Jain Tark Bhasha

Author(s): Yashovijay Upadhyay,
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/007598/1

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CONTENTS
1. CONTENTS
III-IX 2. INTRODUCTION
X-XVII 3. TEXT
१-३० १. प्रमाणपरिच्छेदः
पृ. १-२१ । (The numericals indicate the para) मंगलाचरणम्
प्रमाणसामान्यस्य लक्षणनिरूपणम्-१, लब्धीन्द्रियमेव प्रमाणामति मतस्य खण्डनम्-२;
प्रत्यक्षलक्षणम्-३; प्रत्यक्षस्य सांव्यवहारिक-पारमार्थिकत्वाभ्यां द्विधा विभजनम्-४;
सांव्यवहारिकस्येन्द्रियजा निन्द्रियजभेदाभ्यां द्विधा द्वयोश्चानयोः पुनर्मतिश्रुतभेदानां द्विधा विभजनम् मतिश्रुतयोविवेकश्च-५;
मतिज्ञानस्य चतुर्विधत्वम्-६; व्यञ्जनावग्रहस्य नयन-मनोवर्जेन्द्रियभेदाच्वातुर्विध्यप्रदर्शनप्रसङ्गे मनसश्चक्षुषोश्च प्राप्यकारित्वसिद्धान्तखण्डनम्-७;
अर्थावग्रहस्य निरूपणम्-८;
बालस्य सामान्यग्रहणं परिचितविषयस्य विशेषज्ञान मित्यपेक्षया, तेन शब्द इत्यवगृहीत इति नानुपन्न मिति मतस्य खण्डनम्-६; आलोचनापूर्व केऽर्थावग्रहे सत्यालोचनं सामान्य ग्राहि तथार्थावग्रह इतरव्यावृत्तवस्तुस्वरूपग्राहीति न सूत्रानुपपत्तिरिति मतस्य खण्डन म्-१०; नैश्चयिकव्यावहारिकत्वाभ्यां द्विविधेऽवग्रहे क्षिप्रेतरादिभेदसङ्गतिः-११;
ईहानिरूपणम्-१२; अवायः-१३; धारण। तस्यास्वैविध्यञ्च-१४; व्युत्पत्त्यर्थमनुसृत्यासद्भतार्थविशेषव्यतिरेकावधारणमपायः, सद्भतार्थविशेषावधारणञ्च धारणेति मतखण्डनम्-१५;
गृहीतग्राहित्वादविच्युतिस्मृतिलक्षणो ज्ञानभेदी न प्रमाणमिति मतस्य धारणा क्वापि न घटत इति मतस्य च खण्डनम्-१६
अवग्रहादीनामुत्क्रमव्यतिक्रमाभ्यां न्यूनत्वेन वानुत्पादनं पत्रिंशदधिकानि त्रीणि शतानि मते दाश्च-१७;

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( iv ) श्रुतज्ञानस्य चतुर्दशभेदाः १८: पारमार्थिक-प्रत्यक्षस्य लक्षणं त्रैविध्यमवधेर्लक्षणं षट्भेदत्वञ्च-१६; मनःपर्यवज्ञानस्य लक्षणं द्वैविध्यञ्च-२०;
केवलज्ञाननिरूपणम्-२१; केवलज्ञानस्य योगजधर्मानुगृहीतमनोजन्यत्वमात्रखण्डनम्-२२; केवलभोजिनः कैवल्यं नेति दिगम्बरमतखण्डनम्-२३;
परोक्षस्य लक्षणं पञ्चप्रकारकत्वं स्मृतेरप्रामाण्यखण्डनञ्च-२४;
प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य निरूपणम्-२५; नैकं प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्वरूपमिति बौद्धमतखण्डनम्-२६; पूर्वदर्शनाहितसंस्कारप्रबोधोत्पन्नस्मृति-सहायमिन्द्रियं प्रत्यभिज्ञानमुत्पादयतीति मतखण्डनम्-२७;
सादृश्यज्ञानं तूपमानं न प्रत्यभिज्ञानमिति मीमांसकानां मतस्य खण्डनम् -२८;
सज्ञासज्ञिसम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिरूपमुपमानमिति नैयायिकानां मतस्य खण्डनम् -२६;
तर्कस्य लक्षणनिरूपणम्-३०; भूयोदर्शनव्यभिचारादर्शनसहकृतेनेन्द्रियेण व्याप्तिग्रहोऽस्त्विति मतं खण्डयित्वा तर्कस्य प्रामाण्यस्थापना-३१, प्रत्यक्षपृष्ठभाविविकल्परूपत्वान्न तर्कः प्रमाणमिति बौद्धमतस्य खण्डनम्-३२; व्याप्यस्याहार्यारोपेण व्यापकस्याहार्यप्रसञ्जनं तर्कः, न चायं स्वतःप्रमाणमिति नैयायिकमतस्य खण्डनम्-३३;
अनुमानस्य लक्षणं द्विधा विभजनञ्च-३४; हेतोर्लक्षणप्रसङ्गे त्रिलक्षण एव हेतुरिति बौद्धानां मतस्य खण्डनम्-३५, पक्षधर्मताऽनुमितो नाङ्गमिति प्रतिपादनम् –३६; सार्वत्रिक्याः व्याप्तेविषयभेदमात्रेणान्तर्व्याप्तिबहिर्व्याप्तित्वाभ्यां भेदस्य दुर्वचत्वम् पाञ्चरूप्यं हेतुलक्षणमिति नैयायिकमतस्य च खण्डनम्
साध्यलक्षणनिरूपणम्-३८; कथायां शङ्कितस्यैव साध्यस्य साधनं युक्तमिति मतस्य खण्डनम्-३६; साध्यलक्षणेऽनिराकृतमिति वादिप्रतिवाद्युभयापेक्षयाभीप्सितमिति च वाद्यपेक्षयवोक्तम्-४०; व्याप्तिग्रहणसमयापेक्षया धर्म एव साध्यमानमानिकप्रतिपत्त्यवसरापेक्षया च तद्विशिष्टः प्रसिद्धो धर्मः साध्यम्-४१ धर्मिणः प्रसिद्धिः प्रमाणात् विकल्पात् प्रमाणविकल्पाभ्याञ्चेति-४२; विकल्पसिद्धे धमिरिण न सत्ता साध्येति बौद्धमतस्य खण्डनम् -४३; विकल्पसिद्धो धर्मो नास्त्येवेति नैयायिकमतस्य खण्डनम्-४४; विकल्पसिद्धस्य धर्मिणो नाखण्डस्यैव भानम्-४५; खण्डशः प्रसिद्धपदार्थास्तित्वनास्तित्वसाधनौचित्यम्-४६; परार्थानुमानस्य लक्षणनिरूपणप्रसङ्गे पक्षस्याप्रयोग इनि सौगतस्य मतस्य खण्डनम्-४८; हेतोः साध्योपपत्त्यनुपपत्तिभ्यां द्विधा प्रयोगः-४६; पक्षहेतु

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( v )
वचनलक्षणमवयवद्वयमेव परप्रतिपत्त्यङ्गम् - ५० मन्दमतींस्तु प्रति दृष्टान्तोपनयनिगमनप्रयोगः पक्षशुद्ध्यादिप्रयोगश्चेति दशावयवो हेतु : – ५१;
हेतोर्विविधाः भेदा: विधिरूपो विधिसाधको हेतुः षोढा - ५२; विधिरूपो निषेधसाधको हेतुः सप्तधा - ५३; प्रतिषेधरूपो विधिसाधकः पञ्चधा - ५४; प्रतिषेधरूपः प्रतिषेधसाधकः सप्तधा - ५५;
त्रिधा हेत्वाभास: - ५६; अन्यतरासिद्धस्य हेत्वाभासस्य सिद्धि: - ५७; विरुद्धलक्षणम् - ५८, अनैकान्तिकलक्षरणम् - ५६; धर्मभूषरणप्रतिपादिता किञ्चित्कराख्यहेत्वाभासस्य खण्डनम् - ६० ;
आगमप्रमाणलक्षणनिरूपणम् - ६१; आगमे सप्तभङ्गी - ६२;
सप्तभङ्गानां स्वरूपम्—६३; सप्तभङ्गानां सकला देशस्वभावत्वं विकलादेशस्वभावत्वञ्च – ६४; कालाद्यष्टानामभेदभेदयोर्विनियोगः - ६५ ;
२. नयपरिच्छेदः
पृ० २१ - २५; नयस्वरूपनिरूपणं नयानां द्रव्यार्थिकपर्यायार्थिकत्वाभ्यां द्विधा विभजनमनयोश्च भेदेषु ऋजुसूत्रस्य जिनभद्रगरिणमते द्रव्यार्थिकेऽन्तर्भावः – १ ; नैगमनयनिरूपणम् – २; सङ्ग्रहनयनिरूपणम् – ३; ऋजुमूत्रनयनिरूपणम् – ४; शब्दनयनिरूपणम् – ५; समभिरूढनयनिरूपणम् - ६; एवम्भूतनयनिरूपणम् – ७; अर्थशब्दनययोविवेकः, अपितानपितनयो व्यवहारनिश्चयनयौ च नयेषु बहुविषयाल्पविषयत्वाभ्यां क्रमिकत्वम् - ; नयेष्वपि सप्तभङ्गीयोजना – १० ; नयाभासेष्वजैन मतानामन्तर्भावः - ११,
३. निक्षेपपरिच्छेदः
पृ० २५- ३०;
निक्षेपस्य लक्षणं भेदाश्च - १; नामनिक्षेपः - २; स्थापनानिक्षेपः - ३; द्रव्यनिक्षेप :- ४; भावनिक्षेपः - ५; चतुर्णां निक्षेपारणामभेदनिराकरणम् – ६, भावस्यावशिष्टानाञ्च नयानां परस्परमभेदो भेदश्च, निक्षेपारणां नयेषु योजनात्र जिनभद्रगरणीनां मतचर्चा च-८;
जीवविषये निक्षेपाः भावाभावविषये तत्त्वार्थटीकाकृतश्च मतम् - ६; संसा रिजीवे द्रव्यत्वेऽपि भावत्वाविरोधः ।
प्रशस्तिश्लोकाः
पृ० ३० ।
4. TRANSLATION
On the Organ of Knowledge
pp. 33-70.
(The numericals indicate the para)
Salutations-The investigation into the definition of the pramāna in general – 1; refutation of the view-point that sense qua attainment is the pramāna—2;
Definition of perceptual cognition—3; division of perceptual division into two: the empirical and the transcendental

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(vi)
- t; division of the empirical into two-sensuous and quasisensuous, further division of the two into two-sensuous cognition and scriptural knowledge and the distinction between the sensuous cognition and scriptural knowledge—5;
Four divisions of sensuous cognition—6; refutation of the contactory nature of mind and sight while demonstrating the four types of contact-awareness in accordance with the number of the senses except eyes and mind-7;
Treatment of object-perception—8; refutation of the view point that it is not logically incoherent to say that he cognises the word' from the point of view of the fact that a child's cognition is that of general nature and for a man who is conversant with the object, the cognition is special-9; refutation of the viewpoint that the scriptural statement is not inconsistent because as object-perception is preceded by intuitional cognition, intuitional cognition cognises indistinct general features whereas the object perception cognises the form of the object as distinct from other objects—10; the classification of the perception into two; the transcendental and empirical and thereby justification for the varieties of quick and otherwise, etc.-11
Investigation of speculation-12; perceptual judgement -13; retention and its three-fold classification-14; refutation of the view-point that in accordance with the etymological meaning, perceptual judgement is the determination of distinction from the non-existent particular and retention is determination of the existent particular-15;
Refutation of the view point that the two forms of knowledge, the absence of lapse and the memory, as cogniser of the already cognised, are not organ of knowledge and that no retention is compatible,–16; non-occurrence of the determinate perception etc. in a perverted or disturbed order or deficiently and three hundred and thirty six varieties of sensuous knowledge-17;
Fourteen varieties of verbal knowledge-18;
Definition of transcendental perception and its classification into three, as also the definition of clairvoyance and its classification into six-19;
Definition of telepathy and its classification into two-20; investigation into pure knowledge-21; refutation of the view

