Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion

SR No.: 001747
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Ramjee Singh
Publisher: Parshwanath Shodhpith Varanasi
Publication Year: 1993
Total Pages: 282
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ethics, & Yoga
File Size: 15 MB

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Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion
unjust to brand it as a loose piece of mosaic work' or 'odd collection of arbitrary half-truths'. In fact the truths presented are alternative truths which are true in their own aspects. Ofcourse, Syadváda rejects the 'dispotic absolute truth' or the 'block universe' or a ‘seemless coat'. Even in the synthesis achieved through the dynamics of Syadváda, there is 'discriminative unity' rather than 'secondless unit'. In short, absolutism in thought is rejected to avoid arbitrariness in action.
(4) To brand Syädvāda as agnosticism or Scepticism like that of Sañjaya or of Pyrroh is again another injustice. The prefix 'Syāt' does not mean 'perhaps' but 'in respect of' a particular context. Each model truth is valid from its own standpoint. It is not a doctrine of 'know nothingness' or "unknowability'. Each standpoint of the saptabhangi is definite in its own place. Syadvāda statements are not 'indefinite (Belvalkar ), but 'indeterminate' ( Hiriyanna which means that it cannot be defined absolutely. No single mode of expression is adequate to express the nature of reality. The various modes of truths are not merely many truths, but alternative truths, each being as definite as anything.
(5) Regarding the charge of 'Self-contradiction against Syadváda by the great Vedantic and Buddhist Acāryas, I feel that the motive behind it must be extra-logical. How one can believe that Dharmakirti will call Anekantavāda as mere non-sensical talk ( Pralăpamātra ) in view of Jaina theory of dual character of universal and particular of a thing. He asks of all realities are Sat, there would be no difference between cow and camel. Prajñakara Gupta and Arcaça point out that the triple charactered nature of reality having origination, destruction and permanence cannot exist together and hence is self contradictory. Sāntarakṣita thinks that there would be a comingling ( Sánkarya ) and a confusion ( Sandeha ) in the dual nature of reality, the result of which would not be helpful to decide which is general and which particular.
Karnakagomin also refutes the dual characteristic theory of the Jainas in his own way. In his famous treatise Refutation