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124
Jain-Tarka-Bhasa
that the same are the parts of an inference-for-others. The earlier Jaina logicians suggested the use of illustration also as the third part. Compare Apta Mimaṁsā (6, 17, 18, 27) and Nyāyāvatāra (13, 19). Akalanka and other Jaina logicians including Yarovijaya, who followed him, did not consider illustration as a part of syllogism. Devasüri went to the extent of accepting that in cases of exceptionally intelligent person the use of the probane only may also suffice (Syadvādaratnākara, p. 548). This is, however, the position which is held generally by the Buddhist and is refuted here. Amongst the Buddhists also Dharmakirti had accepted two parts in Vadanyāya (p.61). In the Pramāņavārttika (1.128), however, he accepted only probane as the part of syllogism. All this shows a tendency to reduce the number of the parts of syllogism. The fact, that the Jaina logicians including rasovijaya (the text p.16, para 51) accepted the utility of other parts of syllogism also with reference to persons of dull wit, shows that the Jaina view has not been rigid about the parts of syllogism. The stand of Devasūri, who even agreed with the Buddhists, shows the liberality of the faina approach, which is based on relativity.
rasovijaya and majority of the faina logicians have, however, refuted the position of the Buddhists, who hold that thesis may also be eliminated from the syllogism as it may be known from the context itself.
P.15. L. 12-20. The arguments of rašovijaya against the Buddhists' view-point can be explained as follows: the probane can also be presumed from the context. When one says that the word is transitory, the probane of being produced by effort is also known impliedly, at least, to some intelligent persons; and, therefore, may be eliminated in such cases. It is, in fact, not a question of knowing impliedly, but of making the validity of the relationship of the qualified object and the quality, explicitly clear. For this, the mention of the qualified object is as necessary as that of the probane.
P. 15. para 48. Here we find very strange view-point of the Sāňkhya school. Everybody accepts inference forothers as inference, where persons other than the self are conveyed the conclusion of the inference by using syllogism.
