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Samādhitantram
there is existence only of internal ‘objects of knowledge' (artha), i.e., of cognition arrived at through the subjective act of mind, then all inferences (anumāna) drawn by the intellect (buddhi), and verbal testimony of the Scripture (āgama) would become sources of invalid knowledge (pramāņābhāsa). But how can there be invalid knowledge (pramāṇābhāsa) without there being existence of valid knowledge (pramāņa)? Further, existence of the objects of knowledge in the world is established through the use of sentences (vākya); without the use of sentences truth cannot be established. Are sentences different from your cognition (vijñāna)? If yes, you lose your ground that momentary cognition (vijñāna) alone exists. If you say that sentences also are cognition (vijñāna) then how have you expressed, 'This world is nothing but momentary cognition (vijñāna)? Moreover, cognition, the possessor of knowledge, is never without the objects of knowledge. If you do not accept independent existence of objects of knowledge, then your cognition also becomes non-existent. If you accept the existence of objects of knowledge, your absolutism gets destroyed. So, if you recognize cognition, you have to also recognize objects of knowledge. Recognition of the real is not accidental since it is universally experienced without any hindrance. When you employ the sādhana - cognition, there can be no escape from also accepting the sādhya – objects of knowledge. In short, your assertions about absolutistic cognition (vijñānādvaita) are unfounded; though these sound attractive like the dulcet utterances of an infant.”
In the end, Svayambuddha voiced his unease about the idea of nihilism (śūnyavāda), expressed by Satamati:
“In your idea of nihilism (śūnyavāda), do you have room for the
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