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Shri Mahavir Jain Aradhana Kendra
www.kobatirth.org
Acharya Shri Kailashsagarsuri Gyanmandir
Buddhism
131
aversion, pleasure, pain, cognition etc. inhere in the Self, and act as the modifications of the Self, they would all emerge at once or simultaneously, for, the . Self being of a permanent nature, remains the same in these psychical experiences. But it does not happen so in actuality. The variety of psychical experiences takes place not simultaneously but at different times in succession. Another problem is how these psychical facts can be related to the Self unless they enter into the constitution of the Self, and become identical with it? If they are identified, the Self will be a transitory event like the cognition. If however, the cognition remains distinct, it will not be related and the Self need not be posited as a condition of it. Similarly, pleasure and pain are looked upon as qualities of the Self; but being transitory modifications, they cannot belong to the Self, and if they could belong to it, then the Self being modifiable would become non-eternal. Now, these qualities will either belong or not belong to the Self. On the first alternative, the Self cannot but be a fluxional entity like pleasure and pain; on the second alternative, the hypothesis of a Self as the ground and condition of the psychical manifold will be absolutely unnecessary. Thus the Buddhists prove that there cannot be an eternal Self. What, therefore, exists is only a continuous series of momentary existences. The Buddhists thus confront their opponents with a dilemmatic situation. The Self would be subject to emergence and cessation if it was not regarded as absolutely different from the
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