Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion

Author(s): Ramjee Singh
Publisher: Parshwanath Shodhpith Varanasi

Page 89

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Jaina Perspective in Philosophy and Religion
there can be no omniscience. Since the objects of the world in shape of past, present and future can never be exhausted, consequently knowledge will always remain incomplete. 1
But their might be difficulties even if we regard omniscient knowledge as simultaneous, such as the following --
(1) The omniscient person comprehend contradictory things like heat and cold by a simple cognition which seems absurd.2 To this objection, it may be replied that contradictory things like heat and cold do exist at the same time, for example, where there is flash of lightning in the midst of darkness, there occurs a simultaneous perception of the two contradictory things.s
( 2 ) Then, if the whole world is known to the omniscient person, all at once, he has nothing to know any further, and so he will turn to be quite unconscious having nothing to know.4 To this, it may be said on behalf of the Jainas that the objection would have been valid if the perception of the omniscient person and the whole world were annihilated in the following instant. But both are everlasting, hence there is no absurdity in the Jaina position regarding the simultaneity of omniscient perception,5
(d) The most fundamental difference between Syādväda and Sarvajñata or Kevala-jñāna is that while the former "leads us to relative and partial truth whereas omniscience to absolute truth.". It comes within its own range. After all,
1. Prameya-kamala-martanda of Prabhacandra, Nirnaya
Sagar Press, Bombay, 1941, p. 251; Nyaya-Kumuda-Candra
of Prabhacandra, M. D. J. G. Bombay, 1938, Vol. 1, p. 88. 2. Prameya-kamala-Mártanda, p. 254. 3. Ibid, p. 260. 4. Ibid, p. 254. 5. Ibid, p. 260. 6. Anekanta-jaya-patākā of Haribhadra, Introduction, Vol.
II, p. CXX,