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An Examination of Brahma-Sūtra ( 11. 2. 33)
117
Śrīkapçha has clearly misunderstood the Jaina standpoint itself. While he accepts the possibility of reconciliation of the contradictory attributes in the same object from different standpoints, he outright denies that Jainas ever adhere to the relativistic logic?.
Lastly, Nimbārka and Bhaskara, who broadly accept the Jaina principle of identity-in-difference or unity in diversity with regard to the nature of reality, also fail to appreciate the true import of Jaina principle. Nimbārka, for instance, refuses to admit the application of this principle in matters of Syádváda. His commentator Sri Nivāsācārya's3 explanation becomes unphilosophical when he says that the justifi - cation for admitting the principle of identity in-difference lies in the Śruti and not in logic.
Bhāskarat argues that if non-absolutism ( Anekānta ) is universal, it becomes absolute ( ekanta ); if not, it is nothing definite. Thus "tossed between the two horns of the dilemma non-absolutism thus evaporates”. However, Bháskara fails to note the Jaina distinction between valid nonabsolute (samyak-anekānta ) and invalid non-absolute ( mithya-anekanta ). To be valid, anekanta must not be absolute but relative. The doctrine of non-absolutisin can be interpreted either as absolute or non-absolute according to Pramāņa or Naya respectively, which only suggests that non-absolutism is not absolute unconditionally.? But the unconditionality of
1. Śrikapçha, 'Sri Kancha-bháşya II, 22. 33 with Țika of
Appayadikşita. 2. Nimbārka, 'Nimbărka-bhașya, II. 2. 23. 3. Sri Nivāsācārya, Tika on 'Nimbarka-Bhäşya, 11. 2. 33. 4. Bhaskar Bhaşya' on Brahma-Sūtra II. 2. 33. 5. Mookerjce, S. : Ibid, p. 171. 6. Samantabhadra, 'Äpta-Mímäusa, K. 108; 'Aş'a 'Saha
sri' (Vidyapandi ), p. 290; Nyaya-dipika" ( Vidyā.
nand. ), pp. 130-131. 7. Samantabhadra, 'Svayambhu Stotra' k. 103.
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