Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion

Author(s): Ramjee Singh
Publisher: Parshwanath Shodhpith Varanasi
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/001747/1

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Parsvanatha Sodhaptha Granthamala : 64
General Editor Dr. Sagarmal Jain
Jaina Perspective
Philosophy
and Religion
ISSN
SARANASAN
Ву
Dr. Ramjee Singh
सच्चं लोगम्मि सारभूयं
पार्श्वनाथ शोधपीठ, वाराणसी-५ PĀRŚVANĀTHA ŚODHAPÍTHA, VĀRĀŅASI-5

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Parsvanatha Sodhapīçha Granthamala : 64 General Editor
Dr. Sagarmal Jain
Jaina Perspective
Philosophy and Religion
By
Dr. Ramjee Singh
M. A., Ph. D., D. Litt.
Vice-Chancellor Jaina Visva-Bharati-Sansthan
Ladaun ( Rajasthan )
Pujya Sohanalal Smaraka Parsvanatha Sodhapitha
Varanasi - 5

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Published with the Financial Assistance by
Shree Bombay Jaina Yuvak Sangh
Published by Pujya Sohanalala Smaraka Parsvanátha Sodhapicha
Near I. T. I. (Karaundi ) B. H. U., Varanasi — 221005
Phone : 311462
Author : Dr. Ramjee Singh
First Edition : 1993
ISBN 81 - 7054 - 084 - 4
Price : Rs. 100.00
Printed at
Naya Sansar Press B. 2/143 A, Bhadaini Varanasi - 221001

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE We feel immense pleasure in bringing out this book 'A Perspective in Jaina Philosophy and Religion' by Prof. Ramjee Singh, Vice-Chancellor, Jaina Visvabharati, Ladnun, Rajasthan (Deemed to be University ) in the hands of scholars, as 64th publication of Parsvanātha Sodhapisha. It is a collection of his valuable research papers and articles, written on various aspects of Jaina Philosophy and Religion, appeared in different journals, seminar proceedings, felicitation and commemoration volumes. These have been classified under sections - Jaina View of Life, Jaina Epistemology, Jaina Metaphysics, Jaina Ethics, Jaina Psychology, Non-absolutism and its Relevance to Jainism and Jaina-Yoga.
We are extremely grateful to Prof. Singh, who did us a favour by giving this work to the institute for publication.
Prof. Singh, an eminent scholar of international fame on Gandhism and Non-violence, is also an authority on Jaina studies, and has made a significant contribution to it. A true Gandbívádi he follows its doctrines in word and spirit and practices in his life.
We are grateful to Dr. Ramanbhai C, Shah and other members of Shree Bombay Jaina Yuvaka Sangh for providing grant of Rs. Ten Thousand for publication of this book.
We are thankfal to Prof. Sagarmal Jain, Director of Pár. svanatha Sodhapitha, who has been instrumental in obtaining this work for publication and seeing it through the press,

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[ IV )
Our thanks are also due to Dr. Ashok Kumar Singh, Research Officer, who has been associated with proof reading and publication of this book.
We are also thankful to Mr. S. K. Upadhyaya of Naya Sansar Press for proof-reading and fine printing.
13-2-1993 Nuchem Plastics Ltd. 20/6 Mathura Road, Faridabad,
Bhupendra Nath Jain
Secretary Pūjya Sohanalala Smaraka Parsvanātha Sodhapicha

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PREFACE
The basic ideology of Jainism has been close to my heart for the following reasons — firstly, I have found an intellectual basis of the Gandhian principle of Ahimsā in the Jaina theory of Anekāntavāda ( Non-absolutism ); secondly, I had, therefore started my initial research on Syadváda-Anekāntavada which was later changed into the “Jaina Concept of Omniscience” on the advice of my revered teacher late Dr. D. M. Datta. Thirdly, I have been greatly benefitted in my life from the association of several Jaina scholars and saints, who have bestowed upon me their affection and kindness. Lastly, as a student of Indology, I thought that it is better to devote my attention to Jainology, which has been relatively a neglected descipline although it has immense potentiality.
Jainology is an amalgalm of Jaina philosophy, Religion and Culture. The scope of the literature produced by Jaina masters and scholars are unlimited. However, a systematic research on Jaina philosophy, Religion and Culture has been very meagre.
The present work is perhaps the first important contribution in this comprehensive field born out of deep study and analysis. It is undoubtedly a scholarly compendium of Jajna Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ethics, Psychology, Religion and Culture. However, unlike an introductory outline, it is marked by profundity and the typical synthetic approach to all problems. The book is neither sectarian nor unsympathetic in this treatment but fully balanced.
This book will enrich the small shelf of books on Jainism in English of every intelligent scholar and lover of Jainism.
My first work on The Jaina Concept of Omniscience was published by L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad in 1974. In the meantime, I have prepared several research papers on Jaina Philosophy, Religion and Culture, which were presen

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[VI]
ted to various national and international conferences. However, they have been so arranged that the collection looks like a monograph.
My grateful thanks go to my friend and Director, Dr. Sagarmal Jain, of Pārsvanátha Sodhapicha, Varanasi, who agreed to publish it from his Institute. Whatever deficiencies are there, they are mine, and whatever merit is found go to Dr. Jain and the management of his Institute without whose help this work would not have seen the light of the day.
15-8-1992 Address Bhikhampur, Bhagalpur – 812 001,
Ramjee Singh Vice-chancellor Jaina Visvabharati ( Deemed University ) Ladoun ( Rajasthan )

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Publisher's Note
Preface
Chapter
CONTENTS
Section One: Introductory
One Jaina View of Life
Two Jaina Agamas and Indian Culture
Section Two: Jaina Epistemology Three From Nescience to Omniscience Four Omniscience: Misconceptions and
Clarifications
Five Six Approaches to the Concept of Omniscience
Six Non-absolutism and Omniscience
Section Three Jaina Metaphysics
Seven Advaita Trends in Jainism
Eight Nature of Unconditionality in Syadvāda
Nine: An Examination of Brahma-Sutra
Section Four: Jaina Ethics
Ten Karmic Idealism of the Jainas
:
Eleven Omniscience: Determinism and
Freedom
Twelve Jaina Mokşa in Indian Philosophy
:
Section Five: Jaina Psychology

Thirteen Para-Psychology and Jainism

III - IV V VI
Pages
1-13
1426
29 - 45
46-57
58-70
71 85
89-103 104-110
111
-
131
119 - 125
126-130
116
147 -
144
- 183

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[ VIII ]
Chapter
Pages Section Six: Non-Absolutism and
its Relevance Fourteen : Non-absolutistic Heritage of Bhagavāna 187 - 208
Mahāvīra Fifteen : Non-absolutism and Jaina View of 209 - 214
Darśana Sixteen : Relevance of Anekānta for Modern 215 - 223
Times Seventeen : Syadváda : A Solution of World 224 - 254
Tension Section Seven : Jainism and Yoga Eighteen : Contribution of Haribhadra to the 257 – 269
Yoga-vidya Author Index
270 - 271 Book Index
272

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INTRODUCTORY
(1) Jaina View of Life. (2) Jaina Agamas and Indian Culture.

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Chapter One JAINA VIEW OF LIFE*
[1] (1) Life is a struggle for perfection. Philosophy should serve as the light house in this struggle of life. Hence, true philosophy, must be a philosophy of life. Our attention has uptill now been mainly directed towards the problems of reality and knowledge, God and Soul etc., but we have neglected Man. However, arts and science, philosophy and culture have got significance only in relation to man. Hence, Vyāsa correctly said : “There is nothing higher than man” ( nahi śreşthataram kiñcit mánuşāt )” Chandidās perhaps went a little further : "Man is higher than everything and nothing is more important than him" (Sabar upare mānūşa satya, tahár upare nai ). Even the Greek Sophists with their own interpretation regarded "man as the measure of all” ( Homo men sura ). The Jainas, even denied God, because they believed in the potential divinity of man. This reminds us of the famous Vedic s
saying: “Those who know Brahman in Man knows the Being who is Supreme" ( Ye puruṣe Brahman Viduste Viduḥ Parameşghinam : Atharva Veda, X. VII. 17).
(2) According to Jainism, man can attain divinity contained in the concept of Four-fold Infinities ( anantachatusaya ). Thus, it shifted the emphasis from God to Man-an outcome of the development of inwardness. Hence, the interest of Jainism has been centered mainly around man, his morality and destiny. Of the seven fundamental categories of Jaina philosophy, only two, the ‘self' and the 'Non-self' are dealt with from a metaphysical point of view; the other five are more corrolaries. Asrava (inftow of karmic-matter ) is * Jaina Lecture to the 54th Session of the Indian Philo
sophical Congress held at Madras.

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Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion
the cause of mundane existence and Samvara is the cause of liberation. Everything else is only its amplification.
(3) Our conduct cannot be isolated from our way of life. Truth and valuation are inseperable. Samantabhadra in his Yuktyānuś sanam (Verse 15 ) says : “Without knowing the real nature of things, all moral distinctions between bondage and liberation, merit and demerit, pleasure and pain will be blurred.”
(4) For Plato, Saṁskāra and Bradley, philosophy, broadly, is the knowledge of reality for the logical positivist it is only 'linguistic analysis'. However philosophy, to be true, must be philosophy of life, where we do not have a part-view but the whole-view or world-view. "Idealism was unable to see the trees in the wood, while empiricism could not see the wood in the trees” said C. D. Broad ( Contemporary British Philosophy, Ed. J. H. Muirhead, Vol. 1, 1924). These are the two different ways of approaching the problem but they are not the only ways. Hence, we should see the world steadily and as a whole. If we do not look at the world synoptically, we shall have a very narrow view of it Purely critical philosophy is arid and rigid.
(5) The Jaina view of life known as anekānta (Nonabsolutism) is nearer to such a synoptic view. To quote Whitehead, such an non-absolutistic approach is “an endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted” (A. N. Whitehead : Process and Reality, 1929, p. 4). The function of philosophy is not merely academic pursuit of knowledge and reality, it also serves as a way of life. It has the dual purpose of revealing truth and increasing virtue so that it may provide a principle to live by and purposes to live for. Hence, C. E. M. Joad opinions that “We must achieve a synoptic view of the universe" (C. E. M. Joad : A Critique of Logical Positivism, 1950, p. 29).

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Jaina View of Life
[11] (1) The Jaina attitude of non-absolutism is rooted in its attitude towards life. Life is dear to all. To do harm to others is to do harm to oneself. The Acărănga Sūtra ( 1. 5. 5) declares : “Thou art he whom thou intendest to tyrannise over." Hence a feeling of immense respect and responsibility for human personality inspires Jainism. It has upheld the worth of life very much, hence its main emphasis is on Ahimsă or non-violence.
(2) However its concern for non-violence is more due to ideological consciousness than emotional compassion. Unlike Buddhism Jainism does not view life as a transient and illusory phenomenon, nor it regards it as immutable like the Upanişad-Vedanta philosophers. Infact, both absolute permanence and absolute impermanence is absolute non-sense. Adhering to the common experience, Jainism regards the nature of reality as having the characteristics of origination, decay and continuance--giving a nen-exclusivists view.
(3) Secondly, Jainism believes in the potential divinity of man. Given freedom of development, every individual can attain the supreme spiritual progress. Hence, any interference means spiritual degeneration. Violence is nothing but interference with life, hence it must be eschewed in thought, word and deed. In this context, Anekantavāda (non-absolutism ) is an extension of Ahińsă in the realm of thought and so is Syādvāda a logical corrolary in the field of speech. Anything should be viewed not from only one standpoint ( ekānta ) but from many angles of vision. The real is a variable constant, hence there must be variable angles of vision, which will ni:gate dogmatism and imperialism of thought. Ekānta, means the 'only' point of view, whereas Anekānta implies the principle of reciprocity and interaction among the reals of the uliverse.
(4) This Anekánta-ideology is the spirit of synthesis (Samanvaya-dršți ) nutured into the synthetic culture of India.

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6
Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion
In the Vedas and Upanişads, the ultimate reality is described neither as real ( Sat ) nor as unreal ( Asat ). Some described the reality is one, while others hold it as many. In fact, the ultimate reality as the same, though it is called by different names. Ajõeyavāda or Agnosticism of Sañjaya shows reconciliatory spirit through his Four-fold or Five-fold formula of denial, so the Vibhajyavada or the Critical method of Investigation of Buddha is contrasted with the Ekantavāda. This is his doctrine of Middle-path or the Madhyam-pratipadá which induced Buddha to “treat prevalent opinions with all due consideration." Nagarjuna's Dialecties of Four-fold Antinomies ( chatuskoți ) resembles Anekanta approach. The Bhedabheda system of Bharata-prapancha is actually referred to as Anekanta. While the Bhatta Mimářsa and the Samkhya have an anekanta bias with respect to some of their ideas and methods. Therefore, Santarakṣita attributes the concept of vaichitrya to the Mimāṁsi as well to the Sámkhyas. Even the critique on the light doctrines of Gautama resemble the Anekantavāda in its spirit and form although they are not as pervasive as they are in Jainism.
(5) Anekantavā da is the heart of Jainism. It constitutes its moral original contribution to the philosophical speculation. However, Anekāntaváda-syädvåda has been more maligned than understood even by the great Vedāntic and Buddhist Acāryas. It is misfortune that system like Advaita which realises the inadequacy of logic to appreciate the evidence of experience as well as the probablistic interpretation of multi-valued logics, which can reconcile the apparent contradictions in the Anekantavāda. Anekanta implies twin functions of analysis and synthesis known as conjunctive and disjunctive dialectics respectively or Nayavada and Syádvāda.
(6) Viewed in the light of the doctrine of Anekanta, the reality reveals not merely as many ( anantatmakam ) but also as infinitely manifold (ananta-dharmātmakam ). The reality is possesed of infinite number of attributes and human know

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Jaina View of Life
ledge is limited untill it attains omniscience. Hence we cannot have the complete grasp of the whole reality or an absolute affirmation or complete negation of a predicate. To know is to relate, therefore our knowledge is essentially relative and limited in many ways. In the sphere of application of the incans of knowledge or in the extent of the knowable our thought is relative. The whole reality in its completeness, cannot be grasped by this partial thought. The objectivity of the universe reveals that the universe is independent of the mind which implies principle of distinction leading to the recognition of non-absolutism.
(7) In absolute sense, a thing is neither real nor unreal, neither permanent nor evanscent but both. This dual nature of things is proved by a reductio-ad-absurdum of absolutism. Further, this is also the basis of the Law of Causation, because an 'absolute real' can neither be cause nor an effect. However, an “absolute flax' cannot be the basis of operation for the Law of Causation. Similarly, the controversy between unity and plurality can be easily solved by the Anekānta logic, which affirms attributes in a unitary entity. A thing is neither an absolute unity nor an irreconciliable multiplicity. Infact, it is both multiplicity-in-unity. Similarly, both absolute existence and non-existence are metaphysical abstractions.
[ III ] (1) To say that a thing is neither real nor unreal, neither cternal nor non-eternal, neither statis nor mobile but partakes of the dual nature perhaps is an affront to the believers in the traditional Laws of Thought. No body rejects them but these abstract formulations are not suited to dynamic character of the universe. Our own observation and experience reveals that the two-valued logic seems to be unreal. So far that abstract formulation of the Laws of Thought A is A (Identity ), A is not A ( Contradiction ), A is either A or not A ( Excluded Midoh ), they may be right. But their concrete

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Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion
formulations (A Radio is a Radio ) admits of change. A real radio is constantly undergoing change, hence there is change according to space and time. Similarly, even change is mcaningless without the idea of persistence. Hence the contradiction (A Skylab cannot both be and not be ) is only national because 'A Skylab' is a Skylab so long it works as a laboratory in the Sky but when it takes as a debris after degeneration, if it is not the same sky-lab in the same condition. Hence, a skylab can be both a skylab and not a skylab. There is no difficulty to accept this in actual experience.
(2) The denial of pre-non-existence and post-non-existence as part of a real leads to the impossibility of all theoretical and practical activity. Similarly, the denial of nonexistence of mutual identity (numerical differences ) and absolute non-existence is also impossible. If there is no difference, there will be no distinction, hence no independence between subject ond object. If there is negation of identity, there is worse confusion. Hence the nature of reality can neither be exculsively identity nor multiplicity. As regards relations, no relation is meaningful if there is pure identity and no relation is possible between the two absolutely independent and different terms. Similarly regarding causal efficiency, the real cannot be either 'absolute constant' nor can it be an 'absolute variant' but a 'variable constant.
[IV] (1) It is asked, whether this kind of non-absolutism is itself absolute or not. If it is former, there is at least one real which is absolute; if it is not, it is not absolute and universal fact. Whether non-absolutism is itself absolute or relative depends upon the nature of proposition which is either complete ( Sakala deśa ) or incomplete ( Vikalādesa ). The former being the object of valid knowledge ( Pramana ) and the latter, two object of aspectal knowlegde ( naya ). This means that the directive of non-absolutism is not absolute unconditionally. However, to avoid the fallacy of infioite regress, the

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Jaina View of Life
Jainas distinguish between the true non-absolutism (Samyak-Anekanta ) and the false non-absolutism (Mithya-Anekanta ). To be valid, therefore, non-absolutism must not be absolute but always relative. When one attribute is stated as constitution the whole nature of the real and thus implies the negation of other attributes, such cognitions are examples of the 'false absolute'. But Naya is not false though it is partial or knowledge from a particular standpoint.
(2) The nature of unconditionality in the statement "All statements are conditional” is quite different from the normal meaning of unconditionality. This is like the idea contained in the passage "I do not know myself” where there is no contradiction between knowledge and ignorance, or in the statement 'I am undecided', where there is atleast one decision : "I am undecided" the uncoditionality is not at the level of existence, while at the level of essence (thought ) anything is alternative. We do not live in the realm of thought or reason above. Behind reason, there is always the watershed of unreason or faith. The Jainas, too have faith in their scriptures as anybody else has in his or her. Her is unconditionally. In each community, there is a special absolute. The absolutes themselves are alternation so far as they are possible (till we are on thought level ), but I have chosen one and stick to it, it is more than possible, it is existent or actual. At this point, there may be a reconciliation between conditionality and unconditionality. On thought level, the statement “Everything is conditional”, holds good but when we adopt the point of view of existence, we are led to rest with unconditionality,
[V]
(1) Ideologically, we cannot make one-sided exposition. But in actual usage, whenever we make any particular statement (Sis P or S is not P ), it takes the form of a categorical proposition, Even a Hypothetical (If S then P) or a Disjunctive ( Either S or P) is said to have a categoric basis and

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Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion
therefore, they can be converted into categorical propositions. But since our thought is relative, so must be our expression.
(2) There is another problem also-how to synthesise the different angles of vision or internal harmony of the opposed piedications (S is P, S is not P, S is both P and not P, S is neither P nor not P). It is, therefore, the Jainas prefix Syāt ( Somehow, in some respect ) as a corrective against any absolutist way of thought and evaluation of reality. This is a linguistic tool for the practical application of non-absolutism in words. Because of this prefix Syát and the relative nature of proposition, it is called Syādvada. But words are only expressive or suggestive (Vachaka or Jñapaka ) rather than productive (Karaka ). Thus the meaning is, however, eventually rooted in nature of things in reality and we have, therefore, to explore a scheme of linguistic symbols (Vachanavinyāsa ) for model judgements representing alternate standpoints. ( Nayas ), or a way of approach or a particular opinion ( abhiprāya ) or view-point ( apekšā ).
(3) This philosophy of standpoints bears the same relation to philosophy as logic does to thought or grammer to language. We cannot affirm or deny anything absolutely of any object owing to the endless complexity of things. Every statement of a thing, therefore, is bound to be one-sided and incomplete. Hence the doctrine of seven-fold predication ( Saptabhaaga ) in the logical consumption of the doctrine of relative standpoints (Syadvada ). If we insist on absolute predication without conditions (Syät ), the only cause open is to dismies either the diversity or the identity as a mere metaphysical fiction. Every single standpoint designated in every statement has a partial truth. Different aspects of reality can be considered from different perspectives (Nikşepa ). Thus Naya is the analytic and Saptabhanga is the synthetic method of studying ontological problems.
If this form of statements, this doctrine insists on the correlation of affirmation and negation. All judgements are

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Jaina View of Life
double-edged in character-existent and non-existent. The predicate of inexpressibility stands for the unique synthesis of existence and non-existence and is therefore 'unspeakable' (avaktavya ). Thus three predicates-'existence', 'non-existence' and 'inexpressibility' make seven exhaustive and unique modes of expression of truth.
11
[ VI ]
(1) We are aware of various criticisms against Anekāntavada-Syadväda that they involve the fallacies of self-contradiction (Virodha ), Absence of Common Abodi (Vaiyadhikaranya ). Infinite-Regress (Anavastha), Confusion (Śanka), Exchange of Natures (Vyatikāra), Doubt (Samśaya), Non-apprehension (Apratipatti), Both sides (Ubhaya) etc. However, we do not want to go into details.
(2) We have considered the most formidable criticism that how far non-absolutism of Syadvada is not absolute but relative. However, it is wrong to confuse the Pragmatic and Pluralistic realistic attitude of Syadvada with either Pragmatism of James-Dewey either or with the objective relativism of the sophists or even with the relative absolutism of Whitehead or Bodis or with Einstenian relativity except in the most general attitude. Pyrroh's prefixing every judgement with a 'may be' must not be identical Jaina 'Syät'. The former degenerates into Agnosticism or Scepticism, the latter leaves no room for any such thing. Scepticism means in the minimum, absence of any assertion, whereas Syadvadins always assert, though what they assert are alternatives-each being valid in its own Universe of Discourse, which controls the interpretation of every word. This is the logic of Relatives.
(3) Perhaps on account of its catholicity of outlook Syadvada is branded as a form 'eclecticism' or a 'philosophy of compromise'. "Since an eclectic system is a loose piece of mosaic work, rather than an organised body of original thought, the term has come to be one of reproach." However, this is

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Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion
unjust to brand it as a loose piece of mosaic work' or 'odd collection of arbitrary half-truths'. In fact the truths presented are alternative truths which are true in their own aspects. Ofcourse, Syadváda rejects the 'dispotic absolute truth' or the 'block universe' or a ‘seemless coat'. Even in the synthesis achieved through the dynamics of Syadváda, there is 'discriminative unity' rather than 'secondless unit'. In short, absolutism in thought is rejected to avoid arbitrariness in action.
(4) To brand Syädvāda as agnosticism or Scepticism like that of Sañjaya or of Pyrroh is again another injustice. The prefix 'Syāt' does not mean 'perhaps' but 'in respect of' a particular context. Each model truth is valid from its own standpoint. It is not a doctrine of 'know nothingness' or "unknowability'. Each standpoint of the saptabhangi is definite in its own place. Syadvāda statements are not 'indefinite (Belvalkar ), but 'indeterminate' ( Hiriyanna which means that it cannot be defined absolutely. No single mode of expression is adequate to express the nature of reality. The various modes of truths are not merely many truths, but alternative truths, each being as definite as anything.
(5) Regarding the charge of 'Self-contradiction against Syadváda by the great Vedantic and Buddhist Acāryas, I feel that the motive behind it must be extra-logical. How one can believe that Dharmakirti will call Anekantavāda as mere non-sensical talk ( Pralăpamātra ) in view of Jaina theory of dual character of universal and particular of a thing. He asks of all realities are Sat, there would be no difference between cow and camel. Prajñakara Gupta and Arcaça point out that the triple charactered nature of reality having origination, destruction and permanence cannot exist together and hence is self contradictory. Sāntarakṣita thinks that there would be a comingling ( Sánkarya ) and a confusion ( Sandeha ) in the dual nature of reality, the result of which would not be helpful to decide which is general and which particular.
Karnakagomin also refutes the dual characteristic theory of the Jainas in his own way. In his famous treatise Refutation

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Jaina View of Life
13
of Anekantavada (Anekantavada Nirása ), Jitari says that one cannot have identity as well as difference by the same nature.
Sankara and Ramanuja also point out to the violation of the law of contradiction.
However, all these thinkers forget that the laws of thoughts should be considered by the testimony of experience and not be pre-conception. Experience shows that a thing is real in own respect but not so in other respect.
The triple character theory is supported through anvasthanupapannatva hetu. From the realistic standpoint there is so such difference which could indicate the seperation between identity and difference. The reality is synthism of identity-in difference and each synthesis is a Játyantara (Sui generis ). Akalanka points out that the Buddhists philosophers ignore the formula Sarvobhavastudats svabhati and tries to establish equality between curd and camel.
Infact, Syadvada is against the formulations of formal twovalued logic. It avoids vicious intellectualism and the fallacy of exclusive particularity. Thus Syadváda is a new dynamics of thinking which is based on catholicism and regard for truth seen from different angles.

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Chapter Two
JAINA AGAMAS AND INDIAN CULTURE
The Place of the Agamas in Cultural History of India
Language and Literature apart from art and architecture constitute the most important records of the cultural history of a country. Hence, the study of the Agamas is bound to reveal the most important observations of Jainism and its contribution to Indian culture,
As we all know, the collective term given by the Jainas to their Sacred literature is called Agamas written in Prakṛt just as the Buddhist Piṭakas in Pali and the Brahmanical Vedas in Samskṛt. The Jaina Agamas like the Buddhist Piṭakas contain the sermons of their founders. They were later on codified by their trusted desciples into the language of the people just for the larger benefit of the masses. Thus the original Sacred Books of both the Jainas and the Buddhists were written in Prakṛt, i. e., Ardhamāgadht and Pali respectively. Being missionaries, their mission was to interest not only the intellectuals but the common people and hence they used the language of the common man. The Jaina Agamas accord a very respectable position to Ardhamagadhi by calling it not only the language of the Aryans1 but also of the celestial gods2. The Buddhist Trpiṭakas enjoin upon their followers to use the local dialect of the peoples for the propagation of their sacred teachings. This was nothing but a legitimate protest against the touch-me-not attitude of the Vedic scholars who would never descend down from their ivory tower of
1. Bhagavati Sutra, V. 5. 4.
2. Prajñāpana Sutra, 1.
3. Chulla-Vagga-Khuddaka-Vatthu-Khandha-Buddha-Vacha
na-Nivṛtti.

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Jaina Āgamas and Indian Culture
15
Samskrt language and on the other hand they would look down upon the use of these languages of the people for imparting religious instructions. Prakst and Pāli were declared to be the languages of the outcastes or Mlechchhas. This shows their regard for maintaining the so-called cultural purity by the priestly order to ensure their monopoly for ever. To be impartial, we cannot deny that there was some amount of animosity among the Jainas and the Buddhist scholars against the use of Sarskřt language at least at the critical stages which is amply reflected in the painful sight of some of Pali and Prákst scholars maintaining linguistic isolationism as a result of which they remained unaware of the Indian heritage as depicted in Saṁskst language and literature. The Bhikkhus of the Hinayana cults of Buddhism in Burma and Ceylon are examples of such isolationism. Similarly, many eminent scholars of Sarskst of that age remained unaware of the growth and development of ideas in the field of Pāli and Prakst languages. The cause of this linguistic animosity was also unhealthy religious rivalries which are demonstrated into the literature of the 7th and 8th centuries A. D. All these factors went to retard the growth of cultural synthesis in India atleast for some time.
In this respect, the Jaina tradition has been rather liberal. Down from the days of Ārya Rakșit ( 2nd Century of Vikram Samvat ) and Uma Swami ( 3rd Century of V. S. , there has been equal interest in Prakrt and Sanskrt so much so that both these languages became the common and combined treasures of the Jaina. Naya, the Jainas have adopted other regional languages also like Kannada and Tamil in South India, Gujarati and Marathi in Western India and even Hindi in Central India for the propagation of their religious teachings or literary pursuits.
1. No Mlechchhaitavai Napabhasitavai - Mahabhașya of
Patañjali, p. 49.

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Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion
Pt. Sukhalalji1 has divided the entire extent of Jaina philoshophical literature broadly into four periods beginning with the Agamic period. Not withstanding the differences in the two tradition of Digambaras and Śveta mbaras, the Jainas generally agree that the Agamas constitute the inspired wisdom of Lord Mahavira, when he attained perfection and Omniscience. The sermons were later on codified by his chief disciples called Gapadharas. According to the Jaina tradition, there are only two types of persons, who are qualified to know the secrets of religion-the Omniscient (Kevalin) who directly perceive everything of all places and of all times. Then there is another class of persons who understand the meaning and significance of sermons indirectly, i. e, through the lectures or sermons by the Kevalins themselves. They are called Śruta Kevalins. Acarya Yati Vṛşabha has given the chronological account of the Missionary (Acarya) tradition of 683 years after the Nirvana of Lord Mahavira having 3 Kevalins, 5 Śruta Kevalins, 20 different orders of Acaryas.3
16
According to the Śvetambara tradition, the last compilation of the Agamas had been done at Valabhi after 980 years of the death of Lord Mahavira at the time of Devardhi, however the compilations of some of the Agamas were done at Pațaliputra also which was after 250 years of Lord Mahāvīra's death. The Agamic literaure is vast and stupendous, comprising of 12 Angas, 12 Upāňgas, 4 Mulas, 2 Chulikas
1. Sukhalal Sanghavi, Darśana Aur Chintana (Ahmedabad, 1957), p. 362.
2. Kailash Chandra Sastri, Jaina Dharma (Kashi, 2475 V. N. ), p. 254.
Mahendra Kumar Acarya, Jaina Darśana (Kashi, 1955 A. D.), p. 16. He says that Harivansa Purana, Jayadhavala, Adi Purāņa and Śrutavatara also support it. see Preface to Jayadhavala, Volume I, pp. 47-50. Dalsukha Malvania, Jaina Darśanika Sahitya Ke Vikas Ki Rūparekha (Varanasi, 1952), pp. 1-4.
3.
4.

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Jaina Agamas and Indian Culture
17 Sūtras, 6 Cheda Sūtras, 10 Prakīrpakas etc?. The commentation on these Agamas are called Niryuktis and Bhaşyas, which are in poetry style and those in prose style are called Cūrộis. Available Niryuktis, are said to be compositions of Bhadrabahu, the Second, which contain subtle philosophical discussion on the problems of existence of soul, analysis of knowledge and meaning etc. The Bhasyas contain the fuller accounts of all subjects. Sanghadas Gani and Jinabhadra are the two famous Bhașyakaras. Jinabhadra was a versatile genius, who has written practically on all subject under the sun. Sanghadas Gani has limited himself to the task of dealing with the problems of epistemology and the ethics of the Jaina Sadhus. Among the Cūrpikaras, Jinadasa Mahattara is a notable figure. Cūrpis are shorter commentaries in prose on the pattern of Jatakas. In Sarnskst, the oldest commentaries of the Āgamas is of Acārya Haribhadra ( 757-857 V. S.), next to whom are Śīlāůka Sūri ( 8th Cent. V. S.) and Sanghacarya, Abhayadeva and Malladhari Hemacandra and last but not the least Malayagiri. All these scholars wrote their commentaries in Sarskst and Prákft but they were so vast and deep that shorter commentaries in the languages of the people was considered essential. Hence, we find the composition of many Primers and Beginners in regional languages like Taba in Gujarati. Ācārya Dharma Singh is said to be an important author of such Beginners and Primers, 2
According to the Digambara traditions, all the old Agamas are said to have lost except the 12th called Drşțivada. They regard Bhadrabahu as the last Sruta Kevali, with him out of 14 Pūrvas, 4 were lost. After Bhadrabahu, the different Acaryas became the teachers of 11 Angas and 10 Pārvas and the process of disintegration continued up till 683 years after Mahavira's Nirvana. An important Ācarya named Dharasena initia1. Dalsukha Malvania, Jaina Darśanika Sahitya ka Singhávalo
kana ( Kashi, 1949 ), pp. 2-3. 2. Ibid, p. 6. 3. Kailash Chandra Shastri, Jaina Dharma, p. 255.

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18 Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion ted his two most able disciples, named Puşpadanta and Bhutabali into the Āgamas, who later on compiled the Sermons in the form of a monumental epics of religion called, Şaç-khandagama in Prakpt. A contemporary of Acarya Gunabhadra compiled Kaşaya-Pahuda upon which Yati Brşabha wrote a commentary in Prakst after he learnt it from Arya Manşku and Na. gahasti. There are quite a few commentaries on these two monumental treasures-Şackhandagama and Kaşaya-pahuda. The last of the commentaries on Şarkhandagama called Dhavala is by Virasena, which comprises 72 thousand verses. The commentary on Kaşaya-pahuda, called Jayadhavala is equally monumental having 20 thousand verses written by Vīrasena and 40 thousand added by his disciple Jinasena. The final portion of the Şaçkhaodagama is called Mahabandha which has 41 thousand verses. This has been composed by Bhūtabali himself. Fortunately, all those three monumental Agamas are treasured at Mudabidri's temple library. Acərya Nemichand Siddhanta Šāstri Chakravarti of the 10th century was supposed to be an authority on these three Agamas. He had composed Gommagasăra and Labdhisara to give the essences of these Agamas. Todaramala has written commentaries upon Gommatasāra and Labdhisāra in Bhaşā. Ācārya Kunda-kunda's Samayasära, Pravacanasāra, Niyamasāra and Pañcāstikaya-sära are in acknowledged Prakṣt works which are regarded as good as the Āgamas by the Jainas. Jainācārya Umā swāti wrote Tattvärtha-Sūtra, which is regarded as the Veritable Bible of the Jainas by both the sects. The legend of the propagation of Jaina religion rests with the Tîrthankars and their disciples called eleven Gapadharas, who are said to have converted a community of 4411 Áramapas? from whom the entire Jaina community has grown. 2. The Contribution of the Agamas
The Validity of Scriptural Knowledge-Except the Carvakas, all systems of Indian Philosophy admit the validity of scriptural knowledge. In the Vedic tradition, the Vedas which are 1. Kalpa-Sūtra, p. 285.

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Jajna Agamas and Indian Culture
19 regarded as impersonal, constitute the highest authority of religion. In the tradition of the śramanic culture of Buddhism and Jainism, the authority of scriptures rests with their prophets, who are supposed to be Omniscient as well above all desires and aversions. In the Jaina tradition, the validity of the scripture is accorded at par with direct perception? since the scriptural knowledge is knowledge gained by the Omniscient being, who has directly perceived the reality. Thus scriptural knowledge is also definite and indubious like the omniscient knowledge. This is admitted by Samantabhadra in his Apta Mimāṁsās. It should also be noted that the knowledge and practice of Scriptures (Āgamas ) also leads to the attainment of Kevala-jñāna, so as to the knower of the Śrutas are called Śrutakevalin. Anybody and everybody cannot be Śruta. In order to be a śruta, he must fulfil the conditions of becoming desireless ( Vitaraga ) and he must destroy the Karmas which obscure the real nature of Śruta.3 Only then, such a Scriptural knowledge serves like the bliss. 4
According to the Vedic tradition, the Vedas manifest their own validity. Words used by us, according to them, denote things that can be cognised by other means of knowledge, and, if we cannot know them through other means, then those who utter them must be of unquestionable authority. So non-Vedic utterances cannot possess any inherent validity. According to Prabhakara, such non-Verbal knowledge is of the nature of inference because only the verbal cognition of the Vedas is strictly verbal.6 The Vedic thinkers adopt the doctrine of impersonate authorship perhaps to
1. Gommațasāra ( Jiva-Kapda), Gatha 368; Tattvārtha-śloka
Varttika, I. 9. 20. 2. Apta-Mimāṁsā, Sloka 105. 3. Tattvartha-śloka-Varttika, I. 20. 2. 4. Kunda-kunda, Darśan pähuda, Gatha, 17. 5. Pärthasarathi Misra, Sastra-dipika, p. 53. 6. Śilăuka, Prakarapa-Pañcika, p. 83.

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20 Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion
maintain its infallibility1, because a person is liable to many defects. However, in order to prove the impersonal authorship of the Vedas, the Vedic thinkers; especially the Mimamsakas introduce a mystical theory of the eternality of the Vedas. They hold that the relationship between the word and its meaning is natural and not created by convention. The purpose of the Mimamsakas in rejecting the authorship of the Vedas to Gods is because God, who is incorporal, has no organs of speech and hence he cannot utter words, and if He assumes the human form, then He is subject to all the limitations of material existence and hence his utterances will not be authoritative. Then there is no tradition of divine or human authorship of the Vedas. If it is said that the Vedas are human compositions because names of saints and seers occur, it may be said that the hymns deal with the eternal phenomena of nature and the names of persons have only symbolical significance and not any historical significance.
In tracing their Agamas to the utterances of Lord Mahāvira, the Jainas have a more secured position. Firstly, since Mahāvīra is Omniscient (Kevalin) what he says must be true. Since, he is above desires (Vitaraga), what he says is free from any subjective prejudices. Lastly, since he is compassionate, what he says is for the benefit of the people. Thus the Jaina theory of scripture as the sermons of Lord Mahāvīra is more intelligible and rational. The adherence of one's faith in the personality of Lord Mahāvīra gives a religious colour. Lastly, such a theory of scripture having its source in the personality of a realised man raises the dignity and status of man to the status of God. Omniscience is not divine but human. It requires a Sadhanā. Thus the Jaina doctrine of Agamas sets up everything in real and historical context, while the explanation of the impersonality of the Vedas is rather vague and ambiguous. However, it looses at one place-by treating the Vedic authorship as impersonal, it implies that it is perhaps very-very old and ancient because a person is 1. Kumarila Bhaṭṭa, Śloka-Varttika, II.

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Jaina Ägamas and Indian Culture
21 after all a historical event. Here the Jaina reply is that since the truth contained in the Agamas are one, eternal and permanent, it is as old as anything. The objects of the knowledge are the one and the same for all. Hence their cognition is neither new nor old. Hence, there is an argument in the teaching of all Arbatas. In this sense, the teachings are eternal and universal and hence impersonal. Thus, the line of demarcation between personal and impersonal authorship of the scripture gives way to a reconciliation. A prophetic utterance, in the sense, it is eternal and universal, is impersonal; however, since it comes from the mouth of a historical person, it is personal.
Agama and its Interpretation – The statement of a trustworthy person is said to be Āgama. Otherwise, words themselves are inert, lifeless and even ambiguous. Hence, the validity of Sabda rests with the person who uses them. Hence, the interpretation of the Agamas depend both upon the Speaker and also upon the Audience. So far, the speakership of the Agamas is concerned, it is held to be the direct sermons of the Omniscient Lord, which have been compiled and codified by their chief disciples called Ganadhara.2 So far the interpretation of the Āgamas from the point of view of the audience is concerned, it should be clearly noted that a certain amount of intellectual ability and moral preparation is needed for the appropriate grasp of the subject matter. In absence of such a preparation, the same Āgama admits of different and even conflicting interpretations about one and the same subject, like the different interpretations of the Brahma-Sūtra and the Bhagavad-Gītā The Jaina Āgamas are the sermons of the Tirthankaras which have been correctly reported by the Śruta-kevalin and the Gapadhara, who are also supposed to be omniscient and also above all desires of love and hate, hence the validity of the Jaina Āgamas is
1. Ācāranga-Sūtra, 4. 125; Sutra-kştājiga, 2. 1. 15, 2. 2. 41. 2. Āvasyaka-Niryukti, G. 192 and Nandi-Sūtra, G. 40.

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22 Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion doubly raised because both the Source as well as the Course of the Āgamas are pure.
The Place of Samayika - There are three distinctive contributions of Jainism to Indian Culture - Equality (Sama ), Self-control (Sama ) and Dignity of labour (Śrama ).1 Equality or Sámāyika is said to be the heart of Jainism. In the Jaina religious scripture, Dvadaśangi or in the 14th Pūrva, 2 the place of Samayika is the first and foremost among the six daily duties. Without the practice of Sāmāyika or equality, there is no hope for any religious or spiritual realisation. When a householder accepts the Jaina religion, he solemnly pledges to abide by the principle of equality.3 The whole of Višeşāvaśyaka-bhāșya of Jinabhadra Gani is an exposition of this principle of Sāmāyika. The three jewels of Jainism, i. e., Right Faith, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct4 depend upon the principle of equality. The Gītā calls it the inner poise or the evenness of mind ( Samatvam5 ), or equal mindedness (Sama Cittatvam6 or Samata?) and such a man who attains this is called seer with an equal eye (Samadarsipaḥ8 or Sarvatra-sama-darśana'). This principle of equality must be reflected both in thought and action. In thought it is the principle of Anekanta, in action it is the principle of Ahimsa.
(a) Anekanta – Anekānta is the application of the principle of equality in the sphere of thought. Thus it is not a philo1. Sukhalal Sanghavi, Jaina Dharma kā Prāpa ( Kashi,
1952), p. 2. 2. This is called the Ācārānga Sūtra. 3. Karemi Bhante Samayeam. 4. Umāswämi, Tattvārtha-Sūtra, I. I. 5. Bhagavad-Gītā, II. 48. 6. Ibid, XIII. 9. 7. Ibid, X. 5. 8. Ibid, V. 18. 9. Ibid, VI. 29.

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Jaina Agamas and Indian Culture
23
sophy but a philosophical standpoint just as there is the Advaitic standpoint of Sankara and the standpoint of the Middlepath of the Buddhists. Anekanta literally means non-absolution. Though the Anekanta Period in Jaina philosophical literature comes after the end of the Agamic period, the genesis of the Anekantic idea is already present in the Agamic literature. The famous Bhagavati Sūtra refers to the important and interesting dreams that Lord Mahāvīra had just before he had attained Keval-jñana. In one of the dreams, there is reference to 'multi-faced' or 'multi-coloured' (citra-vicitra1) wings of Pansakholi which symbolises the multi-faced reality.
The Buddhists also have their doctrine of Vibhajyavāda or 'conditional expressions', which means that they discard onesided view ( ekanśavada ).2 However, the Buddhists believed in Vibhajyavāda to a limited extent, where as the Jainas believe it to the full extent, so that it was finally developed into the Theory of Non-absolutism (Anekantavāda ).3 In Buddhism, Vibhajya means division and Vibhajya Vyakarṇīya means answering a question by dividing. While the Buddhists attribute the divergent attributes at the same time with regard to two different things, the genius of the Jainas is reflected in attributing the different attributes in the one and the same subject, of course, the contexts are different. This leads to the organon of Sapta-bhangi and the multi-valued logic of Syadvada. Even in the Vedas and Upanisads5, the description of the reality is in terms of contradictory attributes, like real and unreal, mobile and immobile. Nasadīya Sukta, therefore, avoids to describe the reality either as real or unreal. Thus Anekanta 1. Bhagavati Sūtra, 16. 6.
2. Digha-Nikaya, Sangeet Pariņāma Sūtra No. 33.
3. Sutra-kṛtanga, I. 14. 19, I. 14. 22; Bhagavati Sūtra, 7. 2. 270, 12. 2. 443, 25. 4, 1. 8. 72.
4. Rg-veda, I. 164. 46.
5. Isavasya Upanisad, 5; Taittirīya Upanisad, II. 7; Bṛhadara. nyak Upanisad, I. 21. 1; Chandogya Upanisad, 6. 2.
6. Rg-veda, X. 129.

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24 Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion seems to be a dynamic of thought-reconciliation, through which we find an attempt at synthesis between apparently contradictory attributes of eternality and non-eternality of the world? or finiteness or infiniteness of the Jiva2 or difference or non-difference between the body and the soul.3 Anekanta however, should not be understood to mean that reality is contradictory. It simply means that it has innumerable number of aspects and attributes which can be thoroughly comprehended only when we can put all of them together. This is ideal of perfection, which can be attained only when we become an omniscient. However, we can have the knowledge of one or other aspect if we are free from prejudice and bias. Thus, on the one hand it has its ideal of finality of knowledge, in reality it aims at aspectal knowledge or naya.4 As a corollary, we have to be cautious in our speech. Lord Mahavira explained every problem with the help of siyavaya5 or Syadvada. Absolutism in speech and language is as bad as absolutism in thought. The Agamic stress on Anekanta and Syadváda is due to its great adherence to Ahimsa. Anekāntavada or Syadváda is extension of the principle of Ahimsa on intellectual level. Jainas think that without non-violence in thought, non-violence in practice is impossible.
(b) Ahimsa - Ahirisă follows as a logical corollary from the principle of Equality (Samya ) of souls. The inequalities of physical and mental abilities are only accidental and they are due to the Karmas. How, since 'life is dear to all and since everything has got life', we have to accept the principle of Ahimsă as an important means of spiritual realisation. To the Sramaņic cult of Jainism, the means are as important as the ends. Our end is no doubt self-realisation or Mokşa. Now,
1. Bhagavati Sūtra, II. 1, IX. 6; Sūtra-kstanga 1. 4. 6. 2. Bhagvati Sūtra, II. I. 90, IX. 38. 7, XIII. 4. 481. 3. Ibid, XIII. 7. 495, XVII. 2. 4. Ibid, VII. 2. 273. 5. Sukhalal Sangavi, Jaina Dharma Ká Prána, p. 2.

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25
Jaina Agdehaskan terima 082049. this self-realisation is impossible without the love of self and this love of self is nothing other than Ahimsā, since self resides in everything. Jainism looks upon the whole world as filled with life. Nothing is fallow or sterile, nothing is dead and inert. What to speak of living beings, even plants and every portion of matter have got life. Hence, respect for life is a spiritual act, it is a law of our being. If we forget it, life becomes well nigh impossible. 'As we feel our pain, so we must feel the pain of others', says the Acārajga. The same truth is stated in Daśvaikālika, where it is clearly said that “all beings desire to live, none want to die'. All our religions accept Ahimisā as a virtue but Jainas have worked out a complete philosophy of non-violence, hence here Ahimsa is more due to rational consideration than emotional as we find in Buddhism and Christianity. The Jaina Ahimsa, embraced the whole universe and is not restricted to humanity. There we can find that Advaita Vedanta and others admit oneness of soul and practically removes the ground of mistrust and violence, which are the result of duality.
Nivarttaka Dharma -- Ahimsă together with Aparigraha constitute the ethical wholeness of self-control or self-restraint in social relationship, self-control is the foundation of a higher moral life as in individual life, it is the basis of higher spiritual life. Except for the Mímárisakas, who believe in heaven etc. all the Vedic and non-vedic systems adopt Mokșa as the Summum Bonum of life, which is a state of cessation of the wheels of existence. It is happiness ( Śreya ) rather than pleasure (Preya ) which is the goal of life. Thus self-purification ( Atma-śuddhi ) and not the acquisition of any earthly or heavenly pleasures, which is the aim of life. The obstacles in the forms of delusion, ignorance and craving must be rooted out by practising the different vows or Vratas, throughout life. Hence, the importance of a realised soul rather than some mysterious agency is emphasised. In short, all these constitute the Nivarttaka Dharma or world-withdrawing religion, which is said to be the heart of Jainism. It is bound to be individualis

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26
Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion
tic, world-withdrawing and self-negating. Emphasis on renunciation, asceticism, penances etc. in the account of Sadhana given in the Acaranga is literally soul-stirring. Like Buddha, Mahāvira also presented a gloomy picture of the world. The living world is afflicted, miserable' thus begins the second lecture of the first book of Acaranga.

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JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
(1) From Nescience to Omniscience (2) Omniscience : Misconceptions and Clarifications (3) Six Approaches to the Concept of Omniscience ( 4 ) Non-absolutism and Omniscience

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Page #38

Chapter Three
FROM NESCIENCE TO OMNISCIENCE
(1) Soul: The Basis of Science, Nescience & Omniscience
By overthrowing rational psychology in his 'Critique of Pure Reason', Kant has disproved the very existence of the soul and thereby the doctrines of the immortality and simplicity of it. But what he lost in the 'Critique of Pure Reason', he regained them in the 'Critique of Practical Reason'. Lord Mahavira presenting the Purva-pakşa in the Viseṣavaśyaka bhaṣya comes to the conclusion that the soul does not exist, but in the Uttar-paksa, refutes all the arguments of the opponents and successfully establishes the existence of the soul. Eminent psychologists of today have been finding themselves helpless to do away with the hypothesis of the soul. "Modern man (is also ) in the search of a soul."3 "The reality of self is obvious to the Introspectionist as the reality of the organism is to the Behaviourists."4 James supports it and his pupil, Calkins comes out strongly for a 'psychology of selves'. Stern, Dilthy, Spranger and Allport have been endeavouring to build up a 'science of personality'. The theory of soul holds that the principle of consciousness must be a substantial entity, psychic phenomena are activities, and the activity is possible unless there exists an agent. Therefore William James regards its admittance 'to be the line of least logical resistance'. Calkins holds that the self, far from being a metaphysical concept, is an ever present fact of immediate experience and fully worthy to be
1. On paralogism of Reason in the transcendental dialectic. 2. Gatha: 1552 (Yaśovijaya Granthamālā No. 1). 3. Jung's Modern Man in Search of a Soul, Kegan Paul. 4. Woodworth, R. S.: Contemporary Schools of Psychology, pp. 241-242.

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30 Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion made the central fact in a scientific psychology, I Huxley, Spencer and even Darwin have likewise admitted that the materialistic hypothesis involves grave philosophical errors. 3
In fact, nothing would be simpler than to start with sensation, which is as simple as simplicity, hence it is bound to be indivisible affection which does not imply a reflection even. Naturally, the subject of such sensations must then be a simple substance, “The ancients employed the term 'should' to indicate their conceptions of a knowing substance that was partless and indestructible and therefore immortal.”8 Words4 abound with references to the arguments for the existence of soul. It is due to the soul that a body appears to be living, the soul itself being the principle of consciousness.5 Udyotkara®, the famous author of Nyaya-Varttika, therefore observes that there is practically no un-unanimity regarding the existence of soul. (2) Soul : Its Characteristics
Indian philosophers are agreed about the nature of the soul as possessing consciousness. Even the Carvakas regard Ātman as Consciousness, which is a byproduct of the material body.? The Buddhists8 also accept this position, with little difference. However, Jainism is very emphatic about the characteristic of soul as consciousness, which consists of jñana and 1. Mehta, M. L. : Jaina Psychology, p. 190. 2. Nahar and Ghosh : An Epitome of Jainism, p. 273. 3. Jaina, C. R.: Jaina Psychology, p. 3. 4. Višeşāvaśyaka bhaşya, Gatha 1532, 1538; Prameya-kamala
Mártanda, p. 114 and Sastra-vārtā-samuccaya, p. 44. 5. Kulkarni, P. G. : *The Jaina Concept of Soul', Journal of
Philosophical Association, Vol. III, No. 11-12, p. 63. 6. Malvania, D. S. : Ātma-Mīmāınsa, p. 34. 7. Caitanya -- Visişța deha-eva-atma. 8. Visuddhi-magga of Buddha-ghosha, XIX. 23. 9. Cf : Sarvártha-Siddhi, 38; Dravya-Sangraha by Nemi
chandra, 2; Pravaçana-sara of Kunda-kunda, II, 80; Nyaya

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From Nescience to Omniscienec
31
darśana ( knowledge and intuition ). In the Tattvartha-Sūtra?, the term for Cetană is given as Upayoga2 which includes bliss and power besides cognition and intuition. So very Jiva, in its natural condition possesses 'four-infinities'. (3) Karma : The Material Basis of Bondage
So infinite cognition, intuition, bliss and power belong to the soul in the state of perfection. But the mundane souls are infected by something foreign, which obscures their natural faculties. This foreign element is known as Karman. The Jaina conception of Karman is not ‘action' or 'deed' as it etymologically means; it is an aggregate of very fine imperceptible material particles. This Doctrine of the Material Nature of Karman is singular to Jainism alone; with others karma is formless. The Jainas regard karma as the crystalised effect of the past activities or energies. But they argue that “in order to act and react and thereby to produce changes in things on which they work, the energies must have to be metamorphosed into forms or centres of forces."'3 Like begets like. The cause is like the effect. “The effect (i. e. body) is physical, hence the cause (i. e. Karma ) has indeed a physical form."4 But unless Karma is associated with the soul, it cannot produce any effect, because karma is only the instrumental cause and it is the soul which is the essential cause of all experiences. Hence the Jainas believe in the Doctrine of Soul as the possessor of Material Karma.5 But why the conscious soul should be associated with the unconscious matter ? It is owing to the Karma, which is a substantive
Sūtra of Gautama, 72; Pañcâstikāya-sära of Kunda-kunda,
I. 27; Sarvartha-Siddhi, p. 163; Puruşartha-Siddhyupāya, 9. 1. Tattvārtha Sūtra, XIV. XII. 8. 2. Upayoga means “active consciousness' and Labdhi means
'dormant conscience'. 3. Nahar and Ghosh : An Epitome of Jainism, p. 317. 4. Cf : Outlines of Jaina Philosophy by M. L. Mehta, p. 63;
Nyaya-Viniscaya-Vivarana, p. 292. 5. Outlines of Jaina Philosophy by M, L. Mehta, p. 61.

