Doctrine of Liberation in Indian Religion

Author(s): Shivkumarmuni
Publisher: Munshiram Manoharlal Publisher's Pvt Ltd New Delhi

Page 53

THE DOCTRINE OF THE SELF
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and motion. It is divided into real time (niscayakāla) and relative time (vyavahārakāla). The real time is a substance according to Jaina philosophy, the characteristic of which is vartanā,43 meaning the gradual change that occurs in substances due to the auxiliary cause of real time. The functions of time are to assist substances in their continuity, in their modifications, in their movements and in their priority and non-priority in time.44 The relative time is not regarded as a substance, because it is simply a measure of duration, as one second, one minute, one hour, etc.
Thus the above mentioned five categories of the ajīvatattva are non-psychical substances. Only jīva, according to Jaina philosophy, is psychical, to which we now turn our attention,
EXISTENCE OF THE SELF (ÄTMAN)
Regarding the existence of the self, it is often argued that the self is non-existent like a flower in the sky because it is not directly perceived as is the case with a ghata or pitcher. In reply to this it is said that the self can indeed be directly perceived by one, because one's knowledge about it which consists of doubts etc., is itself the self. And what is directly experienced needs no other proof, such as pleasure and pain of the body.45
The doubt about the existence of self presupposes its existence. Even if we doubt every item of our experience, the act of doubt cannot be denied. It reminds us of the famous dictum of Descartes, cogito ergo sum, i.e., “I think therefore I am", which is based on this principle of doubt because thought exists, therefore the self exists. It is a proposition which emphasizes the relation between a substance and its qualities. Descartes asserts that a thinking self is an absolute certainty whose reality cannot be doubted at all, because self is a substance whose essential attribute is thought.
A substance is known through its qualities. A substance and its qualities are co-existent. If the qualities are experienced, it means that the substance exists. Jiva or self is also a substance, and its qualities like perception, intuition etc., are objects of our experience. Therefore jīva or self exists.
The existence of the self is justifiable also on the ground that the
43. Uttarādhyayanasūtra, XXVIII. 10, vattană lakhano kālo. 44. Tartvārthasūtra, V. 22, varianăparināmakriyāḥ paratvāparatve ca kālasya. 45. Ganadharavāda, verse 6.