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From Nescience to Omniscience
41
( like the Meru hill ) became known as the object of direct perception, just like the knowledge of existence of fire in hill from the smoke is also the subject-matter of perception.2 Here we may be reminded of the researches in para-psychology and extra-sensory perception including telepathy and clairvoyance. As for perception, we can say that only a type of perception which claims to know all things of all times and places, can definitely say that omniscient does not exist. But if there is such a type of all-comprehensive perception it is no other than the omniscience.2 Similarly, omniscience cannot be established through Anumána, because we cannot think of a relation of universal concommittance between the Sadhya and the Hetu. Sabda Pramāpa also cannot prove it, because there is no infallibility of the Āgamic authority to support it and the fallible Ágamas are either created by omniscient or non-omniscient. Now, if it is through omniscient, there is the fallacy of circular reasoning and if it is through non-omniscient, there is fallacy of Contradiction.4 Upamana5 also cannot establish this, because it works on the basis of imperfect resemblances between two instances, but there is complete absence of any similarity with regard to the omniscient. Arthapatti6 too is helpless, for nothing is affected by the omniscient. Even Abhāva? of omniscience fails to prove its existence. Prabhacandra8 following the
1. Parīkşā-Mukhan, Verse 2; Cf: Nyáya-Dipikā, p. 42;
Nyāya-Viniscaya, pp. 361-362; Svayambhū Stotra, Karika
75; Aşta-Sahasrī, p. 45. 2. Apta-mimansı, Kārika 97. 3. Mímāmsa-śloka-Varttika, p. 81; Tattva-Sangraha, p. 831. 4. Tattva-Sangraha, Kárika 3188-3189. 5. Ibid, 3190. 6. Ibid, 3215. 7. Ibid, 3218. 8. Nyaya-Kumuda-Candra, Part I, p. 88. 9. Ibid ( Sarvajñatvavada ), pp. 86-97.
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