Nyaya Science of Thought

Author(s): Champat Rai Jain
Publisher: ZZZ Unknown

Page 45

THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT.
CHAPTER XX.
Anumând (inference) is of two kinds, svârthânumâna and parârthânumâna, the former implying an inference drawn for one's own satisfaction, that is by oneself, and the latter one that is drawn at the instance or through the words of another.
A svârthânumâna process consists of three parts, namely,
(i) a sadhya, i.e., that which is to be proved, (ii) a sâdhana, or that which can exist only in relation with, and is, therefore, the determinant of the sadhya, and
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(iii) a dharmi, that is the abode of the sâdhya.
The sâdhya also called dharma, with reference to its abode the (dharmi), and the dharmi are sometimes taken together for the sake of brevity, and called paksa. In such a case there are only two limbs of the svårthânumána syllogism, the paksha and sadhana or argument, also called hetu.
The sadhya may be defined as that which is shakya or abadhita (not opposed to or contradicted by direct perception or inference), abhipreta or ishta (which the disputant wishes to establish)
* The ancients employed the terms vadi and prati-vâdi respectively for the theorist and the opponent who raises all sorts of objections against the validity of a proposition propounded by the vadi. The prati-vadi is an imaginary being whose sole raison d'etre lies in the desire to establish the