Book Title: Study of Jainism
Author(s): T G Kalghatgi
Publisher: Prakrit Bharti Academy

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Page 129
________________ 114 Study of Jainism the seven predications with their possible permutations. In the Syadvada the word "Syāt” has been very often interpreted as 'perhaps' connoting uncertainty or doubt. But it would be apter to interpret the word Syāt as 'in a particular context', from a particular point of view, in a universe of discourse. The Syadvada has been generally expressed in the seven-fold predication : (a) Affirmation (asti), (2) Negation (nasti), (3) Affirmation and Negation (asti-nasii), (4) Indescribable (avaktavyam), 15) Affirmation and indescribability (asti-avaktavyam), (6) Negation and indescribability (nästi-avaktavyani) and (7) Affirmation-Negation and indescribability (asti-nasti-avaktavyam) These seven-fold predications constitute the elements of Syadvada and they can be considered as sapiabhangi. Syddydda shows that there are seven ways of describing a thing and its attributes. It attempts to reconcile the contradiction involved in the predications of the thing. (i) Syad-asti : asserts the existence of the thing. From the point of view of the substance (dravya), attribute (bhava), space (ksetra) and time (kala) – that from the context of these relations existence and other attributes are predicated. For instance, the Jar exists as it is made of clay in a particular place and time. (ii) Syad-Nasti involves the negation of its opposite; and such a negation is a logical necessity. One is a necessary concomitant of the other. The two predications-affirmation and denial of the opposite are meant to rebut the possibility of unqualified and absolute existence and non-existence. It cannot be denied that it is possible to conceive the existence and non-existence of a thing though not ontologically real. The predications are, therefore, logically necessary to rebut such a conception of absolute existence and absolute non-existence. 21 The Vedantin believes in the absolute existence of the one reality. The Buddhist does not accept the principle of a permanent reality. But Jainas contend that the two may be predicated in different contexts. The first two predications we may refer to the Hegelian contention that the opposite predications in different Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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