Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion

Author(s): Ramjee Singh
Publisher: Parshwanath Shodhpith Varanasi

Page 84

Non-absolutism and Omniscience
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in relation to a number of things and being liable to be influenced by others is a fundamental feature of Jaina epistemology. Pramana is complete knowledge (sakaladeśa) and Naya is Incomplete knowledge (vikalādeśa ).1 Other controversies between the two traditions of Jainism Agamic and the Logical, regarding the classification of knowledge are referred to elsewhere.2
For clarification, it may be said that the terms 'immediacy and mediacy' are used in different sense than the common meaning and understanding. Jainas deny the immediate character of the ordinary perpetual knowledge like the western representationalists but unlike the Realists. "The knowledge is direct or indirect accordingly as it is born without or with the help of an external instrument different from the self."3
However, to avoid sophistication and also to bring their theory in line with others a distinction is made between really immediate and relatively immediate. The latter is empirically direct and immediates knowledge produced by the sense-organs and the mind.
Tattvartha-Śloka-Varttika,
1. Sarvartha-Siddhi, pp. 20-21; P. 118.
2. See, Sukhalal Sanghavi's, Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics, Section 8, pp. 50-54.
3. Tatia, N. M.: Studies in Jaina Philosophy, Jaina Cultural Research Society, Banaras, 1951, p. 28.
4. Pramana-naya-tattvālokālaṁkāra, II. 45; Pramāņa-mimamsā, 1. 1. 15; Nyāya-dīpikā, p. 32; Prameya-ratna-mālā of Anantakirti, Commentary on Parīkṣa Mukham (Ibid), p. 14.
5. Parikşa Mukham, II. 5; Pramāṇa-mimaṁsa, I. 1. 21; Prameya-ratna-mālā, p. 14.
6. Pramana-naya-tattvā lokālankara, II. 4. 5; Nyaya-dipika, p. 33; Tattvartha-Raja-Varttika of Akalanka, Jñāna Pitha, Kashi, 1915, Commentary on Tattvartha-Sūtra 1. 14. Sthananga-Sutra II. 1. 71; Nandi-Sutra 4.