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Vachaspati has rightly introduced it for the right understanding of the Jaina view.
"If the word, Syat”, says Váchaspati, "be not taken to refer to different aspects of a thing, the word, Syat, becomes mean. ingless in the proposition - Syát, it is...' ............... If the word, however, be taken to refer to the different aspects of the thing, the word, Syat, although it does not expressly state 80, makes the proposition,--
Syät it is mean that in some respects' a thing exists. So, the word “Syát” in the proposition of the predication is not mean
ingless.” As regards Sankara’s contention about the impossibility of attributing contradictory aspects to a thing, it is doubtful if Váchaspati bas supportod Sankara on this point. Vacaspati. no doubt, endorses Sankara's doctrines of the absolute Brahma and of the unreality of the experiential world but makes the significant admission that the attribution of contradictory aspects to a thing is not only not impossible but is conducive to & correct understanding of the nature of a thing.
“That which is really true”, says he, “exists in every way, at every place, at
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