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one-sensed can have potential verbal knowledge in the absence of dravyasruta. It is by the same logic possible for the plants to experience the objects of five senses, even without having such senses. All this is possible due to the destruction-cum-subsidence of the veil of knowledge; otherwise the plants and the one-sensed would have become omniscient (ViBha, 103). The essence of the discussion is that the is capable of having all knowledge without any external aid of senses etc.; the real obstacle in having knowledge is the veil of knowledge and not the absence of external senses. Moreover, no soul in whatsoever form, is completely devoid of knowledge, or otherwise there would be no distinction between the soul and non-soul. The one-sensed, however, do not possess any articulate speech but receive only an indistinct sound. Without the internal capacity of verbal thinking, however, the one-sensed organisms cannot have any instincts of hunger, fear, sex etc., which depend upon some such thinking that 'such and such object would be good for me'.
P. 7 L. 8. The basic idea is, as explained in ViBhā (502), quoted by Pandit Sukhalalji, that whatever causes the bhāvaśruta is the dravyasruta and as such, sighs etc. as indicator of misery etc., are also a sort of a non-alphabetical verbal knowledge.
P. 7 L.10. Dr. Tatia has (Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 50 and pp. 53-55) beautifully analysed the position of the Jaina scriptures on the nature of sanjñi and asañjni śruta, which we summarise as follows: sanjña has three connotations (i) Discursive thinking, taking into account the past, the present and the future. This is called dirghakalika (ii) Discriminative power between good and bad only with reference to the present. This is called hetūpadesika, (iii) Knowledge of right scriptures. This is called dr tivādopadeśiki. The word asañjñā has also three connotations: (i) Weak mind, (ii) Absence of mind, (iii) Perverted knowledge. Besides üha or instinct is also called sanjña in comparison to that which has no instinct either.
Thus the first sañña is that of instincts possessed by one-sensed organisms, the second is the discriminative power between good and bad, possessed by the two or more sensed organisms, the third is discursive thinking which takes into
