is cognised as such. One thing is supposed to be the opposite of another, when in the presence of one, the other is not perceived. But in a perceived thing, no question of contradiction arise, such as in the unitory

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cognition of a varigated canvas, there is no contradiction.
The very nature of reality is infinitely complex and it being an identity and difference, admits of contradictory attributes from different points of view, which are all partial and relative. Hemacandrācārya remarks that, not understanding this and fearing imaginary contradictions and mistaking partial and relative views as absolute, fools fall from the right position.
(उपाधिभेदोपहितं विरुद्धं नार्थेष्वसत्त्वं सदवाच्यते च । इत्यप्रबुध्यैव विरोधभीता जडास्तदेकान्तहताः पतन्ति ॥
Anyayogavyavacchedikā, 24) There is no sankara (intermixture) in Syādvāda. Sarikara means, that which consists in the incidence of opposite attributes in the same substratum (युगपदुभयप्राप्तिः H: 1). Our experience shows that, there is no sankara in the cognition of the multiform colour (90 ETHİ Svaig a chilgaa i Nyāyaviniścaya, p. 45). Syādvāda is not samsayavāda or doctrine of doubt. Doubt is a kind of cognition in which the mind of the perceiver wavers between two conflicting alternatives (Plu: ar 4sat afà 1). It is a kind of uncertain knowledge. But in the case of Syādvāda, both existence and non-existence, are clearly cognised, (from different points of view). There is no question of doubt when the cognition is found to be certain. Really, speaking there is no justification for the emergence of doubt in a matter which has been definitely established. (375cyanat fe üm: RICI 991 faceast स्थाणुपुरुषयोः स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति । परमेकस्मिन्नेव वस्तुनि सत्त्वासत्त्वयोः Hoeka tur vafastanifa Freecha Hift | Anekāntavādas

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Jainism
from the view point of Vedāntic Acãryas
varūpam - Traverses on Less Trodden path of Indian Philosophy and Religion, p. 237). Jainas point out that, the conception of reality as a synthesis of mode and attribute is not incompatiable with the vardict of experience and the interest of truth. As against the Kumārila's criticism that we can generate even hundred alternatives applying doctrine of Saptabhangi, Vidyānanda, says that only seven alternatives are possible not less than seven nor more than seven. He clarifies this idea by stating that according to anekānta, a thing or entity is supposed to possess infinite or innumerable aspects. But sevenfold formula i.e. the seven alternative formulations or predicates using the three principle modes (i.e. positive, negative and neutral) will be applicable to each attribution of a property i.e. to each individual predication. As long as we accept only three basic qualities of one individual predicate viz., positive, negative and neutral, we will get only seven possible combinations. (Astasahasri, p. 126; also see Central Philosophy of Jainism, p. 56). Vidyānanda observes that some people say that let there be only four types of proposition. This is not tenable. For, there are three (further) possibilities by combining the possitive, the negative and both of them with the 'inexpressible'. Thus, we have sevenfold predication i.e. (1) affirmation, (2) negation, (3) both affirmation and negation, (4) the joint and simultaneous affirmation and negation (inexpressible), (5) affirmation and the simulteneous affirmation, (6) negation, and the joint and simulteneous affirmation and negation, and (7) affirmation, negation

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61 and the joint simultaneous affirmation and negation (Astasahasrī, p. 125).
The speciality of Syādvāda is that, it reconciles all the partial view points and gives clear picture of reality. It has woven together all the nayas (partial view points) in it (Ha: 7: act: Adhyātmasāra). It is impartial and treats all the nayas equally like one's own children. According to Jaina thinkers, it is the best view of reality.
It is important to note, according to Jainas, views of other systems of philosophy are relative and partial. They comit the fallacy of mistaking a relative truth to be the absolute truth and fight against one another, while Jainism alone is impartial, because it puts all the partial view points (nayas) together. Anekānta alone is real view and to be the only truth. (अन्योन्यपक्षप्रतिपक्षभावाद् यथा परे मत्सरिणः प्रवादाः । नयानशेषानविशेषमिच्छन् न पक्षपाती समयस्तथा ते ॥ Anyayogavyavacchedikā, 30).
Further, Hemacandrācārya proclaims that Vitarāga is the only God and that Anekānta is the only Philosophical system. (7 OTTICE THIC 264 7 elle cold Torrefa: 1 Anyayogavyavaccehedikā, 28). Without anekānta we cannot explain reality, without it, it is impossible to explain, pain and pleasure, actions and fruits, bondage and liberation, good and evil, existence and non-existence, one and many, permanence and change, universal and particular. Hence, the opponents are out to destroy the world which is to be preserved only by the Jainas. (colia ToG:UT 7 queria 7 a THTHI

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Jainism
from the view point of Vedāntic Ācāryas
griffaraigataifa- tai prah FIGURT04 11 - Anyayogavyavacchedikā, 27).
