Nyaya Science of Thought

Author(s): Champat Rai Jain
Publisher: ZZZ Unknown

Page 26

20
NYAYA.
proved by the fact that the senses are not opposed to ignorance, which is to be removed, and since that which is not opposed to ignorance cannot be the means of its destruction, it follows that they are not directly concerned in the acquisition of right or valid knowledge (pramâna). If sense-perception were the same thing as pramâna, the Sun and the Moon should be of the size actually perceived. But this is absurd. That the senses cannot possibly be regarded as giving birth to truth, i.e., valid knowledge, is also evident from the fact that they are the causes of wrong knowledge also, e.g., the illusory appearance of water in mirage. Besides, that which does not know itself can never know another, because only that which is appropriated by a knowing being is called knowledge, as already explained. Hence, the senses not being appropriative-every one's experience and observation would bear this out-cannot give rise to pramâna. They are merely instrumental in the passage of stimulus from the external object to the soul within, which is the true knower.
In some cases it does undoubtedly seem that valid knowledge accompanies sensual perception, but analysis would show this to happen only in cases of great familiarity with the object of knowledge, dispensing with the necessity for the