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Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion
force or matter in a subtle form, which fills all cosmic space. “The soul by its commerce with the outer world becomes literally penetrated with the particles of subtle-matter.”'I Moreover, the mundane soul is not absolutely formless, because the Jainas believe in the Doctrine of Extended Consciousness, like the Doctrine of Pudgala in Buddhism and the Upanişads2 and also to some extent in Plato and Alexander. While the Samkhya-Yoga, Vedānta, Nyaya-Vaišeşikas and the Buddhists kept consciousness quite aloof from matter, the Jainas could easily conceive of the inter-influencing of the soul and the Karmic-matter, hence the relation between the soul and Karma became very easy. The Karmic matter mixes with the soul as milk mixes with the water or fire with iron. Thus the amīīta karma is affected by mūrta karma as consciousness is affected by drink and medicine. This is the relation of concrete identity between the soul and the Karma.
Without the Karma Phenomenology, the diversity of the variegated nature and the apparent inequalities among human beings and their capacities remain unexplained. Kā lavāda (Temporalism )3, Svabhāvavada (Naturalism )4, Niyativada ( Determinism )5, Yadệcchávada (Fortuism ), Ajñā navāda and Samsaya-vīda (Agnosticism and Scepticism ) ?, Bhauti
1. Radhakrishnan, S : Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 319. 2. Svetāśvatara Upanișad, I. 16; Katha Upanişad, IV. 12.
Chándogya Upanişad, III, 14. 3. 3. Atharva-veda, XIX. 53-54; Mahabhörata (Santi-parva )
chapters 25, 28, 32, 33; Nyāya-Siddhānta-Muktavali,
Káriká 45. 4. Buddha-carita by Koşambi, p. 52; Bhagavad-Gītā, V. 14. 5. Buddha-carita, p. 171; Dīgha-nikāya, I. 2; Rhys Davids.
Dialogues, Part II, p. 69. 6. Nyāya-Sūtra of Gautama, IV. I. 22; Nyāya-Bhāşya of
Vátsyāyana, III. 2. 31; Mahabharata (Santi-parva ) 33, 23, 7. Buddha-carita, p. 178; Sūtra-kstā nga, I. 12. 2

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33
kavāda
(Materialism )1 and Maya-vada (Illusionism )2 fail to satisfy us. Karma is the basis of Jaina psychology and the key-stone supporting edifice of the Jaina ethics.
(4) The Concept of Nescience
•
The link between the spirit and the matter is found in the Doctrine of the Subtle Body (Karma-Śarira or Linga-Śarira ), a resultant of the unseen potency and caused by a Principle of Susceptibility due to Passions and Vibrations. The Doctrines of Constitutional Freedom of the soul and its Potential Four-fold Infinities means that the Soul is intrinsically pure and innately perfect. It is due to Karma that it acquires the conditions of nescience. Nescience is opposite to science or knowledge, i. e., through nescience we see reality not as it is and hence we are deluded and misguided. This Ignorance or Nescience is the "force which prevents wisdom shining from within, that is that which holds it in latency." The relation between the soul and the non-soul is beginningless and is due to nescience or avidya+, otherwise called Mithyatvas, Ajñāna, Mithya-Jñana", Viparyayas, Moha9, Dargana-moha10,Aviveka11, Mala1 and Paśals
1. Digha-Nikaya, I. 2.
2. Brahma-Sutra (Sankara-bhāṣya ), III. 2. 38.
3. Key of Knowledge by C. R. Jaina, p. 743.
4. Yoga-Darśana, II. 24; Vaiśeşika-Sutra, XIX. 2. 10; Katha Upanisad, I. 2. 5; Brahma-Sutra (Sankara bhāṣya ), I. 1.
1; Samyutta Nikaya, II. 17. 7-15.
5. Sthananga-Sūtra, X. 1, p. 734.
6. Samaya-Sara of Kunda-kunda, II. 92.
7. Nyaya-bhasya of Vatsyayana, IV. 1. 3.
8. Samkhya-Kärikā of Ïśwarakṛṣṇa, Kārikā 47, 48; Prasastapāda-Bhāṣya, p. 538.
9. Nyaya-Sutra of Gautama, IV. 1. 6.
10. Samaya-prabhṛta of Kunda-kunda, 25-27.
11. Samkhya-Sutra, VI. 2.
12. Saç-ratna-sangraha, p. 36.
13. Ibid, p. 38.
3

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34 Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion etc. in different schools of Indian Philosophy. They are responsible for the worldly existence, or bondage, which is determined by the nature ( Praksti ), duration ( Sthiti ), intensity (Anubhava ) and quantity ( Pradeśa )2 of karmas. Jivas take matter in accordance with their own karmas because of self-possession (Kaşāya ). This is known as bondages, the causes of which are Delusion (Mithya-dřşti), Lack of Control ( Avirati ), Inadvertence (Pramada ), Passions (Kaşaya ) and Vibrational-activites ( Yoga ).3.
The Jaina term for avidyā is mithyatva, which is divided into categories and sub-categories differently. According to Umāswami,4 it may be divided into abhigrahita and anabhigrä hita; according to Pūjyapada Devanandis it may be divided into Naisargika and Paropdeśapūrvaka, the last again sub-divided into four sub-classes. According to Kundakunda delusion (moha ) may be divided into Mithyatva, ajñana and aviratie; according to the Fourth Karma Grantha, mithya-darsana is divided into - abhigra hika, anabhigrahika, abhinivesika, samasvaika and anabhoga.? However, the most popular division is of Pūjyapadas-ekanta, viparīta, vainayika, samsaya and ajñāna with their numerous sub-division. The five-fold causes of bondage is sometimes reduced to two or
1. Tattvartha-Sūtra, VIII. 3; Dharma-karma-abhyudayam,
XXI. 108; Pañcâstikaya-sara of Kunda-kunda, V. 148; Karma Grantha, V. 96; Vardhamana Purana, XVI. 45; Dravya-Sangraha by Nemichandra, 33; Adhyatma
Kamala-Mártaņda, IV. 7. 2. Tattvārtha-Sūtra, VIII. 2. 3. Tattvartha-Sūtra, VIII. 1; Dravya-Sangraha by Nemi
chandra, 30; Sarvártha-Siddhi, pp. 374-375. 4. Tattvārtha-Sūtra, VIII. 1. 5. Sarvărtha-Siddhi ( on Tattvärtha-Sūtra, VIII. 1 ), p. 375. 6. Samaya-sära of Kunda-kunda, 89. 7. Karma-Grantha, 4. 51. 8. Sarvartha-Siddhi, VIII. 1.

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three (mithya-darśana, kaşaya and yoga or simply kaşaya and yoga) or four.1 In short, nescience or mithyatva is at the root of all evils and the cause of worldly existence. The Jainas do not like to bother about its whence and why. It is coeval with the soul, hence eternal and beginningless. Both the questions of the Self and Nescience are accepted as facts on the basis of uncontradicted experience. As the bondage is determined by the karmas, the nature of bondage is determined by the nature of karmas. There are eight fundamental varities2 of these karmas, i. e., jñānāvaraṇīya, darśanāvaraṇīya, vedanīya, mohanīya, ayu, nāma, gotra and antaraya with their different sub-divisions.3 Vidyananda Swami in his Tattvartha-Śloka-Varttika says that as Right Attitude, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct constitute the path to liberation,5 the anti-thesis of this Trinity, i. e., Wrong Attitude, Wrong Knowledge and Wrong Conduct must lead to the bondage. If the very outlook is wrong, one cannot expect right knowledge and there cannot be right conduct without right knowledge. 6 There is close relation between knowledge and action. Conduct is the fulfilment of knowledge. Theory without practice is useless as practice without theory is blind. Knowledge enlightens, penance purifies and restraint
1. Tattvartha-Sutra, Bhasya by Phulchanda Siddhanta Shastri, pp. 367-368.
2. Adhyatma-Kamala-Martanda of Kaviraja Malla, IV. 2., p. 89.
3. Tattvartha-Sutra, VIII. 4; Karma-Grantha, I. 2; DravyaSangraha by Nemichand, 31; Prasamarati prakarapa of Umaswati, 34.
35
4. Mehta, M. L.: Outlines of Jaina Philosophy, pp. 135-138, p. 146 ( 5, 9, 2, 28, 4, 103, 2 and 5 divisions).
5. Bhasya on Tattvartha-Sutra, I. 1, p. 72.
6. Tattvartha-Sutra, I. 1.
7. Uttaradhyayana-Sūtra, XXVIII. 30.

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36 Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion protects.1 Even after attaining tattva-jñana, the soul remains embodied for sometime to enjoy the fruits of its past sañcit karmas.3 So on the psychological grounds, the Jainas reject the metaphysical position of all those who subscribe to the Doctrine of Unitary principle (i. e., Wrong knowledge alone ) as the cause of the bondage. (5) The Concept of Omniscience
Definition and Analysis-Ominiscience or Keval-Jñana is a kind of direct but extra-sensory perception, “the perfect manifestation of the innate nature of the self, arising on the complete annihilation of the obstructive veils,"3 which is gained by the destruction of Deluding, Knowledge obscuring, Belief obscuring and Obstructive Karmas, 4 when the soul is free from all karmic-matter owing to the non-existence of the causes of bondage and to the shedding of all karmas, 5 the subject-matter of which is all the substances in all their modifications at all the places and in all the times.6 Nothing remains unknown to the omniscient.7
On analysis of the concept of ominscience, we have to decide whether he is human or divine or both; whether the
1. Višeşā vašyaka-bhāşya, Gatha 1126, 1158. 2. Tātia, N. M., Ibid, p. 150. 3. Cf: Sámkhya-Karika of Iswara Krşpa, 67; Yoga-Darsana,
IV. 30; Nyaya-Sūtra, III. 2. 19; Vaiśeşika Upaskar, V. 2. 19; Dialogues of the Buddha II, p. 132; Tattvartha-SūtraVarttika, p. 72; Vedanta-Sára ( Niklinanda's translation )
Sloka 217. 4. Pramāpa-Mímāṁsā of Hemachandra, 1. 1. 15; Sthánānga
Satra, 2. 26. 5. Tattvartha-Sūtra, X. 1. 6. Ibid, X. 2. 7. Ibid, I. 30. Cf: Jaina-Tarka-bhāşă of Yašovijaya, 21;
Pramāpa-Naya-Tattvaloka, 2. 22; Āvašyaka Niryukti, 77; Niyama-sar a, 15.

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knowledge of an omniscient is simultaneous or successive; whether the power of omniscience is potential or actual; whether an omniscient knows all the objects or simply the most important objects; and whether he knows the past and the future as the present or as the past or future. To the Mimāṁsakas? the term omniscient may either mean ( 1 ) the knower of the term 'omniscience' or ( 2 ) complete knowledge of one thing such as oil or ( 3 ) knowledge of the entire world in a most general way or (4) perfect knowledge of one's own respective scriptural matters or ( 5 ) simply knowledge of respective things through the respective Pramānas as far as possible. (6) Historical Development and Comparative Estimate of the
Concept of Sarvajñatva
The germinal concept of omniscience can be traced back to the Vedas where Varupa sits looking at all. In the Upanişads, the state of omniscience is the state of bliss or Turiyavastha. He who knows Brahman, knows everything. Ātman being known everything is known.2 Hiranyagarbha is Sarvajña.3 Likewise in the Vedanta, the Brahman alone, who is one without a secondt, is omniscient. In Buddhism, omniscience is granted to the Buddha. True to their nonmetaphysical attitude, they do not bother about each and everything5, but only about their Four Noble Truths, and their own religious observances etc. Prajñākargupta?
1. Tattvārtha-Sūtra-Bhaşya, I. 47, I. 51. 2. Sanghavi, Sukhalalji : Jñana-Bindu-Paricaya of Yasovijaya
(Jñana-mandala, Kashi, V. S. 1998), p. 45. 3. Macdonell, Vedic Mythology, p. 226. 4. Brhadaranyaka Upanişad, 4. 5. 6. 5. Chandogya-Upanișad, 6. 23; Aitareya-Upanişad 1. 1. 1;
Praśna-Upanişad, 6. 3. 4; Mundaka-Upanişad, 1. 1. 9;
Sankara Bhāşya ( Brahma-Sūtra ), 2. 1. 22. 6. Chandogya Upanişad, 6. 2. 1. 7. Pramāna-Varttika, 1. 33. 35.

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Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion
in his commentary on Dharamkirti's work has established the trio-temporal-spatial omniscience of Sugat and that state is attainable by any man free from attachment and taints. Santarakṣital supports this. In idealistic schools of Buddhism like Sūnyavada and Vijñānavāda, the Concept of omniscience comes very near to that Upanişadic monism where allknowledge amounts to self-knowledge. However to the Buddhists, who subscribe to the Doctrine of Momentary Stream of Consciousness, the fact of omniscience, extending to past and future becomes meaningless. The creating Ïśvara of Nyāya school is omniscient.2 Vaiseșika regards God as omniscient besides other Yogic-souls. Similarly, Alaukika Pratyakşa of the Nyaya3 school, Asamprajñāta Samadhi of the Yoga4, Jivan-Mukti of Sáňkhya5 and Vedanta Turīyāvastha of the Upanişads7 and Radhakrishnan's8 Religious Experience have very clear implications of omniscience, although they partly encroach on the realm of religious mysticism. According to the Nyāya-Vaisesika, omniscience means knowledge of its seven principles, to the Sámkhya it implies intuition of 25 principles, to the Buddhists, it implies the right knowledge of Pañca-skandhas, to the Vedantins it is the knowledge of the Brahman and to the Jainas it will mean the all comprehensive-knowledge of the six categories. Excepting the Mimāṁsakas and the Carvākas all Indian systems believe in the possibility of human omniscience, however, the
1. Pramāna-Varttika, 1. 147-148. 2. Pramāņa-Varttikä lankára (Ed. Rahul Sănkstyayana ). 3. Tattva-Sangraha, Sloka 3309, 3328-3329. 4. Upadhye, A. N.: Ibid ( Introduction, LXXVIII ). 5. Naya-bindu-ţikā, p. 15; Nyaya-mañjarī, p. 103; Nyāya
kandali, p. 195 6. Yoga-darśana, IV. 29, III. 49. 7. Samkhya-Kārikā of Isvarakļşya, Kärikā 67. 8. Vedānta-sāra, Śloka 217. 9. Taittiriya Upanişad, II. 9.

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39
Sramanic culture insistence on human omniscience more than others to grant infalliability to their prophets, because on this depend the very life and death of their systems. 2
In short, the Doctrine of Omniscience follows as the sine qua non from the metaphysical, religious and psychological view-points of each of the school. True to their realistic metaphysics, the Jainas conceive of omniscience as purely human and actual-a direct knowledge of all knowable of all places and times. 2 The Agamas and the logical treaties have equated Sarvajñatva with Dharmajñatva.3 Later Jaina thinkers like Samantabhadrat, Siddhasena5, Akalarka, Haribhadra?, Vidyānandis have separated the concept of omniscience from the idea of religious experience.10 With Acārya Kunda-kundali Sarvajñatva is a dogma, a religious heritage, almost similar to the Advaitic and Upanişadic emphasis on treating Sarvajñatva as Ātmajñatva. The names of other Jaina thiakers such as Umāsvāmi13, Anantakirti23, Patrakesari14, Prabha1. An Idealistic View of Life, p. 84; Cf: Joad, C. E. M.:
Counter Attack from the West, p. 79. 2. Tattva-Sarigraha, p. 844; Cf : Mîmāmsă-śloka-Varttika,
pp. 110-112. 3. Upadhye, A. N. : Ibid (Introduction, LXXIX-LXXX ). 4. Cf: Jaina, C. R. : Jaina Psychology, p. 6; Nyaya, the
Science of Thought, ch. XVIII. 5. Şackhandāgama ( Payadianu ), 78. 6. Apta-mīmānsā, Sloka 5, 6. 7. Sanmati-prakarana, Karika 2. 8. Aşta-Śati, Śloka 5, 6 (Common on Apta-mimăinsa ). 9. Şad-darśana-Samuccaya ( fourth chapter ). 10. Aşta-Sahasri (common on Apta-mīmāṁsă incorporating
Aşta-Satī ) 5, 6. 11. Pravacana-sāra of Kunda-kunda (Jñana-prakarana );
Samaya-sira of Kunda-kunda ( Jiva-kända ). 12. Tattvártha-Sūtra. 13. Brhat-Sarvajña-Siddhi ( Manikya Granthamala, Bombay ). 14. Pañca-Namaskāra-Stotra,

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faina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion
chandral, Abhayadeva Sūria, Rajasekhara3, Vadibh Singh Sūrit, Anantakirtis, Mapikyanandis, Pūjyapāda Devanandi?, Šanti Sūris, Yasovijaya, Mallavădinio, Vadi Deva Sūril1, Nemichandra 2, Hemchandra13, Mallisena14, Dharmabhūşana15, Devendra Sūri16, etc. are relevant. (7) Mimamsaka's Objections and Their Replies
The Mimamsakas try to show that omniscience cannot be established through any of the Pramānas, 17 It cannot be established through Pratyakşa. Perception implies sense-objectcontact during the present time and in the case of KevalaJñāna, this is lacking. To this, we can say that the question of sense-object-relation is not always valid, because things are beyond the power of senses. Such invisible things like atoms, things or persons remote in time or things far beyond 1. Nyāya-Kumuda-Candra of Prabhacandra (Manika cha
ndra Jaina Granthamala, Bombay); Prameya-KamalaMārtanda of Prabhacandra (Nirpaya Sagar Press,
Bombay ). 2. Commentary on : Sanmati-Prakarapa. 3. Syädvăda-Kalika. 4. Syädvåda-Siddhi. 5. Prameya-Ratnamala. 6. Parikşa-Mukham. 7. Sarvārtha-Siddhi. 8. Nyāyāvatara-Varttika. Vștti ( Singhi Jaina Granthamala ). 9. Jää na-Bindu-Prakarana of Yasovijaya (Singhi Jaina
Granthamala ). 10. Nyaya-Bindu. 11. Pramāņa-Naya-Tattvaloka. 12. Dravya-Sangraha by Nemichandra. 13. Parīkşa-Mukham of Manikya Nandi. 14. Syadvád-Mañjari. 15. Nyāya-Dipikā. 16. Karma-Granthas ( Atmananda Jaina Granthamala ). 17. Mimāmsă-Darsana, I. 1. 4.

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( like the Meru hill ) became known as the object of direct perception, just like the knowledge of existence of fire in hill from the smoke is also the subject-matter of perception.2 Here we may be reminded of the researches in para-psychology and extra-sensory perception including telepathy and clairvoyance. As for perception, we can say that only a type of perception which claims to know all things of all times and places, can definitely say that omniscient does not exist. But if there is such a type of all-comprehensive perception it is no other than the omniscience.2 Similarly, omniscience cannot be established through Anumána, because we cannot think of a relation of universal concommittance between the Sadhya and the Hetu. Sabda Pramāpa also cannot prove it, because there is no infallibility of the Āgamic authority to support it and the fallible Ágamas are either created by omniscient or non-omniscient. Now, if it is through omniscient, there is the fallacy of circular reasoning and if it is through non-omniscient, there is fallacy of Contradiction.4 Upamana5 also cannot establish this, because it works on the basis of imperfect resemblances between two instances, but there is complete absence of any similarity with regard to the omniscient. Arthapatti6 too is helpless, for nothing is affected by the omniscient. Even Abhāva? of omniscience fails to prove its existence. Prabhacandra8 following the
1. Parīkşā-Mukhan, Verse 2; Cf: Nyáya-Dipikā, p. 42;
Nyāya-Viniscaya, pp. 361-362; Svayambhū Stotra, Karika
75; Aşta-Sahasrī, p. 45. 2. Apta-mimansı, Kārika 97. 3. Mímāmsa-śloka-Varttika, p. 81; Tattva-Sangraha, p. 831. 4. Tattva-Sangraha, Kárika 3188-3189. 5. Ibid, 3190. 6. Ibid, 3215. 7. Ibid, 3218. 8. Nyaya-Kumuda-Candra, Part I, p. 88. 9. Ibid ( Sarvajñatvavada ), pp. 86-97.

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pattern of Vidyānandil successfully counteract all these arguments and shows that none of these six Pramăņas go against omniscience. Even Abhāva must prove it, since all of them implies some reality as their objects. Besides these epistemological objections the Jainas anticipate some other objections and try to meet them. Regarding the objection that the Arhat is not omniscient because he is a speaker like some vagabond, it is said “there is no contradiction between the speakership and the omniscience. With the perfection of knowledge, verbal skill is also perfected.3 However it may be retorted that Vitarāga Omniscience can not speak for speech is related with desire to speak, and a Vitaraga Omniscient is devoid of any desires. But as a matter of fact, this argument is fallacious. There is no relation between the two. An intelligent person even if he has desire, may not explain the Sástras and during swoon and dreams, where there is absence of desires, people are seen talking and uttering something.* Similarly, when it is said that the proof of the omniscience follows from the final consumation of the progressive development of cognitions, the Mimấmsakas object to it and say that there must be a limit of all progress like that in any human activity. The Jainas reply that physical progress is different from mental progress, 6 Knowledge is limitless and infinite. When the soul shines in full splendour it attains omniscience. To the objection that if an omniscient knows all the objects of the universe at one instant, nothing remains to be cognised by him in the next moment, hence the 1. Apta-Parikşí, pp. 206-229 ( Hindi translation Vir Seva
Mandir Trust Prakashan ). 2. Apta-Mimámsá, Kárikā 98-108. 3. Syadváda Siddhi, VIII. 3. 4. Ibid, VIII. 4 and VIII. 5. 5. Pramāņa Mimāṁsā, l. 1. 16. 6. Jaina Darsana ( Hindi, Mahendra K. Acharya, Varanasi ),
p. 311. 7, Tattvẫrtha-Sutra, X. 1; Sthânãiiga-Sutra, 226.

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soul would turn to be unconscious having nothing to cognise; it is reported that it would have been so only if the perception of the omniscient and also this world-order were destroyed in the following moment. But both of them are eternal. Hence it is foolish to hold that there is one single cognition.1 With respect to the objection that because the omniscient knows everything', he might be tainted by the evils contained in them, it is replied that knowledge is different from active participation. One cannot be subjected to attachment and miseries simply in knowing them, because we cannot be called a drunker simply as we know about the different ingredients of the drink.3 Next, it is objected that we cannot think of an omniscient because through the world we find only ignorant persons. To this it is said that our ignorance cannot be our excuse. We cannot say that persons like Jamini etc. were ignorant of the Vedas because we do not find any such person at the present time.4 When it is argued that since the beginninglessness and endlessness are apparent in the state of omniscience, things must appear in that way, it is replied that the nature of reality does not change in perceiving them. Things appear as they are.5 When it is said that because the Agamas establish omniscience of the Arhat and omniscients also create Āgamas, this is simply paradoxicale, it is said that the Ágamas of the present are profited by the past Āgamas. The Mimāṁsakas say that omniscience may mean either successive or simultaneous knowledge of all objects. Now, if it is regarded as successive knowledge, omniscience becomes impossible since the objects of the world in the past, present and future are inexhaustible, hence the
1. Jaina Psychology (Jaina Sanskriti Sanshodhana Mandala,
Varanasi ), p. 112. 2. Jaina Darsana, pp. 311-312. 3. Ibid, p. 313. 4. Ibid, p. 313. 5. Ibid, p. 312. 6. Ibid, p. 312,

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Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion
knowledge would also be ever-complete. If the knowledge is regarded as simultaneous, there will be confusion and contradiction due to the presence of contradictory objects at the same time. Past and future are non-existent at the present time, hence a knowledge about them would always be illusory. (8) Some Proofs for the Existence of Omniscience
We have to face these difficulties because we regard omniscience only as ordinary perception writ large. As a matter of fact omniscience is a form of direct simultaneousl extra. sensory-perception where there is no scope for CONFUSION, ILLUSION or IGNORANCE. “Our phenomenal knowledge suggests the noumenal as a necessity of thought, but not known through the empirical Pramāpas.2 Metaphysically, manifold and complete objectivity implies some extra-ordinary perception. Psychologically, differences in intelligence etc. in human beings presuppose the possibility of omniscience, somewhere and in some body. Logically, on account of the lack of contradictory proof, it is established beyond doubt. According to the researches made by Sukhalal Sanghavi, the origin of all these proofs may by traced back to the YogaSūtra of Patanjali.3 Knowledge like measure and quantity has got degrees, hence knowledge is bound to reach its final consummation. References about omniscience, in all other literatures5, are after the date of the Yoga-Sūtra. In Jaina literature this argument was first of all advocated by Mallavadi, 6 though the sources concerned are not exactly clear.
1. Prameya-Kamala-Mártanda, p. 254, pp. 260-261; Cf:
Nyāya-Kumuda-Candra, part I, pp. 88-97; PrameyaRatpa-Malā, p. 52; Aşça-Sahasrī, p. 130; Brhat Sarvajña
Siddhi, p. 130. 2. Radhakrishnan, S. : Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 509. 3. Yoga-Sūtra, I. 25. 4. Syadvāda-Mañjari ( Hindi sīkā ), p. 237. 5. Praśastapada's Comments, Vyomavati, p. 108. 6. Nyāya-cakra ( Manuscripts, p. 123 ), quoted in Jñana
Bindu-Prakarapa of Yaśovijaya, p. 44.

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We can sum up the most formidable proofs of AkalankaDeva under the following three categories---firstly, omniscience is proved because there is absolute non-existence of any obstructive--Pramaņas against it. I Akalanka tries to prove the existence of omniscience on the basis of truth found in the astronomical spheres, which indicates correctly about the future eclipses of the sun and moon.2 Lastly, omniscience follows from the essential nature of the soul as knower of all things. As the sun shines fully after the removal of the clouds, so the self knows everything when the knowledgeobscuring-karmas is completely liquidated. According to Vīrasena Svāmī4, we can infer about the whole mountain after perceiving a part of it, so we can be sure of complete knowledge in self by perceiving partial knowledge. Samantabhadra has proved the existence through the reasoning based on Anumeyatva5, or capable of being known through inference. Dharmabhūşana explaining this says that perception' does not mean only 'actual perception' but also 'object of knowledge’8Let us repeat with the author of Apta-Parīkşa, "when omniscience is proved by all the six Pramānas?, who dare to reject it ?" None, perhaps none. Omniscience is perfectly consistent with the Jaina conception of knowledge as the removal of veil. 8
1. Siddhi-Viniscaya-Tīka (Manuscripts ), Ibid, p. 421 (J. S.
P.); Cf: Tattva-Sangraha, p. 846; Apta-Parikṣā, p. 54; Aşta-Sahasri, p. 47; Tattvärtha-Śloka-Varttika, p. 13; Sastra-Varta-Samuccaya, p. 80; Prameya-Kamala-Mar
tapda, p. 370; Prameya-Ratna-Mala, p. 54. 2. Syadvada Mañjarī, p. 237. 3. Jaina Darśana, p. 308. 4. Aşta-Sati Karika 3; Nyāya-Viniscaya 465; Așta-Sahasri, p. 50. 5. Apta-Mımāṁsā, Sloka 5. 6. Nyāya-Dipika, pp. 41-42. 7. Apta-Parikşa, p. 212. 8. Tatia, N. M. : Višeşavasyaka Bhașya, p. 70.

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Chapter Four OMNISCIENCE:MISCONCEPTION AND
CLARIFICATION (1) Meaning of the Term
There is a striking parallel between 'Omniscient and 'Sarvajña' because the Latin 'Omnis'l corresponds to the Samskrt 'sarva'. Even in ancient Indian languages like Saṁskṛt, Pāli, Prā krt, etc. there are many equivalents of the term 'Sarvajña', but the most commonly used term is 'Sarvajña' itself. The etymological meaning of Sarvajña is governed by a particular rule according to which the affix 'ka' comes after a verbal root that ends in long a, when there is no perfix preceding it and when the object is in composition with it (ato-anupsarge kah ).3 As the Pali4 and Prakrta grammars 1. Lewis, c. T. & Short, c. (ed.): A Latin Dictionary
( Oxford Clarendon Press, 1879 rev. 1927), p. 1265. 2. Vacaspatyam (ed.), T. Bhattacharya (Varanasi Chow
khamba Saṁskřt Series, 1962, 8 vols. ), Vol. VI, p. 5208 gives its different meanings; Sabda Kalpadrumaḥ (ed.), R. K. Deva (Delhi : Moti Lal Banarasidas, 1961, 5 vols. ), Vol. 5, p. 303; Āpte's Practical Samskrt Dictionary (ed.) P. K. Gode & G. C. Karve (Poona : Prasad Prakashan, 1959), Part III, p. 1656 agree with Vācaspatyam; Monier & Moneir Williams (A Samskệt English Dictionary, Oxford Clarendon Press, New ed., 1956, p. 1185 ) gives 30 references chosen from the varied fields of Saṁskệt
literature. 3. Pāņini, Aşçādhyayı (ed.) S. C. Vasu ( Allahabad : Papini
Office, 1887 ), III. 2. 3. 4. Rhys Davids, T. W., Stede, W. : Pali-English Dictionary
(Surrey, Pali Text Society, 1921 ), pp. 139-140; Pali Maha vyakarana ( ed.), J. Kashyapa ( Sarnath; Mahabodhi
Society, 1940), p. 2. 5. Suri, V. R. ( ed.): Abhidhăn Rajendraḥ ( Ahmedabad :
R.J, S. Singh, 1925), Vol. 7, p. 567,

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Omniscience : Misconception and Clarification
47
practically follow the rules of Samskrt, the dictionary meanings of other important European languages like German?, Russian, Italian3, Spanish4, French, English etc. are generally grounded on the Latin meaning.? Thus literally, the term 'Omniscience' means "all-knowledge' or 'knowledge of all. But the terms 'all' and knowledge' are used or can be used in different contexts. Similarly the term 'omniscient' has got both straight forward and idiomatic meanings. When we call a man 'omniscient, we do not mean that he knows everything, we simply mean that he is very learned and he knows a lot. Thus there is a distinction between the 'strict and the 'hyperbolical meanings of the term. Then there are special meanings also that are determined by the philosophical and cultural background of a particular system.
It is clear that the lexical works do help to determine the meaning of a term but they cannot finally decide the meaning because they report only the existing usages. While retaining the lexical identity, the term may have different connotations,
1. Breul, K.: A New German and English Dictionary ( London,
Cassell & Co., 1906 ), p. 321, Omniscient = all wissend. 2. Segal, L. (ed.): New Complete English-Russian Dictionary
(London : Lund Hampheries & Co., 1948), p. 654. 3. Boulle, J. & Payne-Payne, De V. (ed.): A New French and
English Dictionary ( London : Cassell & Co., 1905), p. 331. 4. Wessely, J. E. & Payne G. R. (ed.): A Dictionary of the
English and Italian Languages ( Leipzig, 1909 ), p. 135. 5. Bensely, E. R. (ed.): A New Dictionary of Spanish and
English Languages (Paris : Ganeir Brothers, N. D.), p. 453. 6. A New English Dictionary (ed.) James Murry ( 18 Vols.,
Oxford 1888-1928 ), Vol. VII, p. 109; Webester's New International Dictionary (Springfield, 1950, 2nd edition), p. 1368; The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary ( 2 Vols.,
Oxford, 1947), Vol. II, p. 1386. 7. Omni is a combining form of Latin Omnis, as Omnigenes,
Omnivalense, Omnipresence, Omniscientia etc,

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hence the meanings of the term 'omniscience' also differ accordingly. For example, "the man who knows the word 'all' may be 'all-knowing' in name." It means that the man who knows the meaning of 'all' will also know what it signifies. But this is a meaning in name only for no one can prevent another person from giving a word any meaning he likes. The meaning of a term depends upon human stipulation. Secondly, a man may be called 'omniscient', if he knows about everything of a given context (for example, the names of all dramas of Kalidasa and Shakespear). This is precisely the hyperbolic or idiomatic meaning, when a versatile genius or highly learned man is discribed as 'omniscient',2 A third meaning of 'all' may be understood in the sense of the epitome of the world included under the two categories, positive and negative.3 There are two defects here. This is very vague and not exhaustive in particular details. Then we may delimit the use of the term 'all' in a particular system hence the meaning of the term is bound to vary from system to system.4 To get rid of this difficulty, one may say that the term 'all' stands for the object of cognition. But the Mimamsakas may say that there are supra sensible things which can not be cognised by the six means of a cognition. We know, the Mîmamsakas restrict the application of the term to mean the knowledge of duty (dharma )", while the Buddhists limit it to the knowledge of morality (Heya-Upadeya )8 and to the Jainas, it is the 1. Śantarakṣita, Tattva-Sangraha (with Commentary
of
Kamala-śīla, (ed.) G. N. Jha (2 Vols., Baroda Oriental Institute, 1939), Vol. II, Karika 3130.
48
2. Ibid, K. 3131.
3. Ibid, K. 3132.
4. Ibid, K. 3134.
5. Ibid, K. 3134.
6. Śloka-Varttika of Kumarila Bhatta (ed.) G. N. Jha.
7. Ibid, II. 68.
8. Dharmakirti, Pramana-Varttika (ed.) Rahul Sankṛtyayana (Allahabad Kitab Mahal, 1943 ), I. 33, II. 34.

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knowledge of "all substances with all their attributes and modes in all times and in all places." (Sarva-dravya-guna Paryayeşu ).1
(2) Analysis of the Meaning of the term Omniscience
If we suppose that omniscience means the knowledge of 'all substances with all their modes', we can ask whether omniscience is false or true knowledge? If it is false, it is sheer non-sense but if it is true, we can further ask: "whether it is knowledge of only the important things or of all the things." If it is the former, it is not omniscience in the sense under study, if it is latter it raises a further question: Is it the knowledge of all the objects without or with their attributes. If we accept the first alternative, it will raise many complicated metaphysical issues, such as whether or not an object can be known without knowing its attributes or whether objects and their attributes are so separable in knowledge even if not in reality? Thus, the second alternative is accepted which will imply 'knowledge of objects with their attributes'. But on further analysis, it will raise another question: whether the knowledge is of all objects with some or all attributes? If the former, the scope becomes limited, if the latter, there is another dilemma. Is such a knowledge restricted to some particular place or to all the places? If we accept the first alternative, it becomes restricted in space but if we accept the second alternative, we are faced with a further problem : whether the omniscient knowledge (unlimited in space) covers the entire present only or the entire span of time-past, present and future. If we accept the former, it is restricted to the present moment only but if we accept the second alternative, there is another difficulty: whether such knowledge is successive or simultaneous? If it be successive, there can be no omniscience for all the objects with all attributes and modes at all places and at all times can never be exhausted. But if it is taken to be simultaneous, there crops yet another
1. Tattvartha-Sutra of Umāsvāmī (Arrah, 1920), I. 29.

49

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Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion
difficulty: Is such a simultaneous knowledge obtained by a single act of cognition or by a series of cognitions ? The first alternative is unacceptable since then it would be impossible to distinguish between contradictory things and characteristics like heat and cold simultaneously through the act of one single cognition. But suppose, if it can be known through a single supernormal cognition brought about by communion, then there can be no means of cognition to vouch for such knowledge because it is not produced either by perception, inference or authority. But if we accept the second alternative, we can still ask : whether it is actual or possible ? If it is actual it would be difficult to conceive a state of knowledge obtained through several cognitions covering even mutually contradictory things. Then it is impossible to apprehend even in hundreds of thousands of years each one of the innumerable things and thus characteristics of all places and at all times. But to avoid this difficulty, if we suppose that such a knowledge is only possible we are again confronted with another problem. If it is possible to know all things and their attributes simultaneously, nothing will remain to be known by the omniscient being. In that case after having the knowledge, he would behave as an unconscious being, since he will have left nothing to cognate. Supposing, for the moment that we somehow try to overcome this difficulty, we shall still be beset with another problem: Whether past and future will be known as persent or as they are, i. e., the past as past and the future as future. If we accept the first alternative, distinction of time will be lost because the past and the future will merge into the immediate present. But if we accept the second alternative it will imply that the omniscient being cognise the past and the future which are at present non-existents. Thus, in both cases, our knowledge would be illusory and wrong. (3) Categorization
In order to avoid these difficulties involved in the analysis of the concept of omniscience, it has been interpreted to mean the knowledge “important and essential things through their

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important characteristics" and not of "each and everything in their numerical details." But it may be told that unless all the objects with all their attributes are known, how can the distinction between the 'essential' and the 'non-essential' be made. Even if it be possible, some of the old difficulties will reappear. But supposing as it is, even then we can ask what does this omniscience (as the knowledge of important things through their important characteristics) refer to ? To this question, there are some answers in Indian thought, but for my convenience, I shall choose only three for their elucidation and examination : (a) Omniscience as the knowledge of reality, (b) Omniscience as the knowledge of duty and (c) Omniscience as knowledge of the self. I shall take one by one :
(a) Omniscience as the Knowledge of Reality- Suppose, omniscience means knowledge of reality, it is to be clarified : whether it implies the knowledge of the 'transcendental reality' or the 'empirical reality'. If it be the former it will mean difficulty in different systems of thought and metaphysics. But if we do not bind ourselves to any particular metaphysical stand-point and instead vaguely hold the general view that omniscience means knowledge of the essential things, we are faced with a difficult task of explaining the status of the contingent and its relationship to the essential. The Samkhya for example, may say that the knowledge of the essential implies that of the contingent world. But if we admit that the knowledge of the essence does not contain the knowledge of the accident, we shall have to turn ourselves to the pluralistic-realistic systems. However, if we accept the second alternative that omniscience is the knowledge of the empirical reality, there is perhaps then no need of philosophy as the different sciences are already doing the work. But no scientist ever makes any claim to omniscience. But suppose we do have knowledge of reality anyhow in any sense, there still remains a problem: whether it is knowledge of the temporal or non-temporal reality? If we accept the first position, we shall have to argue with science that omniscience is not possible.

51

-

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52 Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion But if we accept the second view that the ultimate reality is far from spatio-temporal limitations, we will be driven to an idealistic view of the universe. Thus, either we accept the views of science according to which omniscience is not possible or we accept the idealistic position, in which case again, there can be no unanimity.
(b) Omniscience as Knowledge of Duty – Viewing those difficulties, omniscience has been treated as the knowledge of duty ( dharma ), since our moral life and hence its knowledge is of supreme value to us. Here omniscience (Sarvajñată ) will be equated with the knowledge of duty ( dharmajñata ). But even this religious-ethical approach involves some difficulties : whether duty, referred to here, is duty in general ( Samanya dharma ) or duty in particular (Varpaśrama dharma ). If the first alternative is accepted, there may be conflicting Jists, since duties vary from person to person and to the same person from time to time. If we adopt the second alternative, another difficulty will arise : whether the particular duty is private or public? If the former, it may lead to narrowness and sectarianism; but if it is the latter, we have to explore some universal and eternal principles of duty, which is very difficult. Even the concept of 'Universal Religion' is still an utopia.?
(c) Omniscience as Knowledge of Self — To simplify matter we can give up the dualistic approach of subject and object 1. For the most part of this analysis, I am indebted to
Abhidhāna Rajendra of V. Sūri ( Ratlam : J. S. S. 1927, 7 Vols. ), Vol. III, pp. 567-585; Nyaya-Kumuda-Candra of Prabhacandra ( Bombay : M. C. D. Jaina Series, 1938 ), Vol. I, pp. 86-97; Prameya-Kamala-Mártanda of Prabhacandra ( Bombay: S. B. Pandurang, 1921 ), pp. 247-264; Āpta-Parīkņā of Vidyānandi (Saharanpur : Vir Seva
Mandir, 1949 ), pp. 206-239. 2. Śloka-Varttika of Kumarila, II. 111-112; Tattva-Savgraha
of Santa Rakṣita, K. 3135,

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53
and identify the object with the subject. Here the knowledge of the object is identical with the knowledge of the subject. However, this meaning of omniscience as the knowledge of the Self is highly specialised and metaphysical because Sarvajñata is identical with Ātmajñata.”1 (4) Implications of Omniscience : Doubts and Difficulties
Those who argue for the existence of omniscience as a fact, rests on metaphysical postulates that knowledge is the selffunctioning of the self. This is theory of the innate possession of omniscience by every soul. What is needed is the actualisation of this potentiality. This is a controversial question, whether there is soul or not and if there is, whether even potentially it is capable of knowing everything. But if we accept these metaphysical postulates, there are serious moral implications. If one knows the future acts of human beings, there was no meaning in voluntary action. So Locke says about omniscience of God: "If God exists and is essentially omniscient, no human action is voluntary.'2 Augustine also says : "If you say, God foreknows that a man will sin, he must necessarily sin. But if there is necessity there is no voluntary choice of sinning but rather fixed and unavoidable necessity."3 To say that since God compels no man to sin, though he sees before-hand those who are going to sin by their own will.4 God's omniscience cannot entail determinism on the analogy of an intimate friend having the fore knowledge of another's voluntary actions without affecting his friend's moral freedom, is not a very good argument. A per
1. Bịhadaranyaka Upanişad, II. 4. 5. 2. John Locke : Essays Concerning Human Understanding,
Book IV, Ch. XXI, Sec. 8-11; Cp. Boethius : "If God is omniscience no human action is voluntary”, Consolation
Philosophiae, Part V, Sec. III. 3. St. Augustine : The City of Gods, Book V, Sec. 9. 4. St. Augustine : The Libero Arbitrio, Cp. Fredrich Schiever
mae, The Christian Faith, Part I, Sec. 2, Para 56.

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son's knowledge about the future action of an intimate friend of his is at most a good guess and not a definite knowledge. To say that a man is free to do something which without knowing that it is within his power to do otherwise is not freedom but ignorance. What is foreseen is necessary and what is necessary is outside the scope of ethics. However, if it is said that “it is not because God foreknows what he foreknows that men act as they do, it is because men act as they do that God foreknows what he foreknows,'2 will create awkward situation in which man's actions will determine God's knowledge. But suppose if it is the case of human omniscience it will mean that the knowledge of the omniscient being is not unfeterred but determined by the actions of other men. But since different people perform different actions, it will create a difficult situation for the cognising mind. To say that the omniscient being believes in an infinitely large number of true synthetic propositions is vague and self-contradictory, for this depends upon the belief at least in one proposition : “Nothing is unknown to him". But this is to admit his omniscience and hence it is like arguing in a circle.3
(5) Validation and Vindication
But such a 'Vicious circularity'' as Fugel says, we cannot escape when we cannot validate any fundamental principle or ideal like this. J. S. Mill also says that “questions
1. Fred Newman : “Omniscience is possible”, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, Sydney, Vol. 42, No. 1, May 64. 2. Nelson Pike : "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action",
The Philosophical Quarterly (Cornell University ), Vol.
LXXIV, No. 1, Jan, 65, p. 32. 3. F. Newman makes a distinction between two senses of
omniscience : necessary and actual like Buddha's distinction between dispositional and unqualified omniscience and
Jainas distinction between potential and actual. 4. Sellers, W. and Hospers, J. (ed.): Readings in Ethical
Theory ( New York Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953 ). Fugel

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55
of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof”] or as Carnap says that it is necessary always to distinguish between 'question within a presupposed frame' and 'question concerning the frame'. In order to grasp this situation, a fundamental distinction often neglected and blurred, must be made between the two types of justifying principles or knowledge-claims, namely, validation and vindication. Validation generally means a vigorous logical proof or 'legitimising of knowledge-claims'. Vindication on the other hand, ineans the justification of an action, which is, though weaker than validation, is an equally respectable method, especially when we know that validation is impossible in matters of fundamental principles.
It seems that although the logicians have exhibited great diabolical skill in enunciating the concept of omniscience and arguing for its exemplification in reality the concept has not been made altogether clear or completely defensible. But apart from the rational approach, there is also another approach. It is sometimes called the approach of faith or the intuitional approach, which is applicable in matters of suprasensible and beyond space-time objects. The non-rational (ahetuvāda ) approach though different from the rational approach (hetuvāda ) is not an irrational approach. After all, there are limitations to our reason as there are limitations
in his essay «Validation and Vindication : An Analysis of the future and the limits of Ethical Arguments” discusses the problem of justification not only with reference to ethical principles but also in regard to the more fundamental principles of deduction, induction and the criterion
of factual meaningfulness. 1. J. S. Mill : Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative
Government ( ed.) A. D. Lindsay (London : J. M. Dent &
Sons, 1960), p. 4. 2. R. Carnap : “Semantics and Ontology", Revene Inter
nationale, 11, 1. 1950.

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to our senses. Thus, there are two separate fields of investigation1, science and spirituality. Science deals with spatiotemporal phenomena with the help of senses and commonsense reasoning including scientific experiment. But there are other fields also, unexplored and also beyond the scope of scientific reach. It seems that there are different ways of knowing. True, there is the western emphasis on critical intelligence and eastern emphasis on creative intuition but there is universal recognition of the spirit in man. It is necessary to be reasonable and not logical. Our whole logical life grows on the foundations of a deeper insight. If intuitive knowledge does not supply us with universal major premises which we can neither question nor establish, our life will come to an end. Intuitions are not substitutes for thought. They are challenges to intelligence. This spirit of man or creativity is felt everywhere in artistic achievement and poetic genius, religious experiences and ethical life, in scientific genius and psychological life.2
56
The concept of omniscience is such a concept, which can admit of vindication (justification actions) on the ground of faith which is supported by the seers having intuitional insight. Modern researches in the field of para-psychology specially in clairvoyance, clair-audience, precognition, telepathy etc. also support the knowledge which can be gained by transcending space-time and the senses. The science of Yoga can be also examined in this direction. It has been the abiding spiritual ambition of man to extend the frontiers of his knowledge. The very attempt to put a limit, an absolute limit to our knowledge is unscientific. It was customary for the old philosophy to discredit the knowledge gained by the senses,
1. Sanmati-Tarka of Siddhasena Divākara, III. 43-45; Aptamimamsa, of Samantabhadra, 76-78.
2. Radhakrishnan, S.: An Idealistic View of Life (London : Geye Allen & Unwin, 1947), Ch. IV; Intellect and Intuition, Ch. V; The Spirit in Man.

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as it was for an old fashioned theology to discredit the nature of the worth of the body. Both have proved to be erroneous. Human thinking with regard to goodness, duty and morality, art and beauty, "extends without assignable limit the knowledge of mankind."2 The growth of human knowledge has been a sort of progressive limitation of sceptical and agnostic attitude. Thus the possibility of omniscience is also contained in the ideal of knowledge or ideal of science. Even in the ideal of epistemological certainty without which all our claims to knowledge must be suspects"3 suggests that the quest for certainty in knowledge is indeed a quest towards omniscience. In reasoning, context is not seen simultaneously with the meaning which has to be the object of reflection and analysis. Thus reason cannot make prime discoveries. The miracle of mind is well-known. What is needed is to unfold the gates of mind and extend the limitless horizon of knowledge.
1. Ladd, G. T.: Knowledge of Life.and Reality (Yale University, 1918), p. 97.
57
2. Ibid, pp. 98-99.
3. Ayer, A. J.: The Problen of Knowledge (London: Macmillan & Co., 1958), p. 41.

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Chapter Five SIX APPROACHES TO OMNISCIENCE
IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY The acceptance or non-acceptance of the idea of Omniscience in a particular system of Indian Philosophy can provide us with a new principle of division of the Indian systems. There are those like the Buddhists, the Jainas, the NyayaVaiseșikas, the Sainkhya-Yogins and the Vedāntins who accept the idea of Omniscience either as a religious dogma or as an epistemological-metaphysical principle. However, the idea is very important and fundamental both to the sástras and common usages. Its germinal concept can be traced back even to the Vedas. 1
However, the Cárvákas, the Indian Agnostics, the Mimariisakas reject the very idea of omniscience. The Carvakas, for example will naturally reject such an assumption because the last word in the Lokayata epistemology is direct senseperception. Hence, they cannot accept anything which is transempirical or transcendental like soul3, Godt, Paraloka), 1. Macdonell. A. A. : Vedic Mythology, Strassburg, 1897, pp.
22-26. 2. Debi Prasad Chattopadhyay thinks that “the purely destru
ctive or negative character of the Lokāyata-epistemology, as depicted by Madhava ( Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha, Eng. trans, E. B. Cowell, R. E. Gough, London, 1914), was fictitious Lokāyata. People's Publishing House, 1949, p. 30. He is of the opinion that though the Lokayata-emphasis is on the Primacy of sense perception, it accepts reason also.
See Ch. 1, Section 8. 3. Shastri, D. R. (ed.): Cárvá ka-Śaşhi, The Book Co.
Calcutta, 1928, Verses 14 & 49. 4. Ibid, Verses 41 & 42. 5. Ibid, Verses 33, 54 & 55.

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59
Karmaphalal ( the consequences of good-evil actions ). If the existence of Atman or the eternal metaphysical subject is denied, the very idea of omniscience is put to a naught. Soul is supposed to be the substratum of knowledge and when this ground is lost, the entire edifice falls down. Attributes cannot exist without the substance.
The Indian Agnostics Sceptics accept a self-imposed limitation to their knowledge, while the Nihilists by their attitude leave no room for any discussion upon this subject. Knowledge by its very nature is limited. However, refined and developed it might be, it cannot grasp all the complexion and substitution of the whole world in the past, present and future. The reality, to use Kant's words, is unknown and unknowable.
However, the worst critics of the doctrine of Omniscience, are the Indian Retreatists or Mimāmsakas. Strangely enough, though they accept the unchalleogeable authority of the Vedas and its fundamental dogmas like the Soul, Heaven, Rebirth, and Pre-birth etc., they openly and most avoided by deny the existence of the omniscience God. The reason is obvious and somewhat extra-ontological but thoroughly practical. The Mimāmsakas are essentially ritualists. To them rituals and their proper performances can guarantee us the highest good of life. So they in their enthusiasm to accord the supreme place for the rituals and their sources, i. e., the scriptures, they have denied the existence and personal God. According to them the Vedas are eternal and gospel truth. They are infalliable and impersonal.2 Kumarila's criticisms of the idea of Omniscience are well known.3 Since, the teachings of
1. Shastri D. R. : Short History of Indian Materialism, The
Book Co., Calcutta, 1930, p. 17. 2. Mimāṁsā-Sūtra ( with Śabara's Bhāşya ), I. 1-2; Mimārsā
śloka-Vārttika, 110-112; Dinkari, p. 29. 3. Sloka-Vārttika, II. 110-143, II. 139-141.

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Buddha, Mahāvīra and Kapila differ among themselves. I Kumarila has a ground to ask the readers how the Omniscience have different views regarding the same thing ?
Omniscience, literally means, all knowledge or the perfect knowledge. This may apparently look to be a very simple idea but really it involves many problems. Let us discuss a few of them.
All-knowledge is rather a very vague term. We have to see whether this knowledge is to be taken denotatively or connotatively, i. e., whether an omniscient being knows all the objects with all their attributes numerically or through their important characteristics. Then if Omniscience means knowledge of Past, Present and Future, we have to know whether the Omniscience knows past and future as the present or past as past and future as future. In brief, whether Omniscient knowledge is simultaneous or successive, is an important question. Now, let us also discuss, who is an Omniscient ? Whether he is human or divine or both ? We know that there are references both about human and divine Omniscience in our religious and philosophical literature. But then, we have to find out whether the concept of human Omniscience has developed out of the idea of divine Omniscience or Vice Versa ? Even, just to satisfy our sense of history, we have to find out the particular system that has laid the foundation of this idea and it would be more interesting to know the sociocultural causes for the emergence of this idea which is so much talked about in our books. Whether this idea is the product of pure philosophical speculation or a mere religious dogma or both ? It is generally argued that the idea, at first, evolved as a religious dogma but later on logical arguments were also advanced to defend its validity. This view finds its support in the fact that the validity or invalidity of the Vedas formed the main planck of all discussions for and against 1. Tattva-Sarigraha, K. 3148-3149, IT off hát: #fqat afa
का प्रमा । अथो भाषय सर्वज्ञो मतभेदः तयोः कथम् ।

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the idea of Omniscience. Connected with this, we have to discuss the relation between the idea and God and Omniscience. Apparently, we do not see any relation save and except the fact that Omniscience is regarded as a divine attribute of God. But in Indian Philosophy, both the thiestic and the athiestic schools have supported the idea of Omniscience. For example, the thiestic systems like the Nyaya-Vaišeşika? and Yoga2 along with the athiestic schools like Sankhyas, Jainism4 and Buddhism and purely metaphysical disciplines like the Upanisadse and the Vedānta? accept Omniscience. Ofcourse, there are certain differences too. For example, the Nyaya-Vaišeşikas accept the idea of both divine and human Omniscience. However, Omniscience is a capacity of knowledge only among the Yogis and not ordinary average people. Nyaya-Vaiseșika do not regard Omniscience as a preconditions of Moksa because the state of Moksa is the state of utter unconsciousness. Sáňkhya, Yoga and Vedanta also donot insist upon attainment of Omniscience as a pre-condition of Mokșa as otherwise held by the Jainas.
Then there is yet another very important problem : the relation between the two very important and related concepts of Sarvajñata (Omniscience ) and Dharmajñatā (Revelation). We have to see whether the idea of Sarvajñata is a product of the idea of Dharmajñatā or vice versa. Buddhism is the veri
1. Padarthadharma-Saŭgraha of Prasastapada, p. 187; Nyaya
Kandali of Prasastapāda, p. 195; Bhaşa Pariccheda of Viswanātha, Section 3; Vaiseșika Sūtra of Kanada, IX.
1. 11-15. 2. Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali, I. 43; III. 16. 3. Sarkhya Pravacana Bhāşya of Vijñānabhikṣu, 1. 91. 4. Pramāņa-Mimāṁsā. of Hemchandra, 1. 1. 5. Pramāna Varttika of Dharmakirti, 1. 33; 1. 35. 6. Bșhadaranyaka Upanişad, IV. 5. 6. 7. Sankara Bhaşya on Brahma-Sūtra of Vadarāyaṇa, I. 2. 8;
1. 3. 13.

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table champion of Dharmajñata because Buddhas's Omniscience is the sense of Dharmajña or Margajña (Path-leader ). It senses that both these principles of Omniscience and revelation have got independent origins, although later on they have fused together. As pointed out earlier that the Buddhists, at first, subordinates the idea of Sarvajñatā to the idea of Dharmajñata but later on, perhaps on account of the Jaina influences, we find separate and independent treatment of Omniscience even at the hands of the Buddhists. Lord Buddha becomes an Omniscient deity. However, this is interesting to know that the sectarian bias of each of the schools like the Jainas, Buddhists, Sámkhyas lead than to think only their own perceptor as Omniscient and non-else. This has naturally led the Mimamsakas to put them is a very awkward position. How is it that if all of them are Omniscientists, they differ so vitally.
Before, I take up a fuller discussion of the problem, I like to discuss broadly the six main approaches to the concept of Omniscience in Indian Philosophy. SIX APPROACHES TO THE CONCEPT OF OMNISCIENCE
IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY (1) The Approach of Worship
The Vedic Approach to the concept of omniscience is the Approach of Worship. There is a tendency to extol each of the many gods as the Supreme God, who is naturally the Creator of the universe and possessing the attributes of omnipotence, omniscience etc. However in the whole of the Vedas, the particular term Sarvajñatva or Sarvajñatā never occurs, yet there are many words denoting the meaning of the said word, as can be inferred from the following expressions : Viśva Vedas?, Viśva Vida, Viśvani Vidvan3, Sarvavit*, 1. Rg-veda, 1. 21. 1; Sama-veda, 1. 1. 3. 2. Atharva-veda, 1. 13. 4; Rg-veda, 10. 91. 3, 3. Rg-veda, 9. 4. 85; 10. 122. 2. 4. Atharva-veda, 17, 1. 11,

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hommatidsophy 63
Jatvedası, etc. However, throughout all these discussions, 'Omniscience' is a purely divine attribute. No where is found a single passage where it is human. However, there are prayerpassages to the gods to grant infinite knowledge and strength.2 In the Vedic speculation, which is mostly primitive and crude, we find that each god at first is a symbol of Nature or a picture of the gross physical world as indicated by names. Hence, we find the concept of physical omnipresence and physical omniscience as can be inferred from the following expressions : Sahasraksa?, Visvatascakşul,4, Visva-Draştah5, Visva-carsane6, etc. Infact, this physical omnipresence forms the basis of their physical omniscience. Omniscience of these gods are more physical than psychological or mental, so much so that the power of vision is glorified more often than the power of mind. Such omniscience of Lord Varupa is evident.? The words Paśyati, Prati-paśyati, Maha-paśyati and Sarvam-paśyatis, are very suggestive in this respect ( The omniscience of Agnio, Indra10, Varunali, Vaka12, Puruşa 13, Soma14, etc. Is referred here and there. ).
1. Atharva-veda, 1. 7. 2; 1. 7. 5; 1. 9. 3; 2. 128; 2. 292; 3. 1;3.
2. 1; 4. 15. 10; 4. 234; 4. 39. 1; 4. 40. 1-8; 3. 15. 8; 3. 22. 4. 2. Sama-veda, 1. 2. 199; Rg-veda, 8. 93. 34. 3. Atharva-veda, 4. 28. 3; Ssma-veda, 3. 1. 1; Yajur-veda,
31. 1. 4. Rg-veda, 10. 81. 3. 5. Atharva-veda, 6. 107. 4. 6. Rg-veda, 9. 48. 5; Atharva-veda, 4. 32. 4. 7. Atharva-veda, 4. 16. 5. 8. Ibid, 4. 16. 2. 9. Rg-veda, 1. 1. 1-2, 1. 12. 1. 10. Sama-veda, 1. 2. 199, 1. 4. 352, 1. 4. 382. 11. Atharva-veda, 4. 16. 5, 4. 16. 2. 12. Ibid, 4. 20. 4, 4.40. 2. 13. Yajur-veda, 33. 1. 14. Rg-veda, 9. 66. 1.