These and many other similar statements of Jaina philosophers, reveal that in practice, their doctrine of relativity of truth is often forgotten. Jainas often made an exception and claim absolute validity of their view. Teachings of other systems are considered as relatively real and the Jaina teaching is held to be absolutely real. This goes against the Jaina doctrine itself. If we take these statements literally, then Jainism by its own assertion becomes partially false.
Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya tried to answer this objection by saying that "anekānta' is a real method. We are not emphasizing Anekāntavāda in the form of anekānta, because, in this on the basis of context and intention of the speaker, particular view point becomes dominant and other view point becomes subordinate. Anekānta is not a single doctrine, it is combination of many nayas (view points) and does not uphold particular view point. Thus, it cannot be said that, it is also ekāntavāda :
(अनेकान्तेऽपि अनेकान्ताद् अनिष्टैवमपाकृता । नयसूक्ष्मेक्षिकाप्रान्ते विश्रान्तेः सुलभत्वतः ॥
Adhyātmopanişadprakaraṇa, 1.4). This is a doctrine of reconciliation and accept. able to almost all the systems of Indian philosophy, according to Yaśovijaya. It harmonises all the conflicting views and sees unity in diversity (Adhyātmopanisadprakaraña, 1.45-51).
In defence of body-size of the soul, the Jaina

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Śri Rāmānujācarya and Jainism
philosophers say that the soul is included in the astikāyadravyas, because its constituents possess extension in space. It has quality of expansion and contraction. But it does not extend in space like matter. It is like the light. Just as the light fills the space, when it is burning and just as many lights may remain in the same place, without coming into conflict with one another, siinilarly, the soul fills the space and many souls may remain together without any conflict. Though, the self itself formless, it takes the form of the body, which it illuminates. There is no harm in accepting the soul of an ant is as small as the body of it, and the soul of an elephant is as big as the elephant itself. Like a light of the lamp, it occupies entire body of the elephant, or contracts itself, according to the size of the body. The soul is co-extensive with the body. The Jaina view that the soul has the size of the body seems to be bases on practical significance. What is the point in believing the soul to be all-pervading, if the particular body alone is the centre of enjoyment (bhogāyatana) and comes under his jurisdiction ?
