Traverses on Less Trodden Path of Indian Philosophy and Religion

Author(s): Yajneshwar S Shastri
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 18

Reconciliation of different philosophical view-points
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everything is included.98 Some of the Buddhists claim that, particulars are the only reals. Nyāya-Veiseşikas give equal treatment to both samanya and višesa as principles of reality, but recognise them as absolutely distinct entities, 89 But all these views are partial representation of truth. Reality is neither absolutely universal nor absolutely particular. Suppose if we accept that there is nothing except the general and that there is no such thing as particular, (as Vedāntins maintain) then we should be forced in everyday activity to give up all the particulars of a thing and to accept only its general aspect. For instance, all the transformations of gold, such as ear-rings, bracelets, necklace etc., that are real in our daily life and that are actually experienced by us shall have to be given up and everytime we shall have to deal with gold as gold and nothing else-no varities of transformations of it. If on the other hand, we accept only the particulars of gold such as ear-rings, bracelets, etc. and eliminate the underlying substance gold from our daily exchange, then we have to face great confusion and inconvenience in our daily experience. The truth is that exclusive acceptance of the general only or particular only would land us into utter confussion. We thus, have to accept, both universal and particular, but not as independent categories, as Nyāya.Vaigesika philosophers hold. Nyaya. Vaiseșikas hold that universality or generality consists in a group of features common to a number of individuals and as such, is absolutely different from the particularities which are peculia. rities characterising each of the individuals. The Jainas state that, both tbose are not different but really inseparable. Neither of the universal and the particular has real existence, independent of the other. In the individual of our experience, the generality manifests itself through the particular and the perticularity appears as the particular mode of the generality. Wben we see a cow, we apprehend a certain unity of animal form, such as belongs to all individuals, we call cows, but at the same time we apprehend its distinction from other animals such as buffalo, horse, etc. Moreover, when, we speak of brindled cow', thus referring to the particular character (višeşa) of the animal, we also recognise the fact that the animal is a cow, we, thus, notice, the generality and the particularity. the two-in-one. Similarly, brindledness' too has a variety of forms. So, when we speak of 'a brindled cow', we do not refer to any brindled colour of the animal, but the particular brindled colour which we sco in the cow before us. So, here again, the perception of the
28 ekasmin mahāsāmānye antarbhāvah prajñānaghane.-- Brhadāranyaka Upanişad with
sānkarabhāsya, II. IV-9, The principle Upanişad, Pub. : Motilal Baparasidass, Delhi,
1978, p. 762. 29 S, M, IV, pp. 10-12,