Anekantavada

Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Atmanand Jain Sabha

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more or less powerless in the subject and extornally the object presents itself suitabaly beforo it.
Against the Buddhist idealists' view, the Jainas urge that the very apprehension of “I” in conscious experienoos shows that underlying them a permanent subject is persistent. A unified whole or a connected series of conscious experionce which we have, cannot be made up of dis. parate moments of :consciousness, unless a persistent subject is supposed to permeate and unify those moments.
(2). In their support of the dootrine of the real existence of the knowing self, the Jainas are joined by all the different schools of the Vedie Philosophy, including the Vedanta. The Vedantic system of Sankara, however, fixes upon the Brahma as the only real soul and denies the reality of the individual selves. This position of the Maya-vada School is opposed not only by the non-Vedic Jaina system and the Vedic Schools of the Sankhya, the Yoga, the Mimonsa, the Nyaya and the Vaiśesika philosophy but by such systems of the Vedantic thought itself as the Dvaita (dualistic e. g. the system of Madhava ), the Dvaitadvaita ( the monistico-dualistic e. g. the system of Nimbărka ) and the Višistadvaita (the
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