We have seen that, these Vedāntic Ācāryas have given several arguments against the Jaina conception of the size of the soul. It is surprising to note that the Jaina Philosophers who flourished after Nimbārka, Śankara and Rāmānuja, did not give any attention to criticism of Dehaparimāņavāda made by these Vedāntic Ācāryas. Šarkarācārya, alone raised more than ten objections against it. We do not find any attempt made by the Jaina Philosophers to answer these objections. They remained unanswered by the Jainas.

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APPENDIX
(I)
Bhaskarācārya (c. 900 A.D.) on Jainism (Brahmasutra-Bhaskarabhāsyam,
II. II. 33-36)
नैकस्मिन्नसम्भवात् ॥२.२.३३॥
इदानीमार्हतं मतं परीक्ष्यते । सप्त चैषां पदार्थाः शास्त्रसङ्ग्रहभूताः जीवाजीवास्रवसम्वरनिर्जरबन्धमोक्षा इति । तेषामपरः प्रपञ्चः पञ्चास्तिकायो नामजीवास्तिकाय: पुद्गलास्तिकायो धर्मास्तिकायोऽधर्मास्तिकाय आकाशास्तिकायश्चेति । इमं च सप्तभङ्गीनयं नाम न्यायं सर्वत्रावतारयन्ति । स्यादस्ति स्यान्नास्ति स्यादस्ति च नास्ति चावक्तव्यः स्यादस्ति चावक्तव्यः स्यान्नास्ति चावक्तव्यश्च स्यादस्ति च नास्ति चावक्तव्यश्चेति । तत्र जीवाजीवौ प्रसिद्धावाश्रावयति पुरुषं विषयेष्विन्द्रियवृत्तिभिरिति आश्रव उच्यते । अन्ये त्वार्हता व्याचक्षते कर्तारमभिव्याप्याश्रवत्यनुगच्छतीत्याश्रवं कर्मोच्यत इति । सम्वरः सम्बन्धः । निर्जरस्तपः पूर्वसञ्चितं कल्मषं निर्जरयतीति । अश्रान्तमौनी वीरासने तिष्ठति भोजनतप्तशिलारोहणकेशोल्लुञ्चनादिलक्षणम् । अष्टविधो बन्धः। दर्शनावरणीयं ज्ञानावरणीयं मोहनीयमन्तरीयमिति चत्वार्य्येतानि घातिकर्माण्युच्यन्ते । वेदनीयं नामिकं गोत्रिकमायुष्कमिति चत्वार्य्यघातिकर्माणि । बन्धनिवृत्तौ नित्यसिद्धार्हदनुग्रहान्मोक्षो भवतीति । पुदगलास्तिकाय इति परमाणवो ऽभिधीयन्ते । धर्मास्तिकायः प्रवृत्यनुमेयो ऽधर्मास्तिकायः स्थितिहेतुरमुक्तानाम् । आकाशास्तिकायो द्विधा भिद्यते लोकाकाशोऽलोकाकाशश्चेति । उपर्युपरिस्थितानां लोकानामन्तर्वर्ती लोकाकाशस्तेषामुपरिमोक्षस्थानमलोकाकाशस्तु परतो यत्र लोका न सन्ति । जीवास्तु त्रेधा भिद्यन्ते बद्धात्मानो मुक्तात्मानो नित्यसिद्धाश्चेति । ये मुक्तात्मानस्ते सर्वज्ञा निरतिशयसुखाश्चासत इति । तत्रेदमुच्यते नैकस्मिन्धर्मिण्यसम्भवात् । ननु पटरूपेण घटो नास्ति स्वेन रूपेणास्तीति को विरोधः । उच्यते स्वरूपेऽपि सप्तभङ्गीनयस्याविशेषात् । स्वरूपमस्तीत्यपि स्यान्नास्तीत्यपि तत्रानध्यवसानमेव स्यात् । किञ्च ये सप्त पदार्थास्ते तथैवान्यथा वा । ननु सर्वमनैकान्तिकमित्यवधारणं ज्ञानं निश्चितमेव नेत्युच्यते । अवधारणमप्यनैकान्तिकमेव स्यात् । अवधारणं स्यात् नास्ति चावधारणनमिति क्वचिन्निश्चयः स्यान्मोक्षोऽस्ति नास्तीत्यवधारणाद प्रवृत्तिरेव स्यात्तत्रैवं शास्त्रं प्रणयन्नुन्मत्ततुल्यस्तीर्थंकरः

