Jain Tark Bhasha

Author(s): Yashovijay Upadhyay,
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas

Page 98

79
On the symbol three ? The name, for example, is common in every object, which is named, and in its image and in the substance. The absence of the real object, in the form of image, is also found equally in all the three, because all the three are devoid of the real. The substance also exists in the name, the image and the substance, because it is the substance which is named and of which the image is made, and, of course, the substance in the substance itself is present by its very nature; therefore, it is not proper to distinguish between these as there are no contradictory qualities in them; if this be said; no, their difference is justified, because even though they are not possessed of contradictory qualities in this way, yet in another way, contradictory qualities can be proved in them; e. g. the image is different from the name and the substance, because there we have the form, intention, conception, action and the resultant e. g., in the image of Indra, the form as being possessed of thousand eyes etc. and the intention of that person, who made the image, as to make it real Indra and the conception of Indra, of one who sees it, by looking at that form, and the action of bowing etc. of those, whose minds are engaged in devotion, and the resultant in the form of the birth of son etc., is also seen. These things are not so in the name 'Indra' and the potential Indra, and, therefore, it is different from these two. Similarly, the substance being the potential cause of the real is also different from the name and the image, e. g., a speaker, without attention, is a potential one, as at the time of attention, he becomes the cause of the real, characterised by attention, or just as the soul of a monk is potential Indra, as it is the cause of the real Indra. This is not the case with the name and the image of Indra. Similarly, the name is also different on account of the above said differences from the image and the substance. Therefore, even though the milk and the butter-milk etc. are identical from the point of view of whiteness yet, they are different from the point of view of sweetness etc. Similarly, the name etc., though identical from one point of view, are different from another point of view.
*7. One can say that only the real is the object; what is