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(2) Approach of Ātmajñata
In the Upanişads, the concept of Sarvajñatva has been equated with the concept of Atmajñatva or Brahmajñatva. When 'All this is Ātman', we can conclude that Ātman being known everything is known'.2 It is a common assertion of the Upanişads that ‘By knowing the Atman, one knows everything'.3 However, Ātman and Brahman are used synonyinously, as expressed in the following. This "Self is the Brahman'.4 'I am Brahman'.5 Like the expression 'All this is Ātman' we have the expression 'All this is Brahman'. 6 The famous Upanişadic dictums That thou art'? and 'I am Brahman's affirm this identification. This makes clear that the concept of Brahman is the primal and pivotal concept of the Upanişads together with the concept of Ātman. So like the conversation in the Bșhadaranyakalo, we also meet a similar conversation in the Mundak about
1. Chándogya Upanişad, 7. 25. 2. 2. Bịhadaranyak Upanişad, 4. 5. 6. 3. Chandogya Upanisad, 6. 21; īsāvāsya Upanişad, 6. 8. 7;
Bșhadāraṇyak Upanişad, 6. 8. 7, 3. 7. 1, 4. 5. 6; Praśna Upanişad, 4 10-11; Katha Upanişad, 2. 1. 3, 2. 2. 15; Sandilya Upanişad, 2. 3; Trivadvibhuti Mahånārāyaniya Upanişad, Ch. 8, p. 382; Ganešottartapin Upanişad, Ch.
IV, p. 637; ch. VI, p. 640. 4. Chândogya Upanişad, 3. 14. 1. 5. Brhadaranyak Upanişad, 1. 4. 10. 6. Mundaka Upanişad, 2. 2. 11; Bfhadāranyak Upanişad, 2.
4. 6, 1. 5. 6, 1. 4. 1. 7. Chandogya Upanișad, 6. 8.7; Aitareya Upanişad, 5. 3;
Svetāśvatara Upanişad, 1, 16. 8. Brhadaranyak Upanişad, 1. 4. 10. 9. Ibid, 1. 4. 10; Maitrí Upanişad, 6. 77; Kauşitaki Upa
nişad, 4. 19. 10. Bșhadaranyak Upanișad, 4. 5. 6,

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Six Approaches to Omniscience in Indian Philosophy 65 Brahman when Saunaka enquires from Angira 'knowing what one knows everything' it is replied that 'It is Brahman'1.
While the term 'Sarvajñata' does not occur even a single time in the whole of the Vedas, it occurs for 31 times in the whole of 120 Upanisads but where as in the principal Uranisads the term denotes 'knowledge about the Self', in the minor Upanisads, we find references about the omniscience of God and other deities. We pass from the Vedic conception of Physical omniscience to the metaphysical omniscience of the Upanisads. Soul-knowledge is all-knowledge, hence the Upanisadic message: 'Know thyself". But this 'soul-knowledge' which is equivalent to 'all-knowledge' does not mean each and every details of the contingent world. It would simply mean the complete negation of nescience, the cosmicillusion, by fully grasping the underlying reality. Strangely enough, this Atmanic Approach to knowledge is common both to the Upanisads and some of the Jaina thinkers like Kundakunda and Yogîndu. Kunda-kunda identifies Sarvajñata with Atmajñata meaning thereby that any ethics of self-realisation must aim at knowing the Self which is the highest principle of their metaphysics and morality. But at some places there is greater emphasis over Brahmans or even the Creator God and His omniscience than this subject-objectless Atman1.
1. Mundaka Upanisad, 1. 1. 3, 1. 1. 6.
2. Chandogya Upanisad, 7. 1. 1, 6. 1. 1-3; Bṛhadaranyak Upanisad, 3. 7. 1; Mundaka Upanisad, 1. 1. 37.
3. Katha-Upanisad (Sankara Bhāṣya ), 2. 2. 13: Māṇḍūkya Upanisad, 1. 6; Mundaka Upanisad 1. 1. 9, 2. 2. 7; Kena Upanisad (Sankara Bhāṣya ), 3. 1; Svetasvatara Upanisad, 1. 4, 1. 9; Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad, 7. 1. 3. 21; Subala Upanişad, Ch. 5, p. 245; Śuka-Rahasya, 1. 9, p. 257.
4. Mandukya Upanisad (Adi Prakarana ), 3. 36; Alatsanti Prakarapa, 4. 85; 4. 89; Mundaka Upanisad, 1. 1. 9, 2. 2. 7; Adhyatma Upanisad, V. 13, p. 537; Tripuratapina Upanişad, Ch. 2, p. 537.
5

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Like the Vedic tradition, sometimes the Upanişadic seers also indulge in prayerful exhaultations to the deities. 1 Omniscience of Vişnu?, Brahmas and even Maheśat finds explicit references. Lastly, the concept of omniscience is also associated with the mystical syllable 'Aum'5 which is the acne of spiritualistic cosmogony of the Upanişads. 'Aum' is the world-al16 and hence to know ‘Aum' is to know everything. (3) The Approach of Dharmajñata
The heterodox systems like Buddhism and Jainism have a religion without God but they would not like to miss the advantages that one gets in accepting God. God is omnipotent, omniscient etc. Hence what is said by God, acquires additional prestige and power. Hence as a substitute of God, they have Prophets who are also omniscients in. This is the simple law of spiritual sociology that necessity is the mother of invention. Instead of God or godess, they strictly adhere to their respective religious dogmas. The basis of religion is ultimately faith. “The heart has reason of which reason has no knowledge', says Pascal. Tennyson in his 'Memorium' has said 'Believing where we cannot prove'. The need for believing is inherent in human nature. So we have nothing to say against the religious dogmas. “Religion may sometime justifiably be taken in the Lucretian sense of superstitio”?, says Galloway. But what of 1. Mahā nārāyaṇīya Upanişad, 2. 9-10, 6. 2 & 5; Praśna-Upa
nişad, 1. 8; Isavāsya-Upanişad 8; Hansa-Upanişad, V. I, p.
146. 2. Maitrayaniya Upanişad, 6. 38. 3. Nārada-parivrājaka Upanişad, 8. 14. 4. Sarva Upanişad, V. 20. 5. Maodūkya Upanişad, 1; Chandogya Upanişad, 2. 23. 3;
Taittiriya Upanişad, 18-17; Maitrí Upanişad, 6. 5, 6. 3; Śvetaśvatar Upanişad, 1. 14; Katha Upanişad, 2, 3. 2. 1. 8; Mundaka Upanişad, 3. 1. 9; Praśna Upanişad, 5. 1-5;
Katha Upanişad, 1. 2. 15–17. 6. Chandogya Upanişad, 1. 15. 7. Philosophy of Religion, p. 27 ( Edinbur., 1956 ).

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that? 'Religion is the poetry which we believe'-as Santyana says in his Reason and Religion. Thus omniscience is demonstrated as a religious necessity, i. e., we pass from metaphysical determination to an ethical and volitional determination of knowledge. This spirit of the evangelic religions may also be traced back to the Mahabharat, where knowledge of Dharma is held as the supreme knowledge. Even in the Jaina Agamas, the concept of Sarvajñata has been equated with the conception of Dharmaj ñatal. Prajñakargupta has proved Sugata ( Buddha ) as Dharmajña together with Sarvajñas, Santarakşita also supports it. (4) Approach of Reason
Dogmas if lift to the private field should not be questioned, but if made public, they are bound to face postmortem examinations and hence the formal reasoning is bound to step in. So, we find quite a best of logicians who try to prove Omniscience with the rarest dialectical skill and logical acumen. Among the Buddhists, the names of Santarakṣita4 ( 749770 ) and Prajñakarguptas (about 10th century) are important. Among the Jainas, there is long and continued tradition of logicians who have tried to prove Omniscience with the help of arguments. The names of Umaswati ( 2nd Century ), Siddhasena (5th Century )?, Samantabhadra (6th Century )8, Pūjyapada (6th Century )', Akalanka ( 7th Cen1. Şaçkhandagama ( Amravati, 1939 ), Sut. 78. 2. Pramāpavarttikalarkara, p. 329. 3. Tattva-Sangraha, K. 3328. 4. Ibid ( G.O.S., Baroda ), K. 3328. 5. Pramana-Varttikalankara ( Mahabodhi Society, Saranath ),
p. 329. 6. Tattvartha-Sūtra (Varni Jaina Granthamala, Kashi ), 1. 9. 7. Sanmati-Prakarana (Ed. Dalsukha Malvania, Banaras ),
Ch. VII. 8. Apta-Mimāṁsā (Jaina Siddhanta Prakashini Sanstha,
Calcutta ), Ch. VII. 9. Sarvartha-Siddhi ( Bh ratiya Jnana Picha, Kashi), Ch. I, II.

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tury )?, Abhayadeva Súri ( 7th Century )2, Haribhadra ( 8th Century )3, Vidyānanda ( 9th Century )4, Manikyanandi ( 9th Century )5, Anantakirti ( 11th Century 16, Prabhacandra ( 11th Century )?, Hemcandra ( 11th Century )8, Vadideva Singh Sūri ( 12th Century )', Mallisena ( 14th Century )10, Dharmabhişana ( 14th Century )11, Yaśovijaya ( 18th Century )12 etc.13 are important in this connection. ( 5 ) Mixed Approach of Reason and Faith
Man has both head and heart, hence needs not only to be silent but also to be convinced, i. e., we want a synthesis of faith and reason, which is in conformity with the best traditions of Indian Philosophy. Bare reason is empty and blind 1 Asta-Sati (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay ), śloka 5 & 6. 2. Tattva-Bodha-Vidhayini or Vada-Mahārnava (Gujrat
Puratatva Mandir, Ahmedabad ), Ch. I. 3. Şad-darśana-Samuccaya ( Chowkhambha, Banaras ),
Ch. IV. 4. Aşa-Sahasri ( Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay), Ch. l. 5. Parīkşā-Mukham (Central Jaina Publishing House,
Lucknow ), Ch. VI. 6. Brhat-Sarvajña-Siddhi (Manikya Candra Digambar Jaina
Granthamala, Bombay ). 7 Nyāya-Kumud-Candra ( M. C. D. J. Granthamala,
Bombay) Chapter on Sarvajñata, pp. 86-97. 8. Pramana-Mimāṁsa (Bhasti Jaina Parishat, Calcutta ),
Appor. VI-XVIII. 9. Syadvada Siddhi (M, C. D. J. Granthamala, Bombay)
Ch. VI. 10. Syadváda-Mañjari (Paramshruta Prabhavaka Mandir,
Bombay ), śloka 17. 11. Nyaya-Dipika ( Vir Seva Mandir, Saharanpur ), Ch. II.
Sec. 17. 12. Jñana-Bindu (Singhi Jaina Jñana Pitha, Ahmedabad ),
Ch. VII. 13. Santi-sūri (Rajashekhar, Patrakesari, Devanandi Nemi
çandra etc.).

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faith is dangerous. So what is needed is an integral approach where we should learn to respect the intuitional experiences of the trusted and tried persons and also maintain the intellectual and logical standards. I think, this is the typical Jaina approach to the concept of omniscience. With the Jainas, the concept of omniscience is both a religious dogma as well as logical theory. The Agamas and the logical treatises equally try to establish the theory of omniscience. Lord Mahavira's omniscience is a religious necessity and possibility of human omniscience is a rare intellectual achievement of the Jaina Logicians in the face of terrific opposition from the side of the Mimansakas.
(6) The Yogic Approach
In the literarure of Nyaya. Vaiśeşika and also SamkhyaYoga and some of the Tantras, we find that there are yogicdisciplines, which if perfected can enable us to have extraordinary powers, such as extra-ordinary perception, extrasensory perception, pre-cognition etc The Nyaya-Vaiśeşika recognises Alaukika Pratyakṣa1 of which the yogic intuition is one of the three varities2. Yogic perception differs from divine omniscience in that it is produced, while the latter is eternal3. The Yoga philosophy believes that if the art of Yoga is perfected, we can achieve the redirection of our consciousness, which is brought about by practice and conquest of desire4. The normal limits of human vision are not the limits of the universe. Asamprajnata Samadhi of Yoga5 indicates the possibility of human omniscience. Recent researchers in the field of para-psychology simply go to strengthen this position".
1. Laugākṣi Bhaskara, Tarka-Kaumudi, p. 9; Viśvanatha's Bhaşa-Pariccheda, Sec. 3.
2. Padartha-dharma-sangraha of Prasastapada, p. 258.
3. Ibid, p. 187, Nyaya-Kandali, p. 195.
4. Yoga-Sutra, 1. 2.
5. Ibid, 3. 49, 4. 29.
6. Names of J. B. Rhine, G. N. M. Tyrrell, P. D. Payne, L. J.

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CONCLUSION Of all the six approaches to the concept of omniscience in Indian Philosophy, the Jaina approach is most serious and sincere. This problem is a problem of life and death to them. They accept it as a religious dogma, as an outcome of reasoning and Logic and also as a fruit of yogic exercises.
Benedit, H. H. Price, Charles Richet, R. Tischner, J. J. West, G. E. W. Wolstenholme, E. C. P. Miller, R. S. Woodworth, Carl Murchison, S. D. Katkin, Mayer, O. Mc Dougall etc. are well known.

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Chapter Six NON-ABSOLUTISM AND OMNISCIENCE (1) Is Non-absolutism Absolute ?
Is non-absolutism is absolute, it is not universal since there is one real which is absolute and if non-absolutism is itself nonabsolute, it is not an absolute and universal fact. “Tossed between the two horns of the dilemma non-absolutism thus simply evaporates.”! But there are also the following points :
(a ) Every proposition of the dialectical seven-fold judgement is either Complete or Incomplete. In complete judgement, we use only one word that describes one characteristic of that object and hold the remaining characters to be identical with it. On the other hand, in Incomplete Judgement, we speak of truth as relative to our standpoints. In short, Complete Judgement is the object of valid knowledge (pramapa) and Incomplete Judgement is the object of aspectal knowledge (Naya )4. Hence the "non-absolute is constituted of the absolute as its elements and as such would not be possible if there were no absolute,"5
1. Mookerjee, S. : The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism,
Bharati Mahavidyalaya, Calcutta, 1944, p. 169. 2. Umāsvāmí: Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra, Central Jaina Pub
lishing House, Arrah, T. 6; Vidyānanda : Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttikam, 1. 6. 3, (Ed.) Manoharlal, Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1918, p. 118, IV. 43; Vadideva Suri : Pramāņa-naya-tattvalokālankāra, IV. 43, Kashi, Editor
Himanshu, Vijaya Vira Samvat 2437. 3. Tattvartha-śloka-vārttika, p. 118; Pramāņa.naya-tattva
loka, IV. 45. 4. Pūjyapāda : Sarvārtha-Siddhi, Bharatiya Jñana Pitha,
Kashi, 1955, p. 20. 5. Mookerjee, S. : Ibid, p. 171.

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(b) The unconditionality in the statement “All statements are conditional” is quite different from the normal meaning of unconditionality. This is like the idea contained in the passage-'I do not know myself', where there is no contradiction
een 'knowledge' and 'ignorance' or in the sentence, 'I am undecided', where there is atleast one decision that I am undecided. Similarly, the categoricality behind a disjunctive judgement (A man is either good or bad etc.? ) the categoricality is not like the categoricality of an ordinary categorical judgement. “The horse is red'. The question of 'why' has been discussed elsewhere2 in detail.
(c) Samantabhadra, an early Jaina logician, in one of his worship-songs, clarifies this position the light of the doctrine of manifoldness of truth. He says, "even to the doctrine of nonabsolutism can be interpreted either as absolute or non-absolute according to the pramāņa or Naya respectively. This means that even the doctrine of non-absolutism is not absolute unconditionally. 3
(d) However, to avoid the fallacy of infinite regress, the Jainas distinguish between Vaild non-absolutism (Samyak anekanta ) and invalid non-absolutism (Mithya Anekānta4 ). Like an invalid absolute judgement an invalid non-absolute
1. Bradley, F. H. : The Principles of Logic, Oxford, 2nd ed.,
Vol. 1, p. 130. 2. Jaina Antiquary, Arrah, Vol. 22, No. 1, article of the
author entitled 'The Nature of the Unconditionality in
Syadváda', pp. 20-24. 3. Svayambhu Stotra, K. 130, Vira Seva Mandir, Sarasawa,
1951, p. 67 and Nyaya-dipikā of Abhidharma Bhūşaņa, Ed. Darbari Lal Kothia, Vira Seva Mandir, Sarasawa,
1945, pp. 128-129. 4. Samantabhadra : Āpta-Mīmāsā, K. 108, Sanatana Jaina
Granthamala, Kasbi, 1914; Aşta-Sahasri : Vidyananda, Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, p. 290; Nyaya-dipikā, pp. 130-131.

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judgement, too is invalid. To be valid, Anekanta must not be absolute but always relative. In short, the doctrine of nonabsolutism is an opposite (theory) or Ekantavāda, onesided exposition irrespective of other view points1. Anekantavada literally means not, one, aside, exposition but many sided exposition taking into account all possible angles of vision regarding any object or idea.
Now, if we consider the above points, we can not say that "the theory of relativity cannot be logically sustained without the hypothesis of an absolute." Thought is not mere distinction but also relation. Everything is possible only in relation to and as distinct from others and the Law of contradiction is the negative aspect of the Law of identity. Under these circumstances, it is not legitimate to hold that the hypothesis of an absolute cannot be logically sustained without the hypothesis of a relative. Absolute to be absolute presupposes a relative somewhere and in some forms, even the relative of its non-existence.
Jaina Logic of Anekanta is based not on abstract intellctualism but on experience and realism leading to a non-absolutistic attitude of mind. Multiplicity and unity, particularity and the Universality, eternality and non-eternality, definability and non-definability etc., which apparently seem to be contradictory characteristics of reality or object, are interpreted to co-exist in the same object from different points of view
1. Kapadia, H. R. (Ed.), Anekānta-jaya-pa tākā of Haribhadra, Vol. I, p. IX (Introduction), Gackawada Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1940.
2. Radhakrishnan, S.: Indian Philosophy, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1929, Vol. 1, pp. 305-306 (Cf. Hanumanta Rao's article on 'Jaina Instrumental Theory of Knowledge', Indian Philosophical Congress, 1926 (Proceedings).
3. Syadvada-Mañjari of Mallisena, (ed.) A. B. Dhruva, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1933, V. 25.

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without any offence to logic. All cognition be it of identity or diversity or after all are valid. They seem to be contradictory of each other simply because one of them is mistaken to be the whole truthi, In fact, “the integrity of truth consists in this very variety of its aspects, within the rational unity of an all comprehensive and ramifying principle."2 The charge of contradiction against the co-presence of being and nonbeing in the real is a figment of a priori logic. 3 (2) Is Knowledge Absolute ?
Since absoluteness is unknown to Jaina Metaphysics, so it is in its metaphysics of knowledge. The Jaina division of knowledge into immediate and mediatet is not only free from the fallacy of overlapping division but it is also based on common experiences and point out to the initial non-absolutism.
However, the professed non-absolutism becomes more explicit, when knowledge is classified into Pramana ( knowledge of a thing in its relation ). This aspect of knowledge existing
1. Sanghavi, S. : Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and
Metaphysics, Indian Studies, Past and Present, Calcutta,
1961, p. 19. 2. Desai, M. D. : The Naya-Karpika, C. J. P. H., Arrah,
1915, p. 25 ( Introduction ). 3. Mookerjee, S. : Ibid, p. 190 (Chapter I deals with 'Logi
cal Background of Jaina Philosophy' in the light of Ane
kānta Logic ). 4. Tattvārtha-Sūtra, I. 11-12; Paríkşā-Mukham of Mavikya
nandi (Ed.) S. C. Ghoshal, The Central Jaina Publishing House, 1940, II. I; Pramāpa-Mimāmsā of Hemacandra, edited by Sukhalal Sanghavi, Bhartiya Vidya Bhawan, Bombay, 1939, 1. 1-9; Nyáya-Dipikā, p. 23; Pramana
naya-tattva lokalarikára, 11. 5. Prasad, R.: His Article on "A Critical Study of Jaina
Theory of Knowledge”, in Jaina Antiquary, Vol. XV, No.
2, Jan. 1949, pp. 66-67. 6. Tattvartha-Sūtra I. 6; Nyaya-dipikā, p. 8.

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in relation to a number of things and being liable to be influenced by others is a fundamental feature of Jaina epistemology. Pramana is complete knowledge (sakaladeśa) and Naya is Incomplete knowledge (vikalādeśa ).1 Other controversies between the two traditions of Jainism Agamic and the Logical, regarding the classification of knowledge are referred to elsewhere.2
For clarification, it may be said that the terms 'immediacy and mediacy' are used in different sense than the common meaning and understanding. Jainas deny the immediate character of the ordinary perpetual knowledge like the western representationalists but unlike the Realists. "The knowledge is direct or indirect accordingly as it is born without or with the help of an external instrument different from the self."3
However, to avoid sophistication and also to bring their theory in line with others a distinction is made between really immediate and relatively immediate. The latter is empirically direct and immediates knowledge produced by the sense-organs and the mind.
Tattvartha-Śloka-Varttika,
1. Sarvartha-Siddhi, pp. 20-21; P. 118.
2. See, Sukhalal Sanghavi's, Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics, Section 8, pp. 50-54.
3. Tatia, N. M.: Studies in Jaina Philosophy, Jaina Cultural Research Society, Banaras, 1951, p. 28.
4. Pramana-naya-tattvālokālaṁkāra, II. 45; Pramāņa-mimamsā, 1. 1. 15; Nyāya-dīpikā, p. 32; Prameya-ratna-mālā of Anantakirti, Commentary on Parīkṣa Mukham (Ibid), p. 14.
5. Parikşa Mukham, II. 5; Pramāṇa-mimaṁsa, I. 1. 21; Prameya-ratna-mālā, p. 14.
6. Pramana-naya-tattvā lokālankara, II. 4. 5; Nyaya-dipika, p. 33; Tattvartha-Raja-Varttika of Akalanka, Jñāna Pitha, Kashi, 1915, Commentary on Tattvartha-Sūtra 1. 14. Sthananga-Sutra II. 1. 71; Nandi-Sutra 4.

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Pramāna and Naya represent roughly the absolute and the relative characters of knowledge respectively and taken together, as knowledge is constituent, it becomes non-absolutistic. A closer study of the theory of Pramāṇā is defined as the knowledge of an object in all its aspects and since an object has innumerable characteristics? it implies that if we know all. The universe is an interrelated whole. Nothing:is an isolated phenomenon. Hence, right knowledge of the even one object will lead to the knowledge of the entire universe. This shows that our knowledge has got a relative character. This relativism is realistic. It not only asserts a plurality of determinate truths but also takes each truth to be an indetermination of alternative truths."3 These so many truths are really alternate truths, so it is a mistake of finding one absolute truth or even one cognition of the plurality of truths.
"If knowing is a unity, known is a plurality, the objective category being distinction or togetherness. If finally, knowledge is the object, refers to the known, the known must present an equivalent of this of relation or reference, a relation and its content.”4 Intellectualistic abstractionism has to be given up and we should try to dehumanise the ideal and realise the real. The reality is not a rounded ready made whole or an abstract unity of many definite or determinate aspect but that “the so called unity is after all a manifold being only a name for fundamentally different aspects of truth which do not
1, Nyāyavatāra, V. 29; Sad-daršāna-samuccaya of Haribha
dra, 55 ( with Guwaratna's Comments ), Royal Asiatic
Society, Calcutta, 1905. 2. Acārānga-Sūtra, 13. 4. 122; Pravacana-sāra of Kunda
kunda (Ed., Trans. ), A. Chakravarti, Raichandra Jaina
Shastra Mala, Bombay, 1935, 1. 48-49. 3. Bhattacharya K.C. : His article on "The Jaina Theory of
Anekānta” in Jaina Antiquary, Vol. IX, No. I. 4. lbid, pp. 10-11.

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make an unity in any sense of the term.”l So far we know or can know, the making of truth and making of reality is one. Reality like truth is therefore definite-indefinite ( anekanta ), Its indefiniteness follows from the inexhaustible reserve of objective reality and its definiteness comes from the fact that it grows up into the reality of our own knowing which we make.
So we can fairly conclude that in Jainism, non-absolutism is not only a metaphysical but also an epistemological concept. There is no absolute reality, so there is no absolute truth.
Jainas believe that “when there is isolation and obstruction, there is everywhere, so far as the abstraction forgots itself unreality and error." (3) Distinction between Syadrada and Sarvajñata
Syadvāda is not the final truth. It is merely an attitude of knowledge. In fact, it simply helps us in arriving at the ultimate truth. Syadvāda works or can work only in our practical life and it is therefore that the Jainas regard it as
1. Bhattacharya, H. M.: His article on *The Jaina Concept of
Truth and Reality' in the Philosophical Quarterly, Cal
cutta, Vol. III, No. 3, October 1927, p. 213. 2. Bradley, F. H. : Essays on Truth & Reality, Oxford Uni
versity Press, 1914, p. 487; Bradley F. H. : Appcorace & Reality, Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 9th imp., 1951, “There is truth in every idea, howsoever false...... Reality is now this; now that; in this sense it is full of negative, contradictions and oppositions.” Holmes, E. : The Quest of Ideal, p. 21. “It would be nonsense to say that every movement is either swift or slow. It would be nearer the truth to say that every movement is both swift and slow..." Hegal, G. W. F.: A History of Philosophy, p. 465. "Contradiction is the root of all life and movement, that everything is contradiction..."

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practical truth (Vyavahāra Satya). Siddhasena Divakara points out this fact clearly in the following verses -
i, e., without the help of Syadváda, we cannot execute our business in our practical life.
But there is another realm of truth which is not in any way partial or relative but absolute and which is the subject matter of omniscience or perfect knowledge.
Let us illustrate the point of difference between these two types of knowledge - Syadváda and Sarvajñatá.
(a) The immediate effect of valid knowledge ( Prama ) is the removal of ignorance, the mediate effect of the absolute knowledge or Kevala-Jñana, is bliss and equanimity, which the mediate effect of practical knowledge or Syadvāda is the facility to select or reject, what is conductive or not, for self realisation Pramana or Jñanas is the right knowledge. S The development of omniscience is necessarily accompanied by that of perfect or absolute happiness, 4 being free from destructive Karmas." This happiness is independent of every1. Nyayavatāra, V. 28; Mimāṁsā, p. 104. 2. There seems to be difference between the categories of
(Jñana ) and the means of valid knowledge (Pramāna), Tattvärtha-Sūtra, I. 9-10, however Manikyanandi says that a particular type of Jñana is Pramāpa which has the determination of itself as well as of the objects not known before. ( Parikşa-mukham, I. 1-2 ) so says Akalanka ( Aşgasati, Aşga-sa hasri, p. 175 ) and Vidyanandi ( TattvārthaŚloka-Varttika, I. 1078, p. 174 ), According to Hemcandra, a means of knowledge is the authentic definite cognition of an object ( Pramaya-Mímāṁsā, I. 1. 2), so is the view
of Vadideva (Pramana-naya-tattvāloka, I. 2. 3). 3. Nyaya-Dipika, p. 9; Pramāņa-Mimāṁsā, 1. 1. 2. 4. Pavacana-sära of Kunda-kunda, ed. & trans. A. N. Upa
dhye, Raicandra Jaina Shastra Mala, Bombay, 1935, I.
19, 1, 59, 1. 68. 5. Ibid, 1. 60,

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thing and hence eternal it is not physical but spiritual.1 It is not the pleasures of those senses which are in fact miseries, the cause of bondage and dangerous. 2
(b) Syadváda is so foundational to the Jaina Philosophy that it has been assigned a very high place in Jaina metaphysics of knowledge. It is said to be flawless, perhaps because it is associated with the great Mahavīra. True "both Syadvada and Kevala-jñana (omniscient knowledge ) illumine the whole reality, but the difference between them is that while the former illumines the object indirectly, the latter does it directly.”4 Vidyānanda further explaining the point stresses the fact that there is no contradiction between the two kinds of knowledge, since by 'illumining the whole reality', it means revolution of all the seven categories of self, not self etc.5 This attitude shows the spirit of Syadvāda is so much ingrained in Jaina culture that it finds it difficult to assign Syadvåda an inferior place than omniscience.
(c) A vital point of difference between Syadvāda and omniscient knowledge is that while in the case of the former, one knows of all the objects of the world in succession, in the case of Kevala-jñana, the knowledge is simultaneous. 6 By its every definition, omniscience means “an actual direct nonsensuous knowledge, the subject matter of which is all the substances in all their modifications at all the places and in all the times.? The omniscient knowledge is regarded as simultaneous rather than successive, perhaps because it is succesive,
1. Pravacana-sara of Kunda-kunda, Ibid, I. 65. 2. Ibid, I. 63-64; I. 76 (Cf. Parmātma Prakaśa of Yogindu,
Ed. A. N. Upadhye, Parama Śruta Prabhavaka Mandal,
Bombay, 1937, V. 201 ). 3. Svayambhu Stotra, V. 138. 4. Apta-mīmārsa, V. 105. 5. Aşța-sa hasri, p. 288. 6. Apta-Mimarsa, 101; Asta-Sahasrí, pp. 281-282. 7. Tattvartha-śloka-vārttika, I. 29-23, p. 253.

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there can be no omniscience. Since the objects of the world in shape of past, present and future can never be exhausted, consequently knowledge will always remain incomplete. 1
But their might be difficulties even if we regard omniscient knowledge as simultaneous, such as the following --
(1) The omniscient person comprehend contradictory things like heat and cold by a simple cognition which seems absurd.2 To this objection, it may be replied that contradictory things like heat and cold do exist at the same time, for example, where there is flash of lightning in the midst of darkness, there occurs a simultaneous perception of the two contradictory things.s
( 2 ) Then, if the whole world is known to the omniscient person, all at once, he has nothing to know any further, and so he will turn to be quite unconscious having nothing to know.4 To this, it may be said on behalf of the Jainas that the objection would have been valid if the perception of the omniscient person and the whole world were annihilated in the following instant. But both are everlasting, hence there is no absurdity in the Jaina position regarding the simultaneity of omniscient perception,5
(d) The most fundamental difference between Syādväda and Sarvajñata or Kevala-jñāna is that while the former "leads us to relative and partial truth whereas omniscience to absolute truth.". It comes within its own range. After all,
1. Prameya-kamala-martanda of Prabhacandra, Nirnaya
Sagar Press, Bombay, 1941, p. 251; Nyaya-Kumuda-Candra
of Prabhacandra, M. D. J. G. Bombay, 1938, Vol. 1, p. 88. 2. Prameya-kamala-Mártanda, p. 254. 3. Ibid, p. 260. 4. Ibid, p. 254. 5. Ibid, p. 260. 6. Anekanta-jaya-patākā of Haribhadra, Introduction, Vol.
II, p. CXX,

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Syidvāda is an application of scriptural knowledgel which determines the meaning of an object through the employment of one-sided Nayasa, and the scriptural knowledge is a kind of mediate or indirect knowledge.
True, unlike Naya (knowledge of an aspect of a thing ), Syadvada in it sweeps all the different nayas; but even then it never asserts that it is the absolute truth. In fact, Syādvāda is merely an attitude of philosophising which tells us that on account of infinite complexities of nature and limited capacity of our knowledge, what is presented is only a relative truth. Now, one can point out that if we combine the result of the seven-fold nayas into one, cannot we get as the absolute truth? Is not the absolute truth a sum of relative truths ? The answer is in the negative. Firstly, the knowledge arrived at through the alternative Nayas do not and cannot take place simultaneously but in succession3 leading to the fallacy of infinite regress4 since an object possesses innumerable character. Secondly, to regard Syadváda as absolute is to violate its very fundamental character of non-absolutism. Samantabhadra has very explicitly said that even Anekanta (non-absolutism ) is non-absolute ( Anekanta5 ) in respect of Prama a and Naya. Further, the distinction is made between SamyakAnekanta and Mithya-Anekanta (i. e. Real and False nonabsolutism ) and it is held that the real Anekānta is never absolute but always relative to something else.? However, this is not the case with omniscience. It is the knowledge of the absolute truth.
1. Laghiyastraya of Akalanka ( Akalanka Grant ha Trayam
Ed. Mahendra Kumar, Singhi Jaina Granthamala, Cal
cutta, H. 1139 ), K. 62, p. 21. 2. Nya yavatara, K. 30. 3. Apta-mimāṁsa, K. 101. 4. Nyāya-kumuda-candra, p. 89. 5. Svayambhu Stotra, K. 102; Sanmati Tarka, III. 27-28. 6. Äpta-Mimāṁsā, 108. 7, Äsja-Sahasri, p. 290.

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(e) Their is one more minor point of difference between Syadvada, knowledge and omniscience. Syadvada like ordinary knowledge rests on sense-perception, i. e., it is limited to our sense-organs only. But Kevala-jñana has no dependence on any sense and arises after destruction of obstructions.1 Ordinary individuals do not have this knowledge but only the Arhats2, whose deluding (Mohaniya) Karmas are destroyed and the knowledge and Belief obscuring (Jñanavaraṇīya + Darśanavarapiya) Karmas are removed and the obstructive Karmas (Antarayas) are also destroyed.3
82
Here, knowledge is acquired by the soul directly without the intervention of senses or signs4, for in that case it would not have cognated all objects, for the senses can only stimulate knowledge of object which can be perceived by them. Here we find a complete absence of dependence upon anything except the soul. Jainas like the western Realists and Representationalists held that the ordinary sense-perception is really mediate in character and hence according to the Jainas, the transcendental perception ( Kevala-jñāna) is immediate along with Avadhi and Manaḥ-paryaya, all of which do not require the help of the senses.5
This attempt to free perception from the limitations of senses accords it a very high status and hence it is regarded as supreme knowledge characteristic of supreme state of selfrealisation and bliss.6
CONCLUSION
The following points have emerged out of the foregoing discussions:
1. Parikşa-mukham, II. 11.
2. Pramana-naya-tattvälokālankara, II. 14.
3. Pramapa-Mimamsa, I. 1. 15; Tattvartha-sutra, X. 1.
4 Pramana-naya-tattvālokālankara, II. 18.
5. Pravacana-sara, I. 54.
6. Ibid, I. 19, I. 59, I. 60.

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(a) Importance of Anekanta Logic : Anekānta logic is as important as the absolute wisdom or omniscience. The loss caused by Anekānta or Syadváda by its being mediate is fully made up by its capacity to demonstrate the truth of the absolute wisdom to mankind. That is why it has been regarded as indispensable for common practical life. Not only this, it has been accorded a special religious status. Even Lord Mahavira's sermons are delivered through the technique of Syadvāda, 2 which is very much perfect technique of expressing the manifold nature of reality. This is the technique of the Victor and the perfect. 3
(b) The dual nature of Anekanta-Anekanta & Ekanta : Anekantavada is both Anekānta and Ekānta. It is ekānta in as much as it is an independent view point, it is anekanta because it is the sum total of view points. Anekanta may also become Ekānta, if it does not go against the right view of things.4
As the doctrine of Anekanta shows all possible sides of a thing and thus does not postulate about a thing in any fixed way, in the same way Anekanta itself is also subject to this possibility and other side-that is to say, it also sometimes assumes the form of onesidedness.5 However, the Jainas do not have any objection even if their doctrine recalls on itself. On the contrary, it strengthens their position and shows the unlimited extent of the range. 6
1. Sanmati Tarka, III. 68. 2. Bhagavati Sūtra, VII. 2. 273; XIII. 7. 495; Every sermonic
sentences of Lord Mahavira had always a prefix of Syat for otherwise truth would have been violated, Cf. : Apta
Mimaṁsa, 105. 3. Svayambhu Stotra, 41 and 45. 4. Sanmati Tarka, III. 28. 5. Ibid, III. 27. 6. Anekanta-Jaya-Pataka, Vol. II (Introduction ), p. CVII.

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(c) Beyond Anekanta : True, absolute wisdom is baseless without the Anekānta logic but to suppose that there is nothing beyond Syadvada in Jaina theory of knowledge, is wrong. The importance of Syadv: da lies more in its analytical enquiry than in concrete results. It is a way of philosophising rather than a readymade metaphysics. The demand of higher spiritual life is the life of a Yogin, who realises the complete unity of existence in his consciousness, transcending the sphere of the phenomena. He can view things sub-species aternitatis, through his pure insight and intuition. "He is in possession of absolute truth, transcending the realm of provisional truths."} This is the state of supreme knowledge, free from all limitations, where “the soul vibrates at its natural rhythm and exercises its function of unlimiting knowledge.”2 This is another name of pure perception or infinition in epistemology and mysticism in religion. This is an attitude of mind which involves a direct, immediate and first hand intuitive apprehension of the reality. Some Jaina teachers and another like Ācārya Kunda-kundas and Yogindu4 are outspoken mystics. Their mysticism turns round two concepts --- Ātman and Paramātman (God but not creator ). Parmatman in Jainism is nearer to that of a parsonal Absolute and the different states of spiritual development are merely meditational stages being caused by sick-mindedness of the soul for its final deliverance.
(d) From Anekanta to Advaitiya Omniscience : So far Jainism puts the highest value on the mystical experience of a Kevalin who transcends the realm of the phenomenal and
1. Shastri P.: His article on "The Jaina Doctrine of Syad
vāda with a New Pragmatic Background", in Siddha-Bha
rati, II. 93. 2. Radhakrishnan, S. : Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 298. 3. Pravacana-sara, I. 35, I. 60, I. 61, I. 29, II. 106. 4. Paramātma Prakasa, II. 174, II. 201, II, 195, and his
Yoga-Sára, V. 9.

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reaches at the absolute truth, "it approaches very near Advaita Vedānta”. I Yogîndu'sa identification between the spirit and the super spirit is a triumph of monism in the history of Indian religious thoughts. As the Vedāntins distinguish between the higher and the lower knowledge, so here also we find a distinction between omniscience and Syadvada. However, inspite of many other similarities, there is one vital difference, in the Vedāntic conception the objectivity is not outside the knower, while for Jaina3 omniscience, there is a complex external objectivity infinitely over both time and place and the individual self retains its individuality even in the search of omniscience and bliss.
1. Shastri, P. D. : Ibid, p. 13; Cf. : See author's article on
"Advaita Trends in Jainism", published in Darśanika,
Faridkot, 1959. 2. Pravacana-sāra ( Ibid ), Introduction, p. LXXVII. 3. Sanmati-Tarka, 1. 49; 1. 150; Apta-Mimātsá’, 24 & 25;
Tattvartha-Sloka, 1. 23-53.

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JAINA METAPHYSICS (1) Advaita Trends in Jainism. (2) Nature of Unconditionality in Syadvada. (3) An Examination of Brahma-Sutra ( 11. 2. 33 )

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Chapter Seven
ADVAITA TRENDS IN JAINISM
Avidya: The Cause of Bondage
Spiritualism is an essential feature of Indian mind. It always endeavours after spiritual light or the vision of truth. Hence the Vedic prayer "lead me from falsity to Truth, from darkness to light, from death to immorality." Bondage is the process of birth and rebirth, the consequent miseries. Liberation therefore is the stoppage of this process.1 The vision of truth is the vision of freedom. Ignorance therefore is the cause of the bondage.
-
This is the principle which acts as the hindrance against the apprehension of truth, obstructs our innate capacity to know the truth. This is our degeneration or descent. Hence knowledge is essential for liberation and hence the prayer.
The seeds of Vedantic (Advaitic) thought can be traced in the Upanisads, where Avidya is perversity of vision and attachment to the world. Maya is the cosmic force that brings forth the world of plurality. If the Maya conditions the universe, Avidya keeps one attached to it. There is Maya because there is Avidya. To Gaudapada, Māyā is the cosmic illusion and the avidya the individual ignorance - a result of it. Sankara postulates Maya to explain origination of cosmic illusion while Avidya the individual. However the freedom is the goal. But this freedom is only through knowledge (Jñanat-eva-tu-Kaivalyam) without knowledge there is no emancipation (Rte-Jñanānna Muktiḥ3). The purpose of man (is effected) through the mere knowledge of Brahman
1. Bhagavad-Gita, 2. 51; Katha-Upanisad, 1. 3. 7-8. 2. Malkani, G. R.: Vedantic Epistemology, p. 3.
3. Rg-veda.

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thus Badarāyāņa opines.I He who knows the self, overcomes grief. He who knows that highest Brahman, becomes even Brahman.3 He who knows Brahman, attaines the highest.4 Mokşa is the absence of false knowledge says Padmapada. This insight, this changed attitude to life and its happenings is not so much a condition of Mokşa, as Mokşa itself.5 The cause of pain is simply error or false knowledge. The Jaina term for Avidyā is Mithyátva. Knowledge downs only after the destruction of darkness. So the path of freedom is the path of knowledge. Knowledge therefore is the first of the ‘Three Jewels' The soul is inherently perfect and has infinite potentiality. It is self luminous. It shines as the sun. But there are clouds and fogs of Karma. So the moment the clouds disappear, the Sun comes into its own. It is our ignorance about the real nature of our souls that bind us to the
1. Brahma-Sūtra, Sārkara Bhāşya, III. IV. 1. 2. Chandogya Upanişad, III. 1. 3. Mundaka Upanişad, III. 2. 9. 4. Taittiriya Upanişad, II. 1., Chandogya Upanişad, VI. 14,
VIII. 7; Bșhadaranyak Upanişad, IV. 5. 6-15, Svetās
vatara Upanişad, 5. 13. 5. Radhakrishnan, S.: Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 637. 6. Sānkara Bhasya on Brahma-Sūtra, II. 3. 46; Chandogya
Upanişad, VIII. 8. 4-5; Nyaya-Bhășya, 4. 2. 1; Prašas
tapada Bháșya. 7. Tattvārthādbigama-Sūtra, 10. 1; Tattvártha-Sūtra, l. 1;
Dravya-Sangraha, 40, p. 538; Cf. : Sainkhya-Karika of Iswarakrspa ( Trans. by S. S. Shastri ), 44; Maghara-výtti, 44; Tattvärtha-Sloka-Värttika, p. 72; Candra-PrabhaCaritam, K. 44; Yoga-darsana, 2.3, 3-5; Tattvártha-Sūtra, 8. 1; Uttarādhyaya na Sūtra, 21. 19. 18. 123; Dharma-sarmábhyudayam, 23. 43, 28, 20, 29. 71, 32. 7; SthânárgaSūtra, 2. 2. 21. 123; Samaya-sāra of Kunda-kunda, iX. 293; Pañcastikaya-samaya-sära of Kunda-kuoda, l. 47; Pravacana-sära of Kunda-kunda, II. 81.

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wheel of Samsara or bondage. Thus the need of right knowledge or the knowledge of reality is Supreme.
Here we find almost no distinction between Jainism and Vedanta. State of Liberation
We have seen that Moksa is the goal of human life. With the solitary exception of the Carva kas all schools of Indian philosophy accepts this as the Highest Good or Param puruşartha. However there are two different views regarding the nature of Mukti--positivistic and Negativistic. The Buddhists?, the Naiyāyikas, the Samkhyas3, Yoga4 and the PūrvaMimamsas, hold that in the State of Mukti there is complete absence of miseries but not the attainment of some positive happiness. The Jainase and the Vedantins do hold that the State of Mukti is the state of double blessedness. There is first the end of miseries and then there is also the attainment of Positive bliss This is because the self possesses infinite knowledge, Power and bliss. Here comes a difficulty. If Mokşa is the result of spiritual descipline, it can not be eternal, if otherwise it is beyond attainment. Vedanta solves this difficulty. To the Advaitins Mokşa is the realisation of identity of Jiva and Brabman. It is not something to be attained afresh.
1. Cf. Madhyamika Vitti (P. T. S.), p. 197; Introduction to
Paramātma Prakāśa of Yogindu (Traps. by A. N. Upadhye ); The World and Liberation, Prapanca-pravýtti; For positive Views of Nirvāpa, see Visuddhimagga of
Buddha-Ghosh, 8. 247, 16. 64; 16. 37. 2. Nyaya-Bhașya, 1. 1. 21; Nyaya-mañjari, p. 508; for
positive views, see p. 200. 3. Sankbya-karika of Iswarakrspa, 67; Sainkhya-tattva
kaumudi, 67. 4. Yoga-Bhäşya, 4. 30. 5. Sloka-varttika, 107. 6 Samaya-sára of Kuoda-kunda, 10. 4,

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It is "Prāptasya Praptiḥ, so says the Upanişads 'That Thou art’l and not “That Thou becomest", Since Brahman besides Sat and Cit is also Ananda so Jiva becomes Anandamaya? when it realises it. Bliss and knowledge are identical.3 Thus liberation is a positive bliss besides cessation of all kinds of miseries. To conclude with Mandana, mere absence of misery is not happiness because misery and happiness, may be experienced together by a person merged in a cool tank with the scorching sun above.4 Nature of Soul
The concept of bondage and liberation follows from the concept of the soul. For the self is prior to all, bondage and liberation, truth and falsehood. Its existence is self-proved; it can not be doubted, for it is the essential nature of him who doubts it.5 It is known in immediate perception, prior to all proof. It is logical postulate. Metaphysically the conception of self-existence implies that the self is eternal, iinmutable and complete. 6 So far Jainism and Advaita Vedānta affirm the existence of self.
Again we find that self is conscious, both in Vedānta and in Jainism, when bondage is the Souls' Association with the body through ignorance, soul is something other than the physical self. Self is the pure existence which is not only uncontradicted but also uncontradictably. This persists through all its states.? The moment we try to negate we affirm. Then this 1. Chandogya Upanişad. 2. Taittiriya Upanişad, III. 8, II. 7. 3. Pravacana-sára of Kunda-kunda, 1. 59-60. 4. Ramcaran : Concept of Mukti in Indian Philosophy (Pro
ceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1944 ), 5. Bhagavad-gita, II. 37; Chindogya Upanişad, VIII. 7. 12;
Taittiriya Upanişad, II. 1-7. 6. Isa. Upanişad, 1; Sankara-Bhaşya on Brahma-Sutra,
1.1.4. 7. Sankara Bhasya, II. 2. 1; Bhagavad-gita, II, 16.

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pure existence is also pure consciousness. Therefore the Ātman is nothing other than the consciousness. However, this consciousness is not the flux of states, a stream of consciousness, It is an universal and eternal consciousness. It is undifferentiated consciousness alone (Nirvisesa Cinmatram?) or pure consciousness with no difference of knower, knowledge, the known, infinite, transcendent, the essence of absolute knowledge.3 Coming to the Jaina conception of Soul, we find that as Jiva is also a substance or Sattá is real or existence. However the most important characteristics of Jiva ( like the Vedanta ) is consiousness or Upayoga.4 So it is co-extensive with knowledge. Further, as in the Vedanta we find the Soul described as eternal, Pure, Self-illumined, free, real, supremely blissful, infinite ( Nitya, Suddha, Buddha, Mukta, Satya, Paramananda ), so also is Jainism." Ātman Paramatmas
The career of the individual self sketched by Salikara is exactly parallel to the sketch given by Jaina Metaphysics. There are two kinds of Self, recognised in Jainism – Pure or Swa-samaya or Ego-in-itself and Para-Samaya or Empirical Ego6. Ego-in itself is the same as the Paramātman of Upanişads or Brahman of Vedānta. Sankara calls the ultimate reality as Paramātman or the Supreme-Self. To Sankara Paramatman and Brahman are inter-changeable terms. The
1. Advaita Makaranda, 11. 13. 2. Sarva-Siddhanta-Sangraha, XII. 8. 41; Šaukara-Bhaşya on
Brahma sūtra, III. 2.16; Yaśavanta Muktavali, p. 49. 3. Viveka-cudamani. p. 239. 4. Paramatma-Prakaśa of Yogindu ( Trans. by A. N. Upa
dhye ) III. 8; Pañcāstikaya-samaya-sāra of Kunda-kunda,
2. 80, 1. 27; Dravya-sangraha, 2. 5. Cf. : Vedānta-sära of Sadānanda, 171 ( Nikhilānanda );
Samaya-sära of Kunda-kunda, 1. 37-38; Tattvārtha-sūtra.
II. 8. 6. Samaya-sara of Kunda-kunda, 1. 2.

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doctrine of identifying Jivatma and Paramatma is common to both the Upanişads and the Jaina thought. In this conne. ction it is worth pointing out that both Kunda-kunda and Sarkara used the word 'Advaita' the indication of the oneness of Jivatma and Paramatma." It is the individual Self which is the doer, the enjoyer, the sufferer, The Atman clothed in the Upadhis is the Jiva which enjoy, suffers and acts from both of which conditions, the highest soul is free. Paramātma Prakāśa of Yogindu strikes a more idealistic note when it says that it is the internal by leaving everything external that becomes the Supreme Soul. Paramātman is peace, happiness and bliss.
The doctrine of three-fold individuality ( external, internal and the supreme ) is supported by Kunda-kunda, Yogindu, Pūjya-păda, Amộtacandra and Guņabhadra etc. Similarly in non-Jaina literature, we find its counterparts in early Vedic literature, in the doctrine of Pañcakośa of the Upanişad.s However, these are ultimately one. Ātman is nothing but sentinancy, non-concrete and Paramātman is nothing but infinite vision, knowledge and bliss. The Ātman itself is Paramatman. Paramātman was called Atman only because of Karmic limitations. Yogindu Superspirit or Paramātman represents the ultimate point of spiritual evolution, which is above subject and object.
However, there is no denying the fact that inspite of vast similarity, we still miss the monistic and pantheistic grandeur of the Upanişadic Brahman in the Jaina conception of
1. Introduction to Samaya-sara of Kunda-kunda; p, CLII. 2. Bịhadāranyak Upanişad, IV. 3. 12; Taittiriya Upanişad,
III. 5; Śārkara Bhaşya on Brahma-sūtra, II. 3. 33. 3. Śănkara-Bhāşya on Brahma-sūtra, I. 3. 19. 4. Introduction to Paramātma-Prakasa of Yogindu ( detailed
summary of the Contents of Paramatma Prakasa ). 5. Taittiriya Upanişad, II. 1-5. 6. Mysticism in Maharashtra, p. 386.

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paramātman. The assertion of the Jainas about the Plurality of Selves?, is apparently in contra-distinction with the Advaitic thought. However, this is not quite in conformity with other Jaina texts or Jaina view of substance or reality. Substance is that which always exists as the universe, which has neither beginning nor end. Substance is one (as a class ). It is inherent essence of things. It manifests itself through diverse forms.2 What is not different from Sattā or Substance, that is called Dravya which is derived from the root ‘Dru' meaning 'to flow'. It is non-different from substance or existence. 3 It is reality.4 Kunda-kunda goes to the extent that there is neither origination (Utpāda ) nor decay ( vyaya or Vināśa ) but eternal and immutable. Origination and decay etc. concerns the Paryāyas of the substance not the substance itself. According to Umaswati, the definition of Reality or existence or substance is Sat (Existence ).5 'Reality is substance' and 'Substance is reality' or 'Reality is existence' or Satta, So existence is reality or reality is existence. This is to say that all is one because all exists. So says Sthanā uga-sūtra that there is 'One Soul', 'One Universe' (Ege Āya, Ege Loe ).? Thus we see that we are very near to the Upanişadic or Vedantic conception of absolute idealism.
However, a dualistic bias of the Jainas lead them to demarcate between ideal existence and Material existence, which is only illogical. Reality is reality, Existence is extstence. It is all
1. Samaya-sära of Kunda-kunda, 1. 1; Paramātma-Prakāśa
of Yogindu (Introduction ); Dravya-Sargraha, 3. 12; Pañcă stikaya-samaya-sara of Kunda-kunda, 1. 16; Go
mmaçasăra, 141 ( Jivakāvda, ). 2. Pañcastikaya-samaya-sára of Kunda-kunda, 1.8. 3. Pravacana-sara of Kunda-kunda, 9. 4. Tattvärthadhigama-Sūtra, V. 29. 5. Ioid, V. 29. 6. Tattvartha-sūtra-bhāşya, 1. 35. 7. Sthananga-Sūtra, 1.1, 1. 1-4.

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inclusive. There is no distinction of subject and object. The concept of such an all pervading existence can only be ideal. The Jaina canons being too crude could not solve this apparent dualism, hence posited Jiva-Dravya and Ajiva-Dravya, but in Umaswati and Kunda-kunda we do not find such an apparent gulf between reality and reality. Thus Jainism can not escape monism in the last analysis. While they are opposed to each other, they do not seem to be opposed to the Unity which is a synthesis of opposite1. Mere Jiva and Ajiva, Spirit and Matter are abstractions. They are moments of one universal. This is the concrete universal - a reality at once divided and united. This is unity in diversity or identity-in-difference.
96
Yogindu and Kunda-kunda equates Atman with Parmatman. The separateness and individuality of a Jiva is only from the point of view of Vyavahara or experience2. Plurality of souls is a relative conception which reality presents when we lay stress on sensations, feelings and bondage. There is no need to deny plurality of the Jivas at the psychological level. Even Sankara does not deny plurality at the practical level. But in Philosophy, Psychological and practical levels are not all. Logic is the hard task-master. Pluralism and Relativism are the two features of a first analysis of common experience and Jainism stops short of it, disregarding its implications4. Plurality may be existence or actual. But it is not real. Similarly infinite is inherent in the finite. We cannot substain the hypothesis of relativism without an absolute.
――
Thus we find great similarity between Advaita and Jainism. Prof. A. Chakravartis gives a unique proof of it. He
1. Radhakrishnan, S.: Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 339. 2. Dravya-Sangraha, 3. 7 & 8.
3. Radhakrishnan, S.: Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 339. 4. Hiriyanna, M.: Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 171. 5. Samaya-sara of Kunda-kunda (Introduction. p. CLX ); Sankara-Bhasya on Brahma-sūtra, 1. 1.

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says that Sarkara enumerates various schools he considers erroneous as Bauddha, Sarnkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeşika and Pasupata etc. regarding the nature of soul. It is strange that he does not mention the Jaina account of self as one of the erroneous views. Perhaps the Jaina concept of Self and identity of Jivatma and Paramātma is the same as in the Advaita Vedanta. Sankara is very near to Jaina-thought. Like other commentators of Brahma-Sūtra, Sankara does not support the view that the Jiva limited by Avidya is one. Brahman limited by the different inner-organs born of Avidya becomes divided as it were many individual souls. This is opposed to the doctrine of Eka-Jiva-Vada held by other Vedantins. There are various arguments of Aneka-Jiva-Vadins. They hold that there are many individuals and the world appearance has no permanent illusion for all the people, but each person creates for himself his own illusion. From this follows the doctrine of Drştivāda, i. e., the theory that the subjective perception is the creating of the objects and that there are no other objective phenomena apart from subjective and perception3. Even in the Upanişads there is distinction between Ātman and Jivas. And the theory of Eka-Jiva-Vada sometimes goes against the Upanişads and the Brahma-Sūtras5.
Doctrine of Standpoiots
Thus to speak of a thing as one or many is entirely dependent upon the point of view we adopt. Sarkara says that though Devadatta is one, he is thought and spoken as a man, a Brahmin, a learned in the Vedas, generous, boy, youngman,
1. Radhakrishnan, S. : Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 610. 2. Dasgupta, S. N. : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1,
p. 417. 3. Ibid, p. 478. 4. Brhadaranyak Upanişad, 4. 3. 21, 3. 3. 5; Svetaśvatara
Upanişad, 4. 6. 5. Brahma-sūtra, 2. 1. 32, 2. 1. 33.

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old man, father, son, grandson, brother, son-in-law etc.? from different standpoints. This is very similar to the Jaina theory of Syadváda or Asti-Nasti-Vada. Even in the Upanişads we have glimpses of how reality reveals itself in different ways at different stages of our knowledge. This distinction of standpoints is a common feature of Vedanta (Sankara ) and Jainism. Śarkara distinguishes ultimate reality from practical reality. Vyavahāra view is useful, essential so far it leads to the realistic view-point. Just as a non-Aryan can not be made to understand except through the medium of his non-Aryan language so the knowledge of the absolute can not be communicated to the ordinary people except through the vyavahara point of view3. But in itself it is in-sufficient. He must rise higher. Kunda-kunda therefore examines every problem from these two points of view in dealing with problems of an empirical life and the real point of view in dealing with supreme reality transcending limitations of the empirical lifes. So to transcend the lower is not to ignore its. Hegel has recognised it; Spinoza? has aceepted it. James has prescribed it; Bergson admitted it; Plato10 affirmed it; Vedas11 and Upanişads19 have proclaimed it; Buddhists 13 and
1. Cakravarti, A. : Introduction to Samaya-sara, p. CLIX. 2. Radhakrishnan, S. : Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 299. 3. Samaya-sära of Kunda-kunda, 1. 8. 4. Cakravarti, A. : Introduction to Samaya-sara, p. CLI, 5. McTaggart : Hegelian Cosmology, II, 292. 6. Ibid, 292. 7. Ethics (Imagination, Reason and Intuition ), Cf. : Vol II,
p. 29. 8. Institutional Religion and Personal Religion. 9. Cf. : Intellect and Intuition. 10. Cf. : Perception and Knowledge. 11. Rg-veda, 10. 129. 1-2. 12. Mundaka Upanişad, 1. 45. 13. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, IX. 849, X. 592.