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APPENDIX
65
स्यात् ॥३३॥
एवञ्चात्माकाय॑म् ॥२-२-३४॥ एवञ्चात्मनोऽपि यदिष्टं शरीरपरिमाणत्वं तदपि पक्षे स्यात् पक्षे नेत्यकात्यं अपरिपूर्णत्वं तत्र शरीरैकदेशे जीव इत्येकदेशो जीवशून्यः स्यात् । किञ्च मनुष्यशरीरपरिमाणो जीवः केन चित्कर्मविपाकेन पिपीलिकाशरीरं प्रविशन्न समीयते ॥३४॥
न च पर्यायादप्यविरोधो विकारादिभ्यः ॥२.२.३५॥
मनुष्यशरीरपरिमाणस्य जीवस्य हस्तिशरीरादावकात्य॑ परिहर्तुं शक्यं कथमनन्तावयव आत्मा हस्तिशरीरे तेषामवयवानामुपचयोऽर्भकशरीरेऽपचय इत्येवम् । पर्यायादविरोध इति चेन्न । विकारमूर्तत्वादिदोषप्रसङ्गात् । यदि सावयवो जीव: स्यात् देहवद्विनाशी स्यात् मूर्तत्वात् न चोपचयापचयौ शक्यौ कल्पयितुं प्रमाणाभावात् । येऽपगतास्तेऽपगता एव न तेषां पुनरात्मसम्बन्धो निरूपयितुं शक्यत इत्यसङ्गतमार्हतं मतम् ॥३५॥
अन्त्यावस्थितेश्चोभयनित्यत्वादविशेषः ॥२-२-३६॥
चरमदेहे गतस्य परिमाणस्यावस्थितिरिष्यते दिगम्बरैभिन्नदेहे मुक्तः सर्वगतोऽहं देहान्तरावच्छेदाभावात् तन्नित्यं परिमाणं ततश्चाद्यमध्ययोरप्यवस्थयोर्नित्यत्वं स्यादतो विशेषः सर्वदाणुर्वा सर्वगतो वा न शरीरपरिमाणत्वमनवस्थितमाश्रयितुं शक्यमेवं चोपचयापचयप्रतिज्ञाहानिरतो दिगम्बरसिद्धान्तो विवसनसमयोऽप्यत्यन्तमनादरणीय इति
॥३६॥
(II) Madhyācārya (1199-1278 A.D.) on Jainism (Brahmasūtra-Madhvabhāşyam - II. II. 33-36 with
Anuvyākhyānam)
॥ नैकस्मिन्नसम्भवात् ॥२.२.३३॥ सत् स्यादसत् स्यात् सदसत् स्यात् स्यात् ततोऽन्यच्च स्यादित्येतनैकस्मिन् युज्यते । अदृष्टत्वेनासम्भवात् ॥ ॥

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Jainism from the view point of Vedāntic Acāryas ॥ एवञ्चाऽत्माकाय॑म् ॥२.२.३४।। जीवस्य शरीरपरिमितत्वाङ्गीकारेऽण्वादिशरीरस्थस्य हस्त्यादिशरीरेऽकात्यं स्यात्
॥ न च पर्यायादप्यविरोधो विकारादिभ्यः ॥२.२.३५॥ तत्तच्छरीरस्थस्य तत्तत्परिमाणत्वमिति न वाच्यम् । विकारित्वादनित्यत्वप्रसक्तेः
॥ अन्त्यावस्थितेश्चोभयनित्यवादविशेषात् ॥२.२.३६॥
परिमाणाभावे स्वरूपाभावप्राप्त्याऽन्त्यपरिमाणस्थितेस्तदर्थत्वेन शरीरस्थितेरुभयनित्यवादविशेषेण सर्वशरीरनित्यत्वं स्यात् ॥★॥
अनुव्याख्यानम् ॥ आह क्षपणको विश्वं सदसद् द्वयमद्वयम् । द्वयाद्वयमतत्सर्वं सप्तभङ्गि सदातनम् ॥२३५॥ नैतत् पदार्थ एकस्मिन् युक्तं दृष्टिविरोधतः । भावाभावतया विश्वं येन रूपेण मीयते । तद्रूपमेव तदिति नियमः केन वार्यते ॥२३६॥ तत्तद्दोषनिवृत्त्यर्थं स्वीकृता तत्तदात्मता । यदि तैरखिलैर्दोषैलिप्यते चलदर्शनः ॥२३७॥ अतिहाय प्रमाणाप्त नियमं सदसत्तया । अशेषमाविरूद्धं च निर्मानं व्याहतं सदा ॥२३८॥ सर्वप्रकारं वदतो दृष्टहानिरमग्रहः । स्वव्याहतत्वमित्याद्या दोषाः सर्वे भवन्ति हि ॥२३९॥ वक्ति स्वप्रभमात्मानं देहमानं तदप्यलम् । दुष्टं नानाशरीरेषु प्रवेशादन्यथाभवात् ॥२४०॥ अन्यथाभावि यद् वस्तु तदनित्यमिति स्थितिः । तन्मते तदनित्यत्वं पुद्गलस्यानिवारितम् ॥२४१॥ नानित्यताऽस्मत्पक्षे तु चैतन्यादेविशेषिणः । लक्षणस्य निवृत्तौ तु स्यान्न तच्चेतने क्वचित् ॥२४२।। ओतप्रोतात्मकत्वं तु पटे देहेऽङ्गसंस्थितिः । इत्यादिलक्षणस्यैव निवृत्तौ स्यादनित्यता ॥२४३॥ भौतिकं त्वेव रूपादि व्याप्तं नाशेन नो मते । नैवं तस्यान्यथाभावो यस्यानित्यत्वमीरितम् ॥२४४॥ रूपादियुक्तस्य तथा जगन्नाशित्वसिद्धये। व्याप्त्या तयाऽन्यथाभावादात्मनोऽनित्यता भवेत् ॥२४५॥ नित्योर्ध्वगतिरप्येषा या मुक्तिरिति कथ्यते । अलोकाकाशमाप्तस्य कथं न विकृतिश्च सा ॥२४६॥ कीदृशश्चान्यथाभावो नाशहेतुतयेष्यते । संस्थानापगमश्चेत् स नहि भूसागरादिषु ॥२४७॥ यः कश्चिदन्यथाभावो यदि मुक्तिश्च तादृशी । देहमाने विकारः स्यादिति स्थास्नूननात्मनः ॥२४८॥ आह हस्त्यादिदेहेषु ह्यपि स्यादन्यथाभावः । अणुदेहस्य जीवस्य गजत्वे विकृतिर्हि या ।

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APPENDIX
67
देहव्याप्त्यै विशेषः कस्तस्याः स्थानुतनौ च नुः ॥२४९॥ गीतात् पुष्पफलावाप्तिः स्पर्शात् कार्यं रसात् स्थितिः । अपि वृक्षस्य दृश्यन्त इति नानात्मता भवेत् । एवञ्चाऽत्माकात्यमिति तत एवाऽह वेदवित् ॥ (२५०)
(IID
Vallabhācārya (1473-1531 A.D.) on Jainism (Brahmasutrānnubhāsyam - II. II. 33-36 with the
commentary Pradipa of Icchārāma Bhatta) विवसनसमयो निराक्रियते,
नैकस्मिन्नसम्भवात् ॥२.२.३३॥ ते ह्यन्तनिष्ठाः प्रपञ्च उदासीनाः सप्त विभक्तीः परेच्छया वदन्ति, स्याच्छब्दोभीष्टवचनः, अस्तिनास्त्यवक्तव्यानां प्रत्येकसमुदायाभ्यां स्यात्पूर्वकः सप्तप्रकारो भवति, तदेकस्मिन् योजयन्ति, तद् विरोधेनासम्भवादयुक्तम् ॥३३॥
प्रदीपः नैकस्मिन्नसम्भवात् ॥३३॥ अधिकरणमवतारयन्ति विवेसनेत्यादि, एत एव क्षपणका आर्हता जैनाश्चोच्यन्ते, मुक्तकच्छाः पूर्वं दूषिताः, इदानीं विवसना दूष्यन्ते, सौगतवज्जैना अपि जगति परमाणुकारणतां वदन्तीति तदनन्तरं तन्निरूपणं, दूष्यांशमनुवदन्ति ते हीत्यादि, सप्त विभक्तीः सप्तभङ्गीनयं नाम न्यायं, परेच्छया वदन्ति स्वेषामन्तनिष्ठत्वात् परेषां विवक्षानुसारेण यथोचितं वदन्तीत्यर्थः, तेषां मतप्रकार उच्यते, तत्र स्याच्छब्दोऽव्ययोऽभीष्टवचनः, अतोऽस्त्यादिभेदैस्तेषां समयः सप्तविधो भवति स्याच्छब्दयोगात् सोऽग्रे वक्तव्यः । ते ह्येवं मन्यन्ते-जीवजडात्मकं बोधाबोधात्मकं जगदेतन्निरीश्वरं तेन समासतः पदार्थद्वयमेव, विस्तरतस्तु जगत् षड्द्रव्यात्मकं तेषां मते, तानि च द्रव्याणि जीवधर्माधर्मपुद्गलकालाकाशाख्यानि । तत्र जीवास्त्रिविधा बद्धा योगसिद्धा मुक्ताश्च । धर्मो नाम गतिमतां गतिहेतुभूतो द्रव्यविशेषो जगद्व्यापी, अधर्मश्च स्थितिहेतुभूतो व्यापकः, पुद्गलो नाम वर्णगन्धरसस्पर्शवद्रव्यं, तच्च द्विविधं परमाणुरूपं तत्सङ्घतात्मकपवनज्वलनसलिलधरणीतनुभवनादिकञ्च, कालस्तु अभूदस्तिभविष्यतीतिव्यवहारहेतुरणुरूपो द्रव्यविशेपः, आकाशोऽप्येकोऽनन्तप्रदेशश्च। षड्द्रव्येषु परमाणुव्यतिरिक्ताः पञ्चास्तिकाया इति व्यवह्रियन्ते, तथा हि-जीवास्तिकायो धर्मास्तिकायोऽधर्मास्तिकायः

