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Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion
without any offence to logic. All cognition be it of identity or diversity or after all are valid. They seem to be contradictory of each other simply because one of them is mistaken to be the whole truthi, In fact, “the integrity of truth consists in this very variety of its aspects, within the rational unity of an all comprehensive and ramifying principle."2 The charge of contradiction against the co-presence of being and nonbeing in the real is a figment of a priori logic. 3 (2) Is Knowledge Absolute ?
Since absoluteness is unknown to Jaina Metaphysics, so it is in its metaphysics of knowledge. The Jaina division of knowledge into immediate and mediatet is not only free from the fallacy of overlapping division but it is also based on common experiences and point out to the initial non-absolutism.
However, the professed non-absolutism becomes more explicit, when knowledge is classified into Pramana ( knowledge of a thing in its relation ). This aspect of knowledge existing
1. Sanghavi, S. : Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and
Metaphysics, Indian Studies, Past and Present, Calcutta,
1961, p. 19. 2. Desai, M. D. : The Naya-Karpika, C. J. P. H., Arrah,
1915, p. 25 ( Introduction ). 3. Mookerjee, S. : Ibid, p. 190 (Chapter I deals with 'Logi
cal Background of Jaina Philosophy' in the light of Ane
kānta Logic ). 4. Tattvārtha-Sūtra, I. 11-12; Paríkşā-Mukham of Mavikya
nandi (Ed.) S. C. Ghoshal, The Central Jaina Publishing House, 1940, II. I; Pramāpa-Mimāmsā of Hemacandra, edited by Sukhalal Sanghavi, Bhartiya Vidya Bhawan, Bombay, 1939, 1. 1-9; Nyáya-Dipikā, p. 23; Pramana
naya-tattva lokalarikára, 11. 5. Prasad, R.: His Article on "A Critical Study of Jaina
Theory of Knowledge”, in Jaina Antiquary, Vol. XV, No.
2, Jan. 1949, pp. 66-67. 6. Tattvartha-Sūtra I. 6; Nyaya-dipikā, p. 8.
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