Anekantavada

Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Atmanand Jain Sabha

Page 44

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supposed to have different edges upon which the other atoms impringe themselves. These and various other difficulties make the doctrine of the atomic reality unacceptable. Thus the ultimate real matter can neither be gross ' atomic nor which leads to the conclusion that matter is not
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real, or, what means the same thing to the nihilists that no object external to knowledge really exists.
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The nihilists take the next step and contend that if there is no real object of knowledge, there cannot be any real subject to know it. Other difficulties about the substantiality of the knowing subject are:-( 1 ) If the subject knows an object because it is co-existent with the latter in time, then why does not the subject know all the objects of the world with which it is co-existent in time? (2) If, however, the co-existence in time is not the essential condition for the subject in the matter of knowing its object, how does the subject come to have the knowledge? If the subject be held to be a perfectly formless substance, it cannot have the knowledge of objects having definite forms. It is not possible to avoid this difficulty by saying that the subject of knowledge has a form viz., the form of consciousness; for, consciousness itself being devoid of any material