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas
I
पुद्गलास्तिकाय आकाशास्तिकायश्चेति । अस्तिकायशब्दोऽनेकदेशवृत्तिद्रव्ये रूढः । तत्र जीवास्तिकायस्त्रिविधजीवात्मको व्याख्यातः, धर्मास्तिकायः प्रवृत्त्यनुमेयः, अधर्मास्तिकाय: स्थित्यनुमेयः, पुद्गलास्तिकायस्तु परमाणुव्यतिरिक्तानि चत्वारि भूतानि स्थावरजङ्गमरूपाणि, परमाणवस्तु नास्तिकायपदवाच्याः, परमाणवोऽपि तेषां मत एकविधा न चतुर्विधाः, पृथिव्यादिभेदस्तु परमाणुपरिणामकृतः, आकाशास्तिकायो द्विविधो लोकाकाशोऽलोकाकाशश्चेति, तत्रोपर्युपरिस्थितानां लोकानामन्तर्वर्ती लोकाकाशः, तेषामुपरि मोक्षस्थानमलोकाकाशस्तत्र हि न लोकाः सन्तीति । एवं जीवाजीवपदार्थों पञ्चधा प्रपञ्चितौ । जीवानां मोक्षोपयोगिनमपरमपि सङ्ग्रहं वदन्ति जीवाजीवास्रवसंवरनिर्जरबन्धमोक्षा इति । जीवाजीवौ प्रपञ्चितौ । तत्र जीवस्तु ज्ञानवीर्यसुखगुणः सावयवो देहपरिमाणः, अजीवस्तु जीवयोग्यं वस्तुजातं आस्रवसंवरनिर्जरास्त्रयः पदार्थाः प्रवृत्तिरूपाः प्रपञ्चयन्ते, द्वेधा प्रवृत्तिः सम्य मिथ्या च तत्र मिथ्याप्रवृत्तिरास्रवः, आस्रावयति पुरुषं विषयेष्वितीन्द्रियप्रवृत्तिरास्रवः, इन्द्रियद्वारादिना पौरुषं ज्योतिर्विषयान् स्पृशद्रूपादिरूपेण परिणमत इति । अन्ये त्वार्हता कर्माण्यास्रवमाहुः, तानि हि कर्तारमभिव्याप्यास्रवन्ति कर्तारमनुगच्छन्तीत्यास्रवः, सेयं मिथ्याप्रवृत्तिरनर्थहेतुत्वात्, संवरनिर्जरौ तु सम्यक्प्रवृत्ती । तत्र शमदमादिरूपा प्रवृत्तिः संवरः, सा हि आस्रवत् स्रौतसो द्वारं संवृणोतीति संवर इत्युच्यते । निर्जरस्त्वनादिकालप्रवृत्तिकषायकलुषपुण्यापुण्यप्रहाणहेतुस्तप्तशिलारोहणास्नान
68
मौनवीरासनतिष्ठतिभोजनकेशोल्लुञ्चनादिलक्षणमर्हदुपदेशान्तर्गतं तपः, तद्धि सुखदुःखोपभोगेन पुण्यापुण्यं निःशेषं जरयतीति निर्जर उच्यते । बन्धस्त्वष्टविधं कर्म, तत्र ज्ञानावरणीयं दर्शनावरणीयं मोहनीयमन्तरायमिति चतुर्विधं घाति कर्म । तत्र सम्यग्ज्ञानं न मोक्षसाधनं नहि ज्ञानाद्वस्तुसिद्धरतिप्रसङ्गादितिविपर्ययो ज्ञानावरणीयं कर्मोच्यते । आर्हतदर्शनान्न मोक्ष इति ज्ञानं दर्शनावरणीयं कर्म । बहुषु विप्रतिषिद्धेषु मोक्षमार्गेषु तीर्थकरैरुपदिष्टेषु विशेषानवधारणं मोहनीयं कर्म । सन्मोक्षमार्गप्रवृत्तानां तद्विघ्नकरं विज्ञानमन्तरायं कर्म । तद्धि जीवगुणानां ज्ञानदर्शनवीर्यसुखानां घातकरमिति घाति कर्मेत्युच्यते । वेदनीयं नामकं गोत्रिकमायुषमितिचतुर्विधमघाति कर्म, तद्धि शरीरसंस्थानतदभिमानतत्स्थितितत्प्रयुक्तसुखदुःखोपेक्षाहेतुभूतं, तत्र वेदनीयं नाम शुक्लपुद्गलविपाकहेतु:, तद्विबन्धोऽपि