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many others formulated it; Jainas1 and Advaita2 too have recommended it. Deussen rightly says that "the Para-vidya is nothing but metaphysics in an empiric dress, i. e., Vidya as it appears considered from the standpoint of Avidya, the realism innate in us. Thus the distinction between the practical and real standpoints of view is a common feature of Vedanta and Jainism, may even of Buddhism of the Upanisads. Concept of Omniscience
Our phenomenal knowledge suggests the noumenal as a necessity of thought but not as something known to through the empirical pramaņas. Owing to the apparent inadequacy of empirical knowledge, Jainism and Vedantins have developed another organon of knowledge. Not content with Mati, Śruta, Avadhi and Manaḥ-paryaya, Jainas have developed the theory of Keval-jñāna or omniscience which is the highest type of perception which falls in the category of extra-sensory perceptions, where the soul intuits all substances with all their modes. Nothing remains unknown in omniscience. Self and knowledge are co-extensive. Its apprehension is simultaneous sudden and obiquitus. This is practically the same as intuition or integral experience, Anubhava or Sakṣatkara (Direct perception ), Samyag Jñana3, i. e., perfect knowledge or Samyag Darśana (Perceptionintuition) in Advaita Vedanta. Omniscience is the culmination of the faculty of cognition of conscious principle10. It is the
1. Samaya-sara (Introduction), p. CLI.
2. V. P. (Siddhanta Leśa Sangraha), 1.
3. Deussen System of Vedanta, p. 100.
4. Radhakrishnan, S.: Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 509. 5. Mehta, M. L.: Outlines of Jaina Philosophy, p. 99.
6. Tattvartha-Sutra, 1. 30; Avaśyaka-Niryukti, 77.
7. Samkhya-Sutra-Bhāṣya, 1. 31.
8. Sankara Bhasya on Brahma-sutra, 1. 2. 8.
9. Ibid, 1. 3. 13.
10. Mehta, M. L.: Outlines of Jaina Philosophy, p. 102.

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full manifestation of the innate nature of a conscious self, emerging on the total cessation of all obstructive vells, is called 'that' (intuition ) transcendent and purel. Jaina literature is full of discussion on omniscience. There are various proofs for it. Inductively, the gradation of knowledge implies omniscience. So says Hemcandra that the proof of it follows from the proof of the necessity of the final consummation of the progressive development of knowledge and other grounds. Metaphysically, complex and manifold objectivity implies some extraordinary perception. Psychologically, differences in intelligence etc. presupposes omniscience. Religious-Mystical argument proves omniscience on the basis of religio-mystical experience. Logically, on account of the lack of contradictory proofs, omniscience is established4. What Vedanta puts negatively, Jainism puts positively. Vedanta links nescience with misery and Jaina links omniscience with eternal bliss. The Vedanta annihilates nescience by submerging the individual into the universal while Jaina says that individual itself becomes universals. The Jainas hold that each and every entity is related to all entities 6. Nothing is wholly independent. Nothing is intelligible by itse}f. So logically the perfect knowledge of one thing means the perfect
1. Cf.: Ibid p. 99; Radhakrishnan, S. : Indian Philosophy,
Vol. II, p. 511. 2. Pra meya-Kamala-Mártanda, 254. 60; Pañca-Namaskara
Stotra, 4. 10-20; Aşga-śati, K.140; Nyaya-viniscaya, K 465, 361, 362; Satkhandagama, 22.78; Jayadhawala, p. 66;
Ācāra nga:sūtra, 2. 3. 3; Ava'yaka-Niryukti, Gatha 127. 3. Parīkşa-mukham of Manikyanandí, translated by Muker
jee and Tatia, p. 30. 4. Ibid, p. 34. 5. Pravacana-sära of Kunda-kunda ( Introduction ). 6. Tatia, N. M. : Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 70.

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knowledge of all things. Jacobil has quoted an old Jaina Stanza "one who knows one things, knows all and he alone who knows all things knows everything completely.”2
This is the culmination of enlightment, soul-knowledge in its prestine form, perception par-excellence. It does not depend upon any sense ( Atīndriya ) and arises after destruction of all obstruction3.
This is relativism par-excellence. To an omniscient the limitation of Syadvada or conditional predication logically cannot bind. He is all knowing. The veil of ignorance is lifted which obscures vision. Thus here we see that the theory of relativity presupposes the hypothesis of an absolute. The very consciousness of our relativity means we have to reach out a fuller conception. A mere pooling of the contributions of the different standpoints (Naya ) will not lead us to the truth in itself. Truth is not a haphazardous jumbling up of its every bits but is a harmonious whole. Dr. Raju holds that “their ( Jainas ) doctrine is a doctrine of the relativity of knowledge"4. They hold "there is reality; its nature is such and such. still, it is possible to understand it in quite opposite ways"'5. But to the omniscient there would not be relative but absolute and unconditional knowledge. Thus relativism as logically pushed forward leads to absolutism. The moment we accept that there is intuitional knowledge of the
1. Jaina Sūtra, II, p. 34. 2. Cf. : Acaranga-sūtra, 1. 3. 4, Višeşávaśyaka Bhasya. 3. Cf. : Parikşă-mukham, 2. 10; Tattvärthadhigama-sūtra, X.
1; Nyāyā vatara, 27; Prameya-kamala-martanda, 1. 1. 9-10; Pramāņa-naya-tattvalokālaikā ra, 11. 18; Sthanālga-sūtra,
226; Dravya-sarigraha, 5; Raja-praśniya, 165. 4. Raju, P. T. : The Principle of Four-cornered Negation in
Indian Philosophy, Extracts from the review of Meta
physics, Vol. VII, No. 4, June 1954, p. 707. 5. Ibid, p. 697.

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Kevalin, which is higher than thought, we are led to monism absolute and unlimited?. Theory of Causation
Following the doctrine of identity between the cause and the effect, Ācārya Kunda-kunda maintains (consistent with Jaina Metaphysics ) that the Cetana cause can produce non-cetana effects. Strangely enough the Advaita-Vedanta which maintains the Brahman to be the ultimate cause of all reality also maintains the non-difference in cause and effect. However in Jainism while the spirit and the matter seem to be opposed to each other they do not seem to be opposed to the unity which is a synthesis of opposites. Again, each portion of matter may be conceived as like a garden full of plants, or like a pond full of fishes. There is nothing fallow, nothing sterile, nothing dead in the universe3. Considered from this point of view Jainism comes very near to Vedanta. Conclusion
The different categories, thus viewed as functional variations of one principle, are no longer in a position of antagonism or indifferent isolation. It seems legitimate to conclude that the universe is one existence which manifest itself, as substance as it unifies the modes and attributes. It is one universe that the Jaina metaphysics gives us5. All is one because all exists. So we find in the Sthanāngasūtra such utterance as 'Ege Aya; Ege loe', 'One Universe, One soul?. But unfortunately the Jaina Metaphysics was
1. Radhakrishnan, S. : Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 340. 2. Introduction to Samaya-saya of Kunda-kunda, p. CLVII. 3. Radhakrishnan, S. : Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 334. 4. Aşa-sahasrī, p. 113. 5. Mookerjee, S. : The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism,
pp. 301-302. 6. Tattvartha-sūtra-bhāșya, 1. 35. 7. Sthapaiga-sútra, 1. 1, 1. 4.

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not allowed to develop along this line?. So says Radhakrishnan, “it is only by stopping short at a half-way house that Jainism is able to set forth a pluralistic realism."9
Since these two substances are interdependent, the dualism must in its turn and finally be resolved in a monisms. Any way whether Jainism can be transmuted into Advaita or not it is certain that there are obvious Advaita trends in Jainism.
1. Mookerjee, S. : The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism,
p. 302. 2. Radhakrishnan, S. : Indian Philosophy, p. 340. 3. Hiriyanna, M. : Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 172. 4. Datta, D. M. : His kipd letter to me on the subject.

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Chapter Eight NATURE OF UNCONDITIONALITY IN
SYĀDVĀDA (1) Ahimsa, Anekantavada and Syadvada --- Jainism is a great experiment in Ahinsa ( non-violence ) in word, deed and thought. Infinite knowledge, faith, power and bliss are the innate characters of every soul. What is needed is external non-interference. The doctrine of Anekantavada ( nonabsolutism ) is simply an extension of Ahinsa in the field of reality. When things have many characters ( anantadharmatmakam )?, naturally they are objects of all-sided knowledge. Any particular object can be viewed from different points of view. So when we speak of a particular aspect, we have to use the word 'syat' i. e., from a particular point of view, or as related to this aspect, this object is such and pot otherwise. So Syádváda is the doctrine of Relativity of Judgement which is born out of the non-violent and non-absolutistic attitude of the Jainas, which led to the uttermost cautiousness of speech of "explaining problems with the help of Siyuvaya (Syadvada ) or Vibhajjavaya. Our thought is relative. Our expressions are relative2. Thus the doctrines of Ahinsa, Anekantavāda and Syadvada are organically related.
(2) Syadvada : A forin of Scepticism - Scepticisin denies the possibility of knowledge3, said James Iverach. It starts from ‘no more such than such' and ends in 'we know not where, why and whence'. It doubts or denies the very possibility of knowledge. But the position taken by Jainisin is this "there is reality; its nature is such and such; still it is possible
1. Haribhadra, Sacl-darsana-samuccaya, 55. 2. Tatia, N, M.: Studies in Jaina Philosophy ( 1951 ), p. 22. 3. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 5, p. 340 b.

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to understand it in quite opposite ways."1 Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya who gives indeterministic interpretation of this theory clearly says that the Jainas "the theory of indeterministic truth is not a form of scepticism. It represents, no doubt, but toleration of many modes of truth.”2 Prof. Kalidas Bhattacharya, who tries to interpret Anekantvada from alternative standpoints also holds that “the Syadvadin is quite definitely assertive so far as asti, nasti etc. are concerned."3 This is a form of realism which asserts a plurality of determinate truths and they have thus developed a wonderful organon of Saptabhangi or the seven-fold pluralistic doctrine of Jaina dialectics. True, every judgement bears the stamp of relativity, but this relativity does never mean uncertainty. In fact, this theory of seven-fold predication is derived from Jaina ontology that reality is determinate 4.
(3) Is Non-absolutism Absolute - Put into the dialectics of the seven-fold predication, the negation of non-absolutism (i. e, non-absolutism does not exist ) is equivalent to the affirmation of absolutism. If non-absolutism is, it is not universal since there is one real which is absolute; if non-absolutism is itself non-absolute, it is not an absolute and universal fact : thus "tossed between the two horns of the dilemma non-absolutism simply evaporates.”5
But we should remember that every proposition of dialectical seven-fold judgement is either Complete or Incomplete.
1. Raju, P. T.: The Principle of Four-cornered Negation in
Indian Philosophy, Extracts from the Review of Meta
physics, June 1954, p. 697. 2. The Jaina Theory of Anekantavada, Jaina Antiquary
June 1943, p. 14. 3. His kind letter to me, dated 30-12-1953, Cf. : His Alter
native Standpoints in Philosophy ( 1953 ), p. 364. 4. Mookerjec, S.: The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism
(1944), p. 123. 5. Ibid, p. 169.

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In complete judgement "we use only word that describes one characteristic of that object, and hold the remaining characters to be identical with it."1 On the other hand, in Incomplete Judgement ( Naya ) we speak of truth as relative to our standpoints, hence a partial knowledge. “Hence the non-absolute is constituted of absolutes as its elements and as such would not be possible if there were no absolute.”2
(4) Is Conditional Judgement Unconditional - We have seen that every judgement is true but conditionally or relatively. But the statement that 'all propositions are conditional cannot be a sweeping remark, for then it will mean that "all statements including even the statement that all statements are conditional' would be conditional.” But the Jainas insist that all propositions except the proposition of its own system have, relative truth. They say that all seven alternatives are true and so their seven-fold conditioned predication is an all comprehensive categorical statement. True, they treat the alternatives only as alternatives, and not as disjunctives in which, alternatives are mutually exclusive, they are nevertheless making a categorical judgement. Does this mean that their doctrine is the doctrine of relativity of knowledge but not of relativity of truth? Yes, the Jainas do hold that their own system is absolutely true. But if knowledge is relative, our knowledge of reality also can have only relative truth.
So we come to this statement that 'every statement is conditional may in sense be taken as unconditional. This is unconditionality in conditionality, or absolutism in nonabsolutism. When the Jainas say that 'every thing is conditional, they are unconditional to this extent that 'every thing
1. Mehta, M. L. : Outlines of Jainu Philosophy ( 1954 ),
p. 123. 2. Mookerjee, S. : The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism
(1944), p. 171.

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is conditional'. Now, docs this not mean self-contradiction or complete overthrowing of the absolutistic position ?
Let us analyse, “A categorical judgement asserts an actual fact absolutely”l in which the relation between the subject and the predicate is simple and unconditional one. Now, in the above proposition, every proposition is conditional', the relation between 'every proposition' (i. e. subject ) and "conditional (predicate ) is apparently unconditional, but there is no clash between its unconditionality and conditionality.
For example, when Bhajtas say that consciousness associated with ignorance is the Self, on account of such Śruti passages, “During dreamless sleep the Atman is undifferentiated consciousness,"2 Even in the waking state a man says - 'I do not know myself' though he is aware of his own existence. 'I had no knowledge' means that I have atleast 'the knowledge of having no knowledge'. But here there is no clash between knowledge and ignorance, hence no contradiction.
Similarly when I say 'I am undecided' ( when I am extremely perplexed about everything ), there is indeed one decision that I am undecided. But this decision does not quarrel with my indecision, hence no contradiction.
Similarly in Logic, we have disjunctive judgements - "The sigoal is either red or green"; "A man is either good or bad" etc., we do mean something categorical behind them. But this categoricality is not like the categoricality of a simple unconditional judgement, 'The horse is red'. True, the basis is always caetgorical but this categoricality dues never clash with the proposition being disjunctive.
1. Bosanquet, B. : Logic, Vol. I, IInd edition ( 1911 ), p. 88. 2. Māvdūkya Upanişad, 5. 3. Bradley, F. H. : The Principles of Logic, Vol. 1, lind edi
tion, p. 130.

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When a logical positivist says that "there is no metaphysics and reality may come through the back-door, Like “Hydra they raise their heads over and over again, not to be destroyed afresh, but to conquer a new.”]
In the conclusion we may say that the unconditionality in the statement, 'All statements are conditional', is quite different from the normal conditionality. This is how and why?
(5) Senses, Reason and Faith - There are primarily two sources to understand the world — senses and reason. Closely connected and corresponding to them there are two grades of Reality - existence and essence ( as the existentialists will say ) or existence and reality ( as the Hegelians will say ). Existence is actuality, or actual verification. This is unconditional, absolute and categorical. There is no alternation or condition, being monistic and unilaternal in attitude. But there is another thing thought. Thought is rational thought or simply reason. Thought gives us essences either by a sort of reflection or by the way of hypothesis and then interprets the world in terms of these essences. However, this interpretation is not verification. There may be alternative essences or hypothesis in terms of each, which the world can be interpreted. Thought therefore is not concerned with existence, but with essences, and there is always the possibility of alternative essences or hypothesis. This is exactly what we mean, when we say that "everything is conditional. To thought or reason thus, everything is conditional or alternative.
But we cannot live in the world of thought alone; we cannot forget existence. But this attitude to existence must be other than thought or reason and what is other than thought or reason must be unreason or irrationality. This irratio
1. Gadkar, ( Mrs ) V. Gajendra : Logical Positivism vs
Metaphysics, Proc. of Indian Philosophical Congress (Mysore), p. 183.

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nality leads us to existence, which as such is unconditional. Behind reason there is always the unreason. We can give the name of faith to this phenomenon as Kanta, Herder, Jacobi etc., have suggested. There are many grounds of faith – one being the scripture. Scripture differs from one another. Jainas must stick to their own position. Here is definiteness. However, we cannot expect such definiteness, on the other side. Reason only differs from one another. Jainas must stick to their own position. Here is definiteness. However, we cannot expect such definiteness on other side. Reason only offers alternative pictures - Jaina, Advaita, Vaiseșika etc., all are equally possible. But do we always obey the command of reason ? No, we have also own interest on irrationality. Hence, in order to avoid indefiniteness etc., we stick to one such possibility which is chosen for us by the community to which we belong or by some superior intuition. Thus there comes unconditionality. However another may choose another possibility as existence if he belongs to another community or if his genius moves in another direction. So there appears to be again alternation among existence. But this alternation is not genuine. There is alternation only so far as we think. There is alternation only on thought level We compare thought with other thoughts. And, what is comparison ? Comparison involves thinking and reasoning, so it is thought process. Some are bound to admit alternation. My standpoint is only a possible one. But I cannot always fly in the air of possibilities, I must have moorings in some one definite form of actuality. I must adopt one standpoint.
(6) Conclusion - Jainism is against all kinds of imperialism in thought. For each community there is a special absolute. But the absolute themselves are alternations so far as they are possible. But this is only on thought level. But when I
1. Immanuel Kant : Critique of Pure Reason, English Trans
iation by Kemp Smith, p. 110, p. 174, pp. 315-316, pp. 323-324.

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have chosen one it is more than possible, it is existence or actual. So there is a wonderful reconciliation between conditionality and unconditionality. Every thing is conditional on thought level, but not on the level of existence. Thus there is no real contradiction.

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Chapter Nine
AN EXAMINATION OF BRAHMA-SŪTRA
( 11. 2. 33 ) ( From the Jaina Standpoint ) Aphorism & Contradiction - The aphorism? under examination seems to be an innocent statement about the Law of Contradiction. However, the purpose of this aphorism is to examine the Jaina logic of seven paralogisms, which is declared to be a wrong theory on the ground of the impossibility of the presence of contradictory qualities in one and the same substance.
However, I think that many of the misgivings could have been avoided had there been a sincere effort to understand the Jaina point-of-view more sympathetically by trying to realise the importance of what is called, 'universe of discourse'. For, even the Law of contradiction means that two contradictory terms B and not B cannot both be true at the same time of one and the same thing A. In other words, two contradictory propositions can not both be true, i. e. one must be false. A man can not at the same time, be alive' and 'dead'. This means that the products of thought should be free from inconsistency and Contradiction, i. e. , valid in Hamilton's sense. However, Mill goes ahead and holds that it must also be true, i. e., agree with the reality of things. It means that "before dealing with a judgement or reasoning expressed in language, the import of its terms should be fully understood, in
1. 'Not in one substance because of the impossibilty', Brah
ma-sūtra, II. 2, 33. 2. Hamilton, ‘Lectures', Vol. III, pp. 25-26. 3. Mill, J. S. : Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, 4th
edition, p. 564, p. 470.

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other words, logical postulates to be allowed to state explicitly in language all that is implicitly contained in thought." The Pragmatists also complain against 'Formal Logic' for its neglect of the 'context'2. Even Mathematical Logicians, according to whom, there is "no essential connection between connotation and denotation" admit the conception of a Universe of Discourse in the sense of a given context, or range of significance'.4
112
The Four-cornered Negation and Contradiction The fourcornered negation of the Madhyamika Buddhists throws light on the problem. According to them, Reality is not (neither B, nor not B nor both B and not B, nor neither B and not B). Now, if Reality is, neither being nor non-being can be negated. But, the Madhyamikas hold that though the Reality is not Being or Non-being it can not be different from them. Thus even the neither... ...nor (i. e. neither Being nor nonBeing) has to be negated, and consequently there has to be a double negation.
This looks like violating the Law of Contradiction, for the denial of the contradictories suggests the possibility of a position in between the two contradictories. Professor Raju5, however, suggests a technical device for the relief of the Buddhists to meet this charge of the possible violation of the Law of Contradiction. In the doctrine of four-cornered negation if we distinguish between contrary and contradictory opposition in the manner of western logic, we will see that two contraries can be negated but not the two contradictories.
-
1. Hamilton, 'Lectures', Vol. III, p. 114.
2. See F. C. S. Schiller's 'Logic For Use', Chapter on 'Formal Theories of Judgement' and 'Meaning', Also See John Dewey's 'Logic', p. 192.
3. Stebbing, L. S.: 'An Introduction to Modern Logic', p. 55. 4. Ibid, p. 56.
5. Raju, P. T.: The Four-cornered Negation, 'The Review of Metaphysics', Vol. VII, No. 4, June 1954.

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An Examination of Brahma-Sutra ( II. 2. 33 ) 113
Law of Contradiction and the Advaita Vedanta To Sankara, Being and Non-being are contraries not contradictories. Reality is Being; Non-being is unreal; but there is the third order of reality which is neither Being nor Non-being, This is the phenomenal word which is neither real nor unreal but phenomenal, this is Maya.
To illustrate this point, a reference to the Upanisadic account of the self would be instructive, Self is mobile and yet immobile, distant yet near, transcendent yet immanent." Sankara1, in his interpretation of this verse anticipates the objections of his opponents with regard to the question: how thest contradictory predications are made about the same subject? Śankara says that there is no fallacy here (naisa doṣaḥ)2 because two contradictory statements have been made from two separate standpoints. Atman is said to be immobile and one viewed from the ultimate point of view, when the Atman is free from all conditions. But it can also be described as mobile (more mobile than mind itself) when it is associated with the powers of limiting adjunct, of being an internal organs. Similarly, Atman is described as far and distant because it is beyond the reach of the ordinary mind, but for the wise people, it is described as being there within (tadantrasya sarvasya )*. Similar statements with contradictory predications are found at other places and Śankara has no other alternative but to reconcile them with the help of his multi-valued logic, the merit of which he unfortunately forgets while criticising the Jaina theory of affirmative-negative-predications (asti-nasti-vada ). However, if we remember the Jaina doctrine of reality as identity-in1. “Iśa Upaniṣad” with Sankara's Commentary, 5.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid, 4.
4. Ibid, 5.
5. Umasvāmī, "Tattvartha Sutra', See also Kunda-kunda's (Introduction by A. Chakravarti, p.
'Samaya-sara
CXXXIII ).
$

•

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difference which is both a permanent and changing entity manifesting through constant change of appearance and disappearance, then we can easily understand that reality when looked at as the underlying permanent substance may be described as permanent, but when viewed from the point of view of the modes (paryaya ) which appear and disappear, it may be described as non-permanent and changing. This difference of aspect is the well known Jaina doctrine of Naya. It is indeed a tragedy that Śankara, while making a distinction between the Vyavahārika and Paramarthika points of view throughout his commentary forgets the same in respect of Jainism. In common experience, we find in the same object, the existence of one thing (pot) and the non-existence of the other (cloth). This does not mean that the same thing is both pot and cloth, hence there is no contradiction.1 Examples of co-existing self-contradictory attributes are daily perceived but only from different points of view. For example, in the same tree, the trunk is stationary while the branches and leaves are in motion. Like Kunda-kunda, Śańkara examines every problem from the two points of view, practical and real, and this doctrine is the supporting edifice of the Advaita Philosophy. The same material clay or gold may be transformed into various forms. So to speak of a thing as one or many entirely depends upon the points of view we adpot. The same substance 'mud' is spoken differently as jar, jug, etc. Devadutta although one only, forms the object of many different names and notions according as he is considered in himself or in his relation to others; thus, he is thought and spoken of as a man, Brahmin, son, grandson, etc. Does it not exactly look like the Jaina point of view of asti-nasti-vāda?
Like Sankara, Rāmānuja also criticises Jaina theory of seven paralogisms2. No doubt,
Ramanuja and Contradiction
1. Rajendra Kumar, 'Anekanta, Syadvada aur Saptabhangi' in Jaina Darśana, Year 1, No. I.
2. 'Sri Bhasya' of Ramanuja on 'Brahma-sūtra', II. 2. 33.

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he recognises substance and attributes as distincts but he says that asti and nasti cannot be predicated of the same thing from the Dravya point of view alone?, i.e., the same substance cannot have the two contradictory predicates. Inspite of this, Ramanuja seems to be very much prejudiced against the Jaina theory when he asks : How can we say that the same thing is and is not at the same time? However, Rāmanuja forgets that if we describe a thing both from the standpoint of underlying substance ( dravya ) and its modifications ( paryaya ), we shall have no such difficulty. We meet with these difficulties because we prefer to live in the world of empty abstractions. In a sense, the Vedantic metaphysics of Ramanuja is the doctrine of one and many. It is one when we talk of the one Absolute Brahman, it is many when we know about the multiple jivas and the multiverse. And when reality is one and many at the same time, Vedantism itself becomes a sufficient argument in favour of Syadvāda. How does the Absolute, which is one and only one, become the all ? How can the one Brahman consist of both conscious (cit) and unconscious (acit ) elements? If these contradictions can be reconciled by Ramanuja, he should not find fault with the very logical calculus of reconciliation adopted by the Jaina doctrine. Thus Ramanuja's attempt to discover contradictions in Syadvada destroys the entire edifice of his metaphysics itself. Anekantavāda pleads for soberness and loyalty to experience which discards absolutism. The dual nature of things is proved by a reduction-ad-absurdum of the opposite views. This does not mean any offence to the canons of logic. The concept of pure logic which is prior to and absolutely independent of experience is dangerous. “Logic is to systematize and rationalize what experience offers"?, In one 1. Khušala Candra, Vedanta Sūtra Ke Vyakhyakára Aur
Saptabhangi', in ‘Jaina Darśana', Year I, Number 1. 2. Mookerjee, S. : The Jaina Philosophy of Absolutism (Cal
cutta, 1944), p. 78. "To allow logic to work in Yacuo and to diçate terms to

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word logic must be loyal to reason and experience alike. Even Vedanta ultimately relies on experience to prove the reality of the triune principle of existence, consciousness and bliss.
Some other Vedantic Acharyas and Contradiction -- According to Vijña nabhikşul, unless the qualitative differences (prakā rabheda ) are recognised as true, two fundamentally
opposite things cannot be reconciled into one object. But if the differences are recognised as true, it amounts to the Vedāntic position. But can we not ask the Vedantist : how can ultimate differences be reconciled with the ultimate identity of Brahman ? Either they should accept identity as ultimate or differences as ultimate but not both. However, the Jainas can avoid such a difficulty by accepting the differences from relative standpoints. We can speak of existence ( bhava ) and non-existence ( abhāva ) of the same thing from two standpoints without being inconsistent. Existence and non-existence coexisting in the same thing is said to be contradictory because both of them are taken as whole-characteristics. It can be well reconciled by taking them as part-characteristics. Vallabha2 also suffers from the same defect as Vijñanabhikṣu when he insists upon the fact that differences can be reconciled only in the Absolute Brahman, who assumes the form of the Jivas for the enjoyment of bliss. However, it is difficult to follow how the formless Brahman assumes different forms, how the One becomes many ? If the law of contradiction is not violated here, the same charge cannot be levelled against the Jaina position when the contradictory attributes are said to inhere in the same object from the different relative standpoints.
the data of experience - and the unfettered exercise of logic in defiance of and in opposition to the testimony of experience, has been responsible for hopelessly chaotic
results achieved by metaphysical speculations”.-Ibid. 1. Vijñānabhikṣu, Vijñanámsta Bhaşya, II. 2. 33—"Prakara
vedam Bina Virudhayorekada Sahavasthana-sambha
vata", etc. 2. Vallabha, 'Apu-bhäşya!, II. 2. 33.

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Śrīkapçha has clearly misunderstood the Jaina standpoint itself. While he accepts the possibility of reconciliation of the contradictory attributes in the same object from different standpoints, he outright denies that Jainas ever adhere to the relativistic logic?.
Lastly, Nimbārka and Bhaskara, who broadly accept the Jaina principle of identity-in-difference or unity in diversity with regard to the nature of reality, also fail to appreciate the true import of Jaina principle. Nimbārka, for instance, refuses to admit the application of this principle in matters of Syádváda. His commentator Sri Nivāsācārya's3 explanation becomes unphilosophical when he says that the justifi - cation for admitting the principle of identity in-difference lies in the Śruti and not in logic.
Bhāskarat argues that if non-absolutism ( Anekānta ) is universal, it becomes absolute ( ekanta ); if not, it is nothing definite. Thus "tossed between the two horns of the dilemma non-absolutism thus evaporates”. However, Bháskara fails to note the Jaina distinction between valid nonabsolute (samyak-anekānta ) and invalid non-absolute ( mithya-anekanta ). To be valid, anekanta must not be absolute but relative. The doctrine of non-absolutisin can be interpreted either as absolute or non-absolute according to Pramāņa or Naya respectively, which only suggests that non-absolutism is not absolute unconditionally.? But the unconditionality of
1. Śrikapçha, 'Sri Kancha-bháşya II, 22. 33 with Țika of
Appayadikşita. 2. Nimbārka, 'Nimbărka-bhașya, II. 2. 23. 3. Sri Nivāsācārya, Tika on 'Nimbarka-Bhäşya, 11. 2. 33. 4. Bhaskar Bhaşya' on Brahma-Sūtra II. 2. 33. 5. Mookerjce, S. : Ibid, p. 171. 6. Samantabhadra, 'Äpta-Mímäusa, K. 108; 'Aş'a 'Saha
sri' (Vidyapandi ), p. 290; Nyaya-dipika" ( Vidyā.
nand. ), pp. 130-131. 7. Samantabhadra, 'Svayambhu Stotra' k. 103.

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Anekānta or Syadvada is quite different from the normal meaning of unconditionality. This is like the idea contained in the expression "I do not know myself”, where there is no contradiction because there is no contradiction between knowledge and ignorance. Similarly, in the sentence, 'I am undecided', there is atleast one decision that 'I am undecided'. As a matter of fact, these critics of Syadváda fail to appreciate the fact that everything is possible only in relation to and as distinct from something other. Contradictory characteristics of reality are interpreted as to coexistent in the same object from different points of view without any offence to logic.

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JAINA ETHICS
(1) Karmic Idealism of the Jainas. (2) Omniscience : Determinism and Freedom. (3) Jaina Moksha in Indian Philosophy.

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Chapter ten KĀRMIC IDEALISM OF THE JAINAS
Karma is the matrix of the universe which undergoes evolution due to karma. Karma is not only the ground-mass of individual's destiny but also the mould in which anything and everything takes shape.
(1) Karma is generally regarded as the principle of determination of the individual's destiny, his well-being and suffering. But a careful study will show that karma is also the ultimate determinant of the various courses of events. There are three reasons for this : first, the problem of individual happiness and suffering is not an isolated affair, because it is somehow related to the entire universe. The past karma puts a world before the individual which brings appropriate pleasure and pain to him. lo short, karma determines both his heredity and environment. Secondly, even Time, Nature, Matter, etc, are not outside the scope of karma and they are merely the different expressions of the working of the universal law of karma. Thirdly, karma is the principle of determination of the world. The variation in matter and time can only be ascribed to karma if we are to avoid the defects of Temporalism (Kalavada ), Naturalism (Svabhavaváda ), Determinism ( Niyativāda ), Accidentalism (YadỊcchávāda ), Materialism (Bhautikavāda ), Scepticisin and Agnosticism ( Sarıśayavāda and Ajñanavāda ), etc.
(2) According to the popular and traditional scheme of Jaina classification of Karmas, they are of cight fundamental types. The different karmas determine our faith (Jarsana ), knowledge ( jñana ), fccling ( vedanā ), delusion ( moha ), age (ayu ), physique (näma ) status ( gotru ) and power (antaraya ). In short, the karmas determine the entire personal. social set-up of the individual, and they also condition a world set-up for him. Of course, in the Leibnitzian manner, the

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set-up is different for everybody. The Jainas also believe that the effects of karma are different upon different individuals in accordance with the nature (praksti ), duration (sthiti ), intensity of fruition ( anubhāga ) and quantity (pradeśa ) of karmas. It is true that in the list of enumeration of various types and sub-types of karmas, we do not find a satisfactory explanation as to why any of this is this and not otherwise, But the Jaina thinkers try to uphold the relevance of karmatheory to the minutest details of life. For instance, the namakarma is said to be of forty-two kinds with sub-classes of ninety-three kinds; as they bring about their respective effects. This demonstrates the anxiety of the Jainas to ascribe anything and everything to some or other form of Karma. In other words, this is to assert the doctrine of universal causation known as Karmaváda.
(3) I think, this may be interpreted as a sort of Idealism, known as Kārmic Idealism, which will be distinct and different from both Subjective and Objective Idealisms. A rough comparison, however, may be made with Kantian Idealism, where there is a construction of categories. But here the categories are not created by the understanding. They are only related to the understanding. That way, even the NyayaVaišeşikas have said that generality and particularity are relative to our understanding. In fact, samānya and visesa are pure objective categories but they only point out that there is some sort of relativity, but this relativity is objective and not subjective. Hence, we can conclude that Kārmic Idealism is not a form of subjective Idealism. Nor is it Objective Idealism, since the Jainas do believe in the eternal co-existence of matter and mind as independent principles of reality. The union of soul and matter is regarded as self-proved and hence the eternal bondage of soul and kärmnic matter is described as its very nature, as dirt in golden ore. This is the startiog point of Jainism.
(4) However, in the ordinary sense of the term, we cannot speak of karmic idealism because karma, in the Jaina pbilo.

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sophy, is not an 'idea'. It is an aggregate of very fine imperceptible material particles. It is the foreign element that infects the purity and perfection of the soul, which has consciousness as its distinguishing feature. This is the doctrine of the material nature of karma, which is peculiar to Jainism. With other systems of Indian philosophy, karma is formless. But the Jainas regard karma as the crystallized effect of the past activities or energies. They say that "in order to act and react and thereby to produce changes in things on which they work, the energies must have to be metamorphosed into forin or centres of forces.” Like begets like. The cause is like the effect. The effect, i. e., the body is physical, hence the cause, i. e., karma has indeed a physical form.
The kármic-matter is one of the six kinds of matter or pudgala. It is very fine and imperceptible, but it is capable of becoming matter. The material molecules or vargayas are molecule-groups of the same kind of matter. There are twenty three kinds of such varganas of which the thirteenth is the karmic-molecule or karma-varganas. There is an intricate arithmetic about the number of karmic molecules. The material nature of karma is quite evident.
(5) But even if karma is considered to be physical in pature, it has a tendency to determine psychic characteristics. "It has the peculiar property of developing the effects of merit and demerit." Then karmas are of two kinds, physical or dravyakarma and ideal or bhāva-karma. The thought of the spiritual activity is bhāva-karma whereas the actual matter flowing into the soul and binding it is called dravya-karma. The bhavakarmas may be compared with the sa:iska ras or latent lendencies of other systems. The Nyāya view of pravrtti ( activity ) and the Yoga concept of vrtti (imodifications ) are very near to it. As our sainskāras or latent tendencies determine our overt actions, life and personality, so bhava-karmas also aflect our physical side of personality. The dravya-karma is also characterized as cover (avarapa ) and bhäva-karma as faults

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( doşa ). Both of them, however, are related to each other as cause and effect. The material aggregate of karmic molecules is dravya-karma; its power to operate is bhava-karma. Bhāva-karmas will condition our bhāvas or emotional states, which may be either pleasant or unpleasant. Now, if these states of emotion ( bhāva ) are really brought about by karmic matter, how can Ātman be said to be the cause of these bhāvas ? But the soul's agency is such that while giving up its own state, it can effect entirely alien or non-mental changes (i, e., it is the cause of its own mental states which are also indirectly conditioned by kärmic matter ). To this, we can say that emotional states (bhāvas ) are conditioned by dravyakarma and karma in its turn is conditioned by kármic-thought or bhāva. Jiva is not the essential cause, in that case and still without essential cause, these changes cannot happen. The soul which brings about changes in itself is the upādana-karapa (meterial cause ) of such mental states but not of the changes in kārmic matter, which are distinctly material in nature. This means that there is a psycho-physical parallelism. Jiva brings changes in consciousness, and matter in the case of material things, and yet the two series are interrelated in a parallel pattern. This implies that neither can matter become mind nor can mind become matter. Jiva is the agent of its own bhāvas, as it causes its own resultants. But it is not the agent of pudgala-karmas,
(6) However, much of these difficulties willbe got over, if we adopt the Jaina doctrine of standpoints or naya. According to the practical point of view, the soul is the doer of materialkarmas ( dravya-karma ), but according to the real point of view, it is the doer of ideal karmas ( bhāva-karmas ). For example, in making a pot, the existence of the idea of pot in the mind of the potter is the ideal karma (bhava-karma ). The potter is directly the cause of the bhava-karma and the bhava-karma again is the cause of dravya-karma. Therefore from the real standpoint the 'potter having the idea of the pot is the agent but according to the practical standpoint, he is

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the agent of dravya-karma. Really, a jiva is neither the material nor the efficient cause of the material-karmas but only the agent of its own emotional states or bhavas. Therefore, it is only from the practical standpoint that the jīvas are described as enjoying happiness and misery which are the fruits of material karma. In fact, the jiva is the possessor of consciousness only. Ātman or jīva is the agent of its own bhāvas, as it causes its own resultants.
(7) In an important sense, science of karma has been described as the science of spirituality. Spirituality aims at unfolding the real nature of spirit or self. This is self-knowledge or self-realization. But to know the self is also to know that it is different from the non-self, with which it is in beginningless conjunction. Karma is the material basis of bondage and nescience of the soul. The beginningless relation between soul and non-soul is due to mithyatva ( nescience ) which is responsible for the worldly existence. This is determined by the nature, duration, intensity and quantity of karmas. Jivas take matter in accordance with their own karmas because of selfpossession ( kaşaya ). It is therefore clear that the science of karma is a necessary part of the science of spirituality. Unless we have a thorough knowledge of the karmas, we cannot know about the true nature of spirit or self. The knowledge of karma removes the false notion of identity between the body and the self, and so on. This is nothing other than the science of spirituality.

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Chapter Eleven OMNISCIENCE': DETERMINISM AND
FREEDOM (1) If X foreknows that Y will act in a manner known as Z, and if Y really acts in the same manner, there seems to be no choice for Y but rather fixed and inexorable necessity. If it is admitted that somebody is omniscient, no human action can be free or voluntary. So it may also be deduced that if the omniscience is a fact, morality becomes a delusion.S
(2) In the case of God, omniscience is regarded as the very nature of God, because He is the maximum being and the only cause of the effected beings. As maximum being, He is the most perfect being, hence most conscious and absolute self-conscious4. But being the only possible cause of beings, God is eminently whatever any effected being may be. Thus knowing himself perfectly and most directly, he knows himself as he is, hence as the only possible cause of all possible beings, and thus knows everything, real or mere possible, in the awareness of his own essence. One reason why God is omniscient is His omnipotence.5 Since He created all things He knew them before they existed, while they were still mere possibilities. He knows not only that which actually exists, but also that which could possibly exist, i, e., future realities and 1. By 'omniscience' I mean knowledge of all things-actual or
possible of all places and of all times. 2. By 'freedom' I mean 'freedom of will'. 3. Cp. 'Either freedom is a fact or morality is a delusion'. 4. Richard De. V. Smet, 'Omniscience in Christian Thought.
an unpublished article written on my request, p. 1. 5. Paul Heinisch, Eng. Editor Rev. William Heidt, Theology
of the Old Testament, p. 89; Cp. P. S., 33 : 15; 94:9; 15; 24; Sir. 23:20,

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future possibilities, in a word, everything. The second reason for God's omniscience is His omnipresence from which no one can escape whether he ascended into heaven, lay down in sheol or sojourned at the furtherest limits of the sea.1
(3) Now, a serious consequence might follow from such a position, “when God created man, He foresaw what would happen concering him,"2 for to confess that "God exists and at the same time to deny that He has foreknowledge of future things is the most manifest folly... ...one who is no prescient of all future things is not God."3 If we say that God foreknows that a man will sin, he must necessarily sin. But "If there is necessity there is no voluntary choice of sinning but fixed and unavoidable necessity."4 So also Locke says, “If God exists and is (essentially ) omniscient, no human action is voluntary.”5 Boethius also says, “If God is omniscient, no human action is voluntary."
(4) Now, one may say, if we apply the concept of omniscience to human beings, the results will be all the more devastating. But it may be pointed out that "God compels no man to sin, though He sees beforehand those who are going to sin by their own will."? Hence, it may be argued that divine omniscience cannot entail determinism. For in stance, an intimate friendc an have foreknowledge of another's
1. Theology of the old Testament, p. 89; Cp. Jer. 23 : 23-24;
PS, 139 : 11-2; Samuel, 23 : 27-28; 23: 9-13. 2. Calvin's statement : Institutes of Christian Theology, Book
III, Ch. XXI. 3. St. Augustine's Remarks : City of God, Book V, Sec. 9; See
also W. Paley's Natural Theology, Ch. XXIV. 4. St. Augustine, The City of God, Book V, Sec. 9. 5. John Locke, Essays Concerning Human Understanding,
Book IV, Ch. XXI, Sec. 9.11. 6. Boethius, Consolatio Philosophise, Part V, Sec. III. 7. St. Augustine, De Liberto Arbitrio, Cp. Fredrich Schleir
machar, The Christian Faith, Part I, Sec, 2. Para 55.

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voluntary actions but it dose not in anyway affect his moral freedom.
(5) But this does not seem to be very good argument. A person's knowledge about the future action of an intimate friend of his is at most a good guess and not definite knowledge.1 Locke's argument that there may be a man who chooses to do something which without knowing that it is within his power to do otherwise (e. g., "If a man chooses to stay in the room without knowing that the room is locked.")" seems to reconcile necessity with freedom but in fact it is a reconciliation of ignorance and knowledge, e. g., he thinks himself free only so long he does not know that he is not free.
(6) If it is said that "It is not because God foreknows what He foreknows that men act as they do it is because men act as they do that God foreknows what He foreknows", it will create a very awkward situation in which man's actions would determine God's knowledge. We can also apply this to human omniscience, where it is likely to create greater complications. It will mean that knowledge of the omniscient being is not unfettered but determined by the actions of other men. Different people perform different actions, often quite contrary to that of their fellows. This will create a difficult situation for the cognising mind if it is to be so determined.
(7) To say that the omniscient being is one who is justified in believing an infinitely large number of true synthetic
1. See, Fred Newman's article on "Omniscience is Possible" in Astralasian Journal of Philosophy, Sydney, Vol. 42, No. 1, May, 64.
2. See Nelson Pike's article on "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action" in The Philosophical Quarterly, Cornell University, No. 1, Jan,' 65, p. 32.
3. Luis de Molina, Concordia Liberi Arbitrii, quoted from Nelson Pike's article, Ibid p. 38, Cp. Boethius, Consolatio Philosophie, Book V, Sec. 3, Para 2.

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propositions is not only vague but also self contradictory. For example, it all depends upon the belief in one proposition at least. 'Nothing is unknown to him'. But this is to admit his omniscience and hence it is like arguing in a circle. Thus, the concept of omniscience whether logical or actuall does involve difficulties.
(8) According to the early Pali sources, Buddha offered a qualified support for the doctrine of omniscience even with regard to himself, and he often criticised Nigantha Nátiaputta3 claiming omniscience in the sense of knowing and seeing, all objects on all times - past, present and even future.4 His reluctance in claiming unqualified omniscience is mainly concerned with knowledge pertaining to future possibly because it will lead to some sort of determinisın in metaphysics and morals. “To speak of omniscience in relation to future is to maintain an impossible position,'*5 be1. Cp. Newman (Ibid ) makes a distinction between two
senses of omniscience, 'necessary' and 'actual' which has been criticised by R. Puccetti (See his article "Mr. Newman's view of omniscience"; a discussion in Journal of Australasian Philosophy, Vol. 42., No. 2, Aug. 1964, p. 261 ). A rough comparison may be made with Buddha's distinction between dispositional and unqualified omniscience ( See Dr. K. N. Upadhyaya's Thesis, "A Comparative Study of the Bhagavadgita and early Buddhism",
University of Ceylon, pp. 342-343 ). 2. Cp. “Those who say that the recluse Gotama is omniscient
and all-seeing --... constantly and at all times....... aro not reporting me correctly." Majjhima-Nikāya, I. 482; Cp. Digha-Nikaya, I. 78-84, II. 82-83, III. 99-101; Sainyutta
Nikaya, I. 191; Majjhima-Nikaya, II. 127. 3. Vide, Majjhima-Nikaya, I. 372-378; II. 214-223. 4. Vide, Digha-Nikiya, III. 134; "The recluse Gotama speaks
of an infinite knowledge with regard to the past but not
to the future.” 5. Dr. K. N. Upadhyaya, Ibid, pp. 343-344.
9

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cause the course of future events are partly determined. by the past and present and partly undetermined. I think, Buddha's hesitation in claiming unqualified omniscience was influenced mainly by moral considerations. If he knew the future acts of human beings, there was no meaning in voluntary. action or freedom of will which forms the basis of ethics and morality. In fact, what is foreseen (i. e., known conclu. sively ), is necessary and what is necessary is outside the scope of ethics, 1
(9) In view of these difficulties, I wonder why the belief in omniscience in some form or other has been a matter of faith, closely connected with the spiritual aspirations of the people. In India, it has been accepted sometimes as a religious dogma, sometimes as a philosophical doctrine and sometimes as both. Except the Cárvikas, almost all the systems of Indian Philosophy - both orthodox and heterodox accept it. Even to the Mimamsakas, "All that is pertinent is the denial of knowledge of harma by man...” They do not intend to deny "the possibility of person knowing all other things. Even the famous passage of Kumarila in question "does not set aside omniscience,"3
(10) To my mind, the reasons and motives in formulating the concept of omniscience are extra-logical, for it is always at the cost of freedom of will, the basis of our moral life.
1. Cp. Theodice, Part I, Sec, 27. 2. Sántarakṣita, Tattva-Sangraha, Vol. II, K. 3128 (G. O.
I. L., Baroda ). 3. Kumarila, Sloka-Varttika, II. 110-111,

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Chapter Twelve JAINA MOKSA IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
(1) Introductory
The concept of Mokşa is perhaps the biggest idea in man's quest of happiness. Sri Ramashankar Bhattacharya says that the science of Mokşa is an experimental science of mental power.1 The history of human existence is a history of endless effort to eliminate sorrow and attain happiness. This is human nature. But we do not get what we want. We are a miserable lot. Death alone is the full-stop to our sufferings. But if we accept this idea of death, it would mean a tragic blow to the sense of human adventure, freedom and effort. We cannot be satisfied with less than immortality. More than that, Immortality must be accompanied by joy. This state of eter. nal joy berest of all sufferings is regarded as Mokşa or liberation. This liberation in itself seems to be a purely negative idea; but since the search for absolute freedom involves the search for ultimate purpose of the life of the individual (Parama Puruşartha ), there is a positive aspect also.
The concept of Mukti roughly distinguishes Indian thought from Western thought. The reason is to be found in the concept of the Soul in Indian Philosophy. With the exceptions of Plato and Plotinus, Western Philosophy is quite unaware of a philosophy of the Self. On the other hand, all Indian systems, both orthodox and heterodox, recognise the idea of the Self as the first requisite for any philosophical adventure. S This is the spiritual basis of our ethical life. The three pursuits of human life, namely Dharma ( virtue), Artha (Wealth ), 1. Darśanika, July 1955, article on Mokşa-Darsana, p. 63. 2. Deshmukha, C. D. : The Concept of Liberation in the
Philosophical Quarterly, July 1937, p. 135. 3. Udyotakara ; Nyaya-Värttika, p. 366.

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and Kama ( enjoyment ) are regarded as simply subservient to mokşa. It is the highest pursuit ( Mokşa eva paramapuruşărtha ). The genesis of the idea of Moksa is traced in “the endeavour of man to find out ways and means by which he could become happy or at least be free from misery”?, as in the state of 'sound sleep'.?
(2) Concept of Moksha in Indian Philosophy Just as no school of Indian philosophy, not even the Cárvākas, deny the concept of Self, similarly there is absolute unanimity regarding the central conception of Mokșa as the highest goal of life;3 but the different schools disser with regard to the nature of Mukti and the means for its realisation, according to their different metaphysical positions and attitudes.
For example, in consonance with the materialistic con. ception of the Soul (caitanya-višişta-deha-eva-atman ), the Cárvakas come to a materialistic conception of liberation (dehocchedah-Mokşaḥ or Moksastu Marana ca prāņavāyunivartanam ). Similarly, in consonance with the doctrines of the Middle-path and Dependent Origination, Buddhists reject both Eternalism ( Śaśvatavada ) of the Upanişads and Nihilism ( Ucchedavada) of the Carvakas, They deny the continuity of any identical substance in man, but not the continuity of the stream of unbroken successive states of five kinds ( Panca-skandhas). The soul or ego is nothing more than this Five-fold Aggregate, hence Nirvana must be the destruction of this mental continuum ( cittam vimuccate ), or at least the “arrest of the stream of consciousness ( santati-anut
1. Ramacandran, N. : 'Concept of Mukti in Indian Philo
sophy', Proceedings of Indian Philosophical Congress,
1944, p. 243. 2. Shamashastry, R. (Dr.): "The Concept of Mukti in
Indian Philosophy', Jha Commemoration Volume, p. 357. 3. Haribhadra : Yoga-dşști-samuccaya, pp. 129-130; Bhava
Prabhịta of Kunda-kunda.

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pada)”, leading to the cessation of the possibilities of future experience ( Anagatānutpada ).
In Nyaya, the destiny of the individual Self is determined by the concept of the Self and its relation to consciousness, which has not been regarded as an essential and inseparable attribute of the soul. Consciousness arises, when it is related to the mind, which in turn is related to the senses, and the senses related to external objects. So in the disembodied condition, sell will be devoid of consciousness. Release is freedom from pain.2 So long as the soul is related to the body, pain is inevitable. Pleasure and pain are produced by undesirable contacts with objects Thus the state of freedom is likc the state of decp dreamless sleep, devoid of consciousness. Plcasure and pain go together like light and shade. So absolute cessation of suffering (atyantika-duḥkha-nivștti) must by implication mean cessation of pleasure too. Now to escape from this dilemma, faced by the majority of the Nysya-thinkers like Vatsyāyana, Sridhara, Udayana, Raghunatha Siromani, there is the opposite thesis of the Naiyāyikadesins and other Naiyayikas like Bhásarvajña and Bhūşapa, that freedom is bliss), instead of a state of painless, passionless, unconscious existence free from the spatio-temporal conditions. However, this is not possible unless they revise their conception of the self and its relation to consciousness.
Like Nyāya, the Self in Vaišeşikas has cognitions of things when it is connected with the body.+ So it is only when the soul is free from the qualities ( either pleasure or pain ) produced by contact with name and form ( atmavišeşa gupanāma ātyantocchedab ), or as Sridhara would say navnāma ātmaviseșa gunanāma atyantocchedah Mokşa, that libcration is possible. It is the absolute destruction of nine specific quali
1. Nyaya-bhaşya, III. 2. 67. 2. Nyaya-sūtra, IV. 1. 163. 3. Nyaya-sára, pp. 39-41; Nyaya-bhasya, 1. 1. 22. 4. Nyaya-kaudali, p. 57.

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ties of the Self. To save this view from the charge that Mokşa comes perilously near the unconscious condition of a pebble or a piece of stone, the Vaiseşikas propound a doctrine of Inherent Felicity in the state of Mokşa. But they have yet to explain how felicity is Unconscious.
Mimamsakas, like the Nyaya-Vaiseșikas, regard the soul as eternal and infinite, with consciousness as its adventitious attribute, dependent upon its relation to the body. It survives death to reap the consequences of action. Since the Mimamsaka school belongs to the ritualistic period of the Vedic culture, the final destiny of an individual is regarded as the attainment of heaven-the usual end of rituals (Svarga kámo yajetc ). But latter on, the idea of heaven is replaced by the idea of liberation, for they realised that we have to fall back to the earth as soon as we exhaust our merit. The concept of heaven was indeed a state of unalloyed bliss (at least temporary ). But the state of liberation is free from pleasure and pain, since consciousness is an adventitious quality of the Soul. To Prabhakaras, Moksa is the realisation of the Moral Imperative as duty (Niyoga-siddhi). To Kumärila, it is the “Soul's experience of its own intrinsic happiness with complete cessation of all kinds of misery,"i which is very much like the Advaitic conception. The general conception of Bhatļas is the realisation of intrinsic happiness ( atmasaukhyānubhūti). Pārthasārathi Misra2 and Gāgabhat:a deny this. Nārāyanabhafta, Bhattasarvajña and Sucaritra Miśra clearly admit the clement of happiness in the state of Mukti, since to them, Soul is consciousness associated with ignorance (Ajñā nopitacaitanyātmavada ) during embodied existence.
According to Samkhya, consciousness is not a mere quality but the soul's very essence, The soul is pure, eternal and immutable. Hence it is not blissful consciousness (ānanda
1. Manameyodaya, V. 26. 2. Šāstra-dipika, pp. 125-131.

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svarūpa ) or stream of consciousness (caitanya prava ha ) or material consciousness (caitanya-deha-višişta ). The Self ( Puruşa ) of Sankhya remains untouched either by joy or sorrow, migration, bondage and liberation.2 Bondage and liberation are phenomenal. The latter requires the formal and final cessation of all the three kinds of sufferings without a possibility of return. This neutral and colourless state of Kaivalya is again an unattractive picture with no appeal to the aspirant. Similarly, in Yoga, freedom is absolute isolation of Matter from Seif. It is only when we can effect a cessation of the highest principle of matter ( citta = mahat = Buddhi) that the state of absolute isolation and redirection of our corsciousness is possible. However there is clear ambivalence in Samkhya doctrine of release in so far as it says that “it is the spirit (Puruşa ) that is to obtain release, and yet the apparently predominant characterization of spirit is such that it is impossible that it should either be bound or released.")
Unike Sámkhya-Yoga, the Self in Salikara is not only consciousness but also blissful consciousness. Unike Sámkliya-Yoga aud Nyāya-Vaiseşika, what is needed is an intuition of identity instead of an intuition of difference. Unlike Pūrva-Mimāínsuł, Moksa in Advaita Vedānta is not only destruction of individual's relation with the world (Prapanca-sambandhavilaya ), but dissolution of the world itself ( Prapañca-vilaya ).
Ramanuja believes that there is both identity and dillerence between God and Man. Man's body and soul are real. The soul is not pure and impersonal consciousness, but a thiaking substance with consciousness as its essential attribute. Hence, Mokşa is not self-annulment in the absolute, but a self
1. Samkhya-kärikā of Isvarakļşņa, K. 62. 2. Sainkhiya-kārika & Samkhya-Tattva-Kaumudi, K. 64-68;
Suur khya-Pravacana-Bhasya, 3. 65-84. 3. Godwin W. F. ; 'Thcories of Consciousness and Libcra.
tion in tlic Särkibya Pbilosophy and the Philosophy of G. Saulayana', Proceedings of Indian Philosophical Congress.

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realisation through sell-surrender and self-eslacement - the sùpreme satisfaction of religious emotion. The liberated soul is not God, but neither is he separated from His all-comprehensive existence. This is Sayujya-bhakti ( unitive devotion ). To Madhva, the distinction between God and Self is real.2 Though the Jiva is absolutely dependent upon God, he is active and dynamic. 3 Hence Mokşa is 'blessed fellowship and not a mere identification. Thus in the state of Mukti, there is not only the utter absence of pain but also the presence of positive bliss. To Nimbarka, with whom the soul is both different and non-disferent from God ( Bledá bheda), complete submission results in both God-realisation and selfrealisation which is endless joy and bliss. Suddhadvaita school of Vallabha regards the relation between God and Soul as that of whole and part. Duality and distress go together. The moment the soul is one with God, we get final release which is utter bliss. To other Vaişpavites like Sri Caitanyadeva, Jaideva, Vidyapati, Candidása etc., to whom the ultimate reality is love and grace, liberation means love through divine grace. Bhakti is Mukti.
In the Gīta, we find that the status of souls is that of different fragments or sparks of God; hence Mokşa must be the unity with Puruşottama--indeed a blissful state. However, it must be sameness of nature (Sádharmya ) with God, and not Identity ( Sarūpya ). But in the Upanişads, as in the Advait Vedanta, the realisation of Oneness with God is the ideal of man, which is a state of ccstasy and rapture, a joyous expansion of the Soul.
To the Kāpalikas, Mokşa is found in the sweet embrace of Hara and Parvati ( Hara-Pārvatyalirigatii ); to the Pasupats, it lies in the holding of all power ( Paramaiśvaryam ); to the Udāsīns ( atheists ), it is in the eradication of cgoism ( ahau1. Sadhu Santideva : The Critical Examination of the Philo.
sophy of Religion, Vol. II, p. 986. . Madhva-blāşya on Brahma-Sūtra, III. 3. 1. 3. Ibid, 11. 3. 38.