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(vii)
point that pure knowledge is born of mind only purified by the qualities by spiritual practices-22; refutation of the Digambara view-point that a person who takes morsels of food, cannot have pure knowledge-23;
Definition of non-perceptual and its classification into five and refutation of the view-point that memory is nonorgan of knowledge-24;
Investigation into recognition-25; refutation of Buddhistic view-point that there is no such one knowledge as recognition-26; refutation of the view-point that recognition is produced by senses with the help of the memory, produced by the awakening of the latent impressions, born at the time of first sight at the time of the next sight-27;
Refutation of the Mimämsä view-point that the knowledge of similarity is analogical and not recognition-28;
Refutation of the Naiyayika view-point that analogy is the cognition of the relationship of word and its meaning -29;
Investigation into reasoning-30; in support of the reasoning as organ of knowledge by refuting the view-point that the concomitance may be said to be perceived by the sense helped by repeated sight and by non-observation of any exception-31; refutation of the Buddhistic view point that reasoning is not an organ of knowledge as being in the form of an after-thought coming after the direct perception-32; refutation of the Naiyayika view-point that reasoning is the reference to determinant concomitance when there is a doubt about determinate concomitant and it is not in itself an organ of knowledge-33;
Definition of inference and its classification into two-34; while defining cause, refutation of the Buddhist view-point that the cause has three characteristics-35; elaboration of the theory that subsistence in the subject is not a part of the inference-36; the incoherence of differentiating between internal concomitance and external concomitance merely on account of the difference in its subject, because concomitance is universal and refutation of the Naiyayika view-point that cause has five characteristics-37;

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(viii
)
The discussion of the nature of probandum-38; refutation of the view-point that only a doubtful thing can be established as a probandum in a debate-39; the epithet of 'not refuted' is given in connection with both the speaker and the opponent whereas the epithet of being desirable' is said only with reference to the speaker-40; from the point of view of grasping the concomitance, the quality itself is the probandum whereas from the point of view of inference, the well-known subject, together with its quality to be proved, is the probandum-41; the qualified object is known as proved, optionally and both ways—42; refutation of the Buddhistic view-point that existence cannot be probandum in the qualified subject which is optional-43; refutation of the Naiyāyika view-point that there is no qualified object which is optionally proved-44; the qualified object which is proved optionally is not experienced in toto—45; propriety of proving the existence or nonexistence, in part, of the well known object-46:
While discussing the inference-for-others, refutation of the Buddhistic view that the subject should not be expressively said-47; refutation of the view point that the inference-forothers is only that where a statement is given from the scriptures of the opponent to prove a thing—48; the two ways of using the causeas concomitant with the probandum and as being one-impossible-without-the-other-49; only two-the statement of the thesis and the cause-are the parts of inference for others-50; for a person of dull wit, the use of illustration, application and conclusion and the use of purification of the thesis etc. should also be made, and thus the cause can have even ten parts-51;
The varieties of cause, six types of that positive cause which proves something positive–52; seven types of that positive cause which proves something negative-53; five types of that negative cause which proves something positive—54; seven types of that negative cause which proves something negative-55;
Three varieties of fallacy-56; establishing the fallacy unproved for either—57; definition of contradictory cause-58; definition of inconclusive—59; non-acceptability of the fallacy 'immaterial' accepted by Dharmabhūşana-60; investigation of

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the definition of the organ of knowledge, viz., scriptures-61; seven-fold way of statement in the scriptures-62; the nature of seven-fold statement-63; the full and the partial seven-fold statement—64; identification and difference with reference to time etc.-65. 2. On the partial point of view
pp. 71-77. Treatment of the nature of the partial point of view, its classification into two : of the modes and of the substance; the inclusion of analytic stand-point in the substantial according to Jinabhadragani—1; the non-distinguished stand-point-2; the generic stand-point-3; the analycic stand-point-4; the verbal stand point-5; the subtle stand-point-6; the such-like stand-point
-7; difference between points of view of meaning and words, implied view-point and unimplied view-point, real view-point and empirical view-point, the view-points of knowledge and action-8; the gradual degree of points of view which covers much and less—9; the application of seven-fold statement with reference to points of view also-10; the inclusion of non-Jaina schools in the false points of view while discussing their nature-11.
3. On the symbol
pp. 77-84. The definition of symbol and its varieties--1; the symbol of name-2; the symbol of replacement-3; the symbol of substance-4; the actual symbol-5; the refutation of the concept of non-difference of the four symbols-6; the non-difference and difference between actual symbol and other symbols-7; adjustment of the symbols in the points of view and the opinion of Jinabhadragani in this context-8; the symbols with reference to soul and the opinion of the commentator of the Tattvārtha (Tattvārthabhāş yavrtti) 9; the coherence of actual symbol with reference to mundane soul which are substantial-10.
4. EULOGY 5. NOTES
89-145 6. INDEX OF THE SANSKRIT WORDS 146-162 7. INDEX OF THE WORKS QUOTED 163-164 8. INDEX OF THE NOTES
165-167 9. BIBLIOGRAPHY.
168-173
85

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INTRODUCTION
About five years ago, I wrote in the preface of my work, Jaina Ethics : "the metaphysical Reality or Truth of logical coherence must remain merely a theoretical possibility unless it is translated into good of life through right living. In fact, the reality or truth is supra-logical and can be better realized by living it practically than by speculating on it intellectually."
Little did I know that I myself may have to write one day on the truth of logical coherence from the Jaina point of view. I had an occasion to guide a Jaina nun in the intricacies of the Jaina Tarka Bhāșă of Ācārya Yašovijaya. I was attracted by the maturity and depth of the work. Therefore, when Dr. R. C. Pandey, Professor and Head of the Depart. ment of Buddhist Studies, University of Delhi, Delhi, suggested that I should take up the translation of this work and when M/S Moti Lal Banarasidass offered to publish my translation with annotations, I gladly took up the work.
This effort of mine is humble in more than one way. In the first place, I have had no opportunity to study the subject of Jaina logic at the feet of a qualified Guru and as Pt. Sukha Lala Ji in his introduction to Jaina Tarka Bhīşa has observed, “it is not possible to follow a work like Jaina Tarka Bhāșa with out having a certain back-ground of the subject" and as Dr. Satakari Mookerjee has made the same observation regarding the Pramāna Mimāṁsa,my attempt to write a commentary on the Faina Tarka Bhāṣā is indeed a courageous step. My only help, however, in this task have been the works of my predecessors. Though all such works have been noted in the bibliography, special mention, however, may be made of the works of Pt. Sukhalalji whom I have followed in my text and whose notes on the Pramāna Mimāṁsā have been my guide throughout
1. PP. 8-9. 2. Mookerjee, Pramānamimäisā, preface, p. XI.

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the work. In fact for the depth with which Pt. Sukhalal Ji has approached the problem of Jaina logic, it is very difficult for anybody to write anything on Jaina logic without being largely influenced by his works. No better compliments to Pt. Sukhlal Ji can be paid than that of Dr. Satakari Mookerjee : 'Pt. Sukhalala Ji is the most learned man in the faina community and one of the foremost scholars of India. His knowledge of the Buddhist, Jaina and Nyāya systems is astounding and this has enabled him to edit the master pieces of Jaina Philosophy with perfect mastery and accuracy. The world will remain indebted to him for his contributions. He is one of the few intellectual stalwarts in the traditional field of Sanskrit scholarship that still are left to us'.1
The development of the art of logic is rather a late phenomenon. This art of logic in India is invariably connected with religion and spiritualism. Still it has been claimed that it is a separate branch of learning. The fact the science of logic is claimed to be a source of equanimity in misery and pleasures brings in very near to spiritualism, though this fact has perhaps escaped the notice of the classical authors. The ancient people, however, were conscious of the desirability as well as non-desirability of logic. This contradiction can be solved by understanding that the Reality is supra-logical but not illogical. The orthodox authors have perhaps not mentioned clearly this point also. The logic can take us to a certain point and is, therefore, useful, but because it cannot take us beyond a certain point, it becomes useless and it also becomes harmful when we insist that it should lead us to the Ultimate Reality. It may be said in other words that from spiritual point of view the utility of logic consists in showing the futility of logic for realisation of the Ultimate.
1. Mookerjee, Pramānamimāṁsā, preface. p. XIV.
CF Nyayabhāsya. 1.1.1. 3. Arthaśāstra, 1.2 qisqet er afavara194fa Also Nitivākyā.
mȚta, 5.56, syna a fastafa atrada faida 4. Gitā, 2.38. 5. Rāmāyana (Ayodhyā kāņda). 100.39; and Mahābhārata (Santiparva),
180. 17.49. and Manusmrti 11.106. 6. rajñavalkyasmrti, 1.3 and Arthasästra, chapter 2.

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Whatever the position, it is a fact that there has been a a tussle between the two view-points-the pro-logic and the anti-logic. The Jainas, true to their philosophy of neutrality, kept themselves aloof from all tussles in the beginning, but ultimately they had also to develop a science of logic of their own. This became necessary to defend oneself from the attacks of the opponents, who had begun challenging the rationality of the Jaina viewpoint. Not only this but it might have been also felt that a creed needs to be presented in an appealing form so that it could become popular. All scholars of philosophy, therefore, devoted themselves to the science of logic.
As far as the Jainas are concerned, they could find the basis for their system of logic in their scriptures themselves. It is but natural, because any thinking is, after all, based on some logic; that it may not have been systematised, is a different question. The Jaina logicians rightly caught the spirit of Jaina scriptures when they said that the main theme of the Jainism is non-absolutism (anekāntavāda) and that every statement is to be accepted only relatively true (syadvada).
Pandit Dalsukhbhai Malavaniya has shown how we can find the germs of non-absolutism in the Jaina scriptures and we need not repeat it here. Similarly, he has also dealt with the seven-fold statement, as found in the Jaina scriptures The theory of the partial point of view (Text, chapter II) has also its origin in the Jaina scriptures.3
The other topics discussed in our text are also mostly dealt with in the faina scriptures. The five types of kr (Text, pp. 2-8) are mentioned by the Bhagavatısūtra* and the Sthānāngasutra, in addition to the Nandısūtra which discusses only the varieties of knowledge in detail. Our author, Yasovijaya, has mainly followed Višeşāvašyakabhāsya in this context. As regards other topics, Anuyogadvāra mentions four types of
1. Āgamayuga kå Jaina Darsana, Agra, 1966, pp 51-91. 2. Ibid, pp. 92-115. 3. Ibid, pp. 114-124. 4. 88.2.317. 5. Sutra, 77. 6. Sutra, 59.

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organ of knowledge (Text. 1.3 and 1-24). The three types of the inference, mentioned in the Jaina scriptures are replaced by two varieties of our text (1.34). The same is the case with Hindu logic also where the Nyāyasūtra gives the same three varities as given in the Jaina scriptures and the later books like Tarkasangraha mention the same two varieties as given in our Text. The Jaina scriptures also mention five types of causes3 (Cf text 1.52 and 1.54). The other tradition mentioned in the Sthānāngasūtra is nearer to the description of our text. Our text (1.50) has accepted only two parts of syllogism whereas Bhadrabāhu in his Daśavaikālikaniryukti' has given a syllogism consisting of ten parts. The art of debate, which occupied an important place not only in the Jaina scriptures but in the ancient Hindu logic also?, was later on neglected in both the traditions. We, therefore, refrain from giving the details about this aspect.
The above account is based on the Jaina āgamas which assume their present form in 533 A.D. (according to the followers of Škandila) or 466 A.D. (according to the followers of Nagārjuna). There are some authors, who are placed earlier than this period, and who have contributed to the development of Jaina logic. The first of such authors is Kundakundācārya who is generally placed in the middle of the 3rd century A.D.'
Acārya Kundakunda justified10 the special meaning attributed to the term 'direct perception' by the Jaina logicians. (Text-1.3 and 1.4) As regards the concept of omniscience (Text 1.21) he made the remarkable statement that from real point of view the omniscient knows only the self.11 As regards the seven-fold statement, Kundakundācārya agrees with
1. Agama Yuga Kā Jaina Darsana, p. 148. 2. Nyāyas tra. 1.1.5. 3. Agama Yuga Kā Jaina Darsana, p. 151-152. 4. See Ibid, p. 159. 5. Gātha, 92 ff and also Găthā, 137. 6. Agama Yuga Kā Jaina Darsana, Chapter IV.
Cf. Nayasútra, 1.1.1. 8. Bhārgava, D., Jaina Ethics, p. 228. For detail see pp. 223-228.
9. lbid, p. 247. 10. Pravacanasāra, 1.57,58. 11. Niyamasāra, 158.

