Jaina World of Non Living

Author(s): N L Jain
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith

Page 79

The Jaina world of Non-living
The definition of reality as having the capacity of transformation into useful (Bhavya, beingness) is also not possible for the absolutists. It can not have the property of transformability because of unproven character of the reality. The contact-theorists have the reality quite different from attributes, action, existence, generality and particularity. Under this assumption, it is not proper that the reality could be the subject of the verb 'to be' (Bhu-to be, root) because of its unproved existence like the ass's horns, due to absence of these inherent qualities in it. It can also not be proved due to other causes like relationship of inherence as this is not possible in the case of an entity unproved by itself like the ass's horns. The reality can also not be the subject of the verb 'to be' in case of its definition of 'multitudes of attributes' because the multitude is imaginary and the attributes themselves have no independent nature of their own separate from it. However, there is no such difficulty for the manifold-predicators as they agree to partial difference between the modifications and the modified (i.e. reality and attributes) in terms of names, characteristics, usefulness etc. 13. The realities like medium of motion etc. are many. This maniness is the common substratum. Hence, the aphorism has a plural number. Secondly, it indicates that it is only these entities which are realities and not others. 14. Q. The conformity with number among realities has yielded the plural number in the aphorism. The same could be applied to the gender also as the realities like non-living etc. belong to masculine gender. Hence, there should be masculine gender too (i.e. Dravyāh in place of Dravyāņi). A. This is not correct. Every word has its own specific gender. It does never change, as is the case with numbers. The word 'Dravya' is assigned a neuter gender only. Supplementary Notes 1. The commentary deals with (1) etymological and simile-based definition of the reality (2) repudiation of the concept of realityness on solid logical grounds (3) logical repudiation of absolutist definitions of
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