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kára nivitti); to the Vaiyākaravas, it is in the power of speech ( Brahma rūpya banya darśanam ); to the Sarvagavas, it is in the eternal continuum of the feeling of the highest felicity ( Nitya niratiśaya sukhabodhaḥ ) etc.
Broadly, there are two different approaches to the conception of liberation in Indian Philosophy:
(1) The Materialistic Conception of Mokşa of the Carvákas, and (2) The Non-materialistic Conception : (a) Positive Conception — Vedanta & Jainism. (i) Sārūpya -- Becoming like God in Nature
and Form = Gīta. ( ii ) Sámipya -- Blessed fellowship = Madhva,
Nimbärka, Vallabha, Caitanya etc. (iii) Salokya -- Residing in the world of God
( Vaikuntha ) = Ramanujists. (iv) Sayujya - Bocoming one with God = Ad
vaita Vedānta. (b) Negative Conception : Buddhism. (i) Uccheda - Nihilism = Madhyamika Bud
dhism. (ii) Nirodha - Cessation of sullering - Nyāya
Vaiseșikas & Mimārsakas, (c) Neutralistic Conception : Samkhya & Yoga. However, there is ample evidence to prove that some of the Buddhist texts, and some Naiyāyikas and Mimārisakas go so far as to prove a positivistic conception of liberation.
(3) The Jaina Outlook Jajoism is an important ideological phenomenon in the religio.philosophical history of mankind. It attempts a 'reapproachment between warring systems by a breadth of vision which goes in the name of Syadváda or Anekāntavāda.] It shares 1. Jaina, H, L. : "What Jainism stands for”, Jaina Antiqu
ary, Vol. II, No. 2, Cf. : Shastri, K. C. : Jaina Dharma (2nd ed. Hindi ), p. 63.

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the realism of the Vedas, the idealism of the Upanisads, the worship-cult of the Purapas, the colourfulness of the Epics, the logical analysis of the Naiyayikas, the atomism of the Vaiseṣikas, the metaphysical dualism of the Samkhyas, the mysticism of the Yogins, and most surprisingly even the monistic trends of the Advaita Vedanta, reflected specifically in Kunda-kunda and Yogindu.1 Siddhasena affirms that all heretic views combined constitute the sayings of Lord Jina. This is the non-absolutistic attitude of Anekantavada, which is an extension of Ahinsa in the intellectual field. Absolutism or imperialism in thought, word and deed is unknown to the Jainas, who are opposed to all kinds of force and fanaticism. Jainism has tried to develop a neither-nor attitude by avoiding
extremes.
(4) Soul and Karma: The Basis of Freedom and Bondage
The Jainas believe the Doctrine of Soul as the Possessor of Material Karma2 and the Doctrine of Extended Consciousness.3 The Jainas subscribe to the Doctrine of Constitutional Freedom of the Soul and its Potential Four-fold infinities, meaning thereby that the Soul is intrinsically pure and innately perfect. But Soul and Karma stand to each other in the relation of beginningless conjunction. Karma is an aggregate of very fine imperceptible material particles, which are the crystallised effect of the past activitics or energies. The link between matter and spirit is found in the Doctrine of the Subtle Body (Karma-Sarira or Linga-Sarira), a resultant of the unseen potency of Passions and Vibrations. "The soul by its commerce with the outer world becomes literally penctrated with the particles of subtle-matter."5 Moreover, the
1. Reference may be made to author's article on 'Advaita Trends in Jainism'.
2. Mehta, M. L.: Outlines of Jaina Philosophy, p. 61. 3. Tattvartha-Sutra, V. 16; Syādvāda-Mañjarī, V. 8. 4. Nahar & Ghosh: An Epitome of Jainism, p. 285. 5. Radhakrishnan, S.: Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 319.

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mundane soul is not absolutely formless, because the Jainas believe in the Doctrine of Extended Consciousness. While the Samkhya, Yoga, Nyaya-Vaiśeşikas and the Buddhists kept consciousness quite free from matter, the Jainas could easily conceive of the inter-influencing of the soul and Karmicmatter; hence the relation between soul and Karma become very easy. The Karmic-matter mixes with the soul as milk mixes with water or fire with iron. Thus formless (amurta) Karma is affected by Murta Karma, as consciousness is affected by drink or medicine. Logically, the cause is non-different from the effect. The effect (body) is physical. Hence the cause (Karma) has indeed a physical form.1 But unless karma is associated with the Jiva (soul), it cannot produce any effect; because Karma is only an instrumental cause; it is the Soul, which is the essential cause of all experiences. This explains the Doctrine of the Soul as the Possessor of Material Karma. The question arises, but why is the conscious soul associated with unconscious matter. Unlike Sakhya, which propounds a Doctrine of Unconscious Teleology, Jainas work out a karma-phenomenology. Karma is a substantive force or matter in a subtle form, which fills all cosmic space. It is due to karma that the Soul acquires the conditions of nescicnce or ignorance. The relation between soul and non-soul is beginningless, and is due to nescience or avidya. This is responsible for worldly existence, or bondage which is determined by the Nature (Prakṛti ), Duration (Sthiti), Intensity (Anubhava) and Quantity (Pradeśa )2 of Karmas. Jiva takes matter in accordance with its own karmas and passions (kaşayas). This is our bondages, the causes of which arc
1. Meha, M. L.: Ibid., p. 63; Nyayavatara-värttika, p. 292. 2. Tattvartha-Sutra; VIII. 3; Dharmasharmabhudayama, XXI. 108; Pañcastikaya-sara, V. 148; Vardhamana Puraya, XIV. 45; Adhyatma-Kamala-Martanda, IV. 7; Dravya-sangraha, 33; Karma-Grantha, 6.
3. Tattvartha-sutra, VIII. 2.

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Delusion (mithya-drşti), Lack of control ( avirati ), Inadvertence (pramada), Passions (kaşaya) and Vibrations ( Yoga),1 Nescience is at the root of all evils and cause of worldly existence. The Jainas do not bother about its whence and why. It is regarded as coeval with the Soul; hence it is eternal and beginningless. Both the Self and Nescience are accepted as facts on the basis of uncontradicted experience. Vidyananda Swami says that Right Attitude, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct constitute the path of liberation. Naturally, the antithesis of this Trinity must lead to bondage. If the very outlook is wrong, one cannot expect right knowledge; and there cannot be right conduct without right knowledge. Theory and practice are interlinked. So, on this realistic ground, the Jainas reject the metaphysical position of all those who subscribe to a unitary principle as the cause of Bondage.
(5) Jaina Moksha
(a) Definition of Moksha Mokşa, the last of the Jaina moral categories, is the gist of Karma-phenomenology and its relation to the Science of the Soul. Mukti is total deliverance of the Soul from kärmic-veil Sarvavarnavimuktirmuktih. As Umasvami says, Mokşa is the total and final freedom from all Karmic-matter; in other words, the nonexistence of the cause of bondage and the shedding of all the Karmas. Aśrava is the influx of the Karma-particles into the Soul. This influx is caused by the actions of the body, speech and mind. As the Karmic inflow is the principle of bondage and its stoppage is a condition of Mokṣa, so Saivară is opposite to Aśrava. Samvara literally means controlling.
140
1. Tattvartha-sutra, VIII. 1; Dravya-Sangraha, 30; SarvarthaSiddhi, pp. 374-375.
2. Uttaradhyana-sutra, XXVIII. 30.
3. Tattvartha-sutra, X. 2.
4. Ibid, VI. 1-2.
5. Ibid, IV. 1.
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But Sarvara only arrests fresh-flow of karma-particles. What we require is not only stoppage of the fresh-flow, but also dissipation of the old one. This shedding or dissipation called Nirjara is possible by austerities. Umāsvāmí has used two prefixes—VI ( Višeşarūpeṇa ), PRA (Prakssarūpena )2 in defining Mokşa, meaning thereby that Mokşa is the total and exhaustive dissolution of all karmic particles, which is the condition of omniscience.
(b) The Nature of Moksha: The Āgamic verse csukhamatyantikam yatra" etc. admits the experience of eternal bliss in the state of Mukti. “It is the safe, happy and quiet place which is reached by the great sages.''3 Some of the Jaina Ācāryas regard bliss as an attitude of knowledge. 4 In Advaita Vedanta, consciousness and bliss comingle together in the undifferentiated One Brahman. Mallişena5 ridicules the Naiyāyikas for reducing Mokşa'to a state which is indistinguishable from pebbles, etc. He says that our phenomenal life is better, in which happiness comes at intervals, than the state of Mukti, which is emotionally dead and colourless. But the Jaina claim for attaining a state of eternal happiness in the state of Mokşa faces a serious dilemma. If it is a product (of spiritual Sădhana ), it is non-eternal; and if it is not such a product, it must be conceded that either it is constitutional and inherent or at least impossible of attainment. So the very conception of Jaina Self and bondage makes the enjoyment of eternal happiness well-nigh impossible. This might be a logical objection. But the Jaina idea of Mokşa is one of Infinite Bliss, which follows from the Doctrine of Four-fold Infinities of the Soul.
(c) The Doctrine of Constitutional Freedom and Four-fold Infinities : The Jivas possess four infinities ( ananta catuş. 1. Tattvartha-sūtra, IX. 3. 2. Ibid, X. I. 3. Sūtrakstaniga, I. 1; 1, 15-16. 4. Sarvarthasiddhi of Pūjyapada, X. 4. 5. Syadvadamañjari, V. 8.

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taya ) inherently, which are obscured by the veil of four Ghātia (Destructive ) Karmas. But the Jaina doctrine of Constitutional Freedom of the Soul and the Four Infinities presents a difficulty. If the Self is inherently good and ess. entially perfect, how can Karma be associated with the Soul ? If karma is said to be the cause of bondage, and bondage the cause of Karma. then there is the fallacy of regressus-adinfinitum. But if Karma is beginningless, then how can the soul be essentially perfect? All the doctrines, of MokşaS dhana then seem to be quite meaningless. Bondage and Mokşa are both phenomenal, not real. As Sám khya-Kārikā says-"Of certainity, therefore, not any ( Spirit ) is bound or liberated.”l We think that the Soul is constitutionally free. But this freedom cannot be manifested without spiritual discipline. This is in consonance with the Jaina doctrine of Satkāryavada which makes a distinction between the Manifest and the unmanifest. Sárinkhya and Advaita Vedanta hold that Mokşa is not the attainment of what is unattained but what is already attained ( Práptasya praptih ). But whereas Sän. khya stresses the need of 'discrimination', and Advaita Vedanta imphasises 'identification', the Jainas work out a scheme of 'manifestation'. The logic is simple. If what is non-existent cannot be produced”, the effect is existent even before the operation of the cause.
(d) Jivan-Mukti and Videha-Mukti : The Jainas, like the Upanişadic thinkers3, Buddhists, Nyāya-Vaiseșikas", Sārnkhyas, Yogins,? Vijñānabhikṣu and Vallabha etc., recog1. Kárika, 63. 2. Cf. Introduction to Samaya-sāra (Ed. A. Chakravarti),
p. CLVII. 3. Katha Upanişad, II. 3. 14-15; Mundak Usanişad, III. 2. 6;
Bịhadáranyak Upanişad, IV. 4. 6-7. 4. Visuddhi-Magga, 16. 73. 5. Nyāya-Bhaşya, IV. 23. 6. Sámkhya-karika, K. 67. 7. Yoga-stītra, IV. 30.

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nise the existence of Jivana-Mukti together with Videha-Mukti. But Ramanujists, Nimbarka, Madhva etc. do not accept Jivana-mukti. Apart from Jivana-mukti and Videha-Mukti, there is an idea of Krama-Mukti (Gradual salvation) in the upaniṣads.1 However, Mukti is Mukti-it must be one and indivisible. Any reference of the persistence of body etc., is meaningless. The duality of Mukti in Jainism is perhaps a legacy of the Upanisadic influence. Since the Jainas, like Advaita-Vedanta believe in release through the dawn of wisdom and the annulement of nescience, Jivana-Mukti is the one and only legitimate concept. Mukti refers to the soul, not to the body; and the dissolution of the body is neither an inevitable pre-condition nor an integral feature of Mukti.”?
(e) Nirvana and Moksha Mokṣa literally means 'release', release of the soul from eternal fetters of Karma. Nirvāņa (Buddhist ) is derived from the Päli root 'nibuttu', which means 'blowing out'. However, instead of taking it in a metaphorical sense of 'blowing out' of passions etc., it is taken in the literal sense of extinction. There is ample evidence to believe that Buddha himself looks upon Nirvana as a positive state of consciousness. The distinction between Sopadhiseṣa & Nirupadhisesa Nirvana is a significant one. One refers to the annulment of the dirt of the mind, while the other refers to the annulment of existence itself.
143
(f) Bhava Moksha and Dravya Moksha : The Jiva attains Mokşa when he is free from the snares of Karma (Karmaphala-vinirmuktaḥ mokşa ). The Mokṣa is either Bhāva (Objective) or Dravya (Subjective). When the soul is free from four Ghatiyā Karmas (Jñanavaraṇīya, Darśnāvaraṇīya, Mohaniya, Vedaniya), it is Bhava Mokşa; and when it is free from Aghatiya Karmas (Nama, Ayu, Gotra, Antaraya ), it is Dravya-Mokşa. After freedom from Aghatiya Karmas (action-currents of non-injury), the Soul attains a state of
1. Katha Upanisad II, 3. 5,
2. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri's paper on 'Jivana-Mukti', The Philosophical Quarterly, Jan. 1939 (Vol. XIV, No. IV).

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never-ending beatitude. A person attains the state of Omnis. cience when Mohaniya ( Deluding ), Jñanavarantya ( Knowledge-obscuring ), Darśanavaraṇīya (Faith-obscuring) and Antaraya (Obstructive ) karmas are destroyed.1 After the attainment of Kevala-Jñana a person is free from all kinds of Karmas and attains final liberation. The Soul comes into its own and regains infinite knowledge, infinite bliss and infinite power,
(g) The Abode of Moksa : When the Jīva attains freedom, it rises higher and higher and reaches the summit of Lokakāśa which is called Siddha-Sila (Region of the Free and Liberated ). It may be pointed out that this is a new conception. The Vedic conception regards Ātman as all-pervasive. The Buddhists do not accept any such things as Ātman; hence they do not posit a Locus of Mokșa ( Mokşa-sthana ). The Mandali sect of the Jainas think that there is no such fixed place of Mokşa. The soul is ever-progressing. But the Jaina concept of Dharma and Adharma (Medium of motion and rest ), present in cach object, leads us to think that there must be a fixed state where the motion must stop.
(h) Conclusion : Moksa in Jainism is not something new. It is a rediscovery of man himself through self-realisation. True happiness lies within. 'Look within' is what Jainism says. “Self-realisation is the ideal of systems such as Nyaya-Vaiseşikas and the Sámkhya too."3 Advaita-Vedanta also is a philosophy of self-relisation par-excellence. The Karma-phenomenology of the Jainas is the outcome of the realistic and the externalistic approach. Constitutional freedom of the soul is a logical necessity. This is simple Satkaryavada.
1. Tattvärtha-Sūtra, X. 1. 2. Ibid, X. 2, X. 3. 3. Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan's Presidential Address to the
Nagpur Session of Indian Philosophical Congress ( Proceedings ), p. 7.

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JAINA PSYCHOLOGY (1) Para-Psychology and Jainism.

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Chapter Thirteen
PARA-PSYCHOLOGY AND JAINISM
(1) Introductory
Jainism is an important ideological phenomenon in the religious history of mankind. It is a well known non-Brahmanical religio-philosophical system which represents a missionary spirit of an evangelist culture with an important heterodoxical departure from the accepted Vedic traditions of India. The entire edifice of Jainism rests on one principle 'Life is dear to all'. This attitude of respect for life is called non-violence (Ahimsa ) or positive love. That is Jesus. That is Gandhi. Love is the basis of life and religion This is manifested in the 'work of relieving misery' and 'securing welfare'2 of man. In other words, personality is the ultimate truth. Therefore the entire emphasis of Jainism is upon the worth and dignity of man and an 'alloyed holiness's of his personality which alone can 'raise mankind to the supreme status of Godhead'. Any form of subjection is a standing negation of the worth of personality and antithetical to the spirit of self-realisation. So the spirit of Jainism is a foe to all kinds of force and fanaticism-either in word, deed and thought. Any form of absolutism or imperialism in thought is repugnant to the spirit of Jainism. Yasovijaya, a great Jaina logician (18th Century A.D.) describing the Jaina view says that the Jainas have a sympathetic attitude towards all other religions just like a mother 1. Warren, H.: Jainism, Central Jaina Publishing House, Arrah, 1916.
2. Prasad, B. World Problems and Jaina Ethics, Jaina Cultural Research Society, Banaras, 1951.
3. Jaina, C. R. The Key of Knowledge,
Publishing House, Arrah, 1915.
4. Ibid; Shastri, K. C. Jaina Dharma, Bharatiya Digambar Jaina Sangha, Banaras, 2475 (Jaina Era ).

Central Jaina

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who loves all her children alike. Another early Jaina philosopher Siddhasena Divakara ( 5th Century A. D.) goes to the length of affirming that all heretical views combined constitute the doctrine of Jainism. Ānandaghana ( 18th Century A. D. ), another Jaina thinker in his extra synthetic mood, describes the six systems of Indian Philosophy as different forms and figures of the same Sweet Mother Divine. It seems that “Jainism has attempted a reapproachment between these warring systems by a breadth of vision which goes by the name of Syadvada or Anekantavāda.”I Anekantavada or the Doctrine of Manifoldness of Truth means that truth is relative to our standpoints. The nature of reality is very complex. It has innumerable characteristics and attributes. But there is limit to human knowledge. Reality is given to us in several partial views. To assert one is not necessarily denying the other. No one can claim the ownership of the whole truth. Total monopoly in the realm of truth and knowledge is only possible for an Omniscient. This is the typical Jaina non-absolutistic attitude which forms the metaphysical foundation of the principle of Non-violence. Non-violence in action must precede non-violence in thought. All the confusion of thought which is prevailing in the world is the outcome of inexhaustive research and the acceptance of a part for the whole. Almost all our disputes only betray the pig-headedness of the blindmen, who spoke differently about the same elephant. Thus we see that truth is not exclusive to anyone. Huxley also asks us to persuade people that every Idol however noble it may seem is ultimately a Moloch that devours its worshippers. In other words, it is fatal to treat the relative and the homemade as though it were the Absolute. “All dogmatism owes it genesis to this partiality of outlook and fondness for a line of thinking to which a person has accustomed him. 1. Jaina H. L. : “What Jainism stands for" ?, Jaina Anti
quary, Vol. II, No. 2, Arrah, 1956. 2. Haribhadra : Şad-darsana-samuccaya ( with commentary
of Gunaratna ), Royal Asiatic Society, Calcutta. 1905.

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self.”1 Madame Blavatsky also says “when one party or ano. ther thinks himself the sole possessor of absolute truth, it becomes only natural that he should think his neighbours absolutely in the clutches of Error or Devil."2 Hence the Jainas are very correct in providing a theoretical basis for their practical belief in non-violence, since theory and practice are interlinked. Anekäntavāda or the Doctrine of Manifold ness of Truth is thus the extension of Ahinsa ( non-violence ) in the realm of thought.
( 2 ) Religion and Para-psychology Religion is perhaps "man's first attempt to make clear to himself its own position in the universe."'3 But despite thousand years of effort and about a hundred years of systematic psychological research, this question remains conspicuously obscure and unsolved. Our mind is still a mystery and who knows it well not remain so if we go on beating the same pathways of research within the old frontiers of mind. However, the type of religion which is compatible with modern philosophy is one "which is detached from the world and unresponsive to intelligence. Hence an irrationalist religion can fit their philosophical requirements."4 In Indian thought, the word “religion has been given additional connotation than the Latin word (Re-legere ). It is called 'Dharma'.
1. Tatia N. M. : "Nayas : Ways of Observation and App
roach", Proceedings of Indian Philosophical Congress,
Madras, 1954. 2. Blavatsky, H.P.: The Secret Doctrine, California, 1947,
quoted in "The Place of Philosopher in Modern Society”, Silver Jubilee Commemoration Volume (Indian Philoso
phical Congress ), Calcutta, 1950. 3. Rhine, J. B. H, : New Frontiers of the Mind, London,
Pelican, 1950. 4. Gibson, A. B. : “Modern Philosopher Consider Religion”,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXV, No. 3, Sydney, 1957,

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This Dharma as Annie Besant defines "is the inner nature that has reached in each man a certain stage of development and unfoldidg."1 However, every religion is a "process which has two sides, an inner and an outer from one point of view it is a state of belief and feeling, an inward spiritual disposition, from another point of view it is an expression of this subjective disposition in appropriate acts."2 Judged from this standard, the inner side of Jaina religion consists in spiritual realisation through the practice of non-violence (Ahimsa) in word, deed and thought since Ahimsa is the essence of Jainism. Nevertheless, Jainism combines epistemological relativism (Syadvada and Anekantavāda) metaphysical dualism of mind and matter, numerical pluralism of nine fundamental elements and sociological self-transcendence by observing different vows of non-violence, truth etc. In its synthetic spirit, it shares the realism of the Vedas, idealism of the Upanisadas, worship-cult of the Purāņas, colourfulness of the Epics, the spirit of logical analysis of the Naiyayikas (Indian Logicians), metaphysical dualism of the atomism of the Vaiśeşika, Samkhyas, mysticism of the Yogins, some sort of monistic trend of the Advaita Vedanta, the spirit of revolt of the Indian Materialist (Lokayats) and the sense of compassion of the Buddhas. As a religion, it has a great historicity. According to Rhys Davids, Hopkins, Oldenberg, Bendole, Monier Williams, W. W. Hunter, Harnsworth, Wheeler, Charpentier, Maxmuller, Bhandarkar, Jayaswal, Tilak, Jainism is older than Buddhism. According to Jyoti Prasad Jaina, It is the oldest living religion'3. To others, like Hoernle, Jacoi, S. Chetty etc., it is the primitive faith of mankind.
1. Besant, A. D. L.: Dharma, Theosophical Publications, London (N. D.).
2. Galloway, G.: The Philosophy of Religion,
Edinburg,
1956.
3. Jaina, J. P. : Jainism: The Oldest Living Religion, Jaina Cultural Research Institute, Banaras, 1951.

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Before we discuss the relation between para-psychology and religion, let us have a word about para-psychology itself. What is it? Is it a 'recrudescence of superstition' or an organised attempt at deceiving the masses with the superstitious nonsense in the interest of the bourgeois reactionaries. 1 Supporters may argue that such big names such as Sidgwick, Myers, Prime Ministers Gerald Balfour and Gladstone, Wallace, Thomson, Rayleigh, Ledge, Curie, Bergson, W. James, Tennyson, Ruskin, Crookes etc., are associated with it. But then a clever critic might retort, “Sir William Crookes was a great physicist but it does not preclude the possibility of his having been hoodwinked in the matter of psychic matter."2 Is it then a "tendency to the third order of knowledge largely a search for an aesthetic satisfaction”3 or a sheer ‘mystification'4. To the natural scientists, it is 'a convenient asylum ignorantic's. Let us close this chapter by recalling Goethe's remark to Eckermann, “If anyone advances anything new.. people resist with all their might.”6 Supporting this psychological explanation for the opposition of para-psychology, Tyrrel says that “there is undoubtedly an instinct which urges us to reject the unusual and the inexpli
1. West, D. J.: Psychical Research Today, Gerald Duck
worth, London, 1954. 2. Parija, P. : “Inaugural Address to the Symposium on Reli
gion", Indian Journal of Para-psychology, Vol 1, No. 4,
Ganganagar, 1959. 3. Jastrow, J. : “The Animus of Psychical Belief”, The Case
For and Against Psychical Belief, Massachusests, 1915. 4. Houdini, H,:"A Magician Among the Spirits", The Case
For and Against Psychical Belief, Massachusets, 1915. 5. Tischner, R. : Telepathy and Clairvoyance (Eng. translation,
W. D. Hutchenson ), Kegan Paul, London, 1925. 6. Barrett, W. F. : Psychical Research, Home University
Library, London, 1911.

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cable whatever the evidence in its favour may be.”l However, Virchow offers another explanation for such opposition : "Facts are inconvenient and the facts are all the more inconvenient because the strike at the root of things.”2 Evidences are so correct that a person like William James was forced to confess : “In fact, were I asked to point to a Scientific Journal where hard-headedness and never-sleeping suspicion of sources of error might be seen in their full-bloom, I think I should have to fall back on the Proceedings of Society of Psychical Research."3 It is needless to repudiate the charges of those who believe that through the researches in para-psychology, the "public has been misled, funds expanded, energies of youngmen wasted."'4 Instead the assertions of eminent investigators among them scientists of world-wide renown are too numerous and too decided.”'5 So far its achievement is concerned, it is simply wonderful. Schopenhauer once said, “The phenomena under consideration are incomparably the most important among all the facts presented to us by the whole experience.” “No scientific movement ever set on foot has, in the same length of time, contributed so much towards the advancement of knowledge as psychical research."? Rt. Hon. W. E, Gladstone said: “It is the most important
1. Tyrrel, G. N. M. : The Personality of Man, Penguin,
London, 1947. 2. Tischner, R. : Ibid. 3. James, W.: “Will to Believe and other Essays", Long
mans, London, 1939. 4. Kellogg, C. : “New Evidencess for Extra-sensory-perce
ption", The Scientific Monthly, Vol. XIV, London,
October, 1937. 5. Oesterich, K. : Occultism and Modern Science. 6. Tischaer, R. : Ibid. 7. Bruce, H. A. : Unpopular Review, Oct.--Dec., 1914,
quoted by W. R. Priuce in 'Is Psychology worth while ?

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work which is being done in the world. By far the most important.”] Sir Henry Bergson addressing the 28th session of Society of Psychical Research said, “This new science will soon make up the time lost." Prof. Charles Richet feels that though the claims may seem to be "Absurd, but not matter, it is true,"3 But after all, we wonder as to why such hyperbolic statements are being made ? Is this the real study of man ? Man is man because of his mind. And our mind is still a mystery. True "psychology has explored a vast field, from academic deserts to greenlands of five human material, but there still exists a Gobi Desert, virtually unexplored and unchartered, concerning which the books say nothing."'4 And the official aim and purpose of Psychical Research Society is to “cxamine without prejudice or prepossession and in a scientific spirit those faculty of man, real or supposed, which appear to be unexplicable on any generally recognised hypothesis." Let us conclude with L. K. Anspacher : “To believe that everything has been discovered is as profound an error as to mistake the horizon for the limits of the world.";
Directly, para-psychology has no significance for religion. Para-psychology is para-psychology. It is not a religion but a
The Case for and Against Psychical Belief, Massachusets,
1915. 1. Gladstonc, W.E.: Journal of Society of Psychical Research,
Vol. VIII, London, 1885. 2. Bergson, H, : 'Presidential Address', Proceedings of Society
of Psychical Research, Vol. VIII, London, 1885. 3. Richet, C.: Thirty Years of Psychical Research (English
trans. Stanely De Brath ), Macmillan, London, 1933. 4. Payne, P. D & Bendit, L. J. : The Psychic Sense, Faber
and Faber, London, 1943. 5. Anspacher, L. K. : Challenge of the Unknown, George
Allen and Unwin, London, 1952.

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branch of science whose business is to epquire into the nature of human personality.1 Indirectly, “the main significance of psychical research for religion lies in its promise to reveal a much wider background of thought than that provided by correct scientific philosophy.”2 Science has been exploring almost entirely the external world but our “psyche is a field yet to be explored.”3 “Manas maketh man as distinguished from both god and brute."4 Man is a mystery, a miracle according to Carlyle. And mind of man is a mystery parexcellence. “In seeing what is, the mind is rendered transparent, it is divested of its will, it reflects without gathering dust." It is the man and his mind that is the cause of bondage and liberation, pain and pleasure-says wisdom of India. And “infact the study of human personality and the extense of human faculty form the main object of psychical research "6 Jung rightly says that the "place of deity seems to be taken by the wholeness of man.”? However, Barrett says that “psychical research, though it may strengthen the foundations cannot take the place of religion, using in its widest sense that much abused word. For fater all, it deals with the external, though it be an unseen world. The psychic order is not the spiritual order."8 However, Sir 1. Tyrrel, G. N. M. : Ibid. 2. Ibid. 3. Rao, Ramkrishna : “A Note on Jung's Conception of
Psyche”, Proceedings of Indian Philosophical Congress,
Mysore, 1956. 4. Ram, N.: Man : His Origin and Evolution, Theosophical
Publications, Adyar, 1952. 5. Mehta, R. : The Search for Freedom, Theosophical Publi
cations, Adyar, 1957. 6. Barrett, W.F.: Ibid. 7. Jung C. G. : Collected Works ( Psychology of Religion ),
Vol. III, Pantheon Series, New York, 1958. 8. Barrett, W. F. : Ibid.

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Arthur Conan Doyle holds that “the ultimate result will be union of science with religion.”] Tischner also thinks that "the influence of psychical research extends further to the philosophy of religion and to ethics,"2 because both these branches deal with the inner aspect of man. However to L. R. G. Crandon, "psychical research has as much to do with religion as golf.”3 But he accepts that “it is going to be one of the most important factor in changing not religion but religious concepts and beliefs."4 Tyrrell in his 'Science and Psychic Phenomenon' has admitted that psychical research lies at the meeting point of three departments of human thought -- Science, Philosophy and Religion.". So we can conclude that “It will ....unite science and religion, more ihan any other activity of mankind has so far done." In a recent symposium held at Cuttuck under the auspices of Indian Institute of para-psychology, Dr. A. C. Das, the president, observed that para-psychology is just “developing as a new branch of psychology."? Mr. M. N. Mukherjee in his
1. Doyle, A.: "The Psychic Question As I See it,” The Case
for and Against Psychical Belief, Massachusets, 1915. 2. Tischner, R. : Ibid. 3. Crandon, L. R. G. : "The Margery Mediumship”, The
Case for and Against Psychical Belief, Massachusets, 1915. 4. Ibid. 5. Tyrell, G. N. M. : Science and Psychic Phenomena,
Metheun, London, 1938. 6. Atreya, B. L. : “Modern Psychical Rescarch and Ancient
Adhyatma Vidya, Their Metting Points", Proceedings of
Indian Philosophical Congress, Poona, 1951. 7. Das, A. C. : “Religion and Para-psychology”, Presidential
Address, "Seminar on Religion and Para-psychology”, Indian Journal of Parapsychology, Ganganagar, Vol. I, No. 4, 1959.

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paper “Materialism and Para-psychology'l has gone so far to equate para-psychology with all other psychical science. Richard V. De Smet2 another symposiast held that it is 'a scientific description'. Prof. B. N. Banerjee3 quotes H. J. Eysenck (Sense and Non-sense in Psychology ) thinks that para-psychological phenomena have been proved. However, Prof. G S. Nairt, holds that though “Para-psychology canic upon the trail of science, but its genuine home is man's interest towards religion." Tu a recent Symposium on 'Para-psychology and Yoga' ( 21st and 22nd December, 62 ) organised under the auspices of the Lucknow University, the President Acharya Jugal Kishore observed that “as civilization advances further into nuclear age and education becomes a more complex phenomenon, the most natural science to take the place of psychology will be para-psychology.”
(3) Jainism And Para-psychology (a) Soul Psychology and Karma Phenomenology
The Jainas believe in the Doctrine of Soul which forms the basis of Higher Psychology popularly termed as para-psychology or Meta-psychology. The idea of psychology as the "Scicnce of Soul' seems old. "There was a time, when it lost its
1. Mukherjee, M. N. : Materialism in Paru-psychology',
Indian Journal of Para-psychology, Vol. 1, No. 4, Ganga. nagar, 1959,
2. Smet, R. De. ; “Para-psychology and Catholicism", Indian
Journal of Para-psychology, Vol. 1, No. 4, Ganganagar,
1954, 3. Banerjee, B. N. : “Religion and Para-psychology”, The
Indian Journal of Para-psychology, Vol. 1, No. 4. 1, Seth Sohan Lal Institute of Para-psychology, Ganganagar, De
cember, 1959. 4. Nair, G. S.:"Rcligion and Para-psychology", ludian Jour.
nal of Para-psychology, Vol. I, No. 4, Ganganagar, 1959.

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mind, now it seems to have lost its consciousness even."1 But so far and no further. Even eminent psychologist of today find themselves helpless to do away with the hypothesis of soul. Jung's book "Modern Man in Search of Soul" (London 1934 ) is amply illustrative of this fact. The reality of the self is obvious to the introspectionists.2 James regards the admittance of soul to be the line of 'least logical resistance'. His pupil Calkins comes out strongly for a “Psychology of Selves'--not as metaphysical concept but an ever present fact of immediate experience. Stern, Dilthey, Allport, Spranger etc., have been endeavouring to build up a "Science of Personality'. Alexis Carrel, the Nobel prize winner scientist demands that attention should be focussed on the 'soul of man's. The 'Racial Unconscious' of Jung, the 'Group Mind of Mc-Dougall, the Comprehensive Consciousness' of Myers have all something of a Soul-psychology in them.
This Soul-psychology of the Jainas is noi concerned with merely the measurement of sensation or the effect of emotions on the outer physical body within the spatio-temporal order. On the other hand, the soul has the inherent capacity to know all things, which follow from the Doctrine of Four-fold infinities of the soul. Every soul innately possesses infinite app
hension, infinite comprehension, infinite power and infinite bliss. Consciousness is the most essential characteristic of the soulst. However, this perfect state of soul is possible only 1. Atreya, B. L. : An Introduction to Para-psychology, Mora
dabad, 1949. 2. Woodworth, R. S. : Contemporary Schools of Psychology,
Methuen, London, 1949. 3. Carrel, A, : Man the Unknown, London, 1948. 4. (a) Uma Swami : Tattvárthadhigama-sitra (English
trans. J. L. Jaini), Central Jaina Publishing House,
Lucknow, 1920. (b) Mallisena : Syadváda-manjari (Ed. and English
trans. A. B. Dhruva ), Bombay Samskrit and Prakrit Series, No. LXXXIII, Poona, 1933.

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after the total destruction of the respective Karmic obstru. ctions. This Karma is the basis of Jaina Psychology. Karma phenomenology is the root concept of Indian speculation which has reached its acme in Jaina ideology. Just as there is the Law of Causation in Science, Doctrine of Psychic Determinism in Freudian Psychology, so there is Doctrine of Karma in the field of moral life. It means, as a man sows, so he reaps. Every act must have its consequence and if the consequences have not been fully worked out in our life time, they demand a rebirth which in turn implies the idea of metempsychosis and the immortality of soul. To them, it is impossible to explain the diversity of universe especially the inequalities among men in worldly position and privileges without the hypothesis of Karma.
The Jaina accounts of soul and Karma are interlinked together. They believe in the Doctrine of Soul as the possesser of Material Karmal. The soul is innately pure and inherently perfect but that is infected by something foreign called Karma, which has been defined as an aggregate of particles of very fine matter imperceptible to our senses. Just as shining sun is often obscured by either a patch of cloud or mist or a veil of dust, so the pure and perfect soul is clouded by the mist of some or other types of Karma. The Doctrine of soul as the Possessor of Karma involves three questions : Firstly, how can we say that (imperceptible multitude of atoms ) exist ? Secondly, how Karma has a physical form ? Thirdly, if Karma is material, how is it connected with the immaterial self ? Let us take one by one.
Karma phenomenology is the keystone supporting edifice of Jainism. Just as a sprout, which is an effect has a seed which is the cause, so our happiness and misery which are effects, must have cause — which is nothing but Karma. The objection that happiness is derived either from a garland, 1. Mehta, M. L. : An Outline of Jaina Philosophy, Jaina
Mission Society, Banglore, 1954.

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sandal paste, a woman etc., which are all objects of sight, is irrelevant since persons having the same means for enjoying happiness do not get the same type of happiness.
To the second question, why Karma has a physical form, it is said that because of our experience of pleasure, pain etc., since there can be no such experiences in association with that which is formless, just in connection with other. Then Karma has a physical shape because it undergoes change in a way different from souls, which is inferred form the change of its effects like body.
Now the last question is-how could the material Karma be connected with the immaterial soul? It is said that it can be in the way consciousness is affected by a drink of intoxicant etc. Then the empirical soul is not absolutely formless. Jainas believe in the Doctrine of Extended Consciousness1. The soul is equal in extent to its own body, for its attributes are found only in the body. Now Karma is material and soul is also extended, hence it can be affected by the material Karma. However, the Jainas regard that the soul and Karma stand to each other in a relation of beginningless conjunction", like the association of the dross with the gold. But just as the dross is removed by the action of an alkaline substance, so the removal of beginningless Karmic veil is possible by the practice of the prescribed course of religious meditations etc. This higher psychology of the Jainas has been worked out in greater details. The material particles constituting the Karma can be viewed from their nature and number depending upon the activities of body, mind and speech, and duration and intensity depending upon passions3 (Passions are
1. (a) Uma Swami: Ibid.
(b) Mallisena : Ibid.
2. Nahar, P. C. and Ghosh, K. C.: An Epitome of Jainism, Calcutta, 1957.
3. Devendra Sūri Karina-Grantha, Atmananda Jaina Granthamala, Ahmedabad, 1921.

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four greed, pride, deceit, anger).
Discussing the nature of Karma, the Jainas point out eight fundamental types1 each divided into a number of subtypes. Of the eight, four are Obscurative (comprehensionobscuring, apprehension-obscuring, deluding power-obscuring) and the remaining are non-obscurative (age, physique, status and feeling determining Karmas ). Each type of Karma is determined by the nature of Karmic atoms. The detailed study of the various types and subtypes of these Karmas only reveal that the Jainas have a deep faith in the universal chain of causation, leaving no room for chance. Chance is nothing but law unknown. So we find that even our names and forms are determined by our past Karmas.
The number of the Karmic matter depends upon the activity of the soul. The maximum and minimum activities fall respectively to the feeling producing and age-determining Karmas according to the Jainas. The whole universe is full of Karmic matter having a constant influx into the soul.
Then the Jainas have a calculus of their own for measuring the duration of each Karma. The maximum and minimum length of duration of the four obstructive karmas is 30 kotakoți-sägaropams, 10 koṭākoţi =crore multiplied by crore palyopamsa Sagaropama ), i, e., a measure.
Lastly, the intensity of the Karma depends upon the strength and weakness of our passions. The more sinful or virtuous a man is, the duration of his sinful or virtuous Karma is longer and the position thereof is stronger.
The conception of soul and Karma is thus the basis of higher psychology in Jainism. The soul is innately pure and inherently perfect but because of Karmic veils, there is obscuration and hence imperfection.
(b) Cognition: Sensory and Extra Sensory
Therefore, if the soul is free from the Karmic influences, it is ominscient and in this state the soul becomes liberated.
1. Devendra Suri: Ibid.

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But the worldly and empirical souls are infected with Kármic matter, hence its power of cognizing everything in all condition is veiled by the Karmic-clouds. “But as although the light of the sun may be veiled by cloud, some light, however, breaks through the clouds, so there also a fraction of the faculty of cognition is preserved to the soul, for if it were to loose this, it is no longer the soul."I Consciousness is the most essential and defining characteristics of the soul2. Cognition is an important aspect of this consciousness which is divided into Indeterminate ( apprehension ) and Determinate cognition (comprehension )s with their numerous divisions and sub-divisions4. Thus we find that Jaina psychology follows
1. Devendra Sūri : Ibid. 2. ( a ) Amộtacandra : Puruşărtha Siddhyupāya (Ed. and
Hindi trans. by Nathū Ram Premi), Parama Sruta
Prabhavaka Mandala, Bombay, 1953. (b) Yogindu : Parmatma-Prakasa & Yoga-Sara (Ed, A.
N. Upadhya ), Raicandra Jaina Shastramala,
Bombay, 1937. (c) Kunda-kunda : Pravacana-sara (Ed. and English
trans. A. N. Upadhya ), Raichandra Jaina Shastra
mala, Bombay, 1935. (d) Kunda-kunda : Parcásikāya-sıra (Ed. and English
trans. A. Chakravarti ), Arrah, 1920. (e) Kunda-kunda : Samaya-sara ( Ed. and English trans.
A. Chakravarti ), Bhartiya Jñāna Pitha, Kashi, 1950. (f) Kunda-kunda : Niyama-sāra (Ed. and English trans.
by Uggar Sain ), Lucknow, 1931. (g) Pūjyapada : Sarvártha-Siddhi ( Ed. and Hindi trans.
by Phūlacandra Siddhanta Sastri ), Bhartiya Jñana
Pitha, Banaras, 1955. (h ) Uma Swamí; Ibid. 3. Uma Swami : Ibid. 4. Ibid.
11

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from its epistemology of experience'l with soul as its basis. Indeterminate cognition is detail less knowledge or the primitive stage of general awareness with simple existence as its content and without any other reference. It is of four types : Visual apprehension, nonvisual apprehension, apprehensive clairvoyance and apprehensive omniscience.? Determinate cognition is divided into 8 categories : nonverbal comprehension, verbal comprehension, clairvoyance, Telepathy, omniscience and three wrong types of non-verbal, verbal comprehension and wrong clairvoyance.
Three types of relations are envisaged between Apprehension ( Indeterminate ) and comprehension (Determinate ): of non-simultaneity3, of succession, and of simultaneity.5 Broadly, comprehension has been divided into sensory (also called indirect ) and Extra-sensory (also called Direct) perception. The reason that the sensory knowledge is called Indirect is because the soul gets the glimpses of reality through the media of sense-organs and not directly. This view gets some support by an analysis of the psychological process involved in the sensory knowledge that perhaps perception involves inference, a question raised of late by the psychophysiologists. 1. Tatia N. M. ; Studies in Jainism, Jaina Cultural Research
Society, Banaras, 1951. 2. Uma Swami : Ibid. 3. Bhadrabahu : Āvaśyaka-Niryukti, Āgamodaya Samiti,
Surat, 1928, 4. (a) Akalankadeva : Aşta-Sati ( a Commentary on Āpta
Mimamsa of Samantabhadra ), Nirnaya Sagar Press,
Bombay, 1915. (b) Uma Swāmí: Ibid.
(c) Kunda-kunda : Niyama-sara, Ibid. 5. Siddhasena Divakara : Sanmati-Tarka-Prakarana, Gujarat
Puratatva Mandir, Ahmedabad, 1921, 6. Uma Swami ; Ibid.

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Then we come to Extra-sensory perception : clairvoyance, Telepathy and Omniscience. “Empirical or sensory perception is conditioned by the senses and mind as is limited"?, but Extra-sensory perception transcends the general laws of space, time and other conditions of normal perception. “Opinion in the West is yet divided on the question whether paranormal powers are biologically primitive and present in the organism or they are outgrown and replaced, or they are the latest acquisitions."2 Except the materialist Carvākas and the scripturalist Mimamsakas, all systems of Indian Philosophy believe in Extra-sensory perceptions. Extra-sensory perception is a form of Direct perception. It may sound odd. But this follows from the very conception of the Jainas that the basis of all knowledge is self. And "if the soul has the capacity to know, it must know independently of any external condition. It is as independent as existence.3 It is like a lamp which illuminates itself. It is not a spatial or temporal relation but a capacity. Space and time are no doubt principles of physical limitations which disappear with the stoppage of Karmic influx into the soul and their shedding. “The ( full ) manifestation of the innate nature of a conscious self, emerging on the total cessation of all obstructive veils, is called” that (intuition ) transcendent and pure."4 This transcended and pure knowledge is of two kinds-Absolute ( Sakala ) and
1. Manikya Nandi : Pariksämukharn with Prameya-Ratna
-mala, Commentary of Ananta Virya (Ed. & English trans. S. C. Ghosal ), The Central Jaina Publishing
House, Lucknow, 1940. 2. Akolakar, V. V. : “Scientific Psychology and Indian
Thought", Address to the Psychology Section of the
Indian Philosophical Congress, Cuttuck, 1959. 3. Tatia N. M.: Studies in Jainism, Ibid. 4. Hemachandra : Pramāna-Mimāṁsā (Ed. and English
trans, S. Mookerjee and N. M. Tatia ), Bharati Jaina Parishat, Calcutta, 1946.

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Relative ( Vikala? ). When there is complete cessation of all possible veils, it is Absolute ( Sakala) but when there is qualitative or quantitative difference in the subsidence and annihilation of these veils, there occurs two varieties of knowledge : Clairvoyance ( Avadhi ) and Telepathy ( Manah-paryaya ). (c) Avadhi Inana or Clairvoyance
Etymologically, Avadhi ( Clairvoyance ) means 'limit'. and perhaps it is therefore defined as “that which is limited to objects having shape and form."? Negatively speaking, formless things like soul, space, time, motion and rest are beyond the perview of Clairvoyance. We know that the soul is capable of perceiving everything in all its modes. However it is only possible when he has completely destroyed the influences of Karmas. But if he has destroyed it only partially, he acquires the power of direct perception of things limited to forms and shape, though they are too distant or minute or obscure. We know that the inherent capacity of soul of perceiving all things is limited or obstructed by knowledge-obscu1. ( a ) Abhinava Dharmabhūşapa ; Nyaya-Dipika (Ed.
and Hindi trans. Darbarilal Jaina "Kothia'), Vira
Seva Mandir, Sarsawa ( India ), 1945. (b) Mahavira : Sthāniuga Sūtra (Ed. by Rai Dhanapat
Singha ), Jaina Prabhakar Press, Bombay, 1890. (c) Jina Das : Nandi Sūtra, Agamodaya Samiti, Bom
bay, 1924. (d) Uma Swami: Ibid. 2. ( a ) Uma Swami: Ibid.
(b) Jina Das : Ibid. (c) Bhadraba hu : Ibid. (d) Yasovijaya : Jñana-Bindu-Prakarapa ( Ed, and Hindi
trans. Sukhalalji Sanghavi ), Singhi Jaina Grantha
mala, Ahmedabad, 1942. (e) Yasovijaya : Jaina-Tarka-Bhaşa ( Ed. & Hindi trans.
Sukhalalji Sanghavi ), Singhi Jaina Granthamala, Ahmedabad, 1938.

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ring Karmas. Avadhi transcends the barriers of time and space in proportion to the difference of destruction-cum-subsidence of Karmic veils. The highest type of Clairvoyance will cognise all objects having form irrespective of past, present and future or near and far and the lowest type can perceive any object having very small fraction (Angula) and can penetrate only a small part of time (Avalika) and only a part (Atom) of all the modes. When a person has partially destroyed the influences of Karmas, he acquires the power of direct knowledge of thing (having forms) but are too distant or minute or obscure to be observed by the ordinary senses and mind. Clairvoyance differs in degrees according to four categories of space, time, matter and modes. Here the Jainas conceive of a Doctrine of Gradation according to which Clairvoyant perception differs in degrees. For example, in point of space, the Clairvoyant perception extends from infinitesimal part of space (Angula = the smallest fraction of space) to the inhabited Universe (Loka = the biggest fraction of space). Similarly from the point of view of time, it extends from avalikā (the smallest fraction of time less than a second) to the countless number of cycles of time including past and future. The infinitesimal indivisible ultimate unit of time is called time-point (Samaya) and that of space is called space-point (Pradeśas). They are beyond ordinary human comprehension and hence can be perceived only by the Omniscient. The indivisible unit of matter is atom and the indivisible unit of mode is one mode of an infinite number with regard to Time, Space, Matter and Modes--the Jainas work out a theory of Relative subtilty of Time, Space, Matter and Modes3-Timepoint being the most extensive and Modes being the least extensive. Knowledge of all the modes is beyond ordinary knowlege which is possible only to an Omniscient.
1. Jina Das: lbid.
2. Mahendra Kumar: Jaina Darśana, Varni Jaina Granthamala, Banaras, 1955.
3. Bhadrabahu : lbid.

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Broadly, Clairvoyance has been divided into congenital (Bhāva-Pratyaya ) and Non-congenital ( Guņa Pratyaya ). The former is the birthright of denziens of heaven and helli and the latter is acquired through merit by men and lower animals. This has been further subdivided into six kindsa. There is another classification of Clairvoyance into three kinds such as Clairvoyance of space ( Deśavadhi ) corresponding to non-cogenital form, ultimate and universal Clairvoyance ( Paramavadhi and Sarvavadhi ) which are possessed by the saints and the Arhats only. The former is liable to destruction but not the latter two3. Avašyaka Niryukti pro. vides us a more detailed study of Clairvoyance subject from fourteen standpoints of view. So sum up, if we are endowed with the highest type of Avadhi or Clairvoyance, we can perceive all the things having form.5 (d) Manah-Paryaya or Telepathy
Literally Manah-Paryaya means 'mental state', though technically it means 'entering into other's mind'. As Clairvoyance (Avadhi ) is the direct knowledge of things even at a distance of space and time, so Telepathy (Manah-Paryaya ) is the direct knowledge of the thoughts of others. This should not sound something absurd in view of Jaina theory of soul as the possessor of infinite knowledge. If we can remove the obstacles like hatred, jealousy etc., that stand in the way of knowing other minds, we can have direct and unfailing excess to the present and past thoughts of others. However, here besides the Jaina Doctrine of soul, we are also concerned with Jaina Doctrine of Mind which is based on the principle 1. Uma Swami : Ibid. 2. Ibid. 3. Akalaikadeva : Tattvärtha-rā ja-Värttika, Bharatiya
Jñana-Pitha, Banaras, 1915. 4. Bhadrababu : Ibid. 5, (a) Jina Das : Ibid.
(b) Bhadrababu : Ibid.

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167 of Vargapas (group of atoms ). The different atomic groups constitute the different bodies in the respective order of gradation--Physical, Fluid, Assimilative, Luminious and Karmic bodies, speech, respiration, mind, Karma Bodies etc.
A state of thought is a mode of mental-stuff. To perceive these mental modes is called telepathy. Mind is both physical and psychical according to the nature of atomic constituents. According to the Jaina doctrine of Karma, mind is a kind of inaterial substance made of Karmic atoms. Hence the psychical mind is the double principle of attainment and activity of cogoition.
Scholars are divided as to the fact weather telepathy should be conceived as perceiving the states and modes of mind alone as held by Jinabhadra”, Hemcandra3, etc. or it perceives also the external objects as held by Pujyapada Devanandi4, following the Avaśyaka Niryukti. To the former school in telepathy, we are directly associated with the states of mind engaged in thinking, denying the possibility of direct perception of external objects themselves and due to its association with the mental stuff, the object itself, is called mind. Hence external objects are also perceived by Telepathy. Anyway, the distinction between ordinary immediate knowledge, i. e., internal and external perception (Mati Jňa na ) and telepathy must be maintained because the mind is only inactive in Telepathy and is due to the potency of destruction-cum-subsidence Karma.
1. (a) Bhadrabahu : Ibid. (b) Jina Bhadra : Višeşāvaśyaka-Bhaşya, Yasovijaya
Jaina Granthamala, Banaras, No. 35 ( N. D.). 2. Jina Bhadra : Ibid. 3. Hemacandra : Ibid. 4. ( a ) Akaladkadeva : Tattvartha-sāja-vārttika, Ibid.
(b) Pūjyapada : Ibid. 5. Jina Das ; Ibid.

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Telepathy has been recognised of two varieties?. Simple Direct knowledge of simple mental things, viz., of what a man is thinking now ( Rju-mati ) and Complex Direct knowledge of complex mental things viz., of what a man is thinking now along with what he has thought of in the past and will think in the future ( Vipulmati ). Naturally, the latter is purer and nore lasting?, more vivid though less wider in scope and therefore superior in the spiritual ladder3. (e) Telepathy and Clairvoyance
Both these kinds of direct and immediate knowledge are the resultant of destruction-cum-subsidence of karmic veils, In both of them, we intuit the states of material substance that constitute the mind. Like Clairvoyance, telepathic knowledge also differs in spatial extension and temporal penetration. However, they differ according to their purity, scope, subject and object4. Intuition of mental states is more lucid and purer than in the states of Clairvoyance. So far as scope is concerned, in telepathic knowledge we can know only an infinitesimal part of the object of Clairvoyance-Simple-Telepathic knowledge knows an infinitesimal degree of the attributes of an atomo, whereas in complex telepathic knowledge, one gets an infinitesimal part of simple mental koowledge. We have already seen that Clairvoyant knowledge is the birth-right of denizens of heaven and hell but telepathic knowledge is acquired due to merit, hence confined to the sphere of human beings only. The former is possible for
1. (a) Una Swami: Ibid,
(b) Mahavira : Ibid. 2. Uma Swāmi: Ibid. 3. Pūjyapāda : Ibid. 4. ( a ) Uma Swami: Ibid.
(b) Hemacandra : Ibid. 5. Uma Swă ini : Ibid. 6. Ibid.

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living beings, in all the possible status of existence, viz., hellish sub-buman, mankind, celestial beings, and liberated beings, whereas telepathic knowledge is possible only for human beings with exalted conductI occupying anyone of the stages of spiritual perfection (Guvasthāna ) ranging between the 6th to the 12th stages. With regard to the object of Telepathic knowledge, it extends to the infinitesimal part of the subtlest form of mental atoms ( Mano-vargaņās ). In Clairvoyance, we intuit other forms of atoms limited to the material object and that again not covering all their modes. But a closer study will reveal that the line of demarcation between the two is not very clear. I do not say that they do not differ. They differ only in degrees. Qualitatively, they are the same. Hence a famous Jaina logician Siddhasena Divakara does not recognise any distinction between Clairvoyance and telepathy%, and extends the scope of telepathy to the sub-human organisins. Anyway, for a specialised study, I think, the distinction will continue. (f) Clairvoyance, Telepathy and Modern Psychical Research
“Legends and reports of apparent telepathy or clairvoyance must be as old as man”, said A. S. Parkes in his opening remarks in a CIBA3 foundation symposium on 'Extrasensory-preception'. During the last three decades, resolute efforts have been made to apply the diflerent problems of extra-sensory-perception under laboratory conditions where millions of tests have been carried in the same way as those used in other ordinary branches of research, which may be said to establish the fact beyond the possibility of
1. Jina Das : Ibid. 2. (a) Akalaukadeva : Nyaya-Viniscaya ( Ed. and Hindi
trans, Mahendra Kumar Shastri ), Singhi Jaina
Granthamala, Ahmedabad, 1939. (b) Yasovijaya : Jñana-bindu-prakarawa, Ibid. 3. Wolstenholme, G. E. W. & Miller, E. CP. (Ed.): Extra
seasory-perception, C. I, B. A. Foundation, London 1956.

