Anekantavada

Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Atmanand Jain Sabha

Page 72

35
All these are manifestly partial view-points regarding objects and one-sided manners of representing them. The Nikšepas thus are also Vikala modes of apprehensions.
It is, however, questionable, if judgments can always be dichotomically divided thus. An object has many aspects and each of its features is particular in some sense and general also in some sense. It is particular in the sense that it indicates some definite attribute in the object, it is somewhat general also in the sense that it is a part and parcel of the course of substancecontinuum and as such, can be assimilated to the other aspects in some sense. Dual in the same manner is also the nature of the object. It is the back-ground of a number of varied, yet perfectly harmonised features; it manifests itself also in particular to particular aspects. The nature of both the object and the feature being tbus many-sided, it is impossible to look upon & judgment purely as synthetic or purely as analytic. In a synthetic judgment, we have besides the conception of the object as a unitary whole, an indication how the object is particularised in the feature, attributed to it in the judment. In the analytic judgment, again, we have besides the particular picture of the object in accordance