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knowledge (nirvikalpaka jñāna) and determinate knowledge (savikalpaka jñāna) are thoroughly discussed in this chapter. With regard to temporal relation between the apprehension and comprehension of an omniscient person, I have supported the view of Siddhasena who holds that the knowledge of the omniscient is a complex of apprehension and comprehension in which both of them lose their separate identity as well as temporal distinction and form a unique pattern which possesses the characters of both. In the third chapter I have given an estimate of sensory and mental comprehension which the Jaina thinkers have elaborately discussed in the shape of mati-jñāna and śruta-jñāna. In the first part the nature and functions of different sense-organs and mind have been taken into account. In the second part I have tried to give an exhaustive account of the categories of non-verbal comprehension ( mati-jñāna). It consists in the Jaina treatment of sensation, perception, retention, recollection, recognition, reasoning, etc. The third part of this chapter has been devoted to verbal comprehension (śruta-jñāna). In the fourth chapter I have dealt with an interesting problem in the field of psychology. This is the problem of what the parapsychologists call Extra-Sensory Perception. I have compared the Jaina account of avalhi and manahparyaya-jñāna with that of Clairvoyance and Telepathy of parapsychology and given their full description from the Jaina point of view. The problem of Omniscience is also discussed briefly. The fifth chapter is devoted to the analysis of sensefeeling and emotion from the Jaina standpoint. The Jaina account of sense-feeling and emotion is a very significant contribution to Indian psychology. In the beginning of the chapter I have advanced some arguments to refute the Jaina belief that holds that the omniscient also possesses sensory feelings, even though he is not in possession of sensory perception. In my opinion, the omniscient who is free from all emotion cannot have any feeling of pleasure and pain. Unlike Schopenhauer, the Jaina regards both pleasure and pain to be positively real. The Jaina further holds that there is neither a neutral feeling nor a mixed feeling. As regards emotions, they are of two varieties according to him: strong emotions and mild emotions. The nature of both these varieties is fully recorded in this chapter. The Jaina view of sex-drive is briefly compared with some important conclusions of modern psychologists. With respect to the Jaina view of the co-existence of various emotions, I have expressed my disagreement with it. The sixth chapter is on activity and its control. In the first part the Jaina conception of mental, vocal, and physical activities is reproduced with some critical remarks here and there. The second part deals with the Jaina account of self-control. All the essential conditions and means recognised by the Jaina thinkers for the successful control, regulation, and cessation of mental, vocal, and physical activities are thoroughly discussed. The Jaina account is compared with that of the Buddhist and of the Yoga. Regarding the role of physical austerity some mystics' opinions have also been quoted. I have given a brief account of transmigration, progression and retrogression, beings and their different states and classes, and the like in the seventh chapter. The last chapter is in the shape of conclusion and recapitulation of the entire treatise,