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out text (1.63) in placing the inexplicable mode of saying at the fourth place but in the Pravacanasāraa he himself places it in the third place.
Next comes Umāsvāmi (known as Umāsvāti in the Svetāmbara tradition) who is placed in the third century A.D. He mentions along with the organs of knowledge the partial view point also. He, however, mentions only five view points in place of seven in our text (2.1). This is, of course according to the Svetāmbara reading. The Digambara reading is different and gives all the seven view points. Umāsvāti, in his autocommentary on the Tattvarthasūtra, explains that the partial view points do not represent any Jaina subjects or non-Jaina schools but are only the different aspects of looking at an object. After Umāsvāti come Acarya Siddhas ena and Samantabhadra, both of whom could be placed near about fourth century A. D. Here we need not go into the controversy as to who of them preceded. It appears that this controversy has assumed a sectarian colour, as all the Svetambara scholars insist on the precedence of Siddhasena whereas the Digambara scholars insist on the precedence of Samantabhadra. The question is considered to be important because one, who preceded of the two, would be given the credit of laying the foundation of Jaina logic. We, however, do not enter this controversy.
The definition of the organ of knowledge in our Text (1. 1) was given by Siddhasena.? He also gave the definition of causes which is substantially the same as given in our Text. (1. 35). He also made distinction between internal concomitance and external concomitance (Text; 1. 37). The distinction of the empirical and the transcendental perceptual cognition (Text, 1.4) was also made by him for the first time. Besides,
1. Pancāstikāya, 14. 2. 2.23. 3. Bhargava, D., Jaina Ethics, p. 251. 4. Tattvārthasitra, 1.6. 5. Ibid, 1.34. T V4 fameur: 1 6. Auto-commentary, Ibid., 1.35. 7. Nyāyāvatāra, I 8. Ibid, 22. 9. lbid, 20.

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he also wrote on such famous topics of logic as inference-forthe-self and inference-for-others. the fallacies of the thesis, cause, homogeneous example and heterogeneous example and the resultant of the organ of knowledge.
The other work of Siddhasena, Sanmati prakarana, describes the partial view point, knowledge and indeterminate intuition and the different schools from the point of view of non-absolutism. The inclusion of different non-Jaina schools in different partial view points was first initiated by Siddhasenal (Cf. Text 2-11)
Samantabhadra in his Aptamimāṁsa has laid emphasis on non-absolutism and seven-fold statements. His definition of organ of knowledge is very much similar to that of our Text (1.1). The main emphasis of Samantab hadra has been to show the irrelevance of absolutism. In this description he has shown the irrationality of the non-Jaina system as also the possibility of reconciliation of contradictory view points. Another important work from our point of view is the Višeşāvasyaka bhasya of Jinabhadra Gani who flourished from 484-588 A.D.3 Much of the description of 5 types of knowledge in our Text is nothing but a summary of the Visesavasyaka-bhāş ya bịhadurtti. Similarly the portion on partial point of view is also influenced by it.
Another author who laid down the foundation ofa regular system of Jaina logic was Akalanka who has been placed in about 760 A.D. Akalanka has the same place in the faina philosophy as Dinnāga and Dharmakirli in the Buddhist philosophy. Akalanka's influence on our author is seen specially in the description of partial point of view. It is also to be noted that the division of our Text into three chapters-organ of knowledge, partial point of view and symbols—is also taken from Akalanka's Laghiyastrayi. After Akalanka came Vidyānanda who commented upon both-Samantabhadra and Akalavika. His influence on our Text is clear on the chapter on partial point of view. He has been placed in the 9th century A.D.5
1. Sanmati prakarana, 3.47-49. 2. Svayambh ūstotra, 63. 3. Vidyābhūşana Satisacandra, History of Indian Logic, p. 181. 4. Ibid, p. 18.5. 5. Vidyābhūşana, S. C., A History of Indian Logic, p. 186.

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Acārya Māņikyanandı who wrote Parikṣāmukha, a standard Text book on Jaina logic, came after Akalanka and is placed in 10th century A.D. Anantavirya who wrote Prameyaratnamåla, a commentary on Parikşāmukha, says that he churned the nectar of Logic-out of the ocean of the speech of Akalanka.? The book is divided into six chapters. In the first chapter the division of Pramana has been given in the same way as in our Text (1.24). The definition of inference of our Text (1.34) has been directly taken from Pariksamukha.3 Manikyanandı has given like our Text many subdivisions of cause. He writes a different chapter on fallacy giving examples of fallacies of eight types of organs of knowledge. Our Text has followed Akalanka in dividing his chapter whereas in style it comes nearer to the Sutra style of Parikşamukha.
Manikyanandı is followed by great commentators Prabhacandra (11th century A.D.) who wrote Prameyakamalamārtanda] on Pariksämukha and Nyayakumudacandra on Laghiyastrayi. These commentaries are very voluminous and deal with the nonJaina systems in detail. Our author has a limited purpose of presenting Jaina logic in concise form in the new terminology of neo-logic and, therefore, he could not make much use of these commentaries in his work. Similarly the influence of the voluminous commentary (1000 A.D.) of Abhayadeva Sûri on Sanmati Tarka is also negligible.
The greatest influence on our Text is, however, that of Pramānanayatattvälokalankara of Deva Suri (1086-1159 A.D.) Our Text can, in fact, be said to be just a recast of this work. It may be argued that if it is so, our author cannot be said to be an original thinker. I would like to reproduce the words of Dr. Satakari Mookerjee in this connection. “As regards the originality of thought which is so highly praised in Europe and in the modern universities of India, our ancient writers did not set an inordinate value on it. It was as much a matter of
1. Săstri Kailasacandra, Faina Nyāya p. 38. 2. अकलङ्कवचोऽम्भोघेरुद्दभ्रे येन धीमता। न्यायविद्यामृतं तस्मै नमो माणिक्यनन्दिने ।।
-Prameyaratna-mālā, 2. 3. Sutra 9. 4. Sastri, Kailasa Chandra, Jaina Nyāya, p. 39. 5. Vidyābhūşana, S.C., A History of Indian Logic, p. 198.

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Acārya Manikyanandı who wrote Parikşamukha, a standard Text book on Jaina logic, came after Akalanka and is placed in 10th century A.D. Anantavirya who wrote Prameyaratnamāla, a commentary on Parikşāmukha, says that he churned the nectar of Logic-out of the ocean of the speech of Akalanka. The book is divided into six chapters. In the first chapter the division of Pramana has been given in the same way as in our Text (1.24). The definition of inference of our Text (1.34) has been directly taken from Parikşamukha.3 Manikyanandı has given like our Text many subdivisions of cause. He writes a different chapter on fallacy giving examples of fallacies of eight types of organs of knowledge. Our Text has followed Akalanka in dividing his chapter whereas in style it comes nearer to the Sutra style of Parikşamukha.
Manikyanandı is followed by great commentators Prabhacandra (11th century A.D.)' who wrote Prameyakamalamārtanda on Pariksāmukha and Nyayakumudacandra on Laghlyastrayi. These commentaries are very voluminous and deal with the nonJaina systems in detail. Our author has a limited purpose of presenting Jaina logic in concise form in the new terminology of neo-logic and, therefore, he could not make much use of these commentaries in his work. Similarly the influence of the voluminous commentary (1000 A.D.) of Abhayadeva Sūri on Sanmati Tarka is also negligible.
The greatest influence on our Text is, however, that of Pramānanayatattvälokalankara of Deva Suri (1086-1159 A.D.') Our Text can, in fact, be said to be just a recast of this work. It may be argued that if it is so, our author cannot be said to be an original thinker. I would like to reproduce the words of Dr. Satakari Mookerjee in this connection. "As regards the originality of thought which is so highly praised in Europe and in the modern universities of India, our ancient writers did not set an inordinate value on it. It was as much a matter of
1. Sastri Kailasacandra, Faina Nyāya p. 33. 2. प्रकलङ्कवचोऽम्भोधेरुद्दधे येन धीमता। न्यायविद्यामृतं तस्मै नमो माणिक्यनन्दिने ।।
-Prameyaratna-mālā, 2. 3. Sutra 9. 4. Sastri, Kailasa Chandra, Jaina Nyāya, p. 39. 5. Vidyabhūşana, S.C., A History of Indian Logic, p. 198.

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( xviii) minorimportance with them as originality of verbal expression. A serious work of philosophical topic did not hold an isolated position in India. It was rather a link in the expanding chain of philosophical speculation. And what was the object of serious concern was fidelity to the fundamentals of the schools and originality was more or less suspect with adherence of the system as rather furnishing a pit for error and misconception. We must not, therefore, expect either originality of expression or of thought in the sense of abrupt departure from the fundamental tenets which give the school a stamp of the distinctive individuality."1
Deva Sūri also wrote an auto-commentary Syadvada-ratnakara on Pramāṇanayatattvālokālankāra. The influence of Deva Sūri's word on faina-Tarka bhāṣā can be very well known by looking at the footnotes of this work edited by Pandit Sukha Lal Ji.
Except some other minor Jaina logicians who preceded Yasovijaya mention may be made of Hemacandra Sūri and Hari bhadra Sūri. Hemacandrasūri's work Pramāņa Mimāṁsā (1088 11772 A.D.) has been very ably commented upon by Pandita Sukhalalji and translated by Satakari Mookerjee. Haribhadra Sūri (about 1120 A.D.): is said to have written 140 works. He is said to have written a commentary on Anekānta Jayapataka. Mention may also be made of Dharmabhūşana (1600 A.D.)* who is the author of Nyāyadipikā and has been mentioned by name in our Text (1.33. L.25).
And lastly comes our author rasovijaya Gani (1608-1688 A.D.)' whose date and life history can be fortunately known from Sujaśavelibhasa, a work written in ancient Gujarati by his contemporary Kantivijaya Gani. He was born in Kano dum near Kalola in Gujarata and died at Dabhoi in 1688 A.D. His father's name was Nārāyana and mother's name was Sobhagade. He was a disciple of Naya Vijaya who was third in line to Harivijaya (1526-1595A.D) who was contemporary of Moghul
1. Mookerjet Satakari, Preface, Pramāna Mimärsā, p. X. 2. Vidya bhūsana S. C.. A History of Indian Logic, p. 205. 3. Ibid, p. 208. 4. Ibid, p. 215. 5. Ibid, p. 217.

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Emperor, Akbar. Hari Vijaya's disciple was Kalyāna Vijaya. Kalyāņa Vijaya's disciple was Lābhavijaya. And rasovijaya's teacher Naya Vijaya was the disciple of Labhavijaya. A businessman, Dhanaji Suri, sent rašovijaya to Kāśi for higher studies in 1626 A.D. He made a special study of logic there and got the titles of Nyaya Visārada and Nyāyācārya. He himself says that he has written one hundred works. A list of seventy-two works of rašovijaya has been given by Pandit Sukhalal fi. Forty of these works are fully available, seven works are partly available and twentyfive works are not available at all. Out of these works written by rafovijaya, it would be noticed that sixteen works are on Jaina logic, out of which only eight are available today. Out of these Nayarahasya has been referred to in our text also (p. 29.6.8). Out of the remaining works, Nyāya-khanda-khādya is written on the style of Khandana khanda khădya and Astasahasrt urtti is a gloss on the Astasähasrt of Vidyānanda. Nyāyakhandakhādya deals with soul, emancipation, momentariness, origination, destruction, non-absolutism, class and individual, space and time, determinant concomitant and determinate concomitant etc. It mentions amongst others, Samantabhadra, Gandhahasti, Sammati, Mišra, Bhatta, Sridhara, Udayana, Narayaņācārya, Širomani, Didhiti-kāra Vardhamana, and Gunānanda. Similarly Asfasahasri-vivarana mentions Vacaspati, Mandana Mifra, Prajñākara, Hemacandra, Vakcakravarti, Vedānti-pašu, Kusumañjali, Gurumata, Muraribhatta, Murári, Miśra, Gautamiya, Bhattācārya, Jarannaiyāyika, Raghudeva Bhat ļācārya, Bhūşanasāra etc. This shows the comparative and critical outlook of Yasovijaya. It is remarkable that he wrote not only on Asfasahasri which is a work by a Digambara author, who has been criticised in our text also (1.2), but also commented upon a non-Jaina work, Yogasūtra of Patañjali. This indicates his non-sectarian approach. Another work is Nyāyaloka, whose contents are given as follows by Dr. Vidyābhūsana : soul, emancipation, inference, testimony, direct knowledge, indirect knowledge, validity of internal things, inherence, negation, ether, substance, etc. This work also refers
1. Faina Tarka-Bhāṣā, p. 30. verse 4. 2. Vidyābhūşana S. C. A History of Indian logic, p. 220. 3. Ibid, P, 219.

