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128 Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion
voluntary actions but it dose not in anyway affect his moral freedom.
(5) But this does not seem to be very good argument. A person's knowledge about the future action of an intimate friend of his is at most a good guess and not definite knowledge.1 Locke's argument that there may be a man who chooses to do something which without knowing that it is within his power to do otherwise (e. g., "If a man chooses to stay in the room without knowing that the room is locked.")" seems to reconcile necessity with freedom but in fact it is a reconciliation of ignorance and knowledge, e. g., he thinks himself free only so long he does not know that he is not free.
(6) If it is said that "It is not because God foreknows what He foreknows that men act as they do it is because men act as they do that God foreknows what He foreknows", it will create a very awkward situation in which man's actions would determine God's knowledge. We can also apply this to human omniscience, where it is likely to create greater complications. It will mean that knowledge of the omniscient being is not unfettered but determined by the actions of other men. Different people perform different actions, often quite contrary to that of their fellows. This will create a difficult situation for the cognising mind if it is to be so determined.
(7) To say that the omniscient being is one who is justified in believing an infinitely large number of true synthetic
1. See, Fred Newman's article on "Omniscience is Possible" in Astralasian Journal of Philosophy, Sydney, Vol. 42, No. 1, May, 64.
2. See Nelson Pike's article on "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action" in The Philosophical Quarterly, Cornell University, No. 1, Jan,' 65, p. 32.
3. Luis de Molina, Concordia Liberi Arbitrii, quoted from Nelson Pike's article, Ibid p. 38, Cp. Boethius, Consolatio Philosophie, Book V, Sec. 3, Para 2.
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