न मोक्षपरिपन्थी तत्त्वज्ञानाविघातकत्वात्, शुक्लपुद्गलारम्भकं वेदनीयकर्मानुगुणं नामिकं कर्म, तद्धि शुक्लपुद्गलस्याद्यावस्थां कलिलबुद्बुदादिरूपामारभते, गोत्रिकं त्वव्याकृतं ततोऽप्याद्यं शक्तिरूपेणावस्थितं, आयुष्कं तूत्पादद्वारेणायुष्कायति कथयतीति, तान्येतानि शुक्लपुद्गलाश्रयत्वादघातीनि कर्माणि । तदेतत् कर्माष्टकं पुरुषबन्धकत्वाद्बन्ध इत्युच्यते । मोक्षस्तु विगलितसमस्तक्लेशतद्वासनस्यानावरणज्ञानस्य सुखैकतानस्य स्वस्वरूपाविर्भाव

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APPENDIX
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स्तादृशस्योपरिदेशावस्थानं वा, स च सम्बन्धनिवृत्तौ नित्यसिद्धार्हदनुग्रहाद्भवतीति । एवं जीवादयः पदार्था व्याख्याताः । एतत् सर्वं वस्तुजातं सत्त्वासत्त्वनित्यत्वानित्यत्वभिन्नत्वाभिन्न- त्वादिभिरनैकान्तिकमिच्छन्तः सप्तभङ्गीनयं नाम न्यायमवतारयन्ति - स्यादस्ति, स्यान्नास्ति, स्यादस्ति च नास्तिच, स्यादवक्तव्यः स्यादस्ति चावक्तव्यः, स्यान्नास्ति चावक्तव्यः, स्यादस्ति च स्यान्नास्ति चावक्तव्यश्चेति । स्याच्छब्दो निपात:, यथाहुः "वाक्येष्वनेकान्तद्योती गम्यम्प्रति विशेषणम् । स्यान्निपातोऽर्थयोगित्वात् तिङन्तप्रतिरूपक" इति । तन्मतमिदं दूषयन्ति तद्विरोधेनासम्भवादयुक्तमिति, अयमर्थः, तन्मतसिद्धनिखिलपदार्थानां मध्य एकैकं पदार्थं धृत्वा तस्मिन् तस्मिन् सप्तभङ्गीनयावतारः कर्तव्यः, यथा हि जीवमुपादाय जीवः स्यादस्ति, जीवः स्यान्नास्ति, जीवः स्यादस्ति च नास्ति च, जीवः स्यादवक्तव्यः, जीवः स्यादस्ति चावक्तव्यः, जीवः स्यान्नास्ति चावक्तव्यः, जीवः स्यादस्ति च स्यान्नास्ति चावक्तव्यश्चेति, इति रीत्या सर्वत्र पदार्थेषु सप्तभङ्गान्वये क्रियमाणे एकस्यापि पदार्थस्य व्यवस्था न स्यादिति तन्मतरीत्यैव तन्मतोच्छेदः सुकर इति भावार्थ: ॥३३॥
ननु कथं बहिरुदासीनस्य तद्दूषणमत आह,
एवञ्चात्माकार्त्स्यम् ॥२.२.३४॥
एवमपि सत्यात्मनो वस्तुपरिच्छेदादकात्सर्यं न सर्वत्वम् ।
अथवा शरीरपरिमाण आत्मा चेत्तदा सर्वशरीराणामतुल्यत्वादात्मनो न कार्त्स्न्ये न कृत्स्नशरीरतुल्यत्वम् ॥३४॥
,
प्रदीपः
एवञ्चात्माकात्र्म्यम् ॥ ३४|| सूत्रमवतारयन्ति नन्वित्यादि, व्याकुर्वन्ति एवमित्यादि, एवं आत्मनिष्ठतया बहिर्दूषणानङ्गीकारे सत्यपि परमाणुभ्य एव सृष्ट्यङ्गीकारेणात्मनो वस्तुपरिच्छेदाङ्गीकारादकात्स्यं न सर्वत्वं स्यात्, तथा च मोक्षदशायामलोकाकाशवृत्तित्वेन तदाकाशावरणसम्भवान्मोक्षदशायां निरावरणत्वभङ्गप्रसङ्गः । नन्वाकाशावरणं नावरणं दिगम्बरादौ तथा प्रसिद्धेरत आहुः अथवेत्यादि, तथा च मनुष्य - शरीरपरिमाणस्य मनुष्यात्मनः कर्मविशेषेण गजशरीरप्रवेश एकदेश एव जीवस्तिष्ठेद्देशान्तरञ्च नैरात्म्यं स्यात्, न कात्र्म्यं न जीवस्य गजशरीरपरिमाणत्वम्
||३४||

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70
Jainism from the view point of Vedāntic Ācāryas न च पर्यायादप्यविरोधो विकारादिभ्यः ॥२.२.३५॥