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controversy and is regarded as an actual and demonstrable occurrence'l. Myers' two volumes on 'Human Personality' are the Magnum opus and something of a Bible in the tradition of Psychical Research which have also been included in the examination for fellowship in mental and Moral Philosophy in Trinty College, Dublin. Not only this, centres of Research in para-psychology have been established in the Department of Biophysics at the University of Pittsburgh, a chair of para-psychology at the University of Utrecht besides large scale experiments at Duke University.
Literally, Clairvoyance means 'clear seeing and telepathy means “far-feeling'. Telesthesia is an alternative word for Clairvoyance. Tischner agrees with Myers that telepatlıy is "the communication of impressions of any kind from one mind to another independently of the recognised channels of sense."? “Wireless telepathy and the X-rays suggest themselves very strongly as analogous to telepathy and Clairvoyance."$ Philosophers like Hegel, Schellingt, Fichte, Von Hartmann spoke of telepathy and Clairvoyance as 'accepted facts'. Distinguished physicists like Sir Oliver Lodge, Sir William Crookes and Sir William Barrett, psychologists like William James, Heymans, Rhine, Pratt, Murphy, Price, Ryzl, Zorab, Thouless, Nandor Fodor etc., are the pioneers in the experiment of psychical research. Prof. Charles Richet, after years of devoted research in this field says that “Cryptesthesia, telekinsis, ectoplasm and premonition seem to be founded on granite; that is to say, on hundreds of exact observations and hundreds of vigorous experiments."'S Alexis
1. Rhine, J. B. H. : Extra-Sensory-Perception, Faber &
Faber, London, 1934. 2. Tischner, R. ; Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Richet, C. : Ibid.

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Carrell holds that, “Clairvoyance and telepathy are a primary datum of scientific observation.”] To McDougal "the ancient belief in Clairvoyance seems also in a fair way established.”2 Even such critical investigators as Lehmann, Dessoir and Baerwald admit today the existence of telepathy. Prof. H. H. Price sees no way of denying them.3 Telepathy forms a very ancient problem. Herodotous tell of a King named Gesus who consulted the Delphic messenger. Classical and medical literature abounds in cases of the influence of one mind upon another. Swedenborg was renowned in this respect. Mesmer and his followers claimed its actual demonstrations. R. Warcollier’s La telepathic contains much valuable material about para-psychology. “Rhine has estimated that about fifty percent people have, or can develop the faculties required for experiments in Clairvoyance and telepathy."4 "Rhine also gives some suggestions to those who may care to repeat those experiments.”I Recently in the Statesman ( Calcutta, 19th January 1963 ), we have read a news about transmission of thought waves between London and Moscow. This is Science. But let us conclude poetically.
“If the dull substance of my flesh was thought. Injurious distance would not stop the way".
and “As star to star vibrates light, may soul to soul.
Strike thro' a finer element of her own." (8) Omniscience or Kerala-Jnana
Omniscience is recognised as an attribute of God but
1. Carrel, A. : Ibid. 2. Besant, A. D. L. : The Riddle of Life, Theosophical Publi
cations, London (N. D.). 3. Price, H. H. : His article in Philosophy, London, Oct.
1940. 4. Payne, P. D. & Bendit, L. J. : lbid. 5. Rhine, J. B. H. : Extra-seusory perception, Ibid.

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thanks to the Jainas who make it possible also for the ordinary human beings. This might have been partially motivated by the fact that since they do not believe in an Omnipotent or Omniscient God. They have brought in this conception of human Omniscience just to compensate that loss. Anyway, Omniscience or Kevala-Jñana has been recognised as a kind of direct and 'extra-ordinary sensory perception'. (This phrase 'extra-ordinary sensory perception instead 'Extrasensory perception', we owe to Dr. W. L, M. Perry which has been also supported by A. S. Parkes in course of CIBA foundation symposium? as referred above ). They think that the expression 'extra-sensory perception is a singularly unfortunate one, in that it begs the question as to the nature of the phenomenon under discussion, and has a slightly supernatural and mystical connotation. However, to Dr. Rhine, the old expression 'extra-sensory-perception' is 'preferable which means by it a perception is a mode that is just not sensory, omitting all questions of unrecognised"2. It is the highest type of immediate and direct extra-sensory perception which is the perfection of the cognitive faculty of self when shines in its full splendour after the total destruction of the deluding, knowledge-obscuring, faith-obscuring and obstructing Karmas3. So a person possessing omniscience can preceive all the substance with all their modest. This is regarded as the state of final liberation when the soul is free from all Kármic-matter to the oon-existence of the cause of bondage and to the shedding of all Karmas, and it can perceive all the substances in all their modifications at all the places and in all the times."5 Nothing remains unknown to
1. Wolstenholme. G. E. W. & Miller, E. C. P. (Ed.): Ibid. 2. Rhine, J. B. H. : Extra-sensory-perception, Ibiu. 3. ( a ) Mahävira : Ibid.
(b) Uma Swāmi : Ibid. 4. Uma Swami: Ibid. 5. Ibid.

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the Omniscient."I The Jainas try to prove Omniscience though all the recognised sources of knowledge in Indian Philosophy? after meeting the onslaught from the side of the Mirnarsakas3 who are the worst critics of the theory of human Omniscience in view of their unfailing faith in the validity of the scirptures. Briefly our phenomenal knowledge suggests the noumenal as a necessity of thought. Then this manifold and complex objectivity implies the need of some extraordinary perception. Psychologically, differences in intelligence etc., in human beings presupposes the possibility of Omniscience somewhere and in somebody. The Jaina logicians claim that since there is no contradictroy proof against this, hence it can be accepted as a convenient and plausible hypothesis. Know ledge like measure and quality has got degree, hence knowledge is bound to reach its final consumat which is nothing but Omniscience, Akalarka, a famous Jaina Logician, tries to prove the existence of Omniscience on the basis of truth found in the astronomical sphere, which predicts correctly the position of future eclipses of the Sun and the Moon. Lastly, the concept of Omniscience follow as a logical corollary from the Jaina theory of soul as inherently pure and infinitely perfect. True, there is the Karmic veil but as the sun shines in its full splendour after the removal of the mists, fog or cloud, so the self knows everything where the knowledge obscuring Karmas are completely liquidated4. From partial knowledge, we can infer about the complete or total knowledge, just as we infer about the whole of mountain
1. (a) Bhadrabahu : Ibid.
(b) Kunda-kunda : Niyama-sära, Ibid. 2. Prabhacandra : Nyāya-Kumuda-Candra, Manik Candra
Digambar Jaina Granthamala, Bombay, 1938. 3. Jamini : Mimāısa-Sūtra ( Ed, and Hindi trans. Devadutta
Sharma ), Prema Pustaka Bhandara, Barely, 1957. 4. (a) Akalarikadeva : Asta-śati, Ibid.
(b) Akala åkadeva ; Nya ya-viniscaya, Ibid.

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by perceiving only a part of it. This is how Virasena Swami reasons. Samantabhadra, an early Jaina Logician has tried to prove the existence of Omniscience though the reasoning based on the capability of being known through inference. Dharmabhūşapa explaining this says that perception does not mean 'actual perception' but also 'object of knowledge'. Shri Sukhalaljí Sanghavi, perhaps the most erudite living Jaina Scholar, says that the origin of all the above varieties of proofs for the existence of Omniscience can be traced back to the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali, especially the Sūtra which deals with Omniscience? Let us conclude with the author of Āpta-parikșa : “When Omiscience is proved by all the six traditional sources of knowledge, it is establised beyond all doubt.” The concept of Omniscience is perfectly consistent with the Jaina concept of soul as the possessor of infinite knowledge which is veild due to various reasons as stated elsewhere in this paper.
(4) Karma and Rebirth If the culmination of knowledge lies in Omniscience, the final consumation of spiritutal life consists in the attainment of emancipation or better self-realisation. It may be possible that owing to various limitations, the final salvation may not be possible during the present life time and hence we require a number of births for its realisation. This is the metaphysics of rebirth. Rebirth is the inseparable twin of Karma. But if rebirth is a fact, the idea of pre-birth also cannot be rejected. The present is the result of the past and cause of the future. As every event must have a cause so every cause must have its effects. This is the Law of Karma, the Ultimate Law of the Universe with adjusts effect to cause on the physical, moral and spiritual planes of being. This is the Law of the Conservation of Moral Energy or the Moral Law of Equilibrium operating in an undeviating and unerring manner like
1. Patañjali : Yoga-Sūtra (Ed. & English trans. by J. H.
Woods ), Cambridge, 1914.

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the Master Law going on uncessantly and ceaselessly. Karma is rebirth latent and rebirth is Karma manifest like indivisible unity of cause and effect. There are broadly speaking two schools of those who believe in the Law of Karma. The Negativists despise all forms of Karma good or bad since they cause bondage. To the Positivists like the Mīmāṁsakas and others, we should practise good Karmas to get good results.
The Karma phenomenology of the Jainas rests on the assumptions that every act must have its consequences which if not fully worked out in our life time, demand a future life for their fruition. This leads us to the idea of metempsychosis. The apparent diversities and inequalities among men demand an explanation which can be satisfied by the Law of Karma. But the Jaina meaning of Karma is different from the ordinary meaning. Karma here does not mean 'work and deed' but an "agregate of particles of very fine matter which are not perceptible by the senses.” This is the Doctrine of the Material Nature of Karman which is singular to Jainism. With other, Karman is formless. The Jainas regard Karma as the crystalised effect of the past activities of energies. But they argue that “in order to act and react and thereby to produce changes in things on which they work, the energies must have to be metamorphosed into forms or centres of forces."1 Like begets like. The cause is like the effect. “The effect ( i. e., Body ) is physical, hence the cause (i. e. Karma ) has indeed a physical form.” But unless Karma is associated with the soul, it cannot produce any effect because Karma is only the instrumental cause and it is the soul which is the essential cause of all experiences. Hence the Jainas believe in the Doctrine of soul as the possessor of Material Karma. But why and how the conscious soul should be associated with the unconscious matter? It is owing to the Karma, which is a substantive force or matter in a subtle form.
1. Nahar, P. C. & Ghosh, K, C. : Ibid. 2. Mehta, M. L. : Ibid.

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which fills all cosmic space. “The soul by its commerce with the outer world becomes literally penetrated with the particles of subtle-matter."1 Moreover the mundane soul is not absolutely formless, because the Jainas believe in the Doctrine of Extended consciousness like the Doctrine of Matter ( Pudgala) in Buddh'sm and the Upanişads, and so to some extent in Plato and Alexander. While in Sankhya-Yoga, Vedanta, Nyāya-Vaiseșika and the Buddhists kept consciousness quite aloof from the matter, the Jainas could easily conceive of the inter-influencing between the soul and the Kármic-matter, hence the relation between the soul and Karma becomes very easy. The Karmic matter mixes with the soul as milk mixes with the water or fire with iron. Thus the formless Karma is affected by the corporal Karma as consciousness affected by drink and medicine. This is the relation of concrete identity between the soul and the Karma.
Without the Karma phenomenology, the diversity of the variegated nature and the apparent inequalities among human beings and their capacities remain unexplained. Moreover, Karma explains the problem of the original Sin, Good and Evil, Heredity and many unexplained problems of science, say in ethnology and astronomy. The proper understanding of the Law of Karma destroys the causes of envy and jealousy and ill-will, impatience and even fear of death. This attitude enables the Jainas to reject many other theories such as Temporalism ( according to which the root cause of diversity is Time which is the highest God, all-pervasive and all
1. Radhakrishnan, S. : History of Philosophy, Vol. 1, George
Allen and Unwin, London, 1948. 2. (a) Anonymous : Svetāśvatar Upanişad, I. 1, 6, Gita
Press, Gorakhpur, 2009 ( Vikrama Era ). (b ) Anonymous : Kacha Upanişad, IV. 12, Gita Press,
Gorakhpur, 2008 (V. E ). (c) Price, H, H. : Ibid.

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powerful )'. Naturalism proclaiming the Omnipotence of Nature discarding all human endeavours. Determinism as preached by Purana Kaśyapa and Makkhali Gośāla leading to the doctrine of non-action, Fortuitism or Accidentalism3 like the Greek thinker, such as plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Epicureans etc. Agnosticism and Scepticism born out of Materialism of Ajita Keśa Kambalin, Sañjaya, Velleti Nathaputta and lastly Illusionism of the Advaita Vedantas. Karma is the basis of Jaina Psychology and the keystone supporting edifice of the Jaina ethics and metaphysics. Needless to say that the metaphysics of transmigration presupposes the metaphysics of Metempsychosis and Karma which are acknowledged as facts and axioms in the Indian thought. Karma is viewed from four points of view – its nature, duration, intensity and scope 6. According to their nature, Karmas are of eight fundamental varieties such as, Knowledge obsuring karma, Intuition obscuring karma, Feeling obscuring karma, Belief obscuring karma, Age determining karma, Status and Power determining karma. There are numerous divisions and sub-divisions of these varieties also?.
The Doctrine of Karma and rebirth seems to be an important missing link in modern psychology. In Indian Philosohy, 1. (a) Anonymous : Atharva-veda, XIX. 5, 3, 4, S, P, E,
Vol. XLII. (b) Vyasa : The Mahābharata (Ed. & Hindi trans.
Hanuman Prasad Poddar and R. D. Shastri ), Gita
Press, Gorakhpur, 1955-85. 2. Vyasa : Bhagavad-Gītā, Gita Press, Gorakhpur, 1953. 3. Vatsyāyana : Nyāya-Sūtra-Bhāşya (Ed. & English trans.
G. N. Jha ), Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1939. 4. Hastings, J. (Ed.): Encyclopaedia of Religion and
Ethics, Vol. I, Edinburg T. and T. Clark, 1908. 5. Vyása : Brahma-Sūtra (Ed. & Hindi trans. Harikrşpa
Dasa Goendka ), Gita Press, Gorakhpur, 1953. 6. Devendra Sūri : Ibid. 7. Ibid.
12

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this dogma is an article of faith. In Vedanta, this Karma is used as Maya (Cosmic illusion ), Avidyă ( Ignorance ) or Prakrti (Material world ), in Mimāṁsā it is called Apūrva (without a beginning ), in Buddhistic thought it is Vásanā ( clinging ), in Saṁkhya-Yoga it is Ābaya (Past actions ), in Nyāya-Vaišeşika systems it is used as Dharmādharma, Adrsta (stock of merit and demerit ) and Samoskāra ( impressions of the past ), in other Hindu literature the terms used for Karma are roughly Daiva ( Fate ), Bhagya (Luck ), Punya and Pāpa ( Virtue and Sin ). The Jainas by introducing this concept of Karma want to remove the defects in the Vedic conception of somewhat deistic God who interferes in the creation of universe without any purpose which leads to the suppression of individual freedom and effort. This also helps them to successfully refute Buddhistic Doctrine of Momentariness and the Carvaka conception of Materialism.
(5) Jaina Yoga Jainism like other systems of Indian Philosophy aims not only at intellectual explanation of truth but also at its realisation. This involves the idea of the Path of spiritual realisation known variously such as Yoga ( merging of the finite with the infinite ), Dhyana ( Meditation ), Samadhi ( Concentration ). To Patañjali, the author of the Yoga-Sūtra, Yoga means the “Cessation of the states of mind'. The Jaina term for Yoga is Caritra (conduct ). To them bondage is due to the inflow of Karmic matter that is due to the actions of body, mind and speech. Hence the process of emancipation will naturally start with the stoppage of this inflow2 and liquidation of the already accumulated Karma-particles associated with.3 But all these require a practical discipline of all round restraint of thought, speech and mind (Gupti), 1. Umā Swami : Ibid. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid.

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five-fold regulations ( Samiti ) of five main vital functions, observances of ten-fold moral virtues ( Dharma ), contemplation of the twelve-fold objects ( Anuprekşa ), Victory over 22 kinds of troubles (Parişahjaya )t, and observances of five-fold conducts Caritrā.5 Besides, practices of six-fold external and internal austerities with their numerous subdivision are essential. This long list of the rules and regulations of conduct and their transgressions indicate that if physical austerity is an index of self-realisation, moral life is a sine qua non for its achievement.
With this idea in view, the Jainas concieve of fourteen gradual stages of spiritual development (Gupasthina ). A detailed study will show a logical order according to the principle of Gradual Evolution of soul from Decreasing sinfulness to the Increasing Purity leading to the final unveiling of the soul. “As one goes ascending in the stages of selfrealisation and the practice of Yoga, one gradually develops the perspective of truth,"8 This I must confess is a very careful probe into the unhidden powers of the inner world. This Doctrine of Gupasthana or Spiritual Development and Yoga are interconnected since the idea of stages of spiritual development involves the idea of the means of liberation.? Yoga is the process of eradication of the exterior and the interior to realize the transcendental self by
1. Uma Swami: Ibid. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Kalghatgi, T. G. : "Production and Control of Para
normal Phenomena in Jaina Yoga”, Proceedings of Seminar on Yoga and Para-psychology, Lucknow University,
1962. 7. Yasovijaya : Yoga-Lakşapa-Dvātririisika, Jaina Dharma
Prasaraka Sabha, Bhavanagar, C. N. D.

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cutting the knot for self-realisation.1 But self-realisation requires self-concentration or Dhyana2 for our mind is always restless. Like the two divisions of Yoga according to Patanjali, the Jainas also divide into five stages such as Practice of Spiritual life ( Adhyatma ), Repeated Practice (Bhavanā), Equanimity (Samatā ), Final Annihilation of Residual Karmas (Vṛtti Sankṣaya) and Concentration (Dhyana ).3 Thus concentration is the immediate cause of liberation and hence so much emphasis is laid down by the Jainas upon this concept of Yoga.
180
(6) The Doctrine of Lesyas or Colorations of the Embodied Souls
The association of the soul with Karma is beginningless. The soul when associated with Karma forms the Subtle Body (Karma Śarīra) comparable to subtle bodies of Saṁkhya (Linga-Sarira 4 and Vedanta (Sūkṣma Sarira ).5 The subtle Karmic matter in the soul throws a reflex producing certain colorations about the souls. This is the Leśya. Since the soul is colourless, hence all colorations concern only the embodied souls which are connected with the matter. The passions determine the nature of the colorations since the infinite power and energy of the soul is circumscribed by the power obscuring Karma being defiled by the passions. The delimited energy as determined by coloration is Yoga or
1. Pujyapada: Samadhi Tantra (Ed. & Hindi trans. by Jugal Kishore Mukhtar ), Vir Seva Mandir, Sarsawa, 1939.
2. Uma Swāmī : Ibid.
3. Haribhadra Yoga-Bindu, Jaina Grantha Sabha, Ahmedabad, Series No. 25, 1940.
4. Isvarakṛşna: Samkhya-Karika (Ed. and English trans. by S. S. Shastri ), Madras, 1948.
Prakasaka
:
5. Sadananda Vedanta-sāra (Ed. & English trans. Nikhilananda), Advaita Ashrma, Almora, 1949.

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activity. 1
The colour-index of the embodied souls is two-fold; material ( Dravya Leśya ) and mental ( Bhāva Leśya ). Material colorations refer to the body or organism, which are produced by Karma-particles 2 or by binding Karma or by mental activities. Mental colorations ( Bhāva Leśya ) refers to the psychic conditions which result from the feelings and mental activities. Popularly six types of colour-indexes have been suggested to fit in with all the moral and immoral kinds of beings such as wickedness and cruelty is represented by black ( Krşpa ) anger and envy by blue (Nila ), dishonesty and meanness by grey ( Kapota ), discipline by pink ( Padma ), subduing of Passions by Yellow (Pita ) and meditation of virtue and truth by white colorations ( Sveta ). Similarly, the denizens of hell, the celestial beings and the human beings are different bodily colorations such as black, white etc.
In short, the doctrine of colorations is the triple index of body, mind and heart. So the aura or radiation spreading round the gods and prophets like Jesus, Buddha, Mahavira, Zoraster etc., presenting a halo has got positive meanings. Just as every neurosis has got a psychosis, so every material colour suggests a physico-psycho-logico-moral attribute. It is held that these colorations are perceptible only through extrasensory perception. A concrete instance has been quoted by Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi of Dharwar university3 where a Tibetan Lama named Manglabjong Raina could see owing to the Yogic discipline he had undergone, the lusture of the aura of an individual. He once saw blue of light emanating from a Chinese delegation which had gone to see the Dalai Lama
1. Chandrsi Mahattar : Pañcha-Sangraha, Mukta Bãi Jñāna
Mandir, Dabhol (N. D.). 2. Mahāvīra : Uttaradhyayana Sūtra ( Ed. Jael Charpentry),
Upsala, 1922. 3. Kalghatgi, T. G. : 'Doctrine of Lesya', The Voice of
Ahinsa, Vol. IX, No. 9, Lucknow.

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(the Tibetan high priest who had taken refuge in India after communist on-slaughts upon them ). He then appealed to the Dalai Lama not to accept the sweetended words of the members of the delegation, as they were full of fraud. J. Charpentur's Leśyā -Theory of Jainas and Ajivakas ( Frestskrift, 1910 ) may be consulted.
Corresponding to this Jaina Doctrine of colorations, we have similar references elsewhere also. In Mababharata, there is a description about six types of colorations of souls?. In Patañjali Yoga-Sūtra, mental states have been classified into four kinds according to this coloration principle? which is said to have been suggested having a Jaina influence. On the basis of an account in Digha-Nikaya, Leumann and Sukhalal Sanghaviť both have found resemblances of six colorations with Makkhali Gośála's six-fold divisions of human beings. In Buddhism, Karma is classified into the same four colours as in Yoga-Sūtra. The theosophical view of the transcendental colour in the individual may also have some resemblance to the Jaina Doctrine of colorations.
(7) Conclusion Inspite of well-recognised centres of Psychical Research in the universities of pittsburgh, Utrecht, Duke etc., and the societies of Psychical Research in London and New York with big names associated with them, para-psychology in the West has just emerged from the stage of heresy. This is precisely because the western scholars have approached this
1. Vyása : The Mahabharata, Ibid. 2. Patañjali : Ibid. 3. Das Gupta, S. N. : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I,
Cambridge, 1922. 4. Sukhalalji Sanghavi : Darsana Aur Cintana, Gujrata
Vidya Sabha, Ahmedabad, 1957. 5. Besant, A. D. L. and Leadbeater, C. W. ; Thought Forms,
Theosophical Publications, London, 1921.

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problem purely from the traditional experimental-laboratory standpoint, and hence so little achievement inspite of such a tremendous effort. Para-psychology demands a new methodology and a new understanding. Para-psychological experiences such as that of clairvoyance, telepathy, omniscience are not common to all and universal and hence it requires a man-to-man research depending mostly upon the individual experiences gained either by them or by ourselves practising those methods. I am constrained to believe that one who is absolutely uninitiated in those disciplines even to a comfortable extent, it is difficult for him either to brand it either as magic or cent per cent scientific. In India, para-psychological phenomena have been investigated from the side of religion and their practices in everyday life. So it is not so much a matter of principle but an actual fact of life.
The Jainas have got a systematic discipline for the achievement of those types of extra-sensory perceptions as stated in the paper. What is required is to demonstrate to the West its validity. Now two methods may be employed. Firstly, every ardent research worker should see for himself what it is and one worker should compare his notes with the other. The second method will be to collect the reports of Psi-phenomenon from those who are already adept in this field and again compare their individual reports. The contribution of Jainism towards the conception of human omniscience is very significant and it needs special investigation.

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NON-ABSOLUTISM
AND
ITS RELEVANCE
(1) Non-absolutistic Heritage of Bhagavan Mahavira.
( 2 ) Non-absolutism and Jaina View of Darshana. (3) Relevance of Anekanta for Modern Times. (4) Syadvada: A Solution of World Tension.

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Chapter Fourteen NON-ABSOLUTISTIC HERITAGE OF BHAGAVĀNA MAHĀVĪRA
[ I ] Only man possesses culture and man lives in society. So culture grows out of the life-history of a nation. It is allinclusive capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society. It is transmitted by communication and is, therefore, an accumulative structure developed out of the reflective thinking of man. It is all the ways of doing and thinking of a group. In other words, it is the 'Stock in trade' of a group. Social groups are distinguished from each other by difference in their stocks of culture-patterns and values. Culture heritage is the sum total of the culture-patterns that a person inherits from the various social groups. Descriptively, culture includes customs, beliefs, morals, art, knowledge. Historically, it is the sum total of social heritages. Normatively, it is composed of traditions, attitudes, ideas that control human behaviour. Psychologically, culture is the means by which people try to obtain their goals. Structurally, it is an organization of conventional understandings and learned behaviour and genetically it arises from and includes all the products of social interaction. Culture includes not only patterns of behaviour but the attitudes and beliefs that motivate behaviour. It is the product of human societies and of the individuals who compose them. In short, culture is the mother of personality, thus culture and personality within the framework of human groups become inseparable. Personality dimensions are expressions in part of culture.
[ I ] The age in which Mahāvīra (6th Century B. C.) was born, was a period of cultural revolution all over the world. Socrates was born in Greece, Zoroaster in Persia, Lao-Tse and

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Confucius in China and Bhagavāna Mahavira and Buddha in India. In India, this was an age of transition and uncertainty. Caste distinctions and priestly oligarchy had become a source of enormous irritation and a means of popular exploitation. Rituals and superstition had over-shadowed the simple faith of nature-worship of the Vedas and had, therefore, led to the growth of Brahmanism. There was also an intellectual chaos and philosophical revolts. Economically, the society was passing through a transition from a pastoralagriculture-handicraft stage to a developing capitalist economy, which led to a corresponding political changes in the political constitution leading to the rise and growth of small village republics and democratic consciousness. It is in this background that Lord Mahavīra was born and had lived. No doubt, Jainism in the present form, is the heritage of Lord Mahavīra but it would be wrong to ignore the origin and development of the creed of the long line of the Tírthankaras, of whom Lord Mahavíra was the 24th and the last. However, the origin of these Tirthaikars, that is Jainism, has been a faithful source of speculation and error for the orientalists. Without going into the problem of historicity of these 24 Tírtharkaras, we can safely conclude that the credit of India's greatness belongs to the Jainas no less to the Brahmins and the Buddhists. At this stage of information, we can conclusively reject either the Buddhistic derivation theory2 or the Hindu-dissenter theory and accord to Jainism 1. Vidyabhūşaņa, S. C. : Jaina Gazette, p. 35. 2. Jyoti Prasad Jaina : Jainism : The Oldest Living Religion
( Varanasi : Jaina Cultural Research Society, 1951), list 8 proofs to show that Jainism is not an off-shoot of Buddhism, pp 5-14; See, S. B. E., Vol. XXII & XLV
( Introduction ). 3. Ibid., pp 15.47; “Jainism and Buddhism are definitely
not Hinduism nor even Vedicism”, Jawaharlal Nehru, Discovery of India (Asia Publishing House, 1967, Rep. ), pp. 123-124.

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an original system quite distinct and independent from all others?. So Dr. G. N. Jha says : If it has similarities with the other Indian syetems, it has its own peculiarities and marked differences as well. Though it may not be possible at this stage of our knowledge to determine the comparative antiquity of Jaina and Brahmanic things, 3 we may say that Jainism is probably as old as the Vedic religion, if not the older ......, 4" It is indeed very original, independent and systematic doctrines and is one of the earliest home religions of India. Unlike Buddhists Jainism, on the other hand, has preserved down to the present time its integrity as a separate world. Hence, it is wrong to hold that Jainism was founded by Mahavīra in the 6th Century. That his predecessor "Parsva was a historical person, is now admitted by all as very probable.” But again, Jacobi says : “There is nothing to prove that Parśva was the founder of Jainism, Jaina tradition is unanimous in making Rşabha, as the First Tirthankara"whose references as a recognised mystics, are found in the Vedic and Puranic literature. The Hindus, themselves recognise Rşabhadeva as the 9th incarnation of Vişnu'. The excavations at Mohenjodarolo, specially the 1. Jacob, L. H. : “The Metaphysics and Ethics of the Jaina
ism", Jaina Antiquary, Arrah, Vol. X, No. 1, p. 40. 2. Jaina Gagette, 1921, p. 146. 3. Chakravarti, C. H. : 'Jainas and Hindus’, Jaina Gagette,
April, 47, p. 61. 4. Cultural Heritage of India (Culcutta : R. K. Centenary
Memorial ), Vol. I, pp. 185-198. 5. Guerinor, A. : Bibliographica Jainica ( Introduction ). 6. S. B. S. ( Jaina Sutras ), XLV (Introduction ). 7. Indian Antiquary, Vol. IX, No. 2, p. 163. 8. Ranade, R. B. : Mysticism in Maharashtra, p. 9. 9. Bhagavat Mahapurāṇam, V. 5, 28; V.5.3, V. 5. 32;
Harivamsa Purăņam, VIII. 58. 10. “Mohenjodaro Antiquities and Jaina Antiquary, XIV, 1,
pp. 1-7.

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finds of nude images are similar to the characteristics of Jaina śramaņas. The Kayotsargal posture of Yoga is peculiarly Jaina. In short, we can conclude that Jainism is a very ancient religion and is related to the primitive philosophy, It is believed to have a non-Aryan or of non-Vedic Aryan origina
Nurtured into the synthetic culture of India and deeply influenced by the Jaina tradition, Mahavira showed wonderful ability in organisation of his Order ( Sangha ), of the floating mass of Sramanic literature and culture. He propagated a veritable spiritual democracy admitting ascetics and laymen, Brahmins and Sūdras, male and female--all into the folds of Jainism, rejecting the Varnaśramas, the authority of the Vedas, God and the myth of māya and Karma-kānda, Positively, he enunciated that the Jaina doctrine of knowledge are inherent in soul, the Karma-phenomenology and inward strenuousness and affirmation of spirit through rigid ethical life for the attainment of salvation.
All the teachings of Mahavīra have come down to us as a living tradition contained in the sacred works ( Agamas )3 which are regarded as eternal and permanent teachings4 for the benefit of the entire mankind, contained in the 14 Pūrvas. Mahavira himself taught the Pūrvas to his disciples, known as Gañadharas. Further the 12 Argas, 12 Upārgas, 4 Mūlas, 2 Cūlikas Sūtras, 6 Cheda Sūtras, 10 Prakīrṇakas were composed. Their commentaries are known as Niryukits &
1. Adi Purana, XVIII. 2. Shasri, S. : Jaina Antiquari, Vol. XV, No. 2, p. 58. 3. Naņdi-Sūtra, 40. 4. Ibid, 57. 5. Malvania, D. : Jaina Dárśanika Sahitya Ka Sinhavalo
kana ( Varanasi : J. C. R. S.), 1940, Bulletin No. 2, pp. 2-3; Bolani, F, C. ; Jaina Grantha Aur Granthakara ( Varanasi : J. C. R. S.), 1950, pp. 1-4.

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Bhasyas (in poetry) and Churnis (in prose ). The Pūrvas were gradually lost but they were superseded by new canons compiled from time to time by the religious councils at Pāšaliputra ( 4th Century B. C. ) and Vallabhí ( 5th Century B. C. ) for issuing Siddhanta. According to Jacobi, the Pūrvas contained the dialogues between Mahavira and rival teachers. The Dşşțivada, which is said to have included the 14 Pūrvas, dealt chiefly with the philosophical standpoints ( dịştis ) of the Jainas and other schools. 1 Not withstanding the differences between the Digambars and the Svetā mbaras, the entire ancient written literature of the Jainas known as Āgamas, are ascribed to Mahāvīra. Hence it is important to study the philosophical attitude ( dịşți ) of Mahāvīra in the perspective of Indian thought and culture.
[ III ] Broadly, we can find four marked philosophical attitudes in ancient Indian thought and culture : The Brahman, the Buddhist, the Jaina and the last but not the least the Carvaka attitude towards life. The Cārvaka-attitude is out and out materialistic atheistic and hedonistic, The Brahman attitude is rooted in the Vedas and Upanişads and hence it is highly speculative and ultra-absolutistic.2 Ultimate reality is conceived as Truth, consciousness and Infinite ( Satyam, Jñanam and Anantam )3, called as Brahman or Ātman4 which is ultimately indefinable. The Buddhist
1. Bool Chand : Lord Mahāvīra (Varanasi : J. C. R. S.)
1948, p. 62. 2. Sveta śvatara Upanişad, VI. 11; Māņdūkya Upanişad, 6;
Taittirīya Upanişad, III. 1; Išāvāsya Upanişad, 1; Rg
veda, X. 129. 1, 1. 164. 46. 3. Taittiriya Upanişad, III. 1. 4. Chandogya Upanişad, VI. 8. 7, III. 14. 1; Brhadaranyak
Upanişad, II. 5. 19.

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attitude is rationalistici in epistemology and middle of the road (Madhyama pratipada2 in metaphysics and morals. The Jaina attitude, from the days of Mahāvīra is radical non-absolutistic, which has developed perhaps out of their great regard for non-violence. Jainism, a religion, has practically been identified with non-violence ( Ahimsă ) and is the key-note of Jainism. Non-violence to be total and complete must be non-violence in thought, word and deed. Hence, they have formulated non-absolutistic theories in all these three fields of life-Anekantavada ( thought ), Syadvada ( speech ) and Ahirmsā (action ). Thus, non-absolutism is not partial but integral, not an accidental but an essential feature of Jainism. It is true that the spirit of synthesis ( samanvaya ) is found in the very texture of Indian culture because it has been a unity in diversity. Hence, even before the advent of Lord Mahāvīra, the non-absolutistic ideas in the seed form were present in the philosophical climate of India. In the Vedas and Upanişads, the ultimate reality is described neither4 as "purely real ( Sat )5 nor as unreal (asat )... Some say it was One?, while others hold it become many8. Ultimately, it is said that the ultimate reality is the same, though it is called by different names. Ātman is
1. Bodhisattvabhūmi, I. XVII ( Yukti-Sarana ), Chūla
malukya Sutta, 63. 2. Samyutta-nikaya, XII. 17. 7-15; XII. 35, 5. 3. Digha-Nikaya, II, p. 217 (P. T. S. ); Mahānidana Sutta
( Warren's trans. p. 208 ); Sainyutta Nikaya (Warren's
Trans. ) XXII. 165. 4. Rg-veda, X. 129; Īsavasya Upanişad 5. 5. Rg-veda, I, 164.46; Chāndogya Upanişad, VI. 2. (. Bșhadaranyak Upanişad, I. 2. 1; Taittiriya Upanişad
II. 7; Chándogya Upanişad, III. 19. 1. 7. Chándogya Upanişad, VI. 2. 8. Ibid. 9. Ķg-veda, 1. 164. 46.

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Brahman.1 Even Lord Buddha's attitude was very close to non-absolutism. He always avoided two extremes-eternalism and nihilism, and held the middle view ( madhyam pratipada ). Lord Buddha's Vibhajyavā da has contributed negatively a lot to the rise and growth of Syádváda. Even the pre-Mahavira Jaina thought was saturated with non-absolutistic ideas. 3
The Brahmanic, the Buddhistic and the Jainas are all engaged in the quest of truth only their methods are different. The method of philosophising adopted by Mahāvīra is known as Anekantavada (Non-absolutism ), which is characterised by two things - totality ( Pūrpata ) and reality ( Yatharthata )4 or viewing the whole reality in its completeness and concreteness. Hence, it was never a Utopia but an attitude of practical life. The basic principle of non-absolutism is applicable in all works of life social and religious, literary and cultural, economic and political. We shall however limit ourselves to the three-fold non-absolutism in thought, word and action.
(IV) (a) Non-absolutism in Thought : Anekantavada — Life is a unity of thought, word and deed. Thought influences action. Hence, emphasis has been laid upon right thinking (Samyak drş!i5 or Samyak Jñāna 6 ). But what is right and what is 1. Brhadaranyak Upanişad, II. 5. 19. 2. Samyutta-nikaya, XII. 17; XII. 24; XII. 35; XL. 85;
XLIV, I. 7-8; Anguttara-nikaya, 3; Digha-nikāya, I. 3. S. N. Gokhale says, “Ahimsā is the key-note of Jainism,
a philosophy which comes from pre-Aryan days”,
quoted by Bool Chand, Ibid. p. 55. 4. Sanghavī, s. : Anekantavada (Varanasi ; J. C. R. S.,
1948 ), p. 3. 5. Digha-nikaya, 22 ( Warren, pp. 372-374 ); Majjhima
nikaya ( quoted by Sogen ); Systems, pp. 169-171. 6. Tattvartha-Sūtra of Uma Swami, I. 1.
13

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wrong, nobody knows because on the one hand, reality is complex, on the other hand, there is limitation to our knowledge, so long we do not attain omniscience. To know is to relate, therefore, our knowledge is essentially relative and limitedi in many ways - in the sphere of application of the means of knowledge or in the extent of the knowable. Our thought is relative. The whole reality in its completeness, cannot be grasped by this partial thought. What is necessary is a change in our attitude, not with the thought alone. Jainism, no doubt, recognises the objectivity of the material universe because it is the most consistent form of realism in Indian Philosophy. The objectivity of the universe reveals that the universe is independent of the mind. This independence presupposes the principle of distinction, which ultimately leads to the recognition of non-absolutism ( anekanta ) realism. The theory of manifoldness of knowledge or reality is the logical terminus of the principle of distinction. Further, distinction presupposes the notion of plurality and also activistic implication of reciprocity among the reals3 which finally results into the relativistic notion of knowledge and reality. The principle of distinction is the universal and basic axiom of all realistic metaphysics. The impelling logic of distinction presents to us an infinitely diversified universe, or in indeterminate reality. A philosophy which does not admit of distinction or independence of subject and object developes inevitably either into subjective or objective idealism. Hence, Anekāntavāda is the most logical and consistent form of realism. This is true of modern Einstenian Theory of Relativity. Russel refutes the idealistic interpretation and says, "the
1. Ladd, G. T. : Knowledge, Life and Reality, p. 95. 2. Sanghavi, S.: Advanced Studies in Logic and Metaphysics,
(Calcutta : Indian Studies, 1961 ), pp. 4-6. 3. Padmarajiah, Y.J.: Jaina Theories of Reality and Know
ledge (Jaina Sahitya Vikas Mandal, 1963, Bombay ), Chapter IX ( Anekantavada ).

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fundamental assumption of relativity is realistic, namely, that those aspects in which all observers agree when they record a given phenomenon, may be regarded as objective, and not as contributed by the observers."1 Subjectivism or solipsism is against scientific relativism, which is sustained by the postulate of the plurality and objectivity of the universe.
Mahavira too was neither a sceptic nor an agnostic. He believed that these infinite number of attributes and characteristics can be discovered by experience alone, and not by a priori logical consideration or random speculations. But he does not admit of a distinction between the external and internal sources of knowledge or reality. A consideration will show the inadequacy of pure logic to give us the full knowledge of the real. The traditional laws of identity ( A is A), contradiction (A is not A ) or Excluded Middle (A cannot be both A and not A) have no appeal to experience and behaviour of things. There is no denying the fact that they are Laws of Thought and hence also laws of Reality but we must
ine their meanings by an appeal to experience alone. Reals are concrete facts of experience, Universal is the very life of particulars and particulars cannot be bereft of universals. But again, the truth of this can be realised through reference to our actual experience. Let us try to understand these problems with the help of dialogue between Mahavira and Gautama : “Are the souls O Lord, eternal, or non-eternal ?
They are eternal, O Gautama, from the view-point of substance, and non-eternal from the view-point of modes.”3
1. Russell, B. : 'Relativity', Encyclopaedia Birtannica ( Uni
versity of Chicago, 1950 ). 2. “The Logical Background of Jaina Philosophy”, by S.
Mookherjee in the Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism
( Calcutta : Bharati Mahavidyalaya, 1944). 3. Bhagavati Sūtra, VII. 2. 273.

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"Is the body, O Lord, identical with the soul or different ? The body, O Gautama, is identical with the soul as well as different from it."?
Similarly, we have numerous dialogue regarding the problem, “whether universal and absolute non-violence is good or bad ?"2 “Whether to sleep or to remain awake is good ?”3 “Whether to be weak or strong ?"4 Whether the Jīvas are mobile or not ?"'5 "Whether the soul is powerful or powerless", and so on. And the replies of Mahavira are always conditional and double, which are also correct, because there is actual reference and experience.
A thing is neither real nor unreal, neither eternal nor noneternal, neither static nor mobile, neither small nor big in the absolute sense but has dual nature. This is no offence to the Laws of thought because two-valued logic seems to unreal if there is loyalty to experience. There is no brass tracks in life or logic. Take for example, the case of being and becoming or identity and difference. It is presupposition of difference that the 'identity' of a thing undergoing change is maintained. Change is meaningless without the idea of persistence. Hence, the contradiction between them is only so-called and illusory. The denial of pre-non-existence
1. Bhagavatt Sūtra, XIII. 7.495. 2. Ibid, VII. 2. 270. 3. Ibid, XII, 2. 443. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid, XXV.4. 6. Ibid, I. 8. 72. 7. For an elaborate discussion of the Jaina theory of mani
foldness of reality, reference may be made to Syadvadamañjarī of Mallisena with Anyayoga-Vyavaccheda-Dvātrimśika of Hemcandra (Ed.) A. B. Dhruva (Poona : B. O. R. I., 1933 ) and Anekanta-Jaya-Pataka of Haribhadra Sūri (ed.) H, R. Kapadia ( 2 Vols. ), Gaekawad Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1960, etc.

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and post non-existence as part of a real leads to the impossibility of the law of causation and the consequential impossibility of all theoretical and practical activity. Similarly, the denial of non-existence of mutual identity (numerical difference) and absolute non-existence is also impossible. There plurality presupposes that the identity of one is not the identity of another. If there is no difference, there will be no distinction, hence no independence between the subject and the object. If there is the negation of identity, there is worse confusion. Hence, the nature of reality is not exclusive or extremistic. It is existent-cum-non-existent; identity-cumdifference, one-in-many. This is seeing both the sides, the obverse and the reverse of the thing. Similarly we can think of the universal and the particular. The world of reals is not only plurality but also unity. But the oneness is not secured at the sacrifice of the many, nor are the many left in unsocial indifference.1 As regards relations, no relation is meaningful if there is pure identity and no relation is possible between two terms which are absolutely independent and different, hence relation is neither a case of unification nor mutual dependence. Relation has no status outside the terms. Hence, there is only one alternative to treat relation in the sense of identity-in-difference as an ontological truth, not merely infernable2, but also as an indubitably perceptual fact.3 Lastly, causal efficiency (Arthakriyākāritvam) is
1. Mukherjee, S.: Ibid, p. 302.
2. Prameya-kamala-martanda of Prabhacandra (ed.) M. K. Jaina (Bombay, 1941), 2nd edition, p. 514.
3. Ibid, p. 514; According to Y. J. Padmarajiah, the Jaina view of relation between the two extremes of Vedanta and Nyaya corresponds, in some essentials, to the views of contemporary westerners like De Witt Parker, "The Theory of Relations, The Self and Nature (Cambridge, 1917) ch. IX; William James, "The Theory and its Relations", The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and

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the test of reality, the real cannot be an absolute constant nor can it be an absolute variable but a variable constant, I An absolute real can neither be a cause nor an effect2 for an absolute effect will have no necessity for a cause, and an eternal cause will be unamenable to any change is selfcontradictory. Hence, real to be real must reveal itself not merely as many ( Anantātmakam) but also infinitely manifold ( Anantadharmātmakam) or non-absolutistic (Anaikantika). This is the integral view of identity-in-difference, or Being-in-becoming etc. (Ubhayavada or Miśravada3 ). We may be unable to understand this unique nature (Játyantara ) of this concrete unity through the recognised channels of knowledge but if we can realise at all the general features of the Absolute, we can see that somehow they come together in a known, vaguely and in the abstract, our result is certain.
This is another point, whether this kind of non-absolutism is itself absolute or not. If non-absolutism is absolute, there is at least one real which is absolute; and if it is not, it is not an absolute and universal fact. For the answer to this question, we shall have to turn ourselves to the theory of Relativism ( Syādvāda ) including the theory of standpoint (Nayavada ), sevenfold predication (Saptabhangi ) and Verbal usage ( Nikșepa ).
(b) Non-absolutism in Speech : Syadvāda -- Whether nonabsolutism is itself absolute or relative depends upon the nature of proposition, which is either complete ( Sakalādesa)
Scientific Methods (ed.), F. S. D. Woodbridge ( 2 Vols. ), Vol. II, pp 30-35; W. McTaggart ; 'The Theory and its
Relations', Ibid, Vol. II, p. 35. 1. Tatia, N. M.: "Anekānta, Syādváda and Saptabhangi”,
Acārya Bhikşu Smsti Grantha ( Calcutta, 1961 ), p. 82. 2. Mookherjee S. : Ibid, p. 25. 3. Padmarajiah, Y. J, : lbid, p. 38.

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or Incomplete (Vikalādeśa )1, the former being the object of valid knowledge (Pramaņa) and the latter, the object of aspectal knowledge (Naya ).2 This means that the doctrine of non-absolutism is not absolute unconditionally. However, to avoid the fallacy of an infinite regress, the Jainas distinguish between true non-absolutism (Samyak-anekānta) and false non-absolutism (Mithya-anekānta ).3 To be valid, therefore, non-absolutism must not be absolute but always relative. When one attribute is stated as constituting the whole nature of the real and thus implies the negation of other attributes, such cognition are examples of the 'false absolute'. But Naya is not false though it is partial knowledge from a particular standpoint. Similarly, the nature of unconditionality in the statement 'All statements are conditional' is quite different4 from the normal meaning of unconditionality. This is like the idea contained in the passage I do not know myself'. Where there is no contradiction between knowledge and ignorance, or in the sentence, 'I am undecided', where there is atleast one decision; 'I am undecided'. The unconditionality is not at the level of existence, while at the level of essence (Thought) everything is alternative. We do not like in the realm of thought or reason alone. Behind reason, there is always the unreason (Faith). The Jainas, too has faith in their scriptures as anybody else has in his own. Here is definiteness or unconditionality. In each community, there is a special absolute. The absolutes themselves are alternation
1. Umāswāmī Tattvartha-sūtra, I. 6; Vidyanandi: Tattvartha-Sloka-Varttikam, I. 6. 3.
2. Pūjyapāda: Sarvärtha-siddhi (Kashi, 1955), p. 20. 3. Samantabhadra : Apta-mimamsā (Kashi, 1914), K. 108; Vidyanandi : Aṣṭa-sāhasri ( Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay), p. 290; Dharmabhūşapa: Nyaya-dipika ( Sarsava, 1945), pp. 130-131.
4. Vide author's article 'Nature of Unconditionality in Syadvada', in this book.

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so far as they are possible (till we are on thought level ), but when I have chosen one and stick to it, it is more than possible, it is existent or actual. Thus, there may be a reconciliation between unconditionality and conditionality. So on thought level, the Syädváda statement 'Everything is conditional', holds good but when we adopt the point of view of existence, we are bound to rest on unconditionality.
But there is a problem, how to express this conditionalitycum-unconditionality in language ? From the point of view of anekanta, we cannot make one-sided exposition. But in actual usage, whenever we make any particular statement (S is Por S is not P), it takes the form of a categorical proposition. Even a hypothetical (If S then P) or a disjunction (Either S or P) is said to have a categorical basis and therefore, they can be converted into a categorical one. But since our thought is relative, so must be our expression. Then there is another problem also to synthesize the different angles of visions or internal harmony of the opposed predications (S is P, S is not P, S is both P and not P, S is neither P nor not P etc.). It is therefore, Lord Mahavīra had always prefixed a restrictive expression, Syāt? ( 'somehow' or 'in some respect') as a corrective against any absolutist way of thought and evaluation of reality. This is a linguistic tool for the practical application of non-absolutism in words, Because of this prefix 'Syat' and the relative nature of the proposition, it is called Syádváda. But words are only expressive or suggestive ( Vācaka or Jñāpaka ) rather than productive ( Kāraka ). Thus, the meaning is, however, eventually rooted in the nature of things in reality and we have,
1. Shastri, K. C. ; “Syadvāda and Saptabhaugi”, Premi
Abhinandan Grantha, p. 338; Apta-Mímāmsā of Samantabhadra, K. 105. However, there is no need of 'Syat' for an enlightened person who knows its imports; Laghiya. straya of Akalauka, Verse 38; Naya-viniscaya of Akalanka, Verse 454.

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therefore, to explore a scheme of linguistic symbols (Vacanvinyasa) for model judgements representing alternative standpoints (Nayas). A Naya in an alter-'viewpoint'1 a way of approach or particular opinion (abhipraya) or viewpoint (apekşṣā) about an object as an event. This philosophy of standpoints bears the same relation to philosophy as logic does to thought or grammar to language. We cannot affirm or deny anything absolutely of any object owing to the endless complexity of things. Every statement of a thing, therefore, is bound to be one-sided and incomplete. Hence, the Doctrine of Seven-fold Predication (Saptabhangi)2 is the logical consummation of the doctrine of relative standpoints (Syadvada) which synthesize the different points of view. If we insist on absolute predication without conditions (Syat), the only course open is to dismiss either the diversity or the identity as a mere metaphysical fiction. Every single standpoint designated in every statement has a partial truth. Different aspects of reality can be considered from different perspectives ( Nikṣepa )4. Thus Naya the analytic and the Saptabhangi is the synthetic method of studying ontological problems. In the forms of statements, this doctrine insists on the co-relation of affirmation and negation. All judgements are double-edged in their character. All
1. Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena Divakara, Śloka-29; Laghiyastraya, Śloka-42; Syadvada-mañjari, Śloka-28; Parīkṣāmukham of Manikyanandi, Verse-19; Apta-mīmāinsă, K. 106.
2. Naya-karpikā of Vinaya Vijaya, K. 22; Saptabhangi Naya of Mannomala Jaina (Introduction ); Tatia, N. M.: Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 198.
3. Jacobi calls Syādvāda a synonym of Jainism, Vide of Religion and Ethics, Vol. VII, p. 465; Scriptural knowledge of the Jainas are also called Syadvāda-śruta, vide Apta-mimämisă of Samantabhadra, K. 105.
4. Tattvärtha-sutra, I. S.

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things are existent as well as non-existent. The predicate of 'inexpressibility' stands for the unique synthesis of existence and non-existence and is therefore 'unspeakable' (Avaktavya ). These three predicates, 'existence', 'non-existence' and the 'inexpressible' make seven propositions. These seven predicates are thus the seven exhaustive and unique modes of expression of truth.
202
It is wrong to charge the theory of Syadvada with the fallacies of self-contradiction, undeterminism, doubt, uncertainty or abandoning original posititon in describing the Avyaktam, Infinite Regress, Confusion, Vaidhikarana etc. It is also wrong to confuse the pragmatic and pluralistic-realistic attitude of Syädvada with either Pragmatism of Messrs. James-Dewey-Schiller or with the subjectivistic relativism of the Sophist or with the relative absolutism of Whitehead or Bodin or with Einstienian relativity except in the most general attitude. Pyrroh's prefixing every judgement with a 'may be' must not be identified with Jaina 'Syat', for the former degenerate into agnosticism or scepticism, where as there is no room for any scepticism whatsoever in Jainism. Scepticism means in the minimum, absence of any assertion, whereas Syadvadins always assert, though what they assert are alternatives - each being valid in its own Universe of Discourse, which controls the interpretation of every word. This is the logic of Relatives.
Although, I have tried to designate Anekantavada as theory of non-absolutism in thought, while Syādvāda as the doctrine of non-absolutism in specch, both of them are used
1. For a detailed criticism of these charges, see, Jaina Darśana (Syadvada Special Number), Vol. II, Nos. 4. 5; Jaina Darśana of M, K. Jaina (Syadvăda-mimāmsa), pp. 549-622.
2. Bool: Laws of Thought, p. 166.
3. Mitra, A. C.; Deductive Logic, pp. 198-200.

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as synonyms. It is opposed to one sided exposition or statement. There is relation between thought and speech. Hence, Buddha emphasised the importance of right speech ( Samyak Vācā ) along with right views (Samyak dņști ). The Hindu thinkers have also recognised the virtue of speech ( Vācaka ) along with the physical (Kāyika ) and mental (Mánasika ) virtues. To the Jainas, non-absolutism is a virtue, absolutism is vice ( Adharma). Views are bound to differ because we are guided by different conditions, thought and modes and attitudes. Hence, we must avoid strong and absolute judgements, because we are not the sole possessor of truth. In other words, it is fatal to treat the relative and the home made as though it were the Absolute. It is the language that makes cognition illuminative of its objects.3 Hence, language too must be so disciplined as to conform itself with the dictum of reality, which is recognised as manifold.
(c) Non absolutism in Action : Ahimsa The Jaina principle of respect for life ( Ahimsā ) is the origin of the respect for the opinion of others. Hence, anekāntavāda or syadváda is an extension of Ahinsă in thought. Non-violence in action must precede non-violence in thought. For Jainism, of all moral principles, ahimsā is a universal and categorical rule of action and is prescribed for its own sake. It is, therefore called the supreme virtue. It is perhaps, because life is dear to all.5 The Ācārārga says : “There art he whom
1. Rayanavati, I. 8; Anekanta-jaya-pataka, I. 30, I. 17, 1. 27. 2. Huxley, Aldous : His Message to the Silver Jubilee Se
ssion of the Indian Philosophical Congress, Calcutta,
1950. 3. Vakpadiya of Bhart;hari ( Benaras Sanskrit Series ), I. 124. 4. Bihat-svayambhu-stotra of Samantabhadra, Verse 119. 5. Daśavaikā lika-sūtra, VI, 10; Acaranga-sūtra, I. 2. 92
93 ( Sabbesi Jibigam Piyam ).

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those intendest to kill."1 One's soul is inviolable, so is that of others.2 Mahāvīra believed in the spiritual equality of all beings and the supreme importance of life. Hence, any action out of our passional vibrations inflicting injury or death is abjured on all accounts. But what is negatively, abstaining from violence is positively love, sympathy and fellow-feeling 3 Negations and affirmations are complementary to each other. So what is negation of the evil is also the affirmation of the good. Hence, there are the negative and positive aspects of Ahimsā4. The Jaina philosophers have distinguished objective violence (Dravya-biisa. ) and subjective violence (Bhava-hiinsä ).5 The former is concerned with the act, the latter with the agent. Purely objective violence like the surg. on's operation is not violence, 6 Hence, the attitude of the soul, the bad motive aod intention (Pramada and Kaşıya ) constitute the true basis of violence and non-violence. Of course, the Jainas also take into account the external behaviour. But the emphasis is upon intention. If only material ( Dravya ) himsā is regarded as the touch-stone of Ahinsa, which we cannot remove in any form when we are living, individual salvation would
1, Ācārājiga-Sūtra, I. 5. 4-5. 2. Upāsakādhyāna, Kalpa 24, śloka, 292; Padma-purava,
XIV. 186. 3. Maitrī, Pramoda, Karunya and Madhyastha, Yaśastilaka
of Somadeva, pp. 334-337. 4. Sanghavi, S.: Pacificism and Jainism ( Varanasi : J. C.
R. S.), pp. 4-5; Pravacana-sära of Kunda-kunda, III. 17. 5. Brahat-kalki-bhāşya, Verse 394-399, The Vitality (Prāņa)
are conscious ( Bhăva ) or material ( Dravya ). Hivisā
is injury to these vitalities. 6. Viśesāvāśyaka-bhāşya, Verse 1764. 7. Tattvartha-sūtra, VII, 13; Puruşártha-siddhyupāya, 43;
Samaya-sara of Kunda-kunda, Gatha, 262.

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become an impossibility.1
Non-violence, however, is not only an individual affair. Individuality is a social affair because personality is a social product.2 It is embedded in social adjustments and accommodation, reason and persuation rather than force and fraud. True, the concept of power is as fundamental to politics as that of energy to physics, but what is needed is power without passions, exploitation, hatred and subjugation of the fellow beings. Hence, non-viclence has a social content. Its application to the problems of social relations gives rise to the principles of truth (Satya ). Ahimsa here assumes the forms of anekānta, which is perhaps the most persistent and rigorous quest of truth in a dispassionate manner. Similarly, the vows of non-possession ( Aparigraha ) and non-stealing ( Asteya ) taken together constitute the principle of non-violence in the economic field. If murder is violence, disproportionate possessions, vulgor show of wealth, corruptions, exploitation, adulteration etc. are violence, though veiled but more dangerous. Similarly, the principle of brahmacarya (Celibacy or selfcontrol ) is also nothing but a form of sexual ahimsā4 There is also social violence which consists in the denial of equal, effective and maximum opportunity of self-realisation to all. In the international field, imperialism and colonialism, also constitute violence like war and armament. On the other hand, the doctrine of peaceful co-existence and move for disarmament are the application of the principle of nonviolence in the international politics. In short, Ahimsa is in reality of the basic social ethics.5
1. Sägara-dharmāmsta of Āsādhara, IV. 23. 2. Subhasitavali, p. 463; Sāgara-dharmámộta, II. 22. 3. Prasad, Benoy: World Problems with Jaina Ethics ( Vara
nasi, J. C. R. S., 1951 ), pp. 8-9. 4. Tatia, N. M.: "Ahińsă in Indian Culture", The Voice of
Ahimsa, Vol. VIII, No. 9-10, Sept.-Oct., 1958, p. 337. 5. Amar, G, L. : "The Jaina Conception of Ahimsa", Maru
dhar Kesari Abhinandana Grantha (Jodhpur ), p. 32.

