Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion

SR No.: 001747
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Ramjee Singh
Publisher: Parshwanath Shodhpith Varanasi
Publication Year: 1993
Total Pages: 282
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ethics, & Yoga
File Size: 15 MB

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Omniscience : Determinism and Freedom
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propositions is not only vague but also self contradictory. For example, it all depends upon the belief in one proposition at least. 'Nothing is unknown to him'. But this is to admit his omniscience and hence it is like arguing in a circle. Thus, the concept of omniscience whether logical or actuall does involve difficulties.
(8) According to the early Pali sources, Buddha offered a qualified support for the doctrine of omniscience even with regard to himself, and he often criticised Nigantha Nátiaputta3 claiming omniscience in the sense of knowing and seeing, all objects on all times - past, present and even future.4 His reluctance in claiming unqualified omniscience is mainly concerned with knowledge pertaining to future possibly because it will lead to some sort of determinisın in metaphysics and morals. “To speak of omniscience in relation to future is to maintain an impossible position,'*5 be1. Cp. Newman (Ibid ) makes a distinction between two
senses of omniscience, 'necessary' and 'actual' which has been criticised by R. Puccetti (See his article "Mr. Newman's view of omniscience"; a discussion in Journal of Australasian Philosophy, Vol. 42., No. 2, Aug. 1964, p. 261 ). A rough comparison may be made with Buddha's distinction between dispositional and unqualified omniscience ( See Dr. K. N. Upadhyaya's Thesis, "A Comparative Study of the Bhagavadgita and early Buddhism",
University of Ceylon, pp. 342-343 ). 2. Cp. “Those who say that the recluse Gotama is omniscient
and all-seeing --... constantly and at all times....... aro not reporting me correctly." Majjhima-Nikāya, I. 482; Cp. Digha-Nikaya, I. 78-84, II. 82-83, III. 99-101; Sainyutta
Nikaya, I. 191; Majjhima-Nikaya, II. 127. 3. Vide, Majjhima-Nikaya, I. 372-378; II. 214-223. 4. Vide, Digha-Nikiya, III. 134; "The recluse Gotama speaks
of an infinite knowledge with regard to the past but not
to the future.” 5. Dr. K. N. Upadhyaya, Ibid, pp. 343-344.
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