Nyaya Science of Thought

Author(s): Champat Rai Jain
Publisher: ZZZ Unknown

Page 29

THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT.
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dependent on memory, inference and the like. The one may be said to represent the intuitional side of life, and the other the intellectual.
Pratyakşa pramâna may be defined as that form of pure, unclouded clarity of Jñâna which, being altogether beyond description, is essentially a matter for experience. The idea is that it is not possible to describe direct pramâna by means of words, but that every one knows from personal experience what is meant by the term.
Pratyakşa pramâna is not to be taken as equivalent to pure, undetermined perception, which, not being antagonistic to doubt, wrong knowledge or ignorance, can never be termed pramâņa. The argument that the nirvikalpaka (unascertained or undetermined perception) is the pratyaksa pramâna because it is caused or produced by the object itself, lacks the support of both the anvaya" and vyatireka* tests, since valid knowledge of unperceived things is a matter of common experience.
* The Anvaya is the statement of the necessary logical connection between the Sadhya (that which is to be proved) and the Sadhana (that which is to prove the existence of the sadhya). The Vyatireka is the opposite of this, and implies the non-existence of Sadhana in the absence of its Sådhya. The following process of inference (syllogism) sufficiently illustrates both these types of arguments. There is fire (Sâdhya) in this hill, because there is smoke(Sadhana) on it; for wherever there is smoke there is fire (anvaya); and wherever there is no fire there is no smoke (Vyatireka).