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Every set of institution requires a virtue, without which it loses organic vitality and becomes mechanical, ineffective and perverted. However, if non-violence is accepted as universal social morality, we can achieve a better society and a happier world. Therefore, Roman Rollandi said that the 'Rşis' who discovered the law of non-violence in the midst of violence were greater geniuses than Newton, greater warriors than Wellington. Non-violence is the law of our species as violence is the law of the brute.
Ahimsā has become both a philosophy and a creed for Jainism. It is distinguished from the Buddhist and the Brahmanical thinkers who would justify wars and even hunting etc. They believe in the purity of intention but they are not very particular about purity of behaviour. For the Jainas, the behaviour ( external) must be as pure as intention4 (internal ). Hence, the Jaina-agamas classify himsā into Sankalpaja and Arambhaja. The former is committed with the sole intention of hinsă, the latter is committed unavoidably in the exercise of one's professions, duties, self-defence, etc. which may further be divided into Udyamis, Gșharambhi and Virodhi. The householder can abstain from Saukalpa ja Hims), but not from Arambhaja although he tries his best to avoid it. 6 The root cause of hirsa, however, is passion.
1, Rolland R.: Mahatma Gandhi, p. 48 quoted by T. G.
Kalghatgi, “The Jaina Doctrine of Ahinsa : A Critique",
Tour of the Karnatak University (N. D.), p. 25. 2. Aççhaśālini, p. 80. 3, Manusmeti, XV. 140-141. 4. Tatia, N. M.: "The Jaina Ideal of Ahimsa", Seminar on
Theory and Technique of Ahimsā, Delhi University,
1969, p. 6. 5. Jaina, G. C. : “Jainagama Main Ahirusa”, unpublished
article, p. 4. 6. Pañcadhyāyr of Royamalla, Sloka 813.

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Therefore, the Jainas, indicate not only the transgressions (Aticara )1 of Ahimsā but also prescribe a number of ways and means for the preservation of Ahirsi, called bhāvana? ( contemplations ), both negative and positive.
[VI The trio of mana, vacana and karma which is brought in our discussion is to establish non-absolutism. Hence, it is a trio rather than a trichotomy. It is vicious intellectualism and the error of exclusive particularity to separate thought from speech or action or vice-versa. Ethical life is a whole an integration of the three aspects of personality, which are interdependent and supplementary to each other. But as I have been able to follow the Jaina spirit and scriptures, I am constrained to believe that the metaphysics of anekānta together with the logical dialectics of naya, syadváda, saptabhangi, niksepa, have been explored to establish the doctrine of Ahinsa on a solid logical and metaphysical foundation. However, the motivation for Mahavīra to adopt Ahimsí is to be traced outside the realm of logic and metaphysics. It has to be find out in the long heritage of non-violence in the Indian culture and also in the character and conditions of Indian society during Mahavira. It seems that the Indian society at this stage was worst victim of violence. Ethics is situational. It cannot be indifferent to the needs of the time. Cruel sacrifices, meaningless rituals, unequal social order, growth of capitalist economy and political rivalries led to this great emphasis upon the philosophy of non-violence.
1. “The transgressions of non-violence are bandha, baddha,
cheda, Atibhara-ropana, and annapāna nirodha”, Tattvá
rtha-sūtra ( Bhāşya ), VII. 3. 2. Negativity, they are Vakgupti, Manogupti, īrya, Adana
nikşepana-Samiti and Alokitapāna-bhajana; positively there are Maitri, Pramoda, Karunya and Mădhyasthya, Ibid, VII. 6.

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This is very similar to our time, when there is strong opinion in favour of disarmament and world peace. It seems, nonviolence is a necessity, even today. We have to choose between Atom and Ahir sā, William James, therefore, calls for a 'moral equivalent of war'. It is not only an intellectual utopia but a concrete moral guide and social stabiliser. The all or the non-approach has brought us on the brink of total annihilation and social anarchy, hence the non-absolutistic approach in thought, word and deed is the only way before us.

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Chapter Fifteen
NON-ABSOLUTISM AND JAINA VIEW
OF DARSANA
India has been the birth-land and play-ground of different types of philosophies, even the rustics and the illiterate talk about Brahman and Atman, Maya and Mokṣa, Anekanta and Ahimsa. Infact philosophy runs into the veins of Indian blood. Indian people not only talk but also live philosophy. Philosophy, Religion and Ethics are so close to the Indian life that they become inseparable parts of the personality of every Indian. Jainism, Buddhism or Vedanta are not arm-chair of philosophies but they are living creeds of the Indian people. Thus philosophy is not only the light-house but also the fountain of life for them. It is not only an enquiry into the meaning of reality but also into the meaning of life. Indeed, Indian philosophy is the philosophy of life.
However, in the technical sense, philosophy is used in three different senses in Indian thought, namely, vision, self-realisation and ratiocination. The first meaning, i. e., 'vision' is very crude although very close to the literal meaning of philosophy or Darśana (drś = to see). Here 'seeing' means 'sense-perception' or Pratyakṣa. The Carvākas accept this view of darśana, because it holds that perception alone is the source of knowledge. In our ordinary usage, we glibly talk about vision of a pot (Ghaţa-darśana) or vision of cloth (Paţa-darśana ). But I wonder, if we can accept such a crude view of philosophy, although we can not deny that the 'deeper-seeing' starts from the 'surface-seeing' of a perceptual 'pot' or a piece of 'cloth'. Even the Vedantic example that the different forms of pot have their ground in the motherearth, forms change but not reality.
14

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The second sense in which philosophy is used is that of Knowledge of self (Atma-darśana ) or intuitive experience. The Upanişads and other systems recognise self as the ultimate reality and hence to know the self is to know the reality, Strangely enough, some of the Jaina mystics like Kundakunda, Pūjyapada and Yogindu accept this view of philosophy. For them knowledge of the self is the highest knowledge and self-realisation is the highest value of life. “One who knows the self, knows all.” The gathās of Kunda-kunda, Pūjyapāda and Yogindu read like passages from the Upanişads and Vedanta. Kunda-kunda clearly says : "It is from the practical point of view only that the Omniscient Lord perceives and knows all; from the real point, the omniscient perceives and knows his soul only."1 Yogindu's words are also remarkable when he declares, “That Ātman is known, everything else is known, so Ātman should be realised.”2 Pūjyapada distinguishes 'self-knowledge' from ‘self-delusion"3 like the Upanişads and the Vedanta.4
The third meaning of philosophy is reason or ratiocination. The Nyaya is the champion of logic in Indian thought. Logic is regarded as the light of all knowledge, means of all practical behaviour and even substainer of all virtues, Without logic, philosophy looses its lustre. Self-knowledge or Intuitiveknowledge is rare phenomenon. It can not be generalised. Hence for ordinary use of life, logic is a must in the field of thought and behaviour. In the absense of reasoning, idea become idiosyncrasies. They become too personal and private. Even intuition is not against reason, though it may be beyond reason. Those who do not know reason are begots and fools and not men. Hence every system of Indian Philo
1. Niyama-sära, Gatha 158. 2. Paramātma-prakaśa, I. 103. 3. Samadhi-tantra, Gatha 20-22. 4. Brhadaranyak Upanişad, III. 7. 1; Vedanta-sára, 171;
Brahma-sūtra ( S. B.), IV. 1. 3.

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sophy accepts Nyāya or Logic as the necessary methodology of Philosophy. The importance of Logic is reflected in the fact that Logic or Nyaya is identified with one of the important systems of Indian Philosophy, attributed to Gotama. Hegel in the west had gone further and had identified not only logic with Philosophy but also with reality. This sort of paralogism is however not accepted by the Indian thinkers. Even Gotama regards reason as the means not the end. The technical Nyaya word for philosophy called 'Anvikşa' means “investigation, since it consists in the reviewing (anuvikşaņa ) of a thing previously apprehended by perception and verbal testimony."I Whatever is established is true. The purpose of the Nyāya is critical examination of the objects of knowledge by means of logical proof. Every Science is a Nyaya, which means literally going into a subject. Hence, it is sometimes called Tarka-vidya or Váda-vidya ( science of debate and discussion ), The Jainas also have a long and rich tradition of their own logic beginning from the Āgamas, 3 Samantabhadra and Siddhasena, Akaladka and Hemacandra, Manikyanandi and Vidyananda, Abhayadeva, Devendra Sīri, Vadiraja, Dharmabhūşaņa, Anantavīrya, Yaśovijaya are some of the most important logicians of the Jaina tradition. It means that logic and life go together. Neither logic is unconnected with life nor life is a verse to logic.
However, there are two additional senses in which Philosophy is used in Jainism, which are peculiar to its own. In one of these senses, philosophy stands for faith (Sraddhan ) of which we find mention in the second verse of Tattvārtha-sūtra (1. 2. ). Infact, here we get the definition of Samyak-darśana which means conviction in the knowledge of things ascertained as they are. Tattva means 'thatness' and Artha is that which is ascertained, hence tattvärtha means ascertainment of 'that
1. Nyaya-bhasya, I. 1. 1. 2. Ibid. 3. Şat-khandagama, V. 5. 51; Sthánānga-sūtra, pp. 309-310.

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212 Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion ness' or 'tattva'. Tattvārtha Sraddha nam is Samyak-darsanam. This is the first of the trio of the Right Belief, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct, together which constitute the path to liberation. Faith is the precursor to knowledge. The Gitā also says that he who has faith attains wisdom or knowledge. 1 Faith is not blind belief, but it is the psychological condition of knowledge. Not only knowledge, faith is necessary even for attaining the highest degree of Yoga2, and the worlds of righteousness.3 Even sacrifice becomes void which is empty of faith.4 Man is of the nature of his faith, what his faith is, that verily, he is.5 Right belief is the basis on which Right knowledge depends, hence we find the serial order in the sūtra which mentions first the right belief and only second Right knowledge. Right belief or Samyag-darśana is either with attachment ( Sarāga ) or without attachment ( Vítarāga). The first is characterised by calmness (Praśam ), fear of mundane existence (Samvega ), Compassion for all living beings (Anukampa) and belief in the existence of things according to tattvärtha. The second type of samyak-darśana consists in the belief in the purity of soul without attachment which can be attained either by intuition (Nisarga ) or by tuition ( Adhigama ) - either by percepts or scriptures. Matter, place, time and five attainments are the external aids and subsidence of Karma (Upaśama ), Destructor of subsidence ( Kşayopaśama ) of Karmas are the internal aids to samyakdarśana.
However, there is one lacuna in the concept of Right belief as to what is "thatness'. Every system of philosophy has its own object of knowledge. Then, right belief will differ from System to system. But it does not matter. The supreme lord
1. Śrīmadbhagavadgita, IV. 39. 2. Ibid, IV. 47. 3. Ibid, XVIII. 71. 4. Ibid, XVII. 13. 5. Ibid, XVII. 3.

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as the Gita says, confirms the faith of each and grants the reward cach seeks. Every surface derives its soil from the depths even as every shadow reflects the nature of the substance. No matter what we rever so long as our reverence is serious, it helps its progress, which is required is serious and sincere faith.
The second special sense of darśana in Jainism is understood in the sense of the knowledge of the generality (Samanya-bodha) or Indeterminate knowledge (Alocana ). This is also called formless consciousness or indeterminate knowledge (Anakara Upayoga ). That knowledge which is gained without probandum (Linga) is darśana, which takes the help of probandum is Jiana. The former is restricted to the immediate present, where as which is spread over the past, present and future in the indeterminate intuition is the cognition of an object which leaves the specific determinations out of account and it takes place immediately on that very sense-object contact. The indeterminate intuition transforms into determinate perception. A cognition which fails to take note of specific characteristics is called indecision1, because it falls short of certitude delivering itself in the form 'what may it be'. Where there is lack of decision or certitude, there can not be valid knowledge. Although, there is some similarity between Jaina 'darśana' and Buddhistic 'Nirvikalpa Jñana', but the latter cannot be called 'Pramana' as there is indecision. But 'darśana' as Hemacandra holds is not sensation (Avagraha). That perception of the generalism (Samanya) of things without particulars (Višeṣa) in which there is no grasping of details is called 'darśana'.2
Darśana whether is visual (Cakşuḥ) or non-visual or clairvoyant (Avadhi ), it is merely 'darśana'. It is neither right belief nor wrong belief. The logical tradition of the Jainas include darśana from the category of Pramāņa and scholars
1. Pramapa-mimamsä, I. 1. 6.
2. Dravya-sangraha, 43.
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like Manikyanandi and Vadideva Sūri treat it as semblance of Pramāpal ( Pramabhāsa ). Abhayadeva in his commentary on Sammati-tarka, no doubt regard 'darśana' as 'Pramāna' but it is not in the logical sense but in the scriptural sense where darśana is regarded as Samyak-darśana. Yaśovijaya in his Trakabhāşā (p. 5) treats darśana as determinate perception and hence falls in the category of Pramapa, on the other hand excludes darśana from the category of Pramana.” Hemacandra also treat it as non-pramāņa.
We have seen that the term 'darśana' has been used in different senses in the Jaina Philosophy, However, even if we accept the most commonly accepted meaning of 'darśana' as direct knowledge of reality, it ceases to be universal in the true senses of the term as every system has its own conception of reality. Hence, there will be as many darśanas' as system of thought. This leads us to posits alternative standpoints in philosophy. This is Anekanta, which is the soul of Jaina thought and culture.
1. Parīkņā-mukham, VI. 2; Pramapa-naya-tattvaloka, VI.
24-25. 2. Tarkabhäşa, p. 1.

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Chapter Sixteen
RELEVANCE OF ANEKANTA IN MODERN TIMES
Modern times is an era of crisis in the realm of human civilization. The reason is that we give so much attention to short-range and local problems that long-range and global problems continue to be neglected. Secondly, life has become more intricately interdependent and complex. So simpler solutions no longer suffice. A world civilization is fast emerging and we cannot afford to solve our problems with a parochial temper and sectarian outlook. For human survival. we need human cooperation on a plenary scale able to deal with rapidly increasing complexities. The critical problems are so complex that we need a philosophy equally complex to grapple with them One dimensional man in a multi-dimensional worldcrisis will be out of joint. Inter-existence is the positive option for mankind. Either there is organic growth of mankind or there is organic destruction of human civilization. Not only this it is too late in history to convert all of mankind to Christianity or Islam or Jainism (or to Communism or Capitalism or any other isms), but also to some metaphysical principles which we have been cherishing since antiquity. The growth of scientific knowledge and outlook has destroyed most of our false dogmas and superstitions but it has failed to provide us knowledge that could sublimate our animal and selfish nature. Animality has been dominating our individual as well as social behaviour. Hence, our life has become full of tensions, turraoils and disorders. Therefore, although we are outwardly pleading for world-peace and non-violence, yet we have been preparing for war. This is the crisis of modern time that we aspire for peace but prepare for the formidable funeral procession of mankind.

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Humanity is tottering today upon the brink of self-annihilation for lack of understanding, which includes understanding ourselves and understanding each other. It is a time of tragic importance for the world because even before the shadows cast by one war is lifted fully, the skies become overcast with dark threatening clouds. Hence, at no period of human history man was in need of sound philosophy than today. As war begins in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defence of peace should be built. Today, if one person does not agree with me, he is wicked, if a country does not agree with my country, it is wicked as if there is no half-way, no neutrality. So ultimately it is our warring ideologies that are at the root of world-tension. But ideologies or philosophies depend upon our-way of philosophizing. Hence Locke rightly felt that epistemological problems are prior to all others. An epistemological reorientation will influence metaphysical grounding which in turn will determine our socio-ethico-political views. Any solution can ultimately be achieved through knowledge free from confusion and prejudices.
Since things have many characters, they are the objects of all sided knowledge. The knowledge which determines the full meaning of an object through the employment of onesided knowledge, is partial knowledge. Hence we should discard all absolute judgements, otherwise truth would be violated. Reality has got innumerable characteristics. A valid knowledge is defined as that which gives us knowledge of a thing in its various aspects. All expressions are somehow real. All objects have got ionumerable characters, hence all things are multidimensional or Anekāntic.
The world is the store-house of great chaos in thought. All the confusion of thought which is prevailing in the world is the outcome of inexhaustive research and acceptance of a part for the whole. Almost all our disputes only betray the pig-headedness of the blind men who spoke differently about an elephant. The outstanding personalities like Sri Aurobindo,

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Raman Maharshi etc. spoke to us, in a world over organised by ideological fanaticism, that truth is not exclusive or sectarian. Every idol however noble it may seem is ultimately a Moloch that devours its worshippers. It is fatal to treat the relative and the home-made as though it were the Absolute. It is only intellectual clarity which will resolve all conflict and rivalry. All dogmatism owes its genesis to the partiality of outlook and fondness for a line of thinking to which a person has accustomed himself. This is imperialism and aggressiveness in thought. When the one party or another thinks himself the sole possessor of absolute truth, it becomes natural that he should think his neighbours absolutely in the clutches of Error or the Devil. Today, one man or one country fight with the other because their views vary. Views are bound to vary because we are guided by different conditions, thought and attitudes. Hence, it is wrong to think oneself right and rest others wrong. Here Syadvāda-Anekāntavada represents the highest form of Catholicism coupled wonderfully with extreme conservatism, a most genuine and yet highly dignified compromise better than which we cannot imagine.
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We must realise that there is other's view-point as our own. This can happen when one puts oneself into another's shoes or to get under the skin of others. This is called sympathy which is the act of reproducing in our minds the feelings of another. Gandhiji once told: "I advise a man not from my standpoint but from his. I try to put myself in his shoes. When I cannot do so. I refuse to advise." He once said: "I am myself a Puritan but for others a Catholic."
Syadvada or Anekantavada is adoption of the safe and secure middle-path leaving the two extremes. It means that virtue has many facets. There is place for the penance of a saint, chastity of a woman, innocence of a child, bravery of a hero etc. As a lover of nature, one can equally enjoy tae rains of rainy season, coolness of winter and heat

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of summer. Similarly, life is not one straight road. There are two many complexities in it. It is not like a train which once started keeps running. The real is a variable constant. It is being and non-being, unity and plurality, the universal and the particular rolled into one thing is neither an absolute unity nor split into an irreconcilable plurality. It is both unity and plurality all the time. There is no opposition between unity of being and plurality of aspects. Similarly, things are neither exclusively particulars, nor are they exclusively universals, but they are a concrete realisation of both. The two elements can be distinguished by reflective thought, but cannot be rent asunder. A real is neither a particular nor universal in an exclusive manner, but a synthesis which is different from both severally and jointly though embracing them in its fold. A real is sui generis.
Although Syadvada-Anekantavāda is not a complete logic, it does involve a basic principle that seems to be essential to the kinds of philosophy needed to account for, and to deal with, the complexities of our emerging world civilization. The two-valued logic developed presupposes the principle of excluded middle as most basic - X is either A or non-A but not both ( because A and non- A are contradictious ). The dynamic, dialectical, organic unities inherent in the increasingly intricate interdependent organisations constituting our emergiog world require a more dynamic, dialectical organic logic than is presently available. Despite the fact that the two-valued logic has immense practical values when used judiciously, it is still not adequate to account for all of the vital developments in human society.
It is so difficult to say objectively anything fundamental about today's civilization or modern man because “all of us are caught in the same prejudices." Only a man who is 'wholly of the present can say something important about the present-day world, and only he who has the most intensive and cxtensive consciousness' of himself and his situation can hope to be such a man. What is required is essential

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thinking' ( Heidegger ) or 'total seeing' (J. Krşpamūrti ) by competent persons for apprehending the problems and predicaments of contemporary civilization and for granting an inkling of their possible solutions. Karl Jaspers also talks of “luminous encompassive thinking', through which contemporary political consciousness must be transformed and a new kind of politics adequate to the threat of atomic doom should be created. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan while speaking on the future of civilization ( Kalki, The Future of Civilization, first published, 1929 ) held that to avert periodic crisis of civilization, what is required is religious idealism and “cooperation and not identification, accommodation to fellowmen and not imitation of them and toleration and not absolutism.” Thus if we want to save our civilization from atomic annihilation, we have to encourage Anekānta culture. However, Anekānta philosophy of life should not be confused with contradictionism, indeterminism, scepticism or solipsism. When we look to the particular merits of each side, there is no contradiction. Application of existence and non-existence to the same thing is contradiction but when existence and non-existence are asserted from different standpoints, it is not contradiction. Even the Upanişads, we have the glimpses of how the reality reveals itself in different ways at different stages of knowledge. Hence Anekānta attitude should not be equated with subjective relativism of the Sophists. It is 'objective relativism' or 'relative absolutism' like Whitehead, Bodin etc. However, there is no similarity with Einstein's theory of relativity. To some extent, we may find its parallel in old Pyrrohoneanism in the West. But while Pyrrohoneanism relapses into agnosticism or scepticism, there is no room for scepticism whatsoever in Jaina theory of Syadváda or Anekāntavāda. Scepticism, means in the minimum, abscence of assertion, where as Syadvadins always assert, though what they assert are alternatives. Disjunctive judgement is stiil judgement. Each disjunction is alternatively valid. Either there is no selfcomplete Reality or any such reality is wholly infinite, a mere

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demand that refuses to be actualised. The only scepticism is that there is concerning the so-called self-complete reality. So where as a sceptic is sceptical about any character of reality, Syadvada is quite definitely assertive. Yet he is more sceptical than any sceptic in the world so far as the definiteness of the ultimate reality is concerned. He would go beyond avaktavya or Sunya so far the Advaitins and Śūnyavadins are concerned with regard to their statements regarding ultimate reality.
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Hence, Anekanta stands against all mental absolutism. We can substantiate this relativistic standpoint on the cosmomicro-physical ground supported by Einstienian doctrine of relativity and Maxwell's equation of electro-magnetism which go fundamentally against the notion of absolute truth. When we say, we know this, we are saying more than is strictly correct, because all we know is what happens when the waves reach our bodies. Researches in Psychology of thinking, perception of self and conception of self in Child-psychology and Psycho-analytical studies in Freudian narcissism or Adlerian power-factor support relativism From socio-cultural standpoint, the doctrine of relativism is justified for no smooth functioning of society is possible without mutual accomodation and adjustment which presupposes Catholicism in thought and sense of tolerance. In ethics and morality, we know so far relativism is dominating. In the field of logic, the doctrine of the universe of Discourse is sometimes limited to a small portion of actual universe of things and is sometimes coextensive with that Universe. The Universe of Discourse controls the interpretation of every word. Logic of Relatives too recognises the truth of Syadvada-Anekantavada when it discusses all relations embodied in propositions.
Much of the confusion either of Buddhism or Advaita Vedanta is due to false exaggeration of the relative principles of becoming and being into absolute truths. Same is the fault with Parmenidian Being and Heraclitan Flux. These may be called the variety of philosophical doctrines.

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Hence Anekinta doctrine is the exposition of the principle of 'comprehensive perspectivism'. No perspective is final or absolute unless it is understood in terms of relativity. Therefore, even Anekanta (non-absolutism ) is subject to Anekānta (non-absolutism ). If non-absolutism is absolute, it is not universal since there is one real which is absolute. And if it is not a non-absolute, it is not an absolute and universal fact. Tossed between the two horns of the dilemma, nonabsolutism thus simply evaporates. But we can meet this difficulty by making a distinction between the theory and practice of anekanta. Every proposition of the dialectical seven-fold judgement is either complete or incomplete. In the former, we use only one word that describes one characteristics of that object and hold the remaining characters to be identical with it. On the other hand, in the Incomplete judgement, we speak of truth as relative to our standpoint. In short, the complete judgement is the object of valid knowledge ( Pramāņa ) and the Incomplete Judgement is the object of aspectal knowledge (Naya ). Hence the (non-absolute is constituted of the absolute as its elements and as such would not be possible if there were no absolutes.
Here we can solve this difficulty by analysing the nature of unconditionality of the statement "All statements are conditional', which is quite different from the normal meaning of unconditionality. This is like the idea contained in the passage - 'I do not know myself', where there is no contradiction between knowledge' and 'ignorance'. In the sentence, 'I am undecided', there is at least one decision that 'I am undecided'. Similarly, the categoricality behind a disjunctive judgement (A man is either good or bad ), is not like the categoricality of an ordinary categorical judgement like 'The horse is red'. True the basis is always categorical but this categoricality does never clash with the proposition being disjunctive. When a logical positivist says that there is no metaphysics', philosophy enters through the back-door. In short, the unconditionality in the statement 'All statements

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are conditional' is quite different from the normal conditionality. There are primarily two sources to understand the world - senses and reason, closely connected with two grades of reality - existence and essence (Existentialism ) or existence and reality ( Hegel ). Existence is actuality or actual verification, which is unconditional, absolute and categorical. There is no alternation or condition. But on the level of thought or reason or essence, there may be alternatives. But we cannot live in the world of thought alone and forget existence. We must also have something other than thought or reason which is unreason or irrationality. Behind reason, there is always the unreason, which we can give the name of faith ( as suggested by Kant, Herder, Jacobi etc. ). There are many grounds of faith – one being the Scripture. Scripture differs from one another, Jainas must stick to their position. Here is definiteness. However, we cannot expect such definiteness with reason because it only offers alternative pictures — Jaina, Advaita, Vaišeşikas. All are equally possible. In order to avoid indefiniteness we stick to one such possibility which is chosen for us by the community to which we belong or by some superior intuition. Thus there comes unconditionality. However, another may choose another possibility as existence if he belongs to another community or if his genius moves into another direction. So there appears to be again alternation among existence. But this alternation only on thought level. We compare thought with other thoughts. And what is comparison ? Comparison involves thinking and reasoning, so it is thought-process. Some are bound to admit alternation. My standpoint is only a possible one. But I cannot always fly in the air of possibilities, I must have moorings in some actuality. I must adopt one standpoint.
Jainism is against all kinds of imperialism in thought. For each community there is a special absolute. But the absolute themselves are alternatives so far as they are probables, But this is only on thought level, But when I have chosen one it is more than possible, it is existence or actual. So

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there is wonderful reconciliation between conditionality and unconditionality. Every thing is conditional on thought level, but on the level of existence there is no real contradiction.
To avoid the fallacy of infinite regress, the Jainas distinguish between valid non-absolutism (Samyak Anekānta ) and invalid non-absolutism (Mithyā Anekānta ). Like an invalid absolute judgement, an invalid non-absolute judgement, too, is invalid. To be valid, Anekanta must not be absolute but relative.
If we consider the above points, we cannot say that the “theory of relativity cannot be logically sustained without the hypothesis of an absolute." Thought is not mere distinction but also relation. Everything is possible only in relation to and as distinct from othrers and the Law of Identity. Under these circumstances, it is not legitimate to hold that the hypothesis of an absolute cannot be sustained without the hypothesis of a relative. Absolute to be absolute presupposes a relative somewhere and in some forms, even the relative of its non-existence.
Jaina logic of Anekanta is based not on abstract intellectualism but on experience and realism leading to a non-absoJutistic attitude of mind. Multiplicity and unity, definability and non-definability etc. which apparently seem to be contradictory characteristics of reality are interpreted to co-exist in the same object from different points of view without any offence to logic. They seem to be contradictory of each other simply because one of them is mistaken to be the whole truth. Infact, integrity of truth consists in this very variety of its aspects, within the rational unity of an all comprehensive and ramifying principle. The charge of contradiction against the co-presence of being and non-being in the real is a figment of a priori logic.

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Chapter Seventeen
SYĀDVADA : A SOLUTION OF
WORLD-TENSION Expository : Syat ( somehow ) Syadvāda is (an epistemological ) solution of World-tension.
Analysis :
(a) Syādvadal — The Jaina theory of Judgement and truth as relative.
(b) World-tension — "Present international tensiors among nations.
(c) Epsitemological Solution - Solution emanating from the standpoint of knowledge.
Synthesis : Syadváda along with its complementary doctrires of Anekantavada and Nayavāda, when applied to the phenomena of international tension, might result in perpetual peace. World-tensions
By world-tension, we mean presence of international conflicts, hot and cold wars, so-called Peace and Defence treaties etc. But international conflicts are often the result of internal conflicts.2 Internal conflicts and contradictions often lead to external and international aggressions and wars.3 Hence 1. (a) 'Every proposition is true but only under certain
condition' - S. Radhakrishnan, History of Indian
Philoscphy, Vol. 1, p. 302. (b) IITIT Teat at FETE:' — Chainsukha Das, Jaina
Darśana-sára. 2. Azad, A. K. : Inaugural Address at Seminar to discuss
the contribution of Gandhian outlook and technique to the
solution of tensions ( 5-1-1953 ). 3. Kriplani, J. B. : "Gandhian way Towards Peace”, - Semi
nar-above,

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world tension includes "tensions within and among nations."1 It is no use denying the great dangers that threaten our present generation. The riven atom, uncontrolled, can only be a growing menace to us all.3 One atom bomb killed more than seventy thousand people, but now it is not a question of one or two or even hundred but of hundreds of millions of them. Prof. Yusuki Tsrurumi says in agony -- "Japan's mind is disturbed profoundly. We face war — how can we avert it ??4 Therefore while inaugurating Silver Jubilee Session of Indian Philosophical Congress Dr. K. N. Katju fears that the story of Mahābhārata it seems is being re-enacted all over again. In the conclusion of that war there was neither the victim to lament his defeat nor the victor to celebrate the victory.5 Refering to Korea he observed, their towns and villages, their land and dwellings are being trampled under foot and destroyed over and over again by invading troops and retreating troops and human life there seems to have lost all sanctity. So that the war of liberation has been turned into a war of annihilation. Surely this is completely a new version of liberation. Though the third-war might mean virtual end of all that western civilization stands for, yet there is inspite of all this an imminent danger of
1. “Solution of tensions within and among nations” — Indian
National Commission for cooperation with Unesco decides
this as the main topic of discussion. 2. Prof. Tucci : My Approach to Gandhi - referred above. 3. Robert Oppenhimer, Ex-chairman, Advisory Atomic
Council — under Article, 'Atomic Weapons and American
Policy', quoted in Foreign Affairs, July 1953. 4. Prof. Tsrurumi, Japanese delegate to the Gandhian
seminar, vide his paper to the Seminar. 5. Dr. K. N. Katju : Inaugural Address to Silver Jubilee
Session of Indian Philosophical Congress. 6. Dr. K. N. Katju : Ibid. 7. Dr. K. N. Katju : Ibid.
15

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war.1 The result is the mounting suspicion and rivalry between the two power blocks, feverish rearmament and cold war, alternating with tipid war.2 Inspite of recent peace moves this is no gain saying the fact that the world is sharply divided into two opposing camps3 and there is an array of peace ( war ), defence ( offence ) treatises like NATO'S+ MEDO'S5 and many more yet to come out. The development of the international organisations in last fifty year recognises that disputes which arise concern many states, and that they need to be settled. So we are practically in a world bewildered by the turmoil of nationalism and war. The whole world is in the ferment. Need of a Solution
Humanity is tottering today upon the brink of the principle of self-annihilation for the lack of proper understanding which includes understanding ourselves, understanding each other. It is a time of tragic importance for the world, because even before the shadows cast by the war lifted fully, the skies have become overcast with dark threatening clouds. 10 Hence, at no period of human history man was in need of a sound
1. R. N. Kaul : Social Philosophy, “Socialist Democracy'. 2. E. Ashirvathem : 'Is Peace Possible? Indian Journal of
Political Science, Vol. XIV, No. 2, April 1952. 3. E. Ashirvathem : Ibid. 4. NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 5. MEDO : Middle Eastern Defence Organisation. 6. James N. Hyde : Article “U. N. and the Peaceful Adjust
ment", in Proceeding of Academy of Political Science,
Vol. XXV, Jan, 1953, United Nations; Success or Failure. 7. E. H. Carr : Nationalism and After, p. 70. 8. Paul Arther Schillip : Article "On Human Understan
ding”, Silver Jubilee Number, Vol. 2, p. 107. 9. Paul Arther Schillip : Ibid. 10. Raj-pramukh of Mysore : Message to the Jubilee Session.

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Philosophy than today.1 As war begins in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defence of peace should be built. Today if a person does not agree with you he is wicked, if a country does not agree with your country it is wicked; there is no half-ways, hence there is no neutrality.4 Unesco, realising the need of a solution is however keen.5
Solutions there are and are of many types — political including diplomatic, economic, religious etc. Broadly there are two approaches towards world peace –
(a) Religico-Spirituo Mystical Approach. (b) Politico-Economico-Positivistic Approach.
Religico-Spirituo Mystical View — The upholders of the religico-spirituo-mystical view hold that without is withinin. 6 We cannot banish war while we are perpetuating war within us. The tremendous amount of hatred and injustice within us accumulated in a national form leads to war." Hence the best solution of world-tension is to control the animal within us." Here the dictum is “Reform yourself and the world will be reformed.”. Some of the mystics, however, depend upon God's goodness.
1. Srimati Hansa Mehta : Message to the Jubilee Session. 2. Dr. Alva Myrdal : Quotation from Unesco's constitution. 3. Pt. J. L. Nehru : Inaugural Address of Gandhian Semi
nar ( 5-1-1953). 4. Memorandum on the Signature of His Majesty's Govern
ment in the U. K. of the Optional clause cmd - 3452, p. 10, Quoted from "Conditions of Peace” by E. H.
Carr, p. 51. 5. Dr. Alva Myrdal : Her Speech on "There can be no Neu
trals', Seminar ( 5-1-1953 ). 6. Idealistic thesis. 7. J. C. Kumarappa : “A Non-violent Way of Life", Article
in Gandhian Seminar. 8. J. C. Kumarappa : Ibid. 9. J. B. Kriplani : Gandhian Way Towards Peace, Seminar.

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Political Solution - Professional politicians often indulge in diplomatic double talk which breeds pessimism and cynicism on the part of the people and makes peace a mere willo-the wisp.1 Some very irresponsible politicians talk of ‘preventive war'2 as a solution of world-tension, for they think offence may be the best form of defence.3 From United Nations we cannot have any hope. Vyshinsky charges that “U.S.A. has stolen the sign-board of U. N.”4 and also Turner confirms that the “U. N. is really dead as a peace and security maintaining organization."5 Commenting upon the prospects for Berlin Meeting the Eastern Economist doubts “whether the meeting will prove another episode in the cold war or a real ground of understanding.”6 Similarly the same Journal had declared that “Conference at Bermuda will hold out no new hopes for the world."??
Hence political solution is practically no solution, for present day politics is not a politics of peace and brotherhood but of falsity and fraud, deceit and dishonesty. We cannot adopt politics as a profession and remain honest.8 So said Adolf Hitler that if you wish the sympathies of broad masses,
1. E. Ashirvathem : 'Is Peace Possible' ? Article in Political
Science Journal. 2. Macarthy and Co. in the U. S. A. Senate. 3. Mathew, Secretary Navy of U. S. A. under Truman.
Indian Political Science Journal, July 1953. 4. Vyshinsky, Soviet Delegate to the United Nations Gene
ral Assembly. 5. A. C. Turrer : Review of Atlantic Alliance “Bulwark of
the West : Implications and Problems of NATO.”, Inter
national Affairs, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, Oct. 1953. 6. Eastern Economist, Article “Prospects for Berlin Mee
ting”, Jan. 1954. 7. Eastern Economist, Article “Conference At Bermuda”,
Nov. 20, 1953. 8. Lowis Mettenry Howe, Address, Jan. 17, 1933.

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then you must tell the crudest and most stupid things. Hence any politico-diplomatic talks of either big four or five for peace will prove a mere moonshine for diplomatic talks are talks of interest and convince.
Economic Solution - But political evils are to a large extent supposed to be eliminated through democracy which has no place for autocratic whims for waging war. But if we are working upto a democracy in politics we must have a democracy in Economics.2 Most serious of the problems which claimed their attention were not political or territorial but financial and economic and that the perils of the future lay not in frontiers and in soveriegnties but in food, coal and transport.3 Political rights too have failed to provide a key to the millennium. 4 So political democracy if it is to survive must be interpreted in economic terms. So long as there are tigers in society there will be wars. 6 Permanent peace cannot come from the endless see-saw, but only from the elimination of the causes of enmity between nations. And in the present day these causes are mainly to be found in economic interest of certain sections and are therefore only to be abolished by a fundamental reconstruction?, of course not of the type of U. N. R. R. A., W. M. B., I. B. R. D., I. T. A., E. R. P. and their counterparts.
This fatal neglect of the economic factor by the peacemaker of 1919 was the main theme of Mr. Keyne's famous
1. Adolf Hitler : Mein Campf. 2. J. C. Kumarappa : Gandhian way. 3. J. M. Keynes : Economic Consequence of Peace, p. 134. 4. R, N. Kaul: Social Philosophy, 'Socialist Democracy'. 5. E. H. Carr : Conditions for Peace. 6. J. C. Kumarappa : Gandhian way. 7. B. Russell : In Praise of Idleness, p. 101. 8. I mean the Soviet Economic pact with Eastern demo.
cracies etc.

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book "The Economic Consequence of the Peace'.1 Individual profit which in the 18th and 19th centuries provided the motive force of the economic system, has failed us and we have not discovered any moral for it rather than war.2 Mr. Keynes adds “Pyramid-building, earthquakes even wars may serve to increase wealth."3 During great U. S. economic crisis Governer Lafolette however charged those who had squandered 40,000,000,000 dollar of American money in the most wasteful and futile war of modern history and were not prepared
te money for public works to relieve distress. The Economic Digest confirms this waste today, when it published that U. S. spends 16 million dollars a month on U. S. forces in U. K.5
So somehow people think that if economies be reconstucted it can bring peace. So economies means political economies and political philosophy. And with this comes the perenial conflict of political ideologies. The free-world must adhere to Marshall and Keynes and the Keynesian Revolution, while the Reds find salvation in no other economic structure other than the Marxian, because the Capital is not a personal, it is a social power.6 So again, ultimately it is our warring ideologies that are at the root of world tension. So whether we philosophize or we won't, we are to be philosophized.?
1. J. M. Keynes : Economic Consequence of Peace. 2. E. H. Carr : Conditions for Peace, p. 101. 3. J. M. Keynes : The General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money, p. 129. 4. D. W. Brogan : The American Political System, p. 132. 5. Economic Digest : Artical “Spending by U.S. Forces in
Britain,” May, 1953. 6. Mark Engles : Communist Manifesto, Vol. I, p. 45. 7. Aristotle : Quoted from "Introduction to Philosophy” by
G. W. Patrick, p. 49.

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Transition to Epistemological Solution
But we must philosophize only in a particular way as there are many methods of philosophy. Much of our philosophy depends upon our way of philosophizing. Empiricism leads to scepticism, whether of Locke or of the Cárvākas. Similarly, dogmatism, rationalism, intuitionism, authoritarianism, mysticism etc. have their own consequences. This branch of philosophy has very lately been accorded an independent place and the term Epistemology has been used firstly by Ferriera, although we can not forget Locke who first reminded us to examine our own abilites, and see what objects our understanding were or were not fitted to deal with.In short, Locke felt that the epistemological problems are former to all others. After all any quest for reality presupposes (path of 5 ) knowledge. In any survey of the history of philosophy we come across with the treatment of knowledge. 6 Cunnigham calls it to be the problem of intellectual enterprise.? But problems of knowledge pre-supposes the methods of acquiring Knowledge. Otherwise one may ask, "If it is the business of Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason to show how mathematics is possible, whose business is to show how the critique of pure reason is possibles ? To maintain that our knowledge is true, we must prove that it is really so. Thus the validity of knowledge is made to rest on the validity of the methods of
1. S. C. Chatterji : Problems of Philosophy, p. 32. 2. Ferrier : Institutes of Metaphysics (1884), Encyclopae
dia Britannicca, Vol. 13/448. 3. Locke : 'Epistime to the Reader', “An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding”. 4. Patrick : Introduction to Philosophy, p. 326. 5. L. T. Hobhouse : Theory of Knowledge. 6. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 13/448. 7. Cunnigham : Problems of Philosophy, Chap. VI-VIII. 8. The New Realism, p. 61 quoted from Nyāya Theory of
Knowledge.

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knowledge.1 Doctrines of the Pramapas, ranging from one (Carvaka ) to eight2, I am sure, determine to a great extent the nature of philosophy. So an epistemological reorientation will influence metaphysical grounding, which in turn will determine our socio-ethico-political views. 3
232
Great logical inter-relations among all social and sociological studies prove that one follows as the reductio-ad-absurdum from the other. Thus we see that any solution can ultimately be achieved through knowledge free from confusion and prejudices. Each addition to knowledge is in sober truth one step further to the goal of all effort, the right understanding of the whole of things as they are in their inmost nature.5 But the main difficulty is to blend the divergent current of thought and in particular the methods of philosophy and science.
With this end in view we put before you an old wine in a new bottole-The relative. Jaina Theory of Judgement namely Syadvada as it expresses one aspect of reality. Syadvada is composed of two words-Syats and vada. Syat may mean perhaps10, some how11, may be12, in some respect13
1. S. C. Chatterjee : Problems of Philosophy, p. 3. 2. Dr. Kuppaswāmī Śastrī : A Primer of Indian Logic, p. 40. 3. L. T. Hobhouse: Theory of Knowledge.
4. Ibid.
5. lbid.
6. Ibid.
7. D. M. Datta : Indian Philosophy, p. 90.
8. ' स्यात्प्रधानो वादः स्याद्वाद :', Jaina Darśana Sara by Chainsukha Das, p. 456.
9. ata fazra, Ibid.
10. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 302.
11. Ibid; D. M. Datta : Indian Philosophy, p. 90. 12. D. M. Datta: Ibid, p. 90.
13. lbid, p. 92.

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Syadvada : A Solution of World-tension 233 etc. So Syadvada with certain reservations? may be translated into Probablism.
Syadváda must be understood along with its metaphysical counterpart of Anekantavāda and other complementary theorem of Nayavada, Nikṣepavā da and Saptabhangi which form a formidable part of Jaina philosophy, which was systematised in the second period of the evolution of Jaina Literature, namely Anekanta Yuga.3 Theory of Syadváda
Definition : In the earliest Jaina work on pure logic by Siddhasena Divākara, the author holds "since things have many characters, they are the object of all sided knowledge.”'4 The knowledge which determines the full meaning of an object through the employment in the scriptural method, of one sided Nayas, is called Syádvāda Sruta.5 Similarly Samantabhadra says that “Syadvada discards all absolute. judgements."6 Even sermonic sentences of Lord Mahāvīra had always a perfix of Syát for otherwise truth would have been violated.? Scriptural knowledge is of three kinds-Scriptures of bad Tirthaukars, one sided methodo and all sided 1. Apart from suggestion of Scepticism. 2. Dr. N. K. Deoraj : History of Indian Philosophy (Hindi ),
p. 135. 3. Dalsukha Malvania - Essay Jaina Drašana Sahitya Kā
Simhāvalokana, in Premi Abhinandan Grantha. 4. "अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्तुगोचरः सर्व संविदाम्" न्यायावतार, श्लोक २९
( Trans. by S. C. Vidyābhūşaņa). 5. "Afgoufef fafasuratare a gaud”, blid, Sloka, 30. 6. "FTITS: Hape FIFFETTIG forafa fafafè:-37TATAIAT", Quo
ted from Premi Abhinandan Granth in स्याद्वाद और सप्त
भंगी, लेखक : कैलाशचन्द्र सिद्धान्तशास्त्री। 7. "ETI IZ 27 ta argacast TTA-37TAGTATAT", Ibid. 8. FirqarT, IT Ro; 79#foral, fa74 HETTIG ( Trans, M.
D. Desai ), Introduction. 9. "Fat Fiar & Ttat atq'', istarfärer, go 9691

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knowledge.1 So Syadvāda holds that the knowledge of reality has got innumberable characteristics.2 The reality is not simply Sat, nor simply Asat, nor simply Universal, nor simply Particular but both and also more.3 Even Tattvärthadhigamasutra, the Bible of Jainism recognises the most important use of Naya as the theory of Syadvada. Even Pramana is defined as that which gives us knowledge of a thing in its various aspects.5 Sri Abhinava Dharmabhūşapa in NyayaDipika holds that all expressions are somehow real. Let us hold with Mallisena Sūri, the author of Syadvada Mañjarī that all objects from a lamp to the sky are both eternal and non-eternal and hence do not disobey Syadvada. 7
Syādvāda and Anekāntavāda
A thing partakes the nature of both reality and unreality, Mallisena says, for example a man having characteristic of lion in one part and of man in other part is called Nysimhavatara. So Anekantavāda is called Syadvada, according to which the same object has got the presence of eter
1. “सम्पूर्णार्थं विनिश्यादि स्याद्वादश्रुतमुच्यते”, न्यायावतार, कारिका ३० । 2. “अनेकान्तात्मकार्थकथनं स्याद्वादः ", अकलंक, ग्रन्थरत्नत्रयम्, लघीयस्त्रये - प्रवचनप्रवेश, ८-२१ ।
वस्तु न केवल सन्नादि केवलमसत् अपितु सदसदात्मकं", Jaina Darśana Sara by Cainsukha Das, pp. 45-60.
4. " प्रमाण नयैरधिगमः", तत्वार्थ सूत्र, सू० ६, अध्याय १।
5. “अर्थस्यानेकरूपस्य धी प्रमाणं", अष्टसाहस्री |
6. "सर्ववाक्यं सावधारणम्", न्यायदीपिका, परोक्षप्रमाण एवं प्रमाण "सिद्धमनेकात्मकं वस्तु", श्लोक १५ ।
3,
44
·4
7. "आदीपमाव्योम समस्वभावं स्याद्वादत्रमुद्रानतिभेदि श्रवस्तुः ", स्याद्वादमंजरी (हिन्दी), श्लोक ५, पृ० २० |
४. भागे सिंहो नरो भागे यो सुर्यो भाग द्वयात्मकः ।
तम भागं विभागेन नरसिंह प्रयक्षते ।। स्याद्वादमञ्जरी, श्लोक ५

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nality etc. All object have got innumerable characters. 1 So Manikyanandí in Parikṣā mukham giving example of विरुद्ध स्वभाव अनुपलब्धि Says that all things are Anekantic ( possessed of different aspects ) because we do not find that these have only one aspect.3 A thing that is real has three characteristics of production, destruction and stability.4 Object according to Nyāya-Dipika has many qualities, 5 which is proved on the basis of perception, inference and testimony. Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena also holds that things have many characters.? So substance is that which has qualities and modifications and the real is substantial.9 So substance has anythiog which has origin existence and destruction 10 1. "स्यादवादोऽनेकान्तवादो नित्यानित्याद्यनेक धर्मशवलैकवस्त्वभ्युपगम्',
स्याद्वादमञ्जरी, पृ० १२४ ।। 2. प्रमाणनयतत्वालोकालंकार, III.XI, वादिदेवसूरि 12th A. D. 3. “अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्त्वेकांतस्वरूपानुपलब्धेः", परीक्षामुखम्, English ___Trans. G. C. Ghoshal, p. 124. 4. ( क ) "उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तम् सत्", तत्वार्थाधिगम सूत्र, ५-३० । (ख ) "घटमौलिसुवर्णार्थीनाशोत्पादस्थितिष्वयम्", आप्तमीमांसा,
____ कारिका ५९-६० ।। (ग) द्रव्यसंग्रह, पृ० ४४ । 5. "सर्वमनेकान्तात्मकं सत्वात्", न्यायदीपिका-परोक्षप्रकाश, पृ० १२५ । 6. "एवं प्रमाणसिद्धमनेकान्तात्मकं वस्तु", न्यायदीपिका, परोक्षप्रकाश । 7. "अनेकान्तात्मक वस्तुः", न्यायावतार, श्लोक २९, English Trans.
S. C. Vidyābhūşaya. ४. ( क ) :'गुणपर्यायवद् द्रव्यम्", तत्वार्थसूत्र, ५-३८ ।
( ख ) लघीयस्त्रय, सू० २, १४२ । (ग) परमात्म-प्रकाश, गाथा ४७ ।
(घ ) "गुण पज्ययासयं", प्रवचनसार, कुंदकुंदाचार्य । 9. ( क ) "सद्व्य लक्षणम्", तत्वार्थसूत्रम्, ५-२९ ।
(ख ) "सत्वं द्रव्यं", अकलंक । 10. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol.
2, p. 313.

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and which may be described by opposites.1 The standpoint of Jainas is supported by Patanjali Yoga and Mimamsă.3 So reality to them is a unity in difference or bhedabheda or difference in unity. Substance perish through its own qualities and modifications. But the Gunas or qualities are inseperably related to substance. The qualites continue while the forms change. Every object has innumerable characters and that which has not many character is also not real like sky lotus", this is proved by the Method of Difference or केवल व्यतिरेक.
Syädvada and Nayavāda
Broadly, knowledge according to the Jaina is of two kindsPramana and Naya; knowledge of a thing in itself and and knowledge of a thing in its relation. A Naya is a standpoint from which we make a statement about a thing. A thing conceived from one particular point of view is the object of Naya or one-sided knowledge." In Saptabhangi Naya, where we find pluralistic doctrine of the Jaina Dialectics, Muni Jinavijaya says that the doctrine points to the rela
1. "अनन्तधर्मात्मकम् वस्तु", हरिभद्र, षड्दर्शन समुच्चय, पृ० ५७ । 2. " द्रव्यं नित्यम् आकृतिरनित्या", इत्यादि, योग - महाभाष्य ।
3. "नोत्पादस्थितिभंगानामभावे स्यान्मतित्रयम्", कुमारिल, मीमांसाश्लोक-वार्तिक, २८ ।
4. S. Radhakrishnan: History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 314.
5. "अनन्तधर्मात्मकमेवतत्त्वमतोऽन्यथा सत्यम् रूपपादम्",
मञ्जरी, श्लोक २१, २२ ।
6. “यदनन्तधर्मात्मकं न भवति तत् सदपि न भवति यथा वियदिन्दीवरम् इति केवलव्यति की हेतु ", स्याद्वाद मञ्जरी, श्लोक २३ ।
7. उमास्वाति : “प्रमाणनयैरधिगमः", तत्वार्थाधिगम सूत्र, ६/१ ।
8. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 298.
9. (a) Nyāyavatara, Eng. Trans. S. C. Vidyabhusana, Śloka, 29.

स्याद्वाद

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tivity of knowledge concerning all the objects of the world. 1 Champata Rai Jaina describes Naya as a Path or way which implies in connection with philosophy, the Method of accurate thinking, hence he calls Naya as the 'Science of thought.” In Nyaya Karnika's introduction Mohan Lal Desai holds that Nyaya-Vidyā or Philosophy of Standpoints is an essential department of knowledge by itself, and bears the same relation to philosophy as logic does to thought or grammar to language or speech.3 Nathmal Taita calls Nayaways of approach and observation.4 Breadly Nayas are divided into Noumenal and Phenomenal, each further divided into ten and six subclasses respectively.5 According to more popular scheme, the Nayas are seven, placed under two broad classes of Arthanaya and Sabdanaya, as they refer to object and meaning. 6 So these
(b) "TATTiTetariat Toret staratara fasta:”, +3777
afqafil, 9341 (c) "Targenta:”, Fette TT 821 (d) FTTETTHFFET, Fast RCI (e) "Fratefaitet, fastqaq5561937:'', qitariya 931
(f) T RIAT, 90€ 1 1. The Saptabhaugi Naya-Kannomal Jaina, Introduction. 2. Nyāya : The Science of Thought, C. R. Jaina, Ch. I, 3. Nyāya-Karņika, Eng. Trans. Mohan Lal. 4. Nathmal Tatia : Article in Proceedings of Indian Philo
sophical Congress, Mysore, 1952. 5. (a) Nahar and Ghosh : An Epitome of Jainism, Ch III,
Jaina Logic of Nyāya. (b) "ga qulfefaaì sottft*: qoftferrafa”, a 1a,
gox1 (c) "mourfe77: qufütfernusafa", FuructTFT, 9841 (d) "zulfafaat:", wafeffaf 9-
(e) "TOUT qofTitat:", Farf-2019, TO PEPI 6. S. Radhakrishnan ; History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I,
p. 299.

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seven Nayas may be in short called the heptagonic forms of our ontological enquiry? or one-sided method of comprehension of seven kinds. In fact there may be as many kinds of Nayas as there are modes of speech.3
Full knowledge of all characters even of a particle of dust cannot be claimed by anyone of us, because of our limitation and bias for a particular angle of vision.4 Truth is relative to our standpoint. We cannot affirm or deny anything absolutely of any object owing to the endless complexity of things. Being is not of a persistent unalterable nature. Every statement of a thing is necessarily one sided and incomplete.5 A thing may be true or untrue or partake of both while being neither. 6 The ordinary human being cannot rise above the limitations of his senses; so his apprehension of reality is partial and valid only from a particular point of view. Thus Nayavāda is an unique instrument of analysis.? Seven Nayas and their Fallacies
Naigam Nayas or non-distinguished regards object as possessing both the general and the specific properties, because no one can live without the other8; all objects possess two
1. Epitome of Jainism, Ch. III. 2. Nyāyāvatāra, Sloka 29. 3. "Frag4T 4TTET TE a fa TuaTOT", FOIETC#57ti 4. Nathmal Tatia : Nayas, etc. p. 192. 5. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 12, p. 867, 14th. Ed. 6. Encyclopaedia of Religion & Ethics, Vol. I, p. 262, Ed, by
Hoerunle. 7. A. N. Upadhye : Silver Jubliee, Vol. I, Jainism (Article ),
p. 134. 8. ( 4 ) ATAUTO af naachat FHI निविशेष न सामान्यं विशेषोऽपि तद्विना ॥
नयकणिका, श्लोक ५ (a) 7 + 7 + 7 = Not + One + Aspece.

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kinds of properties Samanya and Višeşa.1 So this way of pantascopic observation2 criticises the one sided and wrong view of Nyāya-Vaiseșika realism according to which Samanya and Višeşa have separate existences from the object. Thus there is the synthesis of long drawn conflict between the universal and the particular.3 Hence Nyāya-vaiseșika is accused of an abstractionist outlook technically called the Fallacy Naigamabhasa ( नैगमाभास ).4
Nextly, Sangraha Naya ( संग्रहनय ) remedies the extremism of universal and particular. In fact there can be no universal apart from the particular and vice versa.5 For example, not a single nimb or mango or any other tree can be conceived apart from vegetableness, so finger cannot be considered apart from hands.“ So Advaitins and Saukhyas?, Plato and Kant etc, are accused of the Fallacy of Sangrahābhāsas or who recognise universal alone as real.
An extremist assertion is likely to be met with a diametrically opposite view of analytic and particularistic approach where we will meet the Cárvā kas to whom object possess only the specific properties which is non-existent like donkey's
1. "अर्थाः सर्वेऽपि सामान्य विशेषा उभयात्मकाः", नयकणिका, श्लोक २ । 2. Nathmal Tatia : Ibid. 3. ( क ) नय कणिका, श्लोक १० ।
(ख) जैन-दर्शनसार, पृ० ४२ । (ग) “सामान्य विशेषात्मातदर्थो विषयः", परीक्षामुखम्, अध्याय ४,
श्लोक १। 4. Naya-Karnika, Introduction. 5. संग्रही मन्यते वस्तु सामान्यात्मकमेवहि ।
सामान्य व्यतिरिक्तोऽस्ति न विशेषः खपुष्पवत् ।। नयकणिका, श्लोक ६ 6. "विना वनस्पति कोऽपि वृक्षादिर्न दृश्यते", नयकणिका, श्लोक ७ । 7. विशेषात्मकमेवार्थं व्यवहारश्च मन्यते।
विशेषभिन्नं सामान्यं सत्रवरविषाणात् ।। न्यायावतार, श्लोक ८ 8. Naya-Karpiks ; Introduction by Mohan Lal Desai.

