Gandharwad

Author(s): Ratnaprabhvijay, D P Thaker
Publisher: Jain Granth Prakashak Sabha

Page 17

from the five windows as well as the palace, so also a person recollecting an object apprehended by the five senses of a body, is different from the body and its five senses.
When Devadatta recalls an object seen through a number of windows, even when the windows are closed, it is atman or soul that recollects the object perceived through senseorgans even when the sense-organs have ceased working as in case of benumbed state of blindness, deafness etc. This shows evidently that ātman is different from indriyas. Or, say, for example, a soul who observes a person eating tamarind by means of eyes, and exhibits vikāras or perversion by distilling saliva etc. by means of tongue is decidedly different from eyes as well as tongue. Or, ātman is different from indriyas, because having seen an object by means of eyes, ātman holds it by means of hands.
In reply to the Buddhistic theory that like all objects, jiva is destructible, it is argued that one who remembers the incidents that happened in former time and place, is existing like Devadatta who is able to recollect his experience of childhood. So, the soul also can never vanish on account of its being able to recollect the past life.
Bauddhns advocate the destructibility of jñāana ( knowledge ) by means of statements such as “ Yat sat tat sarvam ksanikam". and " Ekavijñānasantatayaḥ sattvāh” etc. But if the destructibility of knowledge were accepted, there would be absolute negation of smaraņa. Jnāna of the pramātā (or the perceiver ) should, therefore, be taken as indestructible. Jnāna being a quality could never exist without a substance. This shows distinctly that soul is distinguished from body. .
Further, according to Bauddhas, kşaņikatā or impermanence is recognized neither by means of self-perception nor by the help of perception through sense-organs, but by means of anumāna or inference only. They further believe that the