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to many Jaina and non-Jaina works.
Coming to Jaina-tarka-bhașă we have already noted above that it takes its scheme from Akalanka. The title of this book is common with the work of the same name of Mokşakara and Kesava Mišra. The Buddhist-Tarka-Bhāşa of Mokşākara is divided in chapters. The names of the three chapters in Jaina Tarka Bhāşā are, as already indicated, taken from Laghiyastrayi of Akalarka, but the last chapter on symbol does not follow Laghiyastrayı but the Svetambara tradition as given in the Višeşāvasyaka-Bhāsya. As regards the work of logic, two works -Nyayakusumāñjali the Tattvacintamani-have been made use of.
I have separately assessed the value of those portions of Jaina-Tarka-Bhāşa, where Yaśovijaya has contradicted the view points of his opponent. My conclusion is this that Yaśovijaya has mastered not only the faina work but also the nonJaina works. His representation of the view points of his opponents is honest and faithful. His view point is objective and his style is distinctively his own. His method is direct, and he does not believe in pedantry. While summarising, he leaves the non-essential and concentrates on the essentials. At places he has shown his originality also, even though his aim was to write a handy text book for beginners. As an instance, we may refer to the Text where validity of recollection has been established (1.24). At places we also find that in his zeal to summarise, he has not only made his work too difficult but also neglected the essential part of the original work from which he was summarising.
With these words I invite my readers to go through the work. I have tried to be as authentic as possible in my translation and notes and I do hope that the book, though small in volume, would prove a safe guide for the beginners and a study of this book alone would serve as a good introduction to other higher works of Jaina logic.
Dayanand Bhargava
1. Vidyābhūşana, S. C. History of Indian logic, p. 219. 2. Journal of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Delhi, Vol. 1.
No. 1, December, 1971,

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महोपाध्यायश्रीयशोविजयकृता
॥ जै न त के भा षा॥
१. प्रमाणपरिच्छेदः।
ऐन्द्रवृन्दनतं नत्वा जिनं तत्वार्थदेशिनम् । प्रमाणनयनिक्षेपैस्तर्कभाषां तनोम्यहम् ॥
[१. प्रमाणसामान्यस्य लक्षणनिरूपणम् । ] ६१. तत्र-स्वपरव्यवसायि ज्ञानं प्रमाणम्-स्वम् आत्मा ज्ञानस्यैव स्वरूपमित्यर्थः, परः तस्मादन्योऽर्थ इति यावत्, ती व्यवस्यति यथास्थितत्वेन निश्चिनोतीत्ये- 5 बंशीलं स्वपरव्यवसायि । अत्र दर्शनेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय ज्ञानपदम् । संशयविपर्ययानध्यवसायेषु तद्वारणाय व्यवसायिपदम् । परोक्षबुद्ध्यादिवादिनां मीमांसकादीनाम् , बाह्यार्थापलापिनां ज्ञानाद्यद्वैतवादिनां च मतनिरासाय स्वपरेति स्वरूपविशेषणार्थमुक्तम् । ननु यद्येवं सम्यग्ज्ञानमेव प्रमाणमिप्यते तदा किमन्यत् तत्फलं वाच्यमिति चेत् । सत्यम् ; स्वार्थव्यवसितेरेव तत्फलत्वात् । नन्वेवं प्रमाणे स्वपरव्यवसायित्वं न स्यात् , 10 प्रमाणस्य परव्यवसायित्वात् फलस्य च स्वव्यवसायित्वादिति चेत् ;न; प्रमाण-फलयोः कथञ्चिदभेदेन तदुपपत्तेः । इत्थं चात्मव्यापाररूपमुपयोगेन्द्रियमेव प्रमाणमिति स्थितम् । न ह्यव्यापृत आत्मा स्पर्शादिप्रकाशको भवति, निर्व्यापारेण कारकेण क्रियाजननायोगात् , मसृणतूलिकादिसनिकर्षण सुषुप्तस्यापि तत्प्रसङ्गाच्च । ६२. केचित्तु
"ततोऽर्थग्रहणाकारा शक्तिर्ज्ञानमिहात्मनः करणत्वेन निर्दिष्टा न विरुद्धा कथश्चन ॥१॥"
[तत्त्वार्थश्लोकवा० १.१.२२ ] इति-लब्धीन्द्रियमेवार्थग्रहणशक्तिलक्षणं प्रमाण सङ्गिरन्ते तदपेशलम् ; उपयोगात्मना
15

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जैनतर्कभाषा। करणेन लब्धेः फले व्यवधानात् , शक्तीनां परोक्षत्वाभ्युपगमेन करण-फलज्ञानयोः परोक्षप्रत्यक्षत्वाभ्युपगमे प्राभाकरमतप्रवेशाच्च । अथ ज्ञानशक्तिरप्यात्मनि स्वाश्रये परिच्छिन्ने द्रव्यार्थतः प्रत्यक्षेति न दोष इति चेत् ; न द्रव्यद्वारा प्रत्यक्षत्वेन सुखादिवत् स्वसंविदितत्वाव्यवस्थितः, 'ज्ञानेन घटं जानामि' इति करणोल्लेखानुपपत्तेश्च । न हि कलश5 समाकलनवेलायां द्रव्यार्थतः प्रत्यक्षाणामपि कुशूलकपालादीनामुल्लेखोऽस्तीति ।
[२. प्रत्यक्षं लक्षायेत्वा सांव्यवहारिक-पारमार्थिकत्वाभ्यां तद्विभजनम् । ] ६३. तद् द्विभेदम्-प्रत्यक्षम् , परोक्षं च । अक्षम् इन्द्रियं प्रतिगतम् कार्यत्वेनाश्रितं प्रत्यक्षम् , अथवाऽश्नुते ज्ञानात्मना सर्वार्थान् व्यामोतीत्यौणादिकनिपातनात्
अक्षो जीवः तं प्रतिगतं प्रत्यक्षम् । न चैवमवध्यादौ मत्यादौ च प्रत्यक्षव्यपदेशो न ... 10 स्यादिति वाच्यम् । यतो व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तमेवैतत् , प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं तु एकार्थसमवायिनाऽ.
नेनोपलक्षितं स्पष्टतावत्त्वमिति । स्पष्टता चानुमानादिभ्योऽतिरेकेण विशेषप्रकाशनमित्यदोपः । अक्षेभ्योऽक्षाद्वा परतो वर्तत इति परोक्षम् , अस्पष्टं ज्ञानमित्यर्थः ।
६४. प्रत्यक्षं द्विविधम्-सांव्यवहारिकम् , पारमार्थिक चेति । समीचीनो बाधारहितो व्यवहारः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिलोकाभिलापलक्षणः संव्यवहारः, तत्प्रयोजनकं सांव्यव15 हारिकम् अपारमार्थिकमित्यर्थः, यथा अस्मदादिप्रत्यक्षम् । तद्धीन्द्रियानिन्द्रियव्यवहि
तात्मव्यापारसम्पाद्यत्वात्परमार्थतः परोक्षगेव, धूमान् अग्निज्ञानवद् व्यवधानाविशेषात् । किञ्च, असिद्धानकान्तिकविरुद्धानुमानाभासवत् संशयविपर्ययानध्यवसायसम्भवात् , सदनुमानवत् सङ्केतस्मरणादिपूर्वकनिश्चयसम्भवाच परमार्थतः परोक्षमेवैतत् ।
[३. सांव्यवहारिकप्रत्यक्षस्य निरूपणम् , मतिश्रुतयोविवेकश्च । ] 20५. एतच्च द्विविधम्-इन्द्रियजम्, अनिन्द्रियजं च । तत्रेन्द्रियजं चक्षुरादि
जनितम् , अनिन्द्रियजं च मनोजन्म । यद्यपीन्द्रियजज्ञानेऽपि मनो व्यापिपर्ति; तथापि तत्रेन्द्रियस्यैवासाधारणकारणत्वाददोषः । द्वयमपीदं मतिश्रुतभेदाद् द्विधा । तत्रेन्द्रियमनोनिमित्तं श्रुताननुसारि ज्ञानं मतिज्ञानम्, श्रुतानुसारि च श्रुतज्ञानम् । श्रुतानुसारित्वं च-सङ्केतविषयपरोपदेशं श्रुतग्रन्थं वाऽनुसृत्य वाच्यवाचकभावेन संयोज्य 'घटो 25 घटः' इत्याधन्तर्जन्या(जैल्पा)कारग्राहित्वम् । नन्वेवमवग्रह एव मतिज्ञानं स्यान्न
त्वीहादयः, तेषां शब्दोल्लेखसहितत्वेन श्रुतत्वप्रसङ्गादिति चेत् ; न श्रुतनिश्रितानामप्यवग्रहादीनां सङ्केतकाले श्रुतानुसारित्वेऽपि व्यवहारकाले तदननुसारित्वात् , अभ्यासपाटववशेन श्रुतानुसरणमन्तरेणापि विकल्पपरम्परापूर्वकविविधवचनप्रवृत्तिदर्शनात् ।
अङ्गोपाङ्गादौ शब्दाद्यवग्रहणे च श्रुताननुसारित्वान्मतित्वमेव, यस्तु तत्र श्रुतानुसारी 30 प्रत्ययस्तत्र श्रुतत्वमेवेत्यवधेयम् ।

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१. प्रमाणपरिच्छेदः । [४. मतिज्ञानस्य अअप्रहादिभेदेन चातुर्विध्यप्रकटनम् । ] ६६. मतिज्ञानम्-अवग्रहेहापायधारणाभेदाच्चतुर्विधम् । अवकृष्टो ग्रहः-अवग्रहः। स द्विविधः-व्यञ्जनावग्रहः, अर्थावग्रहश्च । व्यज्यते प्रकटीक्रियतेऽर्थोऽनेनेति व्यञ्जनम्-कदम्बपुष्पगोलकादिरूपाणामन्तर्निवृत्तीन्द्रियाणां शब्दादिविषयपरिच्छेदहेतुशक्तिविशेषलक्षणमुपकरणेन्द्रियम् , शब्दादिपरिणतद्रव्यनिकुरुम्बम्, तदुभयसम्बन्धश्च । 5 ततो व्यञ्जनेन व्यञ्जनस्यावग्रहो व्यञ्जनावग्रह इति मध्यमपदलोपी समासः। अथ अज्ञानम् अयं बधिरादीनां श्रोत्रशन्दादिसम्बन्धवत् तत्काले ज्ञानानुपलम्भादिति चेत् । न; ज्ञानोपादानत्वेन तत्र ज्ञानत्योपचारात् , जन्तेविग्रहरूपज्ञानदर्शनेन तत्कालेऽपि चेष्टाविशेषाधनुमेयस्वमज्ञानादितुल्याव्यक्तज्ञानानुमानाद्वा एकतेजोऽवयववत् तस्य तनुत्वेनानुपलक्षणात् ।
10 [५. व्यञ्जनावग्रहस्य चातुर्विध्यप्रदर्शने मनश्चक्षुषोरप्राप्यकारित्वसमर्थनम् ।]
७. स च नयन-मनोवर्जेन्द्रियभेदाच्चतुर्धा, नयन-मनसोरप्राप्यकारित्वेन ध्य अनावग्रहासिद्धेः, अन्यथा तयोर्शयकृतानुग्रहोपघातपात्रत्वे जलानलदर्शन-चिन्तनयोः क्लेद-दाहापत्तेः । रवि-चन्द्राद्यवलोकने चक्षुषोऽनुग्रहोपघातौ दृष्टावेवेति चेत्, न; प्रथमावलोकनसमये तददर्शनात् , अनवरतावलोकने च प्राप्तेन रविकिरणादिनोपघातस्या- 15 (स्य), नैसर्गिकसौम्यादिगुणे चन्द्रादो चावलोकिते उपघाताभावादनुग्रहाभिमानस्योपपत्तेः। मृतनष्टादिवस्तुचिन्तने, इष्टसङ्गमविभवलाभादिचिन्तने च जायमानों दौर्बल्योरःक्षतादि-बदनविकासरोमाञ्चोद्गमादिलिङ्गकावुपघातानुग्रहौ न मनसः, किन्तु मनस्त्वपरिपतानिष्टेष्टपुद्गलनिचयरूपद्रव्यमनोऽवष्टम्भेन हृन्निरुद्धवायुभेषजाभ्यामिव जीवस्यैवेति न ताभ्यां मनसः प्राप्यकारित्वसिद्धिः । ननु यदि मनो विषयं प्राप्य न परिच्छिनत्ति तदा 20 कथं प्रसुप्तस्य 'मेवादी गत मे मनः' इति प्रत्यय इति चेत् । न मेवोदी शरीरस्येव मनसो गमनस्वमस्यासत्यत्वात्, अन्यथा विबुद्धस्य कुसुमपरिमलाद्यध्वजनितपरिश्रमाधनुग्रहोपघातप्रसङ्गात्। ननु स्वमानुभूतजिनस्नात्रदर्शन-समीहितार्थालाभयोरनुग्रहोपघाती वियुध(द्धस्य सतो दृश्येते एवेति चेत् ; दृश्येता स्वमविज्ञानकृतौ तौ, स्वमविज्ञानकृतं क्रियाफलं तु तृप्त्यादिकं नास्ति, यतो विषयप्राप्तिरूपा प्राप्यकारिता मनसो युज्यतेति ब्रूमः। 25 क्रियाफलमपि स्वप्ने व्यञ्जनविसर्गलक्षणं दृश्यत एवेति चेत् । तत् तीव्राध्यवसायकृतम् , न तु कामिनीनिधुवनक्रियाकृतमिति को दोषः ? ननु स्त्यानर्धिनिद्रोदये गीतादिक शृण्वतो व्यञ्जनावग्रहो मनसोऽपि भवतीति चेत् । न तदा स्वमाभिमानिनोऽपि श्रवजाधवग्रहेणैवोपपत्तेः। ननु 'च्यवमानो न जानाति' इत्यादिवचनाद सर्वस्यापि छद्मस्थोपयोगस्यासक्येयसमयमानत्वात् , प्रतिसमयं च मनोद्रव्याणां ग्रहणात् विषयमस-30 म्प्राप्तस्यापि मनसो देहादनिर्गतस्य तस्य च स्वसनिहितहृदयादिचिन्तनवेलायां कथं