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horn. So this practical and particularistic view is to meet with the fallacy of wrong selection of species called Vyavahārābhasa (TH), where one eats vegetable without being it of any kind, mango1 etc.
240
The particularistic approach sometimes forgets the past or the future aspect of a thing and confines only to the present, straight away refering to the natural thing. To them past is defunct and the future is unborn.3 The reality is momentary being, a great flux. These are Buddhist and the Heraclitus, who must be charged with the fallacy of straight and direct glimpse, devoid of temporal determinations or Kalikanikṣepa (affaq). This fallacy is called Ṛjusūtrābhāsa ( HIभास ).
But as the real is expressed and characterised by a word who must also examine the meanings of word. So comes Sabda Naya or verbal standpoint. Each name has its own meanings and different words or ( Synonyms ) may also refer to the same object. So the relation between terms and meaning is relative one, and when we take them to be absolute we commit the fallacy of Sabdabhasa", which we find among the nominalist and the grammarians.s
1. " वनस्पतिगृहाणेति प्रोक्ते गृहणतिकोऽपि किम्", नयकणिका, श्लोक ९ । 2. ( क ) "ऋजुसूत्रनयो वस्तुनातीतं नाप्य नागतम्", नयकणिका,
श्लोक ११ ।
( ख ) "अतीते नानागतेन परकीयेन वस्तुना", नयकणिका, श्लोक १२ । 3. Nathmal Tatia; p. 195.
4. नयकणिका, श्लोक १२; न्यायदीपिका - परोक्ष प्रकाश, पृ० ८५ ।
5. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I. 6. अर्थ शब्दनयोऽनेकैः पर्यायैरेकमेव च ।
मन्यते कुंभकलशघटाघेकार्थ वाचका ।। नयकणिका, श्लोक १४
T
7. नयकणिका, Introduction.
8. न्यायावतार, श्लोक १९ : Explanations - अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्तुगोचर
२९ ।
***S

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So Samabhirūdha Naya or Etymological aspect distinguish terms according to their roots. With the difference of the words expressing the same object the significance of the object also. differs as ghata ( घट ) is, which makes noise like ghataghata ( घट घट ) and so on.2 So the identification of reality with the root of the word by which it is denoted is the fallacy of Samabhirudhabhāsas, again committed by grammarians.4
The grammarians reach the climax when they identify reality with such like5 or specialised form of sixth kinds for it argues that if a thing is really recognised, even when it do not fulfil its function, then why can cloth be not called a yarn ?? If we go against it, we commit the fallacy of Evambhūtabhasa.
Doctrine of Saptabhangi
Now the Jainas claim to embody all these seven aspects in their philosophy, hence treat it like a judge over all systems of philosophy which are separately one-sided. So this is the
1. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I,
p. 300. 2. ब्र ते समत्रिरुढोऽर्थं भिन्न पर्यायभेदतः ।
भिन्नार्थाः कुत्र कलशघटाघटपटादिवत् । नयकणिका, श्लोक १५ 3. Naya-karnika, Introduction. 4. Nyayavata ra, Sloka 29. 5. एक पर्यायाभिधेयमपि वस्तु च मन्यते ।
- कार्य स्वकीयं कुर्वाणमेवं भूतनयो ध्रुवम् ।। नयकणिका, श्लोक १७ 6. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I,
p. 300. 7. यदि कार्यमकुर्वाणोऽपीष्यते तत्तया सचेत् ।
तदा पदेऽपि न घट व्यपदेशः किमिष्यते ॥ नयकणिका, श्लोक १८ 8. सर्वे नया अपि विरोध भृतो मिथस्ते,
सभ्ययं साधूनामयं भगवान भजन्ते । भूपा इव प्रति महाभुवि सार्वभौम
पादाम्बुजं प्रधान्युक्ति पराजिता प्राक् ॥ नयकणिका, श्लोक २२ 16

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doctrine of liberal pluralism as contrasted with dogmatic monism. To a realist pot exist as it is, independent of the mind, to an idealist, pot has no existence in the world outside. To a nominalist the pot is a sign in the outward world which calls up it image in the mind, to a Buddhist pot is nothing but a continuous stream of changes. So also to Bergson it is a great flux. Perceptionist regard the pot only as a bundle of qualities without any substratum containing them. But to a Spencerian Positivist pot is a vivid idea the causes of which are unknowable. However to the Vedāntins pot is a figment of illusion, a thing of nescience. All these philosophers look at the pot more or less from one dominating point of view, while neglecting the other. The Jaina logicians welcome all the light that comes from different ways of approach and integrates them in one whole in which all these finite traits can cosubsist.2 All philosophical disputes arise out of a confusion of standpoints 3 Even in practical life we find that a man is father in relation to a particular boy, in relation to another boy he is not father, in relation to both the boys taken together he is the father and is not the father, and since both the ideas cannot be conveyed in words at the same time, he may be called indescribable.4 Considering all these standpoints, a marvellous mechanism of Syādvāda or Saptabhangi has been worked out which is an unique organon of knowledge to grasp the manifoldness of reality. When the reality is dynamic and truth is manifold, our task of knowing the truth becomes difficult for there is nothing certain on account of endless complexities of things, and hence the expression of truth
1. Kannomal Jaina : Saptabhangi Naya, 2. Nathmal Tatia: p. 198. 3. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I,
p. 302. 4. Hira Lall Jaina : Jainism, its History, Philosophy and
Religion, From Ramakrishna Centenary Volume I. 5. S. Radhakrishnan : Ibid, p. 302.

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must be equally difficult if not more, for the words fail to describe the different characters of a thing at the same time.1 So the speaker does describe one character which is prominent than the other characters in that object. Therefore, we have no right to make any absolute judgement. Every proposition gives us only a perhaps, a may be or a Syat.2 Absolute affirmation or negation of any object is therefore unreasonable. All propositions are only hypothetically true. Hence unlike ordinary logic Syadvāda recognizes conditional predication, which is expressed by the prefix Syat. Logic of Syadvāda differs from ordinary logic in the fact that instead of two kinds of judgement as affirmative and negative it recognises as many as seven forms of judgement. So Syadvada is also called Saptabhangī.3
Syadvāda as a Doctrine of Seven Forms of Judgement
So far prefix Syat is concerned, we must use, because any substance is unity-in-diversity, so if we insist on absolute predication without condition, the only course open is to dismiss either the diversity or the identity as a mere mataphysical fiction. So Anekantavāda teaches that every single statement may have a partial truth5, hence even lord Mahavira, the Omniscient took recourse to a Syat before every sermonic sentence, so much so the scriptural knowledge of the Jainas has been called as Syadvada by Samantabhadra." Even Dr. 1. Kailash Chandra Siddhanta Shastri Saptabhangi and Syadvada, Premi Abhinandan Granth, p. 324.
243
2. S. Radhakrishnan : Ibid, p. 302.
3. "सप्तभिः प्रकारैर्वचनविन्यासः सप्तभंगीति गीयते", स्याद्वादमञ्जरी, पृ० २७८ ।
4. Appaswami Chakravarti: Ram Krishna Centenary, Vol. 1. 5. Ibid.
6. स्याद्वाद और सप्तभंगी, लेखक
कैलाशचन्द्र सिद्धान्तशास्त्री, प्रेमी
अभिनन्दन ग्रन्थ, पृ० ३३८ । 7. आप्तमीमांसा : स्याद्वाद केवलज्ञानेवस्तुतत्वप्रकाशने ।

S

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Hermon Jacobi calls Syadváda a Synonym of Jainism.1
Now, the seven forms of Saptabharigi Syadvada are predicative judgement regarding the same object according to the point of view of speech. As different aspect of reality can be considered from four different perspectives ( Niksepa or Nayas ) such as name, representation, privation and present condition”, similarly seven modes of speech can be considered from four different points of view of its own matter, time, place and nature as well as from other point of view.3
Now a thing exists4 as itself under certain circumstances from the point of its own material, place, time and nature. This table exists as made of wood in this hall at the present moment with such and such shape and size, but this does not exist as made of gold, at another place or at another time of a different shape. So the table exists somehow, i. e., not always, everywhere, in every shape. Hence let us say somehow the table exists or simply Finlasfed. Similarly, somehow the table does not exist, when considered from its other point of view. So existence and non-existence are to be asserted accordingly as the element of one or the other is in predominance. Things are considered in relation to their importance and not.5 Hence Syad Násti.
But when can the table exist as well as not exist ? Yes the table can exist for me in certain form, place, etc. and does not exist in other form, place, etc. So we may say that the table somehow exists and not exists ( स्याद अस्ति च नास्ति च ).
1. H. Jacobi : Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 7,
p. 465. 2. "ATH FTTTTTFÖTT 9799 FTECTIF:”, care-777, 9-41 3. स्वद्रव्य, स्वकाल, स्वक्षेत्र, स्वरूप-परद्रव्य, परकाल, परक्षेत्र, पररूप । 4. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I,
p. 302. 5. Umaswati : sfäärarförarea : 1

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But what will we say when we are asked what is the real colour of this table always? The only honest reply would be that the table cannot be described under conditions of the question. Hence Syad Avyaktam. This seems to be something puzzling yet profound. Sankara2 in his Brahma-Sūtra charges the Jainas of contradiction. If reality is indiscribable it cannot be expressed. To call something indescribable and again indulging in its verbal description are contradictory things. Some how Sankara forgot that it is not called simply ‘indescribable' but 'somehow indescribable' which means that the thing is not indescribable absolutely but only hypothetically. Therefore, Dr. Ganga Nath Jha3 charges Sankara for not going through the Jaina text. Fani Bhusan Adhikari also for the same, charged Sankara of injustice while presiding over the annual function of Syädvāda Mahavidyalaya.4 This fourth character of indescribability point out that it is impossible to describe a thing without making any particular standpoint.5 Again, philosophical wisdom does not always lie in straight forward affirmative or negative answers. Sometimes the nature of things are such that they render any description impossible.
The other three of the Saptabhangi are found by combining one by one each of the first three standpoints with the fourth, such as Syāt Asti ca Avyaktaın; Syat Nāsti ca Avyaktam and Syöt Asti Nästi ca Avyaktam. So from scientific standpoint of combination, no other form is possible. 6 1. D. M. Datta : Indian Philosophy, p. 95. 2. नचैवां पदार्थानामवक्तव्यत्वं सम्भवति अव्यक्तव्यश्चेन्नोचेरन् ।
उच्चन्ते यावक्तव्याश्चेति विप्रति विद्धिम् ।। २-२-३३ 3. Dr. G. N. Jha : 'Jaina Dharma' by Kailash Chandra Jaina,
p. 74. 4. Fani Bhusan Adhikari ( Ex. Head, Department of Philo
sophy, Banaras Hindu University ), Ibid, p. 74. 5. D. M. Datta : Indian Philosophy, p. 96. 6. Nahar and Ghosh : Epitome of Jainism, Ch, VII, VIII.

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Naya is the analytic and the Saptabhangi is the synthetic method of studying ontological problems.1 So the defect of Nayavada is supplemented of the method of Saptabhangi, a better organon of knowledge.2 Samantabhadra, the first exponent of Syadvāda3 has characterised Sankhya, Madhyamika, Vaiśeşika, Bauddha as representing first four forms of judgement and Akalanka4 has completed by characterising Sankara, Bauddha and Yoga as representing the last three. This doctrine insists on the corelation of affirmation and negation. All judgements are double-edged in their character. All things are existent as well as non-existent. Here three predicates make seven propositions.
246
Examination of Criticisms against Syādvāda
(1) Fallacy of contradiction Application of existence and non-existence to the same thing is contradiction.
―
Reply Here existence and non-existence are asserted not from one standpoint. Calling a thing both table and bench is contradiction but when we ascribe to the table from the view point of its matter and non-existence to it from the view point of it changing frame, it is not contradiction.
(2) Fallacy of Vaidhikaran There ought to be two receptacles for we assume existence and non-existence in the same thing.
Reply Tree is only one receptacle though it contains both the qualities of stability and mobility.
1. Nahar and Ghosh : Epitome of Jainism, Ch. VII, VIII. 2. आप्तमीमांसा, कारिका ९ - २० ।
3. अष्टसाहस्री, पृ० १३८-१४२ ।
4. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 304.
5. H. Jacobi: Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 7, P. 465.
6. "नैकस्मिन्नसम्भवात्", ब्रह्मसूत्र, शांकरभाष्य २-५-३३ ।

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( 3 ) Fallacy of Anavastha — Statement after statement is made without observing any established rule regarding the finality of things.
Reply : Things having innumerable characteristics need innumerable predication, hence no fallacy of infinite regress,
( 4 ) Fallacy of Confusion ( 47 ) – Many confusing things are said of the same object.
Reply : What we say of it are actual.
(5) Fallacy of Vaitikar (Intermingling of Qualities) - We maintain both existent and non-existent in regard to a thing.
Reply : Existence is predicated from material standpoint, non-existence from phenomenal standpoint.
( 6 ) Fallacy of Doubt - Cannot arise because we are definite from particular standpoint.
Where there is doubt, lack of understanding ( Arthāpatti ) cannot arise, hence no negationism ( Abhāva ) and no fraudism (chala ), which also go contrary to its extreme realism.
Vyāsa and Sankarácārya have also brought in their heavy artilleries to damage one or the other angles of this fortification and force an entrance into the same. Their charges are of contradictionism?, indeterminisma, doubts, uncertaintyt, ridiculous. Self-contradiction, abandoning original position in describing the Avyaktaṁo which are all treated above and elsewhere? in this paper.
1. "#fff AEHAT”, 229-17THTOU, P-64-33.1 2. Knowledge would be of indeterminate character as doubt
or diffidence. 3. The knowledge, the knowabilities, the knowing subject of
all being indeterminate in themselves, Syadvāda cannot
be a source of valid knowledge. 4. Heaven and freedom both are uncertain. 5. Ridiculous Self-contradiction. 6. Epitome of Jainism, Ch. IX; Sankara and Syadvada. 7. Sir Ashutosh Com. Vol. III, Art on Jainism.

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Besides, contemporary thinkers confuse the pragmatic? and pluralistic but realistic attitude of Syadváda with the same pragmatic and pluralistic but idealistic views of Messrs William James, Schiller, Dewey etc. One should remember that even Jaina metaphysics accept Vedic realism and even in the Upanişads we have pluralistic trends. In the Upanişads also we have the glimpses of how the reality reveals itself in different ways at different stages of knowledge.3 However, Syadváda is probably due to the Jainast and so it cannot be traced to the Vedas and Upanişads though the Jainas believe that their fundamental creed can be traced back even before the Veda.5
Then another case of confusion in comparing6 Syadváda with the subjectivistic relativism of the Sophist, with the objective Relativism or Relative Absolutism? like Whitehead, Bodin. However there is no similarity with Eienstien's relativity except in the most general attitude. To some extent we may find its parallel in old Pyrrohoneanism in the west. The Upanişadic Neti, Neti, the Advaita doctrine of the world as Anirvacya, the yoga doctrine of Pradhana as Nihsattvaknirasat-Nihsadasat and the Śūnyavādin's doctrine of the self
1. D. M. Datta : Indian Philosophy, p. 97. 2. ( a ) zrfeTaifaTafea arealfa arffa treatfa arga: 1
चलस्थिरो भयामवैशवृणोव्येव वालिशः ।। माण्डूक्योपनिषद्, ४-३३ (b) "Tapi Afast aga aafra", maa, T4# 54 I (c) '' ETUIT OfThifa7", *1##077
(d) " facutT:", 1997 TIETTI 3. S. Radhakrishnan : History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I,
p. 299. 4. Kalidas Bhattacharya : His letter to me. 5. Sir Ashutosh Com. Volume III, Article of Dr. P. C.
Bagchi. 6. D. M. Datta : Indian Philosophy. 7. K. Bhattacharya : His letter to me.

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or the ultimate reality as Catuşkoțivinirmukta may also be profitably compared. Even on deeper study, we may find something in Kant's thing-in-itself and modern existentialism including Kirkegaard in this connection. But Pyrroh's prefixing every judgement with a ‘may be' must not be thought identical with Jaina Syāt, for Pyrrohoneanism relapses into agnosticism or Scepticism, there is no room for Scepticism whatsover in Jaina theory of Syadváda.
Syádváda does not lead to Scepticism. Scepticism means in the minimum, absence of assertion, where as Syā dvadins always assert, though what they assert are alternatives. Disjunctive judgement is still judgement, i. e., assertion. Many logicians believe that what a disjuctive assert is only the common character of the alternatives, the play with the alternatives being either intellectual experimentation or hesitation as a function of ignorance. Some Hegelians interpret it in terms of identity-in-difference. Syädváda on the other hand just insists that there need be no element of identity, abstract or concrete. There is no reason why one blind man should reject the vision of another. Hence each vision is alternatively valid. So either there is no self complete Reality or any such Reality is wholly infinite, a mere demand that refuses to be actualised. The only Scepticism that there is concerning the so called self-complete Reality. So where as a Sceptic is Sceptical about any character of Reality, Syadväda is quite definitely assertive in so far asti, násti etc. are concerned. Yet he is more Sceptical than any Sceptic in the world so far as the definiteness of the ultimate Reality is concerned. He would go even beyond avaktavya (advaitin so far the world is concerned and Sūnyavādin so far ultimate reality is concerned - Kalidas Bhattacharya's letter to me ). So at best Syádváda is a form of Relative Absolutism, or objective relativismi but never Scepticism.
So Syadvada stands against all mental absolutism. We can 1. D. M. Datta : ludian Philosophy.

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substantiate this relativistic standpoint on the Cosmo-microphysical ground supported by Einstienian Doctrine of Relativity? and Maxwell's equation of electromagnetism which go fundamentally against the notion of absolute truth. When we say, we know this, I am saying more than is strictly correct, because all we know is what happens when the waves reach our bodies, 2
Similarly, researches in Psychology of thinking3, Perception of self and conception of self in Child Psychology and Psycho-analytical studies in Freudian Narcissism or Adlerian Power factors support relativism. The psychological researches into the nature of emotions was substantiated by the writing of Dostoevski, Kirkegaard, Neitzche, Freud, Jung and others who tried to reveal the force of conscious and subconscious feelings on the function of character and life. James uttered a definite activistic voluntaristic note in his Radical Empiricism. Graham Wallas showed how political aspect were dictated by emotional attachment to Party Shibboleths. 6 Mc Dougall attacked the transcendent dextalisin of the German idealistic rationalism as well as the sociological hedonism and the epicurean rationalism of the classical economist and the Benthamite liberals. Thus relativism in Psychology is a truism.?
1. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 19, p. 89. Article on
Relativity' by Sir James Hopwood Jeans. Article on Phi
losophical Consequences of Relativity by B. Russell. 2. B. Russell : Outlines of Philosophy, Chapter on Relati
vity, p. 137. 3. (a) Psychology of Thought, Two Vols., Brand Shard.
(b) Creative Thinking, Warthi mer.
(c) Psychology of Thinking, Dunlop; Humphry. 4. Pia get : Work on Child Psychology. 5. Dr. Mohasin : Oral discussion on this subject on 27-12-53, 6. Dr. V. P. Verma : Rationalism, pp. 19-20. 7. Dr. Mohasin : Oral Discussion on 27-12-53.

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Again from socio-cultural standpoint, the doctrine of Syádvāda is justified for no smooth functioning of society is possible without mutual accommodation and adjustment which presupposes Catholicism in thought and sense of tolerance. In ethics and morality, we know how far relativism is dominating.
In Logic the Doctrine of the Universe of Discourse has a great justification for Syādvāda. Universe of Discourse is sometimes limited to a small portion of the actual universe of things and is sometimes co-extensive with that Universe. 1 “The particular aspect or portion of the total system of reality referred to in any judgement may be conveniently spoken as the Universe of Discourse.2 Hence Carveth Read says that supposition (or Universe of Discourse ) controls the interpretation of everyword.3 Logic of Relativest too recognises the truth of Syádváda when it discusses all relations embodied in propositions.
So Syädváda holds a position of liberal pluralism as contrasted with dogmatic monism.5 Much of the confusion either of Buddhism or Vedāntism is due to the false exaggeration of the relative principles of becoming and being into absolute truths. Same is the case with Parmendian being and Heraclitan flux. It seams that Syādvāda doctrine has been given to the world after carefully shifting out the truths of a vanity of Philosophical doctrines. It does not originate as some seem to think from a vague indefinite and doubtful mental attitude in regard to things. It gives a practically definite knowledge. Syadvāda is never a doctrine of
1. Boole : Laws of Thought, p. 166. 2. Keynes : Formal Logic, pp. 75-76. 3. Carveth Read : Logic. 4. A. C. Mitra : Deductive Logic, pp. 198-200. 5. Kannomal : 'The Saptabhangi. 6. S. Radhakrishan : History of Indian Philosophy,

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doubt.1 Many-sidedness of the Jainas is the true secret of its irreputable perfection. Nayavāda is the touch stone of the dogmatic pronouncement of all one-sided scriptures.2 It is the method of knowing a thing synthetically. Thus, the Philosophy of Anekāntavāda is neither self-contradictory nor vague or indefinite. On the contrary it represents a very sensible view of things in a systematised form. By means of it the seemingly warring ideas and beliefs of different faiths can very well be accommodated and reconciled to each other and then so many clashes would be avoided. Syädyāda and World-tension
Peace is something which the world eagerly wants but which it does not know to secure.4 Peace needs a new civilisation, a new culture and a new philosophy, where there is no narrowness and no partiality. Huxley is correct to a great extent when he says that war exists because people wish it to exist.2 We cannot check violence by remaining violent. But non-violence must preceed non-violence in thought. And here Syádváda gives us help to practice non-violence in thought. Prof R. Prasad also holds that Syadvāda is an extension of Ahirsa in epistemology.5 Unless we resolve our differences, we are bound to face tension. Analysing the ultimate causes of world-tension, we had come to the conclusion that it is ultimately our divergent and conflicting ideologies that come in the way. Politico-socio-economic ideas are interrelated and all of them have definite ideological standpoint. The world is the store-house of great chaos in thought. All the confusion of thought which is prevailing in the world is the
1. Prof A. S. Dhruwa : Syadvāda Maryar. 2. Mohan Lall D. Desai : Naya-karnikā, Introduction. 3. E. Ashirvathem: 'Is Peace Possible' ? Journal of Political
Science. 4. Aldous Huxley : Ends of Means, p. 94. 5. Prof. R. Prasad : Oral discussion.

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outcome of inexhaustive research and the acceptance of a part for the whole. All most all our disputes only betray the pig headedness of the blind men? who spoke differently about an elephant. The outstanding personalities (like Aurobindo, Raman Maharshi etc. ) spoke to us, in a world over organised by ideological fanaticism, that truth is not exclusive or sectarian. In fact, the spirit of India is a foe to every kind of fanaticism and intellectual narrowness.2 Huxley asks us to persuade people that every idol however noble it may seem, is ultimately a Moloch that devours it worshippers. In other words, it is fatal to treat the relative and the home made as though it were the Absolute.3
Dr. Schillip also observes that humanity is tottering today on the brink of the principle of self-annihilation for lack of understanding. 4 It is at the levels of human relationships that we reach the acme of misunderstanding. 5 Prof. Tatia also holds that only intellectual clarity will resolve all conflict and rivalry. All dogmatism owes its genesis to this partiality of outlook and fondness for a line of thinking to which a person has accustomed himself.? In his message to the Silver Jubilee Session of Indian Philosophical Congress, CP. Ramaswamy also observes that “work and sacrifice (for peace ) can only be on the lines of an abandonment of the so called imperia
1. Mohan Lall D, Desai : Naya-karņika, Introduction. 2. S. Radhakrishnan : Presidential Address, Silver Jubilee
Session of Indian Philosophical Congress, Calcutta. 3. Aldous Huxley : In his message to the Silver Jubilee
Session of Indian Philosophical Congress. 4. Paul Arthur Schillip : On Human Understanding, Silver
Jubilee Vol. II. 5. Ibid. 6. Nathmal Tatia ; Naya-ways of Observation, Approach, 198. 7. Ibid.

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lism and aggresiveness in thought1, because peace demands a revolutionary desire, a new simplicity, a new asceticism. Blavatsky thinks that when the one party or another thinks himself the sole possessor of absolute truth, it becomes only natural that he should think his neighbours absolutely in the clutches of Error or the Devil.3 These are obvious psychological roots of tensions4 proved by recent Psychological researches,5 Today one man or one country fight with the other because their views vary. Views are bound to differ, because we are guided by different condition, thought, modes and attitudes. Hence it is wrong to think oneself right and rest others wrong. 6 Here we find that Syadvada represents the highest form of Catholicism coupled wonderfully with extreme conservatism, a most genuine and yet highly dignified compromise better than which I cannot imagine.? Extreme toleration is that all views as possibilities are equally ( alternatively ) valid and extreme conservatism, in that form the point of actuality (or existence, as the existentialist term it ) only one of the definite categories is mine. I cannot always fly in the air of possibilities (or demands ). I must have moorings in some one definite form of actuality. 8
1. C. P. Ramswamy Ayer : Silver Jubilee Vol. II, Message. 2. S. Radhakrishnan : Quoted by Ramasury, Ibid. 3. H. P. Blavatsky : The Secret Doctrine. 4. Alva Mydral : Gandhian Seminar. 5. (a) Tension Affecting International Understanding,
Klinberg (b) Tensions that cause war, Can tril. (c) Democray in a world of tensions, Make on.
(d) Ends and Means, Huxley ( war). 6. Nemicandra Šāstri: Viswa-śānti or Jaina Dharma ( Hindi ). 7. Kalidas Bhattacharya ; His letter to me. 8. Ibid.

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Chapter Eighteen CONTRIBUTION OF HARIBHADRA TO THE
YOGA-VIDYA
[1] The Indian systems of thought and culture are not mere speculations on the external nature of things but also of the mysteries of our mind and soul. Even frankly realistic disciplines like Jainism, Nyaya-Vaiseșikas and the Mimamsakas show most serious concern to fathom the depths of mind and unravel the mysteries of spirit. The common channels and sources of knowledge like perception, inference etc. are found to be inadequate and it has been the abiding spiritual ambition of man to extend the frontiers of his knowledge. Even to a scientist, any attempt to put a limit to our knowledge is the result of some wrong notions. Nothing is regarded as static or absolute. Even to the Marxists, "there is nothing in the nature which cannot be explained'. Thus the growth of human knowledge has been a sort of progressive limitation of sceptical and agnostic attitudes. It seems that it can extend without assignable limits to knowledge of mankind.1 A spiritual conviction and a constant urge for the ultimate truth is the mean of our common Sadhanā. It is not only the perfection of the cognitive faculty of the self but also its ultimate end.2 Hence “know Thyself' (Atma nam viddhi ) has been regraded as the climax of our spiritual Sadhanā. There are obvious limitations to our sensory knowledge, there are antinomies of reasons. Hence, we have to transcend these usual sources of knowledge in order to realise the truth. This pro1. Singh, Ramjee : The Concept of Omniscience in Ancient
Hindu Thought, Oriental Publisher, Delhi, 1979, p. 336. 2. Ibid, The Jaina Concept of Omniscience, L. D. Institute
of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1974, p. 221. 17

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cess has a common term in Indian thought-Yoga. It is not against but beyond reason (Jñana vijñāna sahitam ).
[II] The term Yoga symbolises the core of Indian Spiritual Sadhana. The four-fold social division of occupation (Varnavibhājana ), its trade and business, language and physical culture etc. are only the external signs of the Aryans?; even the concept of other world (heaven-hell ) is not its essential ingredients. Its real and inner spirit lies in the absolute concentration of thought or one pointedness on the ultimate reality which is beyond the present space and time.3 Perhaps, on account of this distinctive feature, the Aryans have been judged as superior to all other races and climes.
In life, theory and practice, knowledge and action, empirical and the transcendental require a synthesis. As a matter of fact, the real practice of one's knowledge is called Yoga. Knowledge precedes, Yoga succeeds. But a knowledge without its practice or implementation is not only incomplete but also ambiguous. Thus Yoga is superior to the Tapas, Jñāna and Karma.4 It is the best of all the three and includes devotion also. Yoga or union with God which is attained through bhakti is the highest spiritual goal. Jñana is scriptural learning ( Sastra pāņditya )5 and not spiritual realization. Truly wise man is the Yogi. Without Yoga or concentration of mind, the human energies are frittered away in many directions and go waste. Hence, the spirit of man is the key for the success of
1. Max Muller : Biographies of Words and the Home of the
Aryans, p. 50. 2. Bhagavad-Gītā, IX. 21, “They return to the world of
mortals when their merit is exhausted." 3. Max Muller : Sacred Books of the East, Vol. I, p. 23 ( In
troduction ). 4. Bhagavad-Gītā, VI. 46. 5. Ibid ( Sankara Bha sya ).

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259
all practical activities. A man versed only in scriptural learning but lacking in yogic realisation is called as 'the friend of the learned'i but not a Yogi.
Then there are two dimensions of Yoga--the external and the internal. Even the process of concentration is regarded its outer frame, where as renunciation of all attachment and reducing oneself to zero is its inner spirit. The real Yoga, therefore, consists in the inner poise, self-mastery, its conquest of anger, sensitiveness, pride and ambition?. So there are two types of Yoga-the Yoga of knowledge and the Yoga of action. The former consists in the knowledge about the Self, its bondage, liberation and the path of liberation. But mere knowledge or theoretical knowledge is no good. What is more important is the performance of work without any selfish attachment to results, with a view to securing the welfare of the world, with the realization that agency belongs to the modes of Prakrti or to God himself.3 In fact, Yoga consists in practical realization of the self.
There are three-fold traditions of Yoga-literature in Indological writings-the Vedic, the Jaina and the Bauddha. Though the term “Yoga' has occurred many times in Rg-veda, it has always been used in the sense of 'Union' only and never in the sense of meditation or concentration of mind. Even such key-words of the Yoga-literature like meditation, nonattachment, breath control, withdrawal from external world etc. are absent in the Rg-veda.4 However, the Upanişads 5
1. Yoga-Vāśişịha, Nirvana Prakarana, Ch. 21. 2. Bhagavad-Gītā, II. 48. 3. Ibid, III, 43 ( View of Yamunācārya in Gítartha Sar
graha ). 4. The term Yoga has occurred many times in the Rgveda,
I. 34. 9; X. 266. 5; I. 18. 7; 1. 5. 3; II. 8. 1; IX. 58. 3. 5. Taittiriyopanişad, II. 4; Kaţha Upanişad, II. 6. 2; Sveta
śvatara Upanişad, II 2, IV. 3, I. 14; Chandogya Upanişad, VII. 6. 2, VII. 7. 1, VII. 26. 1.

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260 Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion
do abound in the mention of these concepts. There might be differences of opinion regarding the nature or number of the ultimate reality but there is a remarkable unanimity regarding the acceptance of yogic sadhana for its realization. All the Vedic systems including the Nyaya1-Vaiseşṣika2, Samkhyas, Yoga and Vedanta5 accept the utility and relevance of Yoga in their respective systems. Purva-mïmamsä is the only exception which does not ever refer to Yoga. It is interested in ritualistic action. The Gita and the Mahabharata, the Bhagavat, the Yoga-vasiṣṭha" and the important works on Tantra10 including many works of Hatha-yoga accept the place and importance of Yoga. Many medieval saints and scholars like Jñanadeva11, Ambeya12, Kabira13 etc. have discussed the subject of Yoga with great seriousness.
[ III ]
Together with its tradition, the term Yoga has a chequered history. In the Rg-veda, it is used in the sense of 'union', later 1. Nyaya-sūtra of Gotama, I. 1. 1, IV. 2. 38, IV. 2. 42, IV. 2. 46.
2. Vaise şika-sutra of Kanāda, I. 1. 4, VI. 2. 2, VI. 2. 8. 3. Sankhya-sūtra of Kapila, I. 1, III. 30-34.
4. Yoga-sutra of Patañjali, IV. 33.
5. Brahma-sutra of Badarāyaṇa, 3rd chapter is known as Sadhana Pada.
6. The first six chapters deal with Karma-yoga, middle six to the Bhakti-yoga and the last six deal with Jñana-yoga. 7. Mahabharata, Santi Parva, 193, 217, 246, 254 chaps. Anusasana Parva, 36, 246 etc.
8. Śrīmad-Bhagavat-Mahāpurāņa, Skandha III, Ch. 28; XI. 15, 19, 20 etc.
9. Yoga-vasistha, chapters on Vairagya, Mumuk şu-Vyabhara, Utapatti, Sthiti, Upasana and Nirvana.
10. Mahanirvana Tantra, 3rd chap.
11. Jñaneswari, 6th chapter.
12. Siddhanta-samhita of the Suhiroba Ambiya. 13. 'Bijaka' is an important treatise on Yoga & mysticism.

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261
on in about 700-800 B. C., it is used in the sense of 'yoking a horse' ( uncontrolled spiritual horses ). It can be traced also in German-Joch, OE-Geoc, Latin-Jugum, Greek-Zugon.1 In Pāṇini's time, the term 'Yoga' had attained its technical meaning of concentration. In Jainism, the term Carita ( conduct ) is the exact equivalent of the general term 'Yoga'.2 Jaina tradition, predominantly being ascetic and world-negating lays stress upon wilful silence ( mauna ), austerities ( tapas ), and other yogic activities. The Jaina Āgamas describing about the conduct of the Sådhus ( Sadhucarya ) refer to many yogic activities like the abstenations and observances ( Yama and Niyama ), study (svadhyaya ), austerities (tapas ), withdrawal of the senses (pratyahára ) etc.3 Even the acts of volition ( Pravrtti ) has to he surcharged by the spirit of volition in the negative sense ( nivștti ), technically called as Aşa-Pravacana-Māla.4 Jaina Sadhus are directed to concentrate on study and meditation for the three-fourths of daily routine.5 In the Jaina Agamas and the Niryuktis, ? the term "Yoga' has been mostly used in the sense of concentration of mind with numerous classifications and sub-classifications. Even Tattvarthas refers to dhyāna and the Dhyāna-Sataka of Jinabhadra Gani Kşamá Śramaņa is only explication of the notion of dhyāna. Hence, Yoga has been rooted in the Āgamic tradition.
1. Das Gupta, S. N. : Philosophical Essays, Calcutta Univer
sity, 1941, p. 179. 2. Ibid, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 226. 3. Sanghavi, S.: Darśana aur Cintana, Gujrat Vidya Sabha,
Ahmedabad, 1957, p. 245. 4. Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, Ch. 24. 5. Ibid, Ch. 26. 9. Sthanā iga-sūtra, IV. 1; Samaváyáiga-sūtra, IV; Bhaga
vati-sūtra, XXV. 7; Uttaradhyayana-sūtra, XXX. 35. 7. Ävaśyaka Niryukti ( Kayotsarga ), Gātha 1462-1486. 8. Umāswātí : Tattvartha-sūtra, IX. 7.

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[IV]
But it was Haribhadra who for the first time gave an altogether new dimension in the interpretation of Yoga. It is only Haribhadra who defined the term 'Yoga' in the sense of 'what leads one to emancipation' ( mukhena, jayano savvo vi dhammovavaro ).1 Thus he has ushered a new era in the Yoga-literature of the Jainas. He wrote important Yoga treatises like Yoga-bindu, Yoga-dṛṣți-sammuccaya, Yoga-vimśikā, Yoga-sataka and Soḍaśaka. The term Yoga used in the general sense of subduing the senses and the mind and the process of concentration and ecstasy even in the earlier stages of the Jaina thought as well as the early Buddhist thought. But the terms Jñana (dhyana) and Samadhi were more in vogue than the term Yoga. It is only in the Yoga-sutra of Patanjali that we find the proper location of dhyana in the eight-fold process of Yoga, for the first time.2 Haribhadra's in his characteristic catholic outlook did not discuss and interpret Yoga according to the Jaina tradition only but he made a comparative and critical study of Patanjali's Yoga etc. The description of eight-fold standpoints in the Yoga-drşti-sammuccaya is altogether a new dimension in Yoga literature.
262
All spiritual and religious activities that lead towards emancipation are considerd by Haribhadra as Yoga. His ingenuity lies in the yogic interpretation of the Jaina doctrine of Spiritual development ( Guna-sthana ). The soul has inherent capacity for emancipation but this capacity remains dormant and inactive due to Karmic influences. But the soul can be roused to active spiritual excertion which is nothing other than yogic activities. The Jainas do not believe either in the
1. Haribhadra Yoga Viisika, Karikä 1.
2. Tatia, N. M.: Studies in Jaina Philosophy, Jaina Cultural Research Society, Varanasi, 1951, p. 261.
3. Haribhadra : Yoga-binbu, 418, 420.
4. Haribhadra Yoga-drşti-sammuccaya, Kārikā 13.

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263
eternal revelation of the truth like the Mimāṁsakas and the Vedāntins, or, in its revelation by a Supreme Divinity like the Nyāya-vaiseşikas and the Patañjali-yoga. Only rare souls known as Tîrthařkaras, who have acquired potency of revealing the truth and preaching it to the world by their moral and virtuous activities can also help in arousing us from moral slumber. The centrifugal tendency of soul to run away from the fetters of world existence is thwarted by a centripetal force of attachment (raga ), repulsion (dveşa )1 and perverted attitude ( mithyātva ). However, the soul, when it achieves purification feel uneasiness with the worldly existence and shows manifestation of energy known as Yathāpravsttakarana for the spiritual advancement. But the struggle between the two-fold processes, centrifugal and the centripetal2 continues unless the soul develops such spiritual strength as is destined to lead it to final emancipation by reducing the duration and intensity and also the mass of Karmic-matter through the triple processes of Yathāpravsttakarana, apūrvakaraṇa and anivșttikarana.3 The soul then starts climbing up the spiritual ladders of Upaśamaśreņi ( ladder of subsidence ) and Kșapakaśreni ( ladder of annihilation ) upto the final fourteenth stage of absolute motionlessness.
Haribhadra's style of describing the fourteen stages of spiritual development through the process of Yoga is original and illuminating. While discussing, he has mentioned the names of many Yogist and treatises on Yoga. A crucial
1. Viśeşāvaśyaka-bhäşya, Yaśovijaya Jaina Granthamala
No. 35, Gātha 1194. 2. Ibid, Gathā 1204-1217. 3. (a) Tattvärtha-raja-várttika of Bhațța Akalarika, Kaśī,
1935, p. 327. (6) Labdhisara of Nemicandra, R. J. S., No. 8, Nirnaya
Sagar Press, 1916, p. 35. 4. Gopendra ( Yoga-bindu, Verse 200 ), Kālātīta ( Yoga
bindu, Verse 300 ); Patañjali, Bhandanta Bhaskarabandhu,

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problem is posed by Haribhadra to know the real point of the beginning of the spiritual development of soul desiring salvation in the timeless world of attachment. According to Haribhadra, when the influence of deluding Karma start decreasing, the process of spiritual development starts.1 The state prior to this beginning, of the spiritual development is called 'Acaram Pudgala Paravarta', while the posterior state is called 'Caram Pudgala Paravarta'.2 Between these two poles of Acaram and Caram, we have the different stages of spiritual development.3 Here in the process of Yoga begins, which causes simplicity, humility, catholicity, benevolence and other virtues in the soul. The emergence of these ethical virtues are the outer signs of the spiritual development of the soul.
The special feature of Haribhadra is his comparative studies in Yoga. For example, in Yoga-vissika, wherein five kinds of activities (Sthána, Ūrņa, Artha, Ālambana and Análambana ) divided into external activity (Karma-yoga ) and internal spiritual activity (Jñāna-yoga )4, are discussed, Haribhadra has tried to correlate them with stages of spiritual development (Guņa-sthāna ). For example, these activities can be properly practised only by those who have attained the fifth or a still higher stage of Guna-sthāna. In this way, Haribhadra correlates the different stages of Guņa-sthānas to the different stages of concentration (dhyana ).5 Haribhadra compares anālambana-yoga with samprajñāta samadhi in
Bhagavadantavādi (Yoga-dịşți-sammuccaya, Verse 16,
Tika ). 1. Yoga-nirņaya ( Yoga-dịşți-sammuccaya, Verse 16, sīkā ). 2. Muktyadveśa-dvātrimśika, Verse 28. 3. Sanghavī, S. : Ibid, p. 264. 4. Haribhadra, Yoga-virsika, I. 2; Sodaśaka-prakarana of
Haribhadra with Yaśobhadra's commentary, Jamanagar,
1982, XIII. 4; XIV. I. 5. Yoga-vimsikā, 1. 18,

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Patanjali's system1, the final consummation of anālambana concentration is Asamprajñāta samadhi. Similarly, the fourteenth stage of spiritual development corresponds to the dhar mamegha samadhi of Patanjali's system, to amṛtatman of yet another system, to bhavaśatru of a third system, to Śivodaya of yet another, to Sattva nanda of yet others and to para of yet another school.2 Similarly, Haribhadra tries to show the unanimity of the conception of final self-realization of all the systems of thought. Haribhadra enumerates eight primary defects, from which the mind of a yogin must always be free. By practising the concentration of mind the soul realizes itself. This is known as Supreme bliss (Paramananda ) in the Vedanta, the extinguished lamp. ( vidhmatādīpa) of the Buddhists, extinction of animality (paśutvavigama ), end of suffering (dukkhanta), freedom,from the specific qualities (Nyayavaiśeşika), and detachment from the elements (bhūtavigama ).4 Like an impartial truth-seeker, Haribhadra asks the seekers to keep their minds open and investigate the truth with perfect detachment and freedom from prejudices.
Similarly, Haribhadra shows that there is a fundamental unity among all apparently conflicting systems of thought regarding the means to free from the worldly existence. He asks us to see unity in diversities. He lays down five steps as a complete course of Yoga, i. e, Contemplation of truth (adh yatma), Repeated practice (bhavana ), Concentration of mind, (dhyana), Equanimity (samată) and Annihilation of all the traces. of karman (Vṛttisaṁkṣaya ).5 The same principle,
269
1. Yoga-vimśika, I. 20.
2. Yasovijaya's Tika on Yoga-vimśika of Haribhadra, p. 20; Yoga-bindu of Haribhadra, Jaina Granthamala Prakashaka Sabha, Ahmedabad, Series No. 25, 1940, p. 422.
3. Soḍaśaka-prakarana of Haribhadra with Yaśobhadra's Tika, XIV. 2-3; XVI. 14.
4. Ibid, XVI. 1-4.
5. Yoga-bindu, pp. 17-18 ( with Svopajñavṛtti ).

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Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion
according to Haribhadra, is expressed by different terms. It is Puruşa in the Vedānta as well as the Jaina system, as Jñana in the Buddhist school, Kșetravit in the Samkhya system. Similarly, the fundamental ground of worldly existence is called Avidya ( Vedānta and Buddhism ), Praksti ( Samkhya ), Karman (Jainas ). Similarly, the relation between matter and spirit is known as Bhránti ( Vedanta and Buddhism ), Pravstti ( Sankhya ) and Bandha in Jaina system. Haribhadra referring to Gopendra of the Sárkhya System holds that the Puruşa does not even enquire about the path of realization unless the Praksti has turned her face from it. In other words, it is the nature of the Spirit to get disentangled from matter. For this requisite purification of the soul is very necessary. Then the soul becomes a Bodhisattva or Tirtharkara.2 When a man becomes a boddhisattva, there is no mere spiritual degeneration to him. 3 He does not commit evil or sin, on the contrary, he is keen exclusively in the well-being of others, acquires wisdom, treads upon right path and appreciates merit.4 Haribhadra compares the Jaina conception of Tīrthankaras with the Bodhisattvas,5 He distinguishes three categories of souls destined to be emancipated-Tīrthankaraso, Gapadharas? and Munda-kevalins.8 Haribhadra's contribution also lies in suggesting five-fold stages of preliminary preparation for Yoga as we find in Patañjali's scheme of Yama and Niyama. As we have referred earlier, the stages of the soul
1. Yoga-bindu of Haribhadra with Svopajñavștti, pp. 17-18. 2. Ibid, p. 270. 3. Ibid, p. 271. 4. Ibid, p. 272. 5. Ibid, p. 274. 6. Ibid, pp. 284-288. 7. Ibid, p. 289. 8. Ibid, p. 290.

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Contribution of Haribhadra to the Yoga-vidyā
267
are adhyatma?, bhavana2, dhyāna, Samata 3 and the last Vșttisamkşaya4. Here the accumulated and obscuring karmas are destroyed for ever and the soul attains omnisciences and final emancipation.
In Yoga-drsţi-samuccaya, Haribhadra presents a novel plan of classification of Yogic stages. The core of this scheme is the concept of Drsţi which means attitude towards truth. The most important feature of spiritual development is acquisition of love of truth (Samyag-drșți ). The gradual purification of its love of truth takes place corresponding to the purification of soul. So long the soul has not cut the knot and attained purification, our attitude is bound to be wrong, and perverse called as avidyā, mithyātva or darśana-moha. Without purification of the soul, we can have only common place attitude (ogha-drsti ) as opposed to right attitude (şad-dịşți ) or attitude of the spiritually advanced soul (yoga-dřşçi ). Haribhadra listed eight kinds of gradual development of love of truth (drşți ) corresponding to the eight-fold stages of Patanjali's Yoga. Haribhadra refers to the consensus of opinion of a number of authors regarding the stages of Yoga in his Svopajñavștti.8 His love of truth is so great that he can never be sectarian. Haribhadra asks us to realize the truth by means 1. Yoga-bindu of Haribhadra with Svopajñavrtti, pp. 17-18,
pp. 358-359. 2. Ibid, pp. 360-361. 3. Ibid, pp. 364-365. 4. Ibid, p. 31. 5. Ibid, pp. 366-367. 6. Yoga-dşşți-samuccaya of Haribhadra, ed. Prof. L. Suali,
Ahmedabad, 1912, p. 12. 7. The eight love of truth ( drsțis ) are — 1. Mitra ( YDS,
p. 22, pp. 22-40 ), 2. Tara ( YDS, pp. 41-48), 3. Bala ( YDS, pp. 49-50 ) 4, Dipta ( YDS, pp. 57-58 ), 5. Sthira (YDS, pp. 152-154 ), 6. Kanta ( YDS, pp. 160-162 ),
7. Prabha ( YDS pp. 168-169 ), 8. Para ( YDS, p. 179 ). 8. Ibid, p. 16.

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Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion
of all the three organs - scripture, logic and practice of Yoga in keeping with best tried and trusted tradition of India. The truth is one. It cannot be many. There is only the difference of angles or terminology. Yoga is not the monopoly of a particular sect or system. It is based on direct experience of the seers and lovers of truth Differences in terminologies of different system about the same concept is illustrated by Haribhadra. For example, the state of final realisation is known as Sadāśiva in one system, Parabrahmana in another, Siddhāntatman in the third and tathatā in another system.1 Hence, there can be no conflict when the truth is realised. Controversies take place only when the truth has not been realized 2 as an empty pot sounds much. The various revelations have to be understood from various contexts and angles. The love of truth ( drsţis ) give us the power to cultivate faith in spirid tual revelations. Similarly, referring to the seventh dạşi ( / rabha ), Haribhadra compares it with Visabhāga-Parikşaya in the Buddhist School, Prasantavāhitā in the Samkhya and Sivavartman in the Saiva system, and as dhruvádhvan in the Mahāvārtikas.3
Besides these eight-fold dặşțis corresponding to the eight steps of Yogic-sadhana in Patañjali, Haribhadra refers to the ihrec-fcid Yoga - The first stage is Iccha Yoga when inspite of knowledge and will, the Yogic practitioner falters in bis practice on account of inertia (Pramada ). The second stage is called Sästra Yoga5, wherein the practitioner does never falter in his yogic practices, strictly follows the scriptural injunctions and has developed penetrating insight. The third and the last stage of Yoga is Samarthya Yoga6, when
1. Yoga-drsţi-samuccaya, p. 157, p. 128. 2. Ibid, p. 130. 3. Ibid, pp. 173-174. 4. Ibid, p. 3. 5. Ibid, p. 4. 6. Ibid, p. 5.

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he has fully mastered the scriptural injunctions and has developed the power to transcend them. There are the three broad divisions of all the possible stages of Yoga and the eight-fold dṛṣṭis are only the elaboration of these three.1 Similarly, Haribhadra's four-fold classification of Yogins, viz., gotra, kula, pravṛttacakra and niṣpanna. The first are not incapable of emancipation while the last have already achieved their final state. Hence, it is only the Kula and Pravṛttacakra yogins who need yogic instruction.2
In spite of these resemblances, there are fundamental differences also with the mystical way adopted by the Jaina monk. Yoga-system of Patanjali has not recognised the imperativeness of mystical conversion. Probably, it confuses moral with the mystical conversion, the importance of initiation by a Guru, and the necessity of seeking his guidance at every step, the possibility of fall from certain heights, i. e., dark-nights of the soul, the significance of Pratikramaņa and Pratyakhyāna. Haribhadra knew these differences but he wanted to establish a unity among the different systems of Indian thought. The process of spiritual development as traced in Yoga-dṛṣṭi-samuccaya is different from that we find in Yoga-bindu. Yoga-vimśikā does not describe the preliminary stages of spiritual development but it discuss adequately about the later stages. Altogether, Haribhadra's studies in Yoga-vidya is a landmark in Indian spiritual sădhanā.
1. Yoga-dṛṣṭi-samuccaya, p. 12. 2. Ibid, pp. 206-207, pp. 208-210.

269

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A
Abhayadeva, 17
Abhinava Dharmabhūṣaṇa, 233 Ajitkeśa Kambalin, 177
Akalanka, 67, 133
Alexander, 176
Anandakirti, 39
Anandaghana, 148
Anspacher, 153
Arcat, 12
Aryarakṣita, 15
B
Barret, 154
Belvalkar, 12 Bergson, H., 151
Bhadrabahu, 17
Bhaskara, 117 Bhaskaravajra, 134
Bhutabali, 18
Bradley, F. H., 4
Broad, E., 4
Buddha, 129-130, 193
Calkins, 29
Candidasa, 136
Carvakas, 18, 30 Caitanya, 136
Carkravarti, A., 96 D
AUTHOR INDEX
Das, A. C., 155
Darwin, 30
Dewey, 11, 249 Dharmakīrti, 12

Dharasena, 17
Dilthey, 29
E
Eukermann, 151
F
Ferrier, 231
G
Gangabhatta, 134 Gandhi, 141
Gautama, 6, 192 Gladstone, 151, 152 Goethe, 151
Gunabhadra, 18, 94
H
Haribhadra, 17, 39 Hiriyanna, 12
Hitler, 228 Huxley, J., 30
I
Iverach, James, 104
J
Jaideva, 136
James, W., 11, 29, 151 Jesus, 147
Jha, G. N., 245 Jinabhadra, 17
Joad, C. E. M., 4 K
Kant, E., 231 Kapalikas, 136
Karnakagomin, 12 Keynes, 229, 230
Kunda-kunda, 18, 39, 94, 102,
164

Page #280

Author Index
271
L Lao-Tse, 187 Locke, 216
M Mahavira, 16, 17, 20, 24, 26,
29, 187, 189, 192, 194, 203,
207, 243 Malayagiri, 17 Mallisena Sūri, 233 Muirhead, J, H., 4 Mukherji, M. N., 155
N Nagarjuna, 6 Narayana Bhatta, 134 Nemicandra, 18 Nimbarka, 117, 136
P Pascal, 66 Patañjali, 15, 175 Patrakesarī, 39 Plato, 176 Prabhakara, 17 Prajna kara Gupta, 12, 37, 67,
177 Puşpadanta, 18 Pūjyapada, 67,94 Pyrroh, 1, 12, 199
R Raju, P. T., 101 Raman Maharsi, 253 Ramanuja, 13, 114-116 Roman Rolland, 206 Rşabhadeva, 189
S Samantabhadra, 4, 67 Sanghadā sagapi, 17
Sañjaya, 171 Siddhasena, 39, 148 Sprayer, 29 Stern, 29 Sucaritra Miśra, 134 Sukhalalji Sanghavi, 16 Sankara, 4, 13, 97, 114, 135 Śantarakṣita, 6, 12, 67 Śri Aurobindo, 216 Śrīkanţha, 117 Šrilanka Sūri, 17 Srinivásācārya, 117
т Tennyson, 60 Todaramala, 18 Tsurumi, 225 Tyrrel, G. N., 151, 155
U Udyotakar, 30 Umāsvāmī, 18, 39, 67, 115
Veerasena, 18 Velleti Näthaputta, 177 Vidyananda Swāmi, 35, 39 Vidyāpati, 136 Vijñānabhikṣu, 116 Virchow, 151 Vyasa, 3
Whitehead, A. N., 4
Y Yaśovijaya, 147 Yati Bșşabha, 18
Z Zoroaster, 187

Page #281

BOOK INDEX A Critique of Logical Positi- Nyaya-dipika, 233, 235 vism, 4
Nyāya-vārttika, 30 Anga, 17
Nyayavatāra, 235 Atharva-veda, 3
Nasadiya-sūkta, 23 Ācārānga, 203
Niyama-sāra, 18 Āgamas, 14, 18, 20, 21 Pañcāstikaya-sära, 18 Apta-mímāṁsā, 18
Pravacana-sára, 18 Āpta-parikṣā, 45
Process and Reality, 4 Āvaśyaka-niryukti, 166, 167 Pūrva, 17 Bhagavad-gītā, 21, 22
Samaya-sara, 18 Bhagawati-Sūtra, 123
Satkhandāgama, 18 Brahma-sūtra, 21, 111
Shinyiiga-sutra, 102 Contemporary British Philo- Syadváda-mañjari, 233 sophy, 4
Tattvārtha-sloka-varttika, 35 Dhavalá, 18
Tattvārtha-sūtra, 18, 31, 221 Gommațasära, 18
Tspitakas, 14 Jātaka, 17
Upanişadas, 23 Kalpa-sūtra, 18
Vedas, 14, 27 Karma-grantha, 34
Višeşāvaśyak-bháşya, 29 Labdhisára, 18
Yuktvanusāsana. 4

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About the Author Dr. Ramjee Singh needs no introduction as a Jaina scholar. He has published his book on the Jaina Concept of Omniscience from L. D. Institute, Ahmedabad in 1974. Besides, he has presented many learned papers on Jainism both in India and abroad. His association with various Jaina institutions in the country and outside is well known. He has a Ph. D. and D. Litt. in Philosphy and also a D. Litt. in Political Science. As a devoted and dedicated scholar, he has published more than 20 books and about 200 research papers. He had been Chairman of Akhila Bharatiya Darsana Parisad for 6 years and its Secretary for 9 years. He was also a member of the Royal Institute of Philosophy (London), Mind Association (Oxford ), Australian Society of Philosophy and Psychology (Sydney), World Jaina Mission, Jaina International, Apuvrat International and a pioneer of Jaina Visva Bharati (Jaina University), Ladnun. He is Secretary of Indian Society of Gandhian Studies and also Secretary for Asia of Afro-asian Philosophical Association, 'He has been nominated as a Member of Indian Council of Philosophical Research. At present he is the Vice-Chancellor of Jaina Visva Bharati Samsthan, Ladnun, Rajasthan (Deemed to be University ) and a former U. G. C. Member of the Panel on Gandhian Studies. He was invited by the World Philosophy Congress at Brighton to deliver a plenary speech. He has travelled far and wide on lecture-giving tour in "Africa, Britain, U. S. A., Sri Lanka, Nepal, Paris, Rome etc. He has been also a former member of Indian Parliament.