________________
as going to the very root of the objective reality. In other words reality has as much a positive ele. ment in it as a negative one; an object, if it is exis: tent in certain respects, is also non-existent in some respeots. This however, does not mean that a thing is non-existent in the very same way in which it is existent. It is always necessary to bear this in mind. Considerable misconceptions have arisen regarding the Jaina theory on account of losing sight of this fact. The Syad-vada has been attacked as an absurd and self-contradictory dootrine on the ground that it attributes contra. diotory features to an object. This objection will be discussed at some length later on. Here it is sufficient to point out that by attributing a nega. tive nature to the object in the second Bhanga, the Jainas doinot contradict its affimative nature, contemplated in the first Bhanga. In both the Bhangas, the formal schemos of time, place, nature and mood are no doubt introduced; but the contexts are different in the two predications. The scheme of place in the case of the pitcher, for instance, in the first Bhanga is Pátaliputra whereas the sobome of place in the second Bhanga is Saurashtra. The contradiction is thus avoided. For, there is no absurdity, if a man present in Caloutta be said to be absent in
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
