Nyaya Science of Thought

Author(s): Champat Rai Jain
Publisher: ZZZ Unknown

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NYAYA.
quence of the speech of another. It consists of two* parts, pratijña, and hetu.
Pratijña means the proposition to be proved, and * It is said in Gautama's Nyaya Darsana that there are not two but five limbs of a syllogism of the parárthånumâna type, namely,
(1) pratijña, (2) hetu, (3) udáharana (illustration),
(4) Upanaya, (statement showing the presence of the sadhana in the dharmi), and
(5) nigamana (conclusion). The following is an illustration of a five-limbed syllogism :
(i) This hill is full of fire (pratijña) ; (ii) Because it is full of smoke (hetu); (iii) Whatever is full of smoke is also full of fire, as a kit
chen (udáharana), (iv) So is this hill full of smoke (upana ya);
(v) Therefore, this hill is full of fire (nigamana). Gautama, however, ignores the fact that parârthânumâna differs from svarthânumâna only in so far as it arises at the instance of another, so that the true basis of inference and the form of syllogism are identically the same in both the types of anumana. Hence, the statement of paksa, called pratijña in a pararthanumana, and hetu are alone needed in an inference at the instance of another. It is obvious that the true basis of anumâna is always the force of vyapti (logical connection), so that the moment this relationship is asserted by mentioning the sadhana, smoke and the like, mind is immediately led to that which is inseparably connected there with, and discovers the sadhya.
This operation is performed of one's own accord in svårthanumána, but at the instance of another in the second kind of inference. In both cases, however, it is one's own mind that