शरीराणामवयवोपचयापचयानुसारेणात्मनोऽपि देवतिर्यड्मनुष्येष्ववयवोपचयापचयाभ्यां तत्तुल्यता स्यात् तथा सति पर्यायेणाविरोध इति न वक्तव्यं, तथा सति विकारापत्तेः सङ्कोचविकासेऽपि विकारस्य दुष्परिहरत्वात् ॥३५॥
प्रदीपः
न च पर्यायादप्यविरोधो विकारादिभ्यः ॥३५।। किञ्चिदाशङ्कय परिहरतीत्याशयेन व्याकुर्वन्ति शरीराणामित्यादिना । अयमर्थः, जीवो हि नानाविधेन पूर्वोक्तकर्माष्टकेन ज्ञानावरणीयादिना तत्तच्छरीरेषु प्रविशति ततो निर्गच्छति च। तानि च शरीराणि नानापरिमाणानि तेषामवयवोपचयापचयानान्दृष्टत्वात्, एवं देवादिशरीरप्रविष्टजीवस्यापि परिमाणनानात्वेन नानात्वं वक्तव्यं, एवञ्च क्रमेऽङ्गीकार्ये प्रत्येकजीवस्वरूपाणां भेदादनवस्था, तत्र क्रमिकपरिमाणभेदमादाय परिमाणानाम्परस्परं विरोधो जीवानाम्भेदाङ्गीकारेण समाधेय इति सूत्रांशेनाशय परिहरति न चेत्यादिना । एवं न वक्तव्यं, कुतः ? विकारादिभ्यः विकारसावयवत्वानित्यत्वानां प्राप्तेर्लोकायतमतादविशेषप्रसङ्गात्, तथा सति तन्मततुल्यत्वाङ्गीकारे सति, मुष्टिस्थापितपटस्य बहिःप्रसारणेन यथा सङ्कोचविकासशालित्वं पटे तथा जीवानामपि सूक्ष्मस्थूलशरीरसम्बन्धेन सङ्कोचविकासयोरेव तन्मतेऽङ्गीकारादस्तु तथैवेति चेत्तत्राहुः विकारस्येत्यादि । तथा च जीवानां पटतुल्यतया सङ्कोचविकासाङ्गीकारे तत्तुल्यतया विकारानित्यत्वाद्यापत्तौ बन्धमोक्षव्यवस्थैव स्यादनुपपन्ना तत्साधनानामाचरणञ्चेतिभावः ॥३५॥
अन्त्यावस्थितेश्चोभयनित्यत्वादविशेषः ॥२.२.३६॥ अन्त्यावस्थितिर्मुक्तिसमयावस्थितिस्तस्माद्धेतोः, पूर्वदोषपरिहाराय चोभयनित्यत्वं भवेदणुत्वं वा, उभयथापि शरीरपरिमाणो न भवतीति न
तवार्थसिद्धिः ॥३६॥६॥ इति द्वितीयाध्याये द्वितीयपादे षष्ठं नैकस्मिन्नसम्भवादित्यधिकरणम् ॥
प्रदीपः अन्त्यावस्थितेश्चोभयनित्यत्वादविशेषः ॥३६॥ दूषणान्तरं वदतीत्याशयेनाहुः अन्त्येत्यादि । दिगम्बरैर्मोक्षावस्थागतो यो जीवस्तत्परिमाणमवस्थितमित्युच्यते मुक्तस्य जीवस्य देहान्तराभावात्तत्परिमाणस्य नित्यत्वं, तस्माद्धेतोः मुक्तावस्थजीव

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परिमाणनित्यताहेतोः, पूर्वदोषेत्यादि चार्वाकमतीयविकाराङ्गीकारेण जीवानित्यत्वं, किं तज्जीवपरिमाणं फलितमित्याहुः, महत्त्वं परममहत्त्वमित्यर्थः, उभयथापि अवस्थाद्वयेऽपि, तवार्थसिद्धिः जीवनित्यत्वसिद्धिः, एतेषु षट्स्वप्यधिकरणेषु ब्रह्म जगदुपादानं न वेतिसन्देहः, तन्मतमेव सन्देहबीजं, नेति पूर्वः पक्षः, वेदविरुद्धसकलसमयानां व्यासपादैरेव दूषितत्वात् ब्रह्मैवोपादानमितिराद्धान्तः । षष्ठे तु ब्रह्मैव विरुद्धधर्माधारं नेतरदितिनियमो युक्तो न वेति सन्देहे स्याद्वादिभिः सर्वत्रैव तथाङ्गीकारान्नेति पूर्वः पक्षः, स्याद्वादस्यासङ्गतत्वाद्ब्रह्मैव तथेति नियमो युक्त एव श्रुत्या भक्तप्रत्यक्षेण चावगतत्वादितिसिद्धान्तः, एतावदधिकं पूर्वतो ज्ञेयम् ||३६||
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