Indian Logic Part 03

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 11

(10)
between present cognition and a past one is impossible unless both cognitions are had by one and the same cogniser. (2) It is an untenable position that one has cognition all the time, that is, even during a state of sleep, swoon or the like. (3) It is impossible for an intangible thing like a cognition-series to get transferred from one body to another at the time of death or even to get transferred from one place to another along with the associated body.
In Ahnika VIII Jayanta deals with the ten prameyas, viz. body, sense-organ, objects of sense-organs, cognition, internal cognitive organ, activity, moral defilement, rebirth, fruit of action, and pain. The first five are the ontological topics while the remaining five are the ethical topics. Specially noteworthy is the detailed refutation of the Sankhya metaphysics undertaken by Jayanta while considering the topic cognition (buddhi). The occasion for the refutation arises because unlike the Naiyāyika the Sankhya philosopher does not equate the three words buddhi, upalabdhi and jñāna but attributes to them three different meanings. Jayanta shows how buddhi as conceived by the Sankhya thinker is redundant. To this criticism directly relevant for his purpose Jayanta adds a general criticism of the Sankhya doctrine of prakrti and its successive transformations and an even more general criticism of the Sankhya doctrine of causation.
Ahnika IX discusses the problem of liberation (mokṣa) and refutes shree varieties of illusionism. Regarding liberation, Jayanta discusses two questions, viz. (i) what condition characterises the state of liberation and (ii) what means lead to the attainment of liberation. While dealing with the first question, Jayanta refutes the Vedāntic position and establishes his own position. The discussion enables us to form a good idea of how Jayanta on the one hand and his Vedantist rival on the other conceive liberation as suited to their respective conceptions of soul as such. While dealing with the second question, Jayanta first argues against the position that liberation is impossible and then against the position that the proper means for attaining liberation is not right understanding alone but it coupled with religious ritual. Jayanta's threefold criticism of illusionism is highly important. He says that one ought to know soul as conceived by the Nyāya authors, not it as conceived by so many advocates of monism, and then one by one assails Brahman-monism, Sabda-monism and Vijñāna-monism.
In Ahnika X Jayanta offers an account of five categories, viz. sansaya (doubt), prayojana (purpose), drstānta (example), siddhānta (established doctrine) and avayava (steps-making-up-an-inferential-demonstration). The problem of avayava is of special interest to logicians as it relates to the problem of inference. The established-Nyāya position is that an inferential demonstration consists of five steps, viz. pratijña, hetu, udāharana, upanaya and nigamana. It is defended by Jayanta against the Buddhist's criticism that the second and third among these are alone indispensable while the rest redundant. In Ahnika XI Jayanta offers an account of seven categories, viz. tarka (reflection), nimaya (demonstrated conclusion), vada (honest debate), jalpa (debate possibly dishonest), vitandā (empty objection-mongering), hetvābhāsa (pseudoprobans) and chala (quibble). The topic of hetvābhāsa is related to the theory of inference. Here, of special importance is Jayanta's posure of the problem of a new possible type of hetvābhāsa called aprayojaka, a problem whose discussion consitutes a noteworthy part of Jayanta's present treatment of hetvābhāsa. In the last Ahnika XII Jayanta offers an account of two categories, viz. jāti (faulty counter-argument) and nigrahasthāna (point-of-defeat).
Nagin J. Shah