Jainism from the View Point of Vedantic Acaryas

Author(s): Yajneshwar S Shastri
Publisher: B J Institute

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Jainism from the view point of Vedāntic Acāryas
does not identify the soul with knowledge (Jñāna) like Sankara who identifies soul with knowledge. Rāmānuja, on the contrary, makes a distiction and maintains that the knowledge is a quality (guma) that belongs to the subject (soul-guņin). The soul is frequently designated as knowledge, simply for the reason that knowledge is its essential quality and it cannot appear without knowledge (Sribhāsya, II.III.29). The soul is thus not consciousness itself but the knower (jñātā), the knowing subject. He states that 'to be a knowing subject is the essential character of the soul and the soul is atomic size' (Śribhāsya, II.III.31). The objection may be raised that, if soul is atomic and occupies an extremely minute portion of the body how can it remain in touch with all the parts of the body and can simultaneously experience, so many sensations ? Rāmānuja, like Nimbārka, replies that, as a drop of sandal-ointment, although applied to one spot of the body only, produces a refreshing sensation extending over the whole body, similarly, the soul also, dwelling in one part of the body only, is conscious of sensations taking place in any part of the body (Sribhāșya, II.III.24).
Another famous Vaişņava Philosopher Śri Vallabhācārya and his followers have also criticised Syadvāda and Dehaparimāņavāda of Jainas. Their criticism is more or less similar to earlier Vedāntic Acāryas. They point out that application of contradoctary attributes to same thing is an impossibility (TFFT Fift अवक्तव्यानां प्रत्येकसमुदायाभ्यां स्यात् पूर्वकः सप्त प्रकारो भवति, तदेकस्मिन्