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जैनतर्कभाषा ।
व्यञ्जनावग्रहो न भवतीति चेत्; शृणु; ग्रहणं हि मनः, न तु ब्राह्मम् । ग्राह्यवस्तुग्रहणे च व्यञ्जनावग्रहो भवतीति न मनोद्रव्यग्रहणे तदबकाशः सनिहितहृदयादिदेशग्रहवेलायामपि नैतदवकाशः, बाह्यार्थापेक्षयैव प्राप्यकारित्वाप्राप्यकारित्वव्यवस्थानात्, क्षयोपशमपाटवेन मनसः प्रथममर्थानुपलब्धिकालासम्भवाद्वा; श्रोत्रादीन्द्रियव्यापार5 कालेऽपि मनोव्यापारस्य व्यञ्जनावग्रहोत्तरमेवाम्युपगमात् 'मनुतेऽर्थान् मन्यन्तेऽर्थाः अनेनेति वा मनः' इति मनःशब्दस्यान्वर्थत्वात्, अर्थभाषणं विना भाषाया इव अर्थमननं विना मनसोऽप्रवृत्तेः । तदेवं नयनमनसोर्न व्यञ्जनावग्रह इति स्थितम् ।
[ ६. अर्थावग्रहस्य निरूपणम् । ]
६८. स्वरूपनामजाति क्रियागुणद्रव्यकल्पनारहितं सामान्यग्रहणम् अर्थावग्रहः । 10 कथं तर्हि 'तेन शब्द इत्यवगृहीतः" इति सूत्रार्थः, तत्र शब्दाद्युल्लेखराहित्याभावादिति 'वेत्; न; 'शब्दः' इति वक्त्रैव भणनात्, रूपरसादिविशेषव्यावृत्यनवधारणपरत्वाद्वा । यदि च 'शब्दोऽयम्' इत्यध्यवसायोऽवग्रहे भवेत् तदा शब्दोल्लेखस्यान्तर्मुहर्त्तिकत्वादर्थावग्रहस्यैकसामा(म)यिकत्वं भज्येत । स्यान्मतम् -'शब्दोऽयम्' इति सामान्यविशेषग्रहणम्प्यर्थावग्रह इष्यताम्, तदुत्तरम् -'प्रायो माधुर्यादयः शङ्खशब्दधर्मा इह, न तु शार्ङ्गधर्माः 15 खरकर्कशत्वादयः' इतीहेात्पत्तेः - इति; मैनम् ; अशब्दव्यावृत्या विशेषप्रतिभासेनास्याsपायत्वात् स्तोकग्रहणस्योत्तरोत्तर भेदापेक्षयाऽव्यवस्थितत्वात् । किञ्च 'शब्दोऽयम्' इति ज्ञान (नं) शब्दगतान्वयधर्मेषु रूपादिव्यावृत्तिपर्यालोचनरूपामीहां विनाऽनुपपन्नम्, सा च नागृहीतेऽर्थे सम्भवतीति तद्ग्रहणं अस्मदभ्युपगतार्थावग्रहकालात् प्राक् प्रतिपत्तव्यम्, स च व्यञ्जनावग्रहकालोऽर्थपरिशून्य इति यत्किञ्चिदेतत् । नन्वनन्तरम् -'क 20 एष शब्दः' इति शब्दत्वावान्तरधर्म विषय केहा निर्देशात् 'शब्दोऽयम्' इत्याकार एवावग्रहोऽभ्युपेय इति चेत्; न; 'शब्दः शब्दः' इति भाषकेणैव भणनात् अर्थावग्रहेऽव्यक्तशब्दश्रवणस्यैव सूत्रे निर्देशात्, अव्यक्तस्य च सामान्यरूपत्वादनाकारोपयोगरूपस्य चास्य तन्मात्रविषयत्वात् । यदि च व्यञ्जनावग्रह एवाव्यक्तशब्दग्रहणमिष्येत तदा सोऽप्यर्थावग्रहः स्यात्, अर्थस्य ग्रहणात् ।
,
25
६९. केचित्तु - 'सङ्केतादिविकल्पविकलस्य जातमात्रस्य बालस्य सामान्यग्रहणम्, परिचितविषयस्य त्वाद्यसमय एक विशेषज्ञानमित्येतदपेक्षया 'तेन शब्द इत्यवगृहीतः' इति नानुपपन्नम् - इत्याहुः; तन्नः एवं हि व्यक्ततरस्य व्यक्तशब्दज्ञानमतिक्रम्यापि सुबहुविशेषग्रहप्रसङ्गात् । न चेष्टापत्तिः; 'न पुनर्जानाति क एष शब्दः' इति सूत्रावयवस्याविशेषेणोक्तत्वात् प्रकृष्टमतेरपि शब्दं धर्मिणमगृहीत्वोत्तरोत्तरसुबहुधर्म30 ग्रहणानुपपतेव |
६१०. अन्ये तु - 'आलोचनपूर्वकमर्थावग्रहमाचक्षते, तत्रालोचनमव्यक्तसामा
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१. प्रमाणपरिच्छेदः । न्यग्राहि, अर्थावग्रहस्त्वितरव्यावृत्तवस्तुस्वरूपग्राहीति न सूत्रानुपएत्तिः'-इति; तदसत्; यत आलोचनं व्यञ्जनावग्रहात् पूर्व स्यात् , पश्चाद्वा, स एव वा? नाद्यः; अर्थव्यञ्जनसम्बन्ध विना तदयोगात् । न द्वितीयः; व्यञ्जनावग्रहान्त्यसमयेऽर्थावग्रहस्यैवोत्पादादालोचनानवकाशात् । न तृतीयः; व्यञ्जनावग्रहस्यैव नामान्तरकरणात् , तस्य चार्थशून्यत्वेनार्थालोचनानुपपत्तेः । किञ्च, आलोचनेनेहां विना झटित्येवार्थावग्रहः कथं 5 जन्यताम् ? युगपञ्चहावग्रहो पृथगसङ्खथेयसमयमानी कथं घटेताम् ? इति विचारणीयम् । नन्ववाहेऽपि क्षिप्रेतरादिभेदप्रदर्शनादसङ्घयसमयमानत्वम् , विशेषविषयत्वं चाविरुद्धमिति चेत् न तस्वतस्तेषामपायभेदत्वात् , कारणे कार्योपचारमाश्रित्यावग्रहमेदत्वप्रतिपादनात् , अविशेषविषये विशेषविषयत्वस्यावास्तवत्वात् ।
5.११. अथवा अवग्रहो द्विविधः-नैश्चयिकः, व्यावहारिकश्च । आद्यः सामा- 10 न्यमात्रग्राही, द्वितीयश्च विशेषविषयः तदुत्तरमुत्तरोत्तरधर्माकासारूपेहाप्रवृत्तेः, अन्यथा अवग्रहं विनेहानुत्थानप्रसङ्गात् अत्रैव क्षिप्रेतरादिमेदसङ्गतिः, अत एव चोपर्युपरि ज्ञानप्रवृत्तिरूपसन्तानव्यवहार इति द्रष्टव्यम् ।
[७. ईहावायधारणानां क्रमशो निरूपणम्। ) ६१२. अवगृहीतविशेषाकाङ्क्षणम्-ईहा, व्यतिरेकधर्मनिराकरणपरोऽन्वयधर्म- 15 घटनप्रवृत्तो बोध इति यावत्, यथा-'श्रोत्रपाद्यत्वादिना प्रायोऽनेन शब्देन भवितव्यम्' 'मधुरत्वादिधर्मयुक्तत्वात् शालादिना' वा इति । न चेयं संशय एव; तस्यैकत्र धर्मिणि विरुद्धनानार्थज्ञानरूपत्वात् , अस्या निश्चयाभिमुखत्वेन विलक्षणत्वात् ।
६१३. ईहितस्य विशेषनिर्णयोऽवायः, यथा-'शब्द एवायम्', 'शास एवायम्' इति वा ।
१४. स एव दृढतमावस्थापनो धारणा । सा च त्रिविधा-अविच्युतिः, स्मृतिः, वासना च । तत्रैकार्थोपयोगसातत्यानिवृत्तिः अविच्युतिः । तस्यैवार्थोपयोगस्य कालान्तरे 'तदेव' इत्युल्लेखेन समुन्मीलनं स्मृतिः। अपायाहितः स्मृतिहेतुः संस्कारो वासना। द्वयोरवग्रहयोरषग्रहत्त्वेन च तिसृणां धारणानां धारणात्वेनोपग्रहान्न विभागव्याघातः ।
१५. केचित्तु-अपनयनमपायः, धरणं च धारणेति व्युत्पत्त्यर्थमात्रानुसारिणः- 25 'असद्भूतार्थविशेषव्यतिरेकावधारणमपायः, सद्भूतार्थविशेषावधारणं च धारणा'-इत्याहुः। तमः क्वचित्तदन्यव्यतिरेकपरामर्शात्, क्वचिदन्वयधर्मसमनुगमात् , क्वचिच्चोभाभ्यामपि भवतोऽपायस्य निश्चयैकरूपेण भेदाभावात् , अन्यथा स्मृतेराधिक्येन मतेः पञ्चमेदस्वप्रसङ्गात् । अथ नास्त्येव भवदभिमता धारणेति भेदचतुष्टया(य)व्याघातः; तथाहिउपयोगोपरमे का नाम धारणा ? उपयोगसातत्यलक्षणा अविच्युतिश्चापायान्नातिरिच्यते । 30
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जैनतर्क भाषा I
या च घटाद्युपयोगोपरमे सङ्कथेयमसङ्ख्येयं वा कालं वासनाऽभ्युपगम्यते, या च 'तदेव' इतिलक्षणा स्मृतिः सा मत्यंशरूपा धारणा न भवति मत्युपयोगस्य प्रागेवोपरतत्वात्, कालान्तरे जायमानोपयोगेऽप्यन्वयमुख्यां धारणायां स्मृत्यन्तर्भावादिति चेत्; न; अपायप्रवृत्यनन्तरं क्वचिदन्तर्मुहूर्त्त यावदपायधाराप्रवृत्तिदर्शनात् अविच्युतेः, पूर्वापर5 दर्शनानुसन्धानस्य 'तदेवेदम्' इति स्मृत्याख्यस्य प्रापायपरिणामस्य तदाघायकसंस्कारलक्षणाया वासनायाश्च अपायाभ्यधिकत्वात् ।
9
१६. नन्वविच्युतिस्मृतिलक्षणौ ज्ञानभेदौ गृहीतग्राहित्वान्न प्रमाणम् ; संस्कारश्च किं स्मृतिज्ञानावरणक्षयोपशमो वा, तज्ज्ञानजननशक्तिर्वा, तद्वस्तुविकल्पों वेति श्रयी गतिः १ तत्र - आद्यपक्षद्वयमयुक्तम् ; ज्ञानरूपत्वाभावात् तद्भेदानां चेह विचार्यत्वात् । 10 तृतीयपक्षोऽप्ययुक्त एवः सङ्ख्येयमसङ्ख्येयं वा कालं वासनाया इष्टत्वात् एतावन्तं च कालं वस्तुविकल्पायोगादिति न कापि धारणा घटत इति चेत्; न; स्पष्टस्पष्टतरस्पष्टतमभिन्नधर्मक वासनाजनकत्वेन अन्यान्यवस्तुग्राहित्वादविच्युतेः प्रागननुभूतवस्त्वेकस्वग्राहित्याच्च स्मृतेः अगृहीतग्राहित्वात् स्मृतिज्ञानावरण कर्मक्षयोपशमरूपायास्तद्विज्ञानजननशक्तिरूपायाश्च वासनायाः स्वयमज्ञानरूपत्वेऽपि कारणे कार्योपचारेण ज्ञानभेदा15 भिधानाविरोधादिति ।
६१७. एते चावग्रहादयो नोत्क्रमव्यतिक्रमाभ्यां न्यूनत्वेन चोत्पद्यन्ते ज्ञेयस्येत्थमेव ज्ञानजननस्वाभाव्यात् । क्वचिदभ्यस्तेऽपायमात्रस्य दृढवासने विषये स्मृतिमात्रस्य चोपलक्षणेऽप्युत्पलपत्रशतव्यतिभेद इव सौक्ष्म्यादवग्रहादिक्रमानुपलक्षणात् । तदेवम् अर्थावग्रहादयो मनइन्द्रियैः पोढा भिद्यमाना व्यञ्जनावग्रहवतुमेदैः सहाष्टाविं 20 शतिर्मति भेदा भवन्ति । अथवा बहु-बहुविध क्षिप्रा ऽनिश्रित निश्चित-ध्रुवैः सप्रतिपक्षैर्द्वादशभिर्भेदैर्भिन्नानामेतेषां पत्रिंशदधिकानि त्रीणि शतानि भवन्ति । बह्वादयश्च भेदा विषयापेक्षाः; तथाहि - कश्चित् नानाशब्दसमूहमाकर्णितं बहुं जानाति 'एतावन्तोऽत्र शङ्खशब्दा एतावन्तश्च पटहादिशब्दाः' इति पृथग्भिन्नजातीयं क्षयोपशमविशेषात् परिच्छिनत्तीत्यर्थः । अन्यस्त्वत्पक्षयोपशमत्वात् तत्समानदेशोऽप्यबहुम् । अपरस्तु क्षयोप25 शमवैचित्र्यात् बहुविधम् एकैकस्यापि शङ्खादिशब्दस्य स्निग्धत्वादिबहुधर्मान्त्रितत्वेना
प्याकलनात् । परस्त्वबहुविधम्, स्निग्धत्वादिस्वल्पधर्मान्वितत्वेनाकलनात् । अन्यस्तु क्षिप्रम्, शीघ्रमेव परिच्छेदात् । इतरस्त्वक्षिप्रम्, चिरविमर्शेनाकलनात् । परस्त्वनिश्रितम्, लिङ्गं विना स्वरूपत एव परिच्छेदात् । अपरस्तु निश्रितम्, लिङ्गनिश्रयाऽऽकलनात् । [ कश्चित्तु निश्चितम् विरुद्धधर्मानालिङ्गितत्वेनावगतेः । इतरस्त्वनिश्चितम् विरुद्धधर्मा30 ङ्किततयावगमात् । ] अन्यो ध्रुवम्, बहादिरूपेणावगतस्य सर्वदेव तथा बोधात् । अन्यस्त्वध्रुवम्, कदाचिद्वह्वादिरूपेण कदाचित्वमहादिरूपेणावगमादिति । उक्ता मतिभेदाः ।
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१. प्रमाणपरिच्छेदः । [८. श्रुतज्ञानं चतुर्दशधा विभज्य तन्निरूपणम् । ] ६१८. श्रुतभेदा उच्यन्ते-श्रुतम् अक्षर-सज्ञि-सम्यक् सादि-सपर्यवसित-गमिकाऽङ्गप्रविष्टभेदैः सप्रतिपक्षश्चतुर्दशविधम् । तत्राक्षरं त्रिविधम्-सञ्ज्ञा-व्यञ्जन-लब्धिभेदात् । सज्ञाक्षरं बहुविधलिपिभेदम् , व्यञ्जनाक्षरं भाष्यमाणमकारादि-एते चोपचाराच्छुते । लब्ध्यक्षरं तु इन्द्रियमनोनिमित्तः श्रुतोपयोगः, तदावरणक्षयोपशमो वा-एतच्च परोपदेशं 5 विनापि नासम्भाव्यम् , अनाकलितोपदेशानामपि मुग्धानां गवादीनां च शब्दश्रवणे तदाभिमुख्यदर्शनात् , एकेन्द्रियाणामप्यव्यक्ताक्षरलाभाञ्च । अनक्षरश्रुतमुच्छ्वासादि, तस्यापि भावभुतहेतुत्वात् , ततोऽपि 'सशोकोऽयम्' इत्यादिज्ञानाविर्भावात् । अथवा श्रुतोपयुक्तस्य सर्वात्मनैवोपयोगात् सर्वस्यैव व्यापारस्य श्रुतरूपत्वेऽपि अत्रैव शास्त्रज्ञलोकप्रसिद्धा रूढिः । समनस्कस्य श्रुतं सज्ञिश्रुतम् । तद्विपरीतमसज्ञिश्रुतम् | 10 सम्यक्श्रुतम् अङ्गानङ्गप्रविष्टम् , लौकिकं तु मिथ्याश्रुतम् । स्वामित्वचिन्तायां तु भजना-सम्यग्दृष्टिपरिगृहीतं मिथ्याश्रतमपि सम्यक्श्रुतमेव वितथभाषित्वादिना यथास्थानं तदर्थविनियोगात्, विपर्ययान्मिथ्यादृष्टिपरिगृहीतं च सम्यक्श्रुतमपि मि. ध्याश्रुतमेवेति । सादि द्रव्यत एकं पुरुषमाश्रित्य, क्षेत्रतश्च भरतैरावते । कालत उत्सर्पिण्यवसर्पिण्यो, भावतश्च तत्तज्ज्ञापकप्रयत्नादिकम् । अनादि द्रव्यती नानापुरुषा- 15 नाश्रित्य, क्षेत्रतो महाविदेहान्, कालतो नोउत्सर्पिण्यवसर्पिणीलक्षणम् , भावतश्च सामान्यतः क्षयोपशममिति । एवं सपर्यवसितापर्यवसितभेदावपि भाव्यौ । गमिकं सदृशपाठं प्रायो दृष्टिवादगतम् । अगमिकमसदृशपाठं प्रायः कालिकश्रतगतम् । अङ्गप्रविष्टं गणधरकृतम् । अनङ्गप्रविष्टं तु स्थविरकृतमिति । तदेवं सप्रभेदं सांव्यवहारिक मतिश्रुतलक्षणं प्रत्यक्षं निरूपितम् ।
20 [९. पारमार्थिकं प्रत्यक्षं त्रिधा विभज्य प्रथममयधर्निरूपणम् । ] ६१९. स्वोत्पत्तावात्मव्यापारमात्रापेक्षं पारमार्थिकम् । तत् त्रिविधम्-अवधिमनःपर्यय-केवलभेदात् । सकलरूपिद्रव्यविषयकजातीयम् आत्ममात्रापेक्षं ज्ञानमवधिज्ञानम् । तञ्च पोढा अनुगामि-वर्धमान-प्रतिपातीतरभेदात् । तत्रोत्पत्तिक्षेत्रादन्यत्राप्यनुवर्तमानमानुगामिकम् , भास्करप्रकाशवत् , यथा भास्करप्रकाशः प्राच्यामाविर्भूतः 25 प्रतीचीमनुसरत्यपि तत्रावकाशमुद्योतयति, तथैतदप्येकत्रोत्पनमन्यत्र गच्छतोऽपि पुंसो विषयमवभासयतीति । उत्पत्तिक्षेत्र एव विषयावभासकमनानुगामिकम् , प्रश्नादेशपुरुषज्ञानवत् , यथा प्रश्नादेशः क्वचिदेव स्थाने संवादयितुं शक्नोति पृच्छयमानमर्थम् , तथेदमपि अधिकृत एव स्थाने विषयमुद्योतयितुमलमिति । उत्पत्तिक्षेत्रात्क्रमेण विषयव्याप्तिमवगाहमानं वर्धमानम्, अधरोत्तरारणिनिर्मथनोत्पनोपाचशुष्कोपचीयमानाधीय- 30 मानेन्धनराश्यग्निवत् , यथा अग्निः प्रयत्नादुपजातः सन् पुनरिन्धनलाभाद्विवृद्धिमुपागच्छति एवं परमशुभाध्यवसायलाभादिदमपि पूर्वोत्पनं वर्धत इति । उत्पत्तिक्षेत्रापेक्षया

