Nyaya Science of Thought

Author(s): Champat Rai Jain
Publisher: ZZZ Unknown

Page 19

THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT.
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the soul, cannot be a property of more than one substance. The parts must then be all made of the same substance. But this also cannot be true, for in that case each part would exercise similar functions, multiplying the operation of consciousness exactly as many times as there are parts in a soul. We should then expect to find not one impression of an object perceived, not one memory of a recalled experience, not one inference drawn from a given set of premises, nor even one act of desire, willing or judgment on the part of the soul, but a multiplicity of them, determinable by the number of parts of which any particular soul were made. But this is contradicted by direct observation. Therefore, every soul is an indivisible unit of consciousness, i.e., an individual.
The simplicity of the subject of inference is further established by the fact that no conclusion is possible in logic unless the major and minor premises are cognized by one and the same individual, for if the proposition, 'A= B’, be held in mind by one man, and the premise, 'B=C', by another, neither of them nor any one else can possibly draw an inference from them. If the soul were made up of parts, those parts would similarly cognize different portions of a syllogism, thus rendering it impossible to draw an inference. Therefore, the soul cannot be a thing made up of parts.