Book Title: Anekantavada
Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Atmanand Jain Sabha

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Page 46
________________ 9 object existing externally to the conscious points is similarly explained away by the Buddhist idealists, by pointing out that some of our momentary consciousnesses have an idea of externality embedded in them. In reality, however, there is neither any real subject nor any real object of knowledge. The Vaibhasika and the Sautrantika Schools of Buddhist philosophy are similarly opposed to the doctrine of the absolute Sunya-vada. With the Vijnana-vāda School, they admit the momentary reality of the cognising state but reject their theory of the absolute unreality of the not-self. The Vaibhasikas as well as the Sautranti kas admit the reality of the objects of knowledge; but according to them, the reality of these is not permanent or persistent. They bold that like the knowing self, all objects of cognition, including the atoms constituting a material thing are of momentary duration and vanish and are dissolved as soon as they emerge into existence. (1) In refuting the nihilists' objection to the substantiality of the subject, the Jainas point out that the subject has the capacity to know all the things of all the times. In perception, the subject knows the things that are not only co-existent with it but so, suitably (Yogya ). In Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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