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८
जैनवर्कभाषा ।
"
क्रमेणाल्पीभवद्विषयं हीयमानम् परिच्छिभेन्धनोपादानसन्तत्यग्निशिखावत् यथा अपनीतेन्धनानिज्वाला परिहीयते तथा इदमपीति । उत्पस्यनन्तरं निर्मूलनश्वरं प्रतिपाति, जलतरङ्गवत्, यथा जलतरङ्ग उत्पन्नमात्र एव निर्मूलं विलीयते तथा इदमपि । मा केबलप्राप्तेः आ मरणाद्वा अवतिष्ठमानम् अप्रतिपाति, वेदवत्, यथा पुरुषवेदादिरापुरुषा5 दिपर्यायं तिष्ठति तथा इदमपीति ।
[ १०. मनः पर्यवज्ञानस्य निरूपणम् । ]
२०. मनोमात्र साक्षात्कारि मनः पर्यवज्ञानम् । मनःपर्यायानिदं साक्षात्परिच्छेसुमलम्, बाह्यानर्थान् पुनस्तदन्यथाऽनुपपश्याऽनुमानेनैव परिच्छिनतीति द्रष्टव्यम् । तद् द्विविधम् - ऋजुमति- विपुलमतिभेदात् । ऋज्वी सामान्यग्राहिणी मतिः ऋजुमतिः । 10 सामान्यशब्दोऽत्र विपुलमत्यपेक्षयाऽल्पविशेषपरः, अन्यथा सामान्यमात्रग्राहित्वे मनःपर्यायदर्शनप्रसङ्गात् । विपुला विशेषग्राहिणी मतिर्विपुलमतिः । तत्र ऋजुमत्या घटादिमात्रमनेन चिन्तितमिति ज्ञायते, विपुलमत्या तु पर्यायशतोपेतं तत् परिच्छिद्यत इति । एते च द्वे ज्ञाने विकलविषयत्वाद्विकलप्रत्यक्षे परिभाष्येते ।
[ ११. केवलज्ञानस्य निरूपणम् । ]
15 २१. निखिलद्रव्यपर्यायसाक्षात्कारि केवलज्ञानम् । अत एवैतत्सकलप्रत्यक्षम् । तच्चावरणक्षयस्य हेतोरैक्याद्भेदरहितम् । आवरणं चात्र कर्मैव, स्वविषयेऽप्रवृत्तिमतोऽस्मदादिज्ञानस्य सावरणत्वात्, असर्वविषयत्वे व्याप्तिज्ञानाभावप्रसङ्गात्, सावरणत्वाभावेऽस्पष्टत्वानुपपत्तेश्च । आवरणस्य च कर्मणो विरोधिना सम्यग्दर्शनादिना विनाशात् सिद्ध्यति कैवल्यम् ।
20
२२. 'योगजधर्मानुगृहीतमनोजन्यमेवेदमस्तु' इति केचित् ; तन्न; धर्मानुगृहीतेनापि मनसा पश्चेन्द्रियार्थज्ञानवदस्य जनयितुमशक्यत्वात् ।
६२३. 'कवलभोजिनः कैवल्यं न घटते' इति दिक्पटः; तन; आहारपर्यायसातवेदनीयोदयादिप्रभूतया कवलभुक्त्या कैवल्याविरोधात्, घातिकर्मणामेव तद्विरोधिस्वात् । दग्धरज्जुस्थानीयात्ततो न तदुत्पत्तिरिति चेत्; नन्वेवं तादृशादायुषो 25 भवोपग्रहोऽपि न स्यात् । किञ्च, औदारिकशरीरस्थितिः कथं कवलभुक्तिं विना भगवतः स्यात् । अनन्तवीर्यत्वेन तां विना तदुपपत्तौ छद्मस्थावस्थायामप्यपरिमितबलत्वश्रवणाद् भुक्त्यभावः स्यादित्यन्यत्र विस्तरः । उक्तं प्रत्यक्षम् ।
[ १२. परोक्षं लक्षयित्वा पञ्चधा विभज्य च स्मृतेर्निरूपणम् । ]
९२४. अथ परोक्षमुच्यते-अस्पष्टं परोक्षम् । तच्च स्मरण- प्रत्यभिज्ञान-तर्का - ऽनुमाना30 ssगममेदतः पञ्चप्रकारम् । अनुभवमात्रजन्यं ज्ञानं स्मरणम्, यथा तत् तीर्थकरबिम्बम् ।

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१. प्रमाणपरिच्छेदः। न वेदमप्रमाणम् , प्रत्यक्षादिवत् अविसंवादकत्वात् । अतीततत्तांशे वर्तमानत्वविषयवादप्रमाणमिदमिति चेत्, न; सर्वत्र विशेषणे विशेष्यकालभानानियमात् । अनुभवप्रमात्वपारतन्यादत्राप्रमात्वमिति चेत्, न; अनुमितेरपि व्याप्तिज्ञानादिप्रमात्वपारतन्त्र्येणाप्रमात्वप्रसङ्गात् । अनुमितेरुत्पत्तौ परापेक्षा, विषयपरिच्छेदे तु स्वातन्त्र्यमिति चेत् । न स्मृतेरप्युत्पत्तावेवानुभवसव्यपेक्षत्वात् , स्वविषयपरिच्छेदे तु स्वातन्त्र्यात् । 5 अनुभवविषयीकृतभावावभासिन्याः स्मृतेविषयपरिच्छेदेऽपि न स्वातन्त्र्यमिति चेत; तर्हि व्याप्तिज्ञानादिविषयीकृतानर्थान् परिच्छिन्दत्या अनुमितेरपि प्रामाण्यं दूरत एव । नैयत्येनाऽभात एवार्थोऽनुमित्या विषयीक्रियत इति चेत् तर्हि तत्तयाऽभात एवार्थः स्मृत्या विषयीक्रियत इति तुल्यमिति न किश्चिदेतत् ।
[ १३. प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य निरूपणम् । ] ६२५. अनुभवस्मृतिहेतुकं तिर्यगूर्ध्वतासामान्यादिगोचरं सङ्कलनात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् । यथा 'तजातीय एवायं गोपिण्डः' 'गोसदृशो गवयः स एवायं जिनदत्तः' 'स एवानेनार्थः कथ्यते' 'गोविलक्षणो महिषः' 'इदं तस्माद् दरम्' 'इदं तस्मात् समीपम्' 'इदं तस्मात् प्रांशु हस्वं वा' इत्यादि ।
६२६. तत्तेदन्तारूपस्पष्टास्पष्टाकारभेदान्नै प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्वरूपमस्तीति शाक्यः; 15 तम आकारभेदेऽपि चित्रज्ञानवदेकस्य तस्यानुभूयमानत्वात् , स्वसामग्रीप्रभवस्यास्य वस्तुतोऽस्पष्टैकरूपत्वाच, इदन्तोल्लेखस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञानिबन्धनत्वात् । विषयाभावाने दमस्तीति चेत् । न; पूर्वापरविवर्तवत्यैकद्रव्यस्य विशिष्टस्यैतद्विपयत्वात् । अत एव 'अगृहीतासंसर्गकमनुभवस्मृतिरूपं ज्ञानद्वयमेवैतद्' इति निरस्तम् ; इत्थं सति विशिष्टज्ञानमात्रोच्छेदापत्तेः। तथापि 'अक्षान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायित्वात् प्रत्यक्षरूपमेवेदं 20 युक्तम्' इति केचित् ; तन्नः साक्षादक्षान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायित्वस्यासिद्धेः, प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य साक्षात्प्रत्यक्षस्मरणान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायित्वेनानुभूयमानत्वात् , अन्यथा प्रथमव्यक्तिदर्शनकालेऽप्युत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् ।।
६२७. अथ पुनदर्शने पूर्वदर्शनाहितसंस्कारप्रबोधोत्पन्नस्मृतिसहायमिन्द्रियं प्रत्यभिज्ञानमुत्पादयतीत्युच्यते; तदनुचितम् । प्रत्यक्षस्य स्मृतिनिरपेक्षत्वात् । अन्यथा 25 पर्वते वह्विज्ञानस्यापि व्याप्तिस्मरणादिसापेक्षमनसैवोपपत्तौ अनुमानस्याप्युच्छेदप्रसङ्गात् । किश्च, 'प्रत्यभिजानामि' इति विलक्षणप्रतीतेरप्यतिरिक्तमेतत् , एतेन 'विशेष्येन्द्रियसभिकर्षसत्वाद्विशेषणज्ञाने सति विशिष्टप्रत्यक्षरूपमेतदुपपद्यते' इति निरस्तम् ; 'एतत्सदृशः सः' इत्यादौ तदभावात्, स्मृत्यनुभवसङ्कलनक्रमस्यानुभविकत्वाच्चेति दिक् ।
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5
जैनतर्क भाषा ।
६२८. अत्राह भाट्टः- नन्वेकत्वज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानमस्तु, सादृश्यज्ञानं तूपमानमेव, गवये दृष्टे गवि च स्मृते सति सादृश्यज्ञानस्योपमानत्वात्, तदुक्तम्
१०
" तस्मात् स्मर्यते तत् स्यात् सादृश्येन विशेषितम् । प्रमेयमुपमानस्य सादृश्यं वा तदन्वितम् ॥ १ ॥ प्रत्यक्षेणावबुद्धेऽपि सादृश्ये गवि च स्मृते । विशिष्टस्यान्यतोऽसिद्धेरुपमानप्रमाणता ॥ २ ॥ "
[ श्लोकवा० उप० श्लो० ३७-३८ ] इति; तन; दृष्टस्य सादृश्य विशिष्टपिण्डस्य स्मृतस्य च गोः सङ्कलनात्मकस्य 'गोसदृशो गवयः' इति ज्ञानस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञानताऽनतिक्रमात् । अन्यथा 'गोविसदृशो 10 महिषः' इत्यादेरपि सादृश्याविषयत्वेनोपमानातिरेके प्रमाणसङ्ख्याव्याघातप्रसङ्गात् ।
६२९. एतेन -'गोसदृशो गवयः' इत्यतिदेशवाक्यार्थज्ञानकरणकं सादृश्य विशिष्टपिण्डदर्शनव्यापारकम् 'अयं गवयशब्दवाच्यः' इति सञ्ज्ञासझिसम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिरूपमुपमानम् - इति नैयायिकमतमप्यपहस्तितं भवति । अनुभूतव्यक्तौ गवयपदवाच्यत्वसङ्कलनात्मकस्यास्य प्रत्यभिज्ञानत्वानतिक्रमात् प्रत्यभिज्ञानावरण कर्मक्षयोपशम विशेषेण 15 यद्धर्मावच्छेदेनातिदेशवाक्यान्यधर्मदर्शनं तद्धर्मावच्छेदेनैव पदवाच्यत्वपरिच्छेदोपपत्तेः । अत एव "पयोम्बुभेदी हंसः स्यात्" इत्यादिवाक्यार्थज्ञानवतां पयोऽम्बुभेदित्वादिविशिष्टव्यक्तिदर्शने सति 'अयं हंसपदवाच्यः' इत्यादिप्रतीतिर्जायमानोपपद्यते । यदि च 'अयं गवयपदवाच्यः' इति प्रतीत्यर्थं प्रत्यभिज्ञातिरिक्तं प्रमाणमाश्रीयते तदा आमलकादिदर्शना हितसंस्कारस्य दिल्वादिदर्शनात् 'अतस्तत् सूक्ष्मम्' इत्यादिप्रतीत्यर्थं 20 प्रमाणान्तरमन्वेषणीयं स्यात् । मानसत्वे चासामुपमानस्यापि मानसत्वप्रसङ्गात् । 'प्रत्यभिजानामि' इति प्रतीत्या प्रत्यभिज्ञानत्वमेवाभ्युपेयमिति दिक् ।
[ १४. तर्कस्य निरूपणम् । ]
$ ३०. सकलदेशकालाद्यवच्छेदेन साध्यसाधनभावादिविषय ऊहस्तर्कः, यथा 'यात्रान् कश्विद्धमः स सर्वो वह्नौ सत्येव भवति, वहिं बिना वा न भवति' 'घटशब्द25 मात्र घटस्य वाचकम् ' 'घटमात्रं घटशब्दवाच्यम्' इत्यादि । तथाहि स्वरूपप्रयुक्ताऽव्यभि चारलक्षणायां व्याप्तौ भूयोदर्शनसहितान्वयव्यतिरेकसहकारेणापि प्रत्यक्षस्य तावदविपयत्वादेवाप्रवृत्तिः, सुतरां च सकलसाध्यसाधनव्यक्त्युपसंहारेण तद्रह इति साध्यसाधनदर्शनस्मरणप्रत्यभिज्ञानोपज नितस्तर्क एव तत्प्रतीतिमाधातुमलम् ।
३१. अथ स्वव्यापकसाध्य सामानाधिकरण्यलक्षणाया व्याप्तेर्योग्यत्वाद् भूयोदर्श30 नव्यभिचारादर्शन सहकृतेनेन्द्रियेण व्याप्तिग्रहोऽस्तु, सकलसाध्यसाधनव्यक्त्युपसंहारस्यापि सामान्यलक्षण प्रत्यासच्या सम्भवादिति चेत्; न; 'तर्कयामि' इत्यनुभवसिद्धेन

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१. प्रमाणपरिच्छेदः ।
तर्केणैव सकलसाध्यसाधनव्यक्त्युपसंहारेण व्याप्तिग्रहोपपत्तौ सामान्यलक्षण प्रत्यासत्तिकल्पने प्रमाणाभावात्, ऊहं विना ज्ञातेन सामान्येनापि सकलव्यक्त्यनुपस्थितेश्च । वाच्यवाचक मावोऽपि तर्केणैवावगम्यते, तस्यैव सकलशब्दार्थगोचरत्वात् । प्रयोजकवृद्धोक्तं श्रुत्वा प्रवर्तमानस्य प्रयोज्यवृद्धस्य चेष्टामवलोक्य तत्कारणज्ञानजनकतां शब्देऽवधारयन्तो (यतो ऽन्त्यावयव श्रवण-पूर्वावयवस्मरणोपजनितवर्णपदवाक्यविषयसङ्कलना- 5 स्मकप्रत्यभिज्ञानवत आवापोद्वापाभ्यां सकलव्यक्त्युपसंहारेण च वाच्यवाचकभावप्रतीतिदर्शनादिति । अयं च तर्कः सम्बन्धप्रतीत्यन्तरनिरपेक्ष एव स्वयोग्यतासामर्थ्यात्सम्बन्धप्रतीतिं जनयतीति नानवस्था ।
३२. प्रत्यक्षपृष्ठभाविविकल्परूपत्वान्नायं प्रमाणमिति बौद्धाः; तन्नः प्रत्यक्षपृष्ठभाविनो विकल्पस्यापि प्रत्यक्षगृहीतमात्राध्यवसायित्वेन सर्वोपसंहारेण व्याप्तिग्राहकत्वा- 10 भावात् । तादृशस्य तस्य सामान्यविषयस्याप्यनुमानवत् प्रमाणत्वात्, अवस्तुनिर्भासेऽपि परम्परया पदार्थप्रतिबन्धेन भवतां व्यवहारतः प्रामाण्यप्रसिद्धेः । यस्तु-अग्निधूमव्यतिरिक्तदेशे प्रथमं धूमस्यानुपलम्भ एकः, तदनन्तरमग्नेरुपलम्भस्ततो धूमस्येत्युपलम्भद्वयम्, पश्चादमेरनुपलम्भोऽनन्तरं धूमस्याप्यनुपलम्भ इति द्वावनुपलम्भाविति प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भपञ्चकाद्वयाप्तिग्रहः - इत्येतेषां सिद्धान्तः, तदुक्तम्
"धूमाधीर्वह्निविज्ञानं धूमज्ञानमधीस्तयोः । प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भाभ्यामिति पञ्चभिरन्वयः ॥”
इति; स तु मिथ्या; उपलम्भानुपलम्भस्वभावस्य द्विविधस्यापि प्रत्यक्षस्य सन्निहितमात्रविषयतयाऽविचारकतया च देशादिव्यवहित समस्तपदार्थगोचरत्वायोगात् ।
११
1. Cf. Nyāyadipika, p. 19
६३३. यत्तु 'व्याप्यस्याहार्यारोपेण व्यापकस्याहार्यप्रसञ्जनं तर्कः । स च विशेष- 20 दर्शनवद् विरोधिशङ्काकालीनप्रमाण मात्र सहकारी, विरोधिशङ्का निवर्तकत्वेन तदनुकूल एव वा । न चायं स्वतः प्रमाणम्' इति नैयायिकैरिष्यते; तन्न; व्याप्तिग्रहरूपस्य तर्कस्य स्वपरव्यवसायित्वेन स्वतः प्रमाणत्वात् पराभिमततर्कस्यापि क्वचिदेतद्विचाराङ्गतया, विपर्ययपर्यवसायिन आहार्यशङ्काविघटकतया, स्वातन्त्र्येण शङ्का मात्र विघटकतया वोपयोगात् । इत्थं चाज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वेन तर्कस्य प्रामाण्यं धर्मभूषणोक्तं सत्येव तन्न (तत्र ) 25 मिथ्याज्ञानरूपे व्यवच्छेद्ये सङ्गच्छते, ज्ञानाभावनिवृत्तिस्त्वर्थज्ञातताव्यवहारनिबन्धनस्वव्यवसितिपर्यवसितैव सामान्यतः फलमिति द्रष्टव्यम् ।
9
age साधकतमस्तक:' इति ।
लोकवातिकमाये (१.१३.११५-८ ) माध्यसाधन नम्बन्धाज्ञाननिवृत्तिरूपे हि फले
15

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जैनतर्कभाषा। (१५. अनुमानं वेधा विभज्य स्वार्थानुमानस्य लक्षणम् । ] ६३४. साधनात्साध्यविज्ञानम्-अनुमानम् । तद् द्विविधं स्वार्थ परार्थ च । तत्र हेतुग्रहण-सम्बन्धस्मरणकारणकं साध्यविज्ञानं स्वार्थम् , यथा गृहीतधूमस्य स्मृतव्याप्तिकस्य 'पर्वतो वह्विमान्' इति ज्ञानम् । अत्र हेतु ग्रहण-सम्बन्धमरणयोः समुदितयोरेव कारण5 त्वमवसे यम् , अन्यथा विस्मृताप्रतिपन्नसम्बन्धस्यागृहीतलिङ्गकस्य च कस्यचिदनुमानोत्पादप्रसङ्गात् ।
[१६. हेतुस्वरूपचर्चा । ] ६३५. निश्चितान्यथानुपपत्त्येकलक्षणो हेतुः, न तु त्रिलक्षणकादिः । तथाहित्रिलक्षण एव हेतुरिति बौद्धाः। पक्षधर्मत्वाभावेऽसिद्धत्वव्यवच्छेदस्य, सपक्ष एव सत्त्वा10 भावे च विरुद्धत्वव्युदासस्य, विपक्षेऽसत्चनियमाभावे चानैकान्तिकत्वनिषेधस्यासम्भवे
नानुमित्यप्रतिरोधानुपपत्तेरिति तन्नः पक्षधर्मत्वाभावेऽपि उदेष्यति शकटं कृत्तिकोदयाद् , उपरि सविता भूमेरालोकवत्वाद्, अस्ति नभश्चन्द्रो जलचन्द्रादित्याद्यनुमानदर्शनात् । न चात्रापि 'कालाकाशादिकं भविष्यच्छकटोदयादिमत् कृत्तिकोदयादिम
स्वात्' इत्येवं पक्षधर्मत्वोपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । अननुभूयमानधर्मिविषयत्वेनेत्थं पक्षधर्म15 त्वोपपादने जगद्धर्म्यपेक्षया काककायेन प्रासादधावल्यस्यापि साधनोपपत्तेः ।
३६. ननु ययेवं पक्षधर्मताऽनुमितौ नाङ्गं तदा कथं तत्र पक्षमाननियम इति चेत् । क्वचिदन्यथाऽनुपपत्त्यवच्छेदकतया ग्रहणात् पक्षभानं यथा नभश्चन्द्रास्तित्वं विना जलचन्द्रोऽनुपपन्न इत्यत्र, क्वचिच्च हेतुग्रहणाधिकरणतया यथा पर्वतो वह्निमान्
धूमवत्वादित्यत्र धूमस्य पर्वते ग्रहणाबढेरपि तत्र भानमिति । व्याप्तिग्रहवेलायां तु 20 पर्वतस्य सर्वत्रानुवृत्यभावेन न ग्रह इति ।
३७. यत्तु अन्तर्व्याप्या पक्षीयसाध्यसाधनसम्बन्धग्रहात पक्षसाध्यसंसर्गमानम् , तदुक्तम्-"पक्षीकृत एव विषये साधनस्य साध्येन व्याप्तिरन्ताप्तिः, अन्यत्र तु पहिाप्तिः" (प्र. न. ३.३८) इति; तन्नः अन्तर्व्याच्या हेतोः साध्यप्रत्यायनशक्ती
सत्यां बहिर्याप्तेरुद्भावनव्यर्थत्वप्रतिपादनेन तस्याः स्वरूपप्रयुक्त(क्ताऽ)व्यभिचारलक्षण25 त्वस्य, बहिर्व्याप्तेश्च सहचारमात्रत्वस्य लाभाव , सार्वत्रिक्या व्याप्तेविषयभेदमात्रेण
भेदस्य दुर्वचत्वात् । न चेदेवं तदान्ताप्तिग्रहकाल एष एव(काल एव) पक्षसाध्यसंसर्गभानादनुमानवैक(फ)ल्यापत्तिः विना पर्वतोवहिमानित्युद्देश्यप्रतीतिमिति यथातन्त्रं भाव.
1. Though this view has been accepted by a school of Nyāya, Vaisesika and Sankhya also, yet since the Buddhists laid special emphasis on this, it has been attributed to them. See Dr. Kothia, D.L., Jaina tarkasastra mem anumānavicāra, p. 191

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१. प्रमाणपरिच्छेदः। नीयं सुधीभिः । इत्थं च 'पक्कान्येतानि सहकारफलानि एकशाखाप्रभवत्वाद् उपयुक्तसहकारफलवदित्यादौ बाधितविषये, मूर्योऽयं देवदत्तः तत्पुत्रत्वात् इतरतत्पुत्रवदित्यादौ सत्प्रतिपक्षे चातिप्रसङ्गवारणाय अबाधितविषयत्वासत्प्रतिपक्षत्वसहितं प्रागुक्त रूपत्रयमादाय पाश्चरूप्यं हेतुलक्षणम्' इति नैयायिकमतमप्यपास्तम् ; उदेष्यति शकटमित्यादौ पक्षधर्मत्वस्यैवासिद्धेः, स श्यामः तत्पुत्रत्वादित्यत्र हेत्वाभासेऽपि पाश्चरूप्य. 5 सवाच, निश्चितान्यथानुपपत्तेरेव सर्वत्र हेतुलक्षणत्वौचित्यात् ।
[१७. साध्यस्वरूपचर्चा । ] ६३८. ननु हेतुना साध्यमनुमातव्यम् । तत्र किं लक्षणं साध्यमिति चेत् ; उच्यतेअप्रतीतमनिराकृतमभीप्सितं च साध्यम् । शङ्कितविपरीतानध्यवासितवस्तूनां साध्यता. प्रतिपत्त्यर्थमप्रतीतमिति विशेषणम् । प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धस्य साध्यत्वं मा प्रसाङ्क्षीदित्यनि- 10 राकृतग्रहणम् । अनभिमतस्यासाध्यत्वप्रतिपत्तयेऽभीप्सितग्रहणम् ।।
३९. कथायां शङ्कितस्यैव साध्यस्य साधनं युक्तमिति कश्चित् । तन्नः विपर्यस्ताव्युत्पन्न योरपि परपक्षदिक्षादिना कथायामुपसर्पणसम्भवेन संशयनिरासार्थमिव विपर्ययानध्यवसायनिरासार्थमपि प्रयोगसम्भवात् , पित्रादेविपर्यस्ताव्युत्पन्नपुत्रादिशिक्षाप्रदानदर्शनाच्च । न येदेवं जिगीषुकथावामनुमानप्रयोग एव न स्यात् तस्य साभिमानत्वेन 15 विपर्यस्तत्वात् ।
४०. अनिराकृतमिति विशेषणं वादिप्रतिवाद्युभयापेक्षया, द्वयोः प्रमाणेनाबाधि- . तस्य कथायां साध्यत्वात् । अभीप्सितमिति तु वाद्यपेक्षयैव, वक्तुरेव स्वाभिप्रेतार्थप्रतिपादनायेच्छासम्भवात् । ततश्च परार्थाश्चक्षुरादय इत्यादौ पारार्य मात्राभिधानेऽप्यात्मार्थत्वमेव सायं(मेव साध्यं) सिध्यति । अन्यथा संहतपरार्थत्वेन बौद्धश्चक्षु. 20 रादीनामभ्युपगमा त साधनवैफल्या]दित्यनन्वयादिदोपदुष्टमेतत्सालयसाधनमिति वद. न्ति । स्वार्थानुमानावसरेऽपि परार्थानुमानोपयोग्यभिधानम् , परार्थस्य स्वार्थपुरःसरत्वेनानतिभेदज्ञापनार्थम् ।
६४१. व्याप्तिग्रहणसमयापेक्षया साध्यं धर्म एव, अन्यथा तदनुपपत्तेः, आनुमानिकप्रतिपयवसरापेक्षया तु पक्षापरपयोयस्तद्विशिष्टः प्रसिद्धो धर्मी। इत्थं च स्वार्थानुमा- 25 नस्य त्रीण्यङ्गानि धर्मी साध्यं साधनं च । तत्र साधनं गमकत्वेनाङ्गम् , साध्यं तु
1. Syādvādaratnākara, p. 538
ततश्च पराश्चिक्षुरादय इत्यादी पारायं मात्राभिधानेऽप्यारमार्थत्वमेव साध्यस्य प्रसिध्यति । तद्धीच्या व्याप्त माङख्यस्य बौद्ध प्रति माध्यमेव । आत्मा हि साहरूयेन साधयितुमपक्रान्तस्ततोऽसादेव माध्यः । अन्यथा माधनम्य वैफल्यापतेः सहतपरार्थत्वेन बौद्धश्चक्षुरादीनामुपगमात् ।

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जैनतर्कभाषा। गम्यत्वेन, धर्मी पुनः साध्यधर्माधारत्वेन, आधारविशेषनिष्ठतया साध्या (साध्यसिद्धे)रनुमानप्रयोजनत्वात् । अथवा पक्षो हेतुरित्यङ्गद्वयं स्वार्थानुमाने, साध्यधर्मविशिष्टस्य धर्मिणः पक्षत्वात् इति धर्मधर्मिभेदाभेदविवक्षया पक्षद्वयं द्रष्टव्यम् ।
४२. धर्मिणः प्रसिद्धिश्च क्वचित्प्रमाणात् क्वचिद्विकल्पात् क्वचित्प्रमाण विकल्पा5 भ्याम् । तत्र निश्चितप्रामाण्यकप्रत्यक्षाद्यन्यतमावधृतत्वं प्रमाणप्रसिद्धत्वम् । अनिश्चित प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्य प्रत्ययगोचरत्वं विकल्पप्रसिद्धत्वम् । तद्वयविषयत्वं प्रमाणविकल्पप्रसिद्धत्वम् । तत्र प्रमाणसिद्धो धर्मी यथा धूमवच्चादग्निमवे साध्ये पर्वतः, स खलु प्रत्यक्षेणानुभूयते । विकल्पसिद्धो धर्मी यथा सर्वज्ञोऽस्ति सुनिश्चितासम्भवद्भाधकप्रमाण
वादित्यस्तित्वे साध्ये सर्वज्ञः, अथवा खरविषाणं नास्तीति नास्तित्वे साध्ये खरवि10 पाणम् । अत्र हि सर्वज्ञखरविपाणे अस्तित्वनास्तित्वसिद्धिभ्यां प्राग विकल्पसिद्धे । उभयसिद्धो धर्मी यथा शब्दः परिणामी कृतकत्वादित्यत्र शब्दः, स हि वर्तमान(न:) प्रत्यक्ष गम्यः, भूतो भविष्यश्च विकल्पगम्यः, स सर्वोऽपि धर्मीति प्रमाणविकल्पसिद्धो धर्मी । प्रमाणोभयसिद्धयोधर्मिणोः साध्ये कामचारः । विकल्पसिद्धे तु धर्मिणि सत्तासत्तयोरेव
साध्यत्वमिति नियमः । तदुक्तम्-"विकल्पसिद्धे तस्मिन् सत्तेतरे साध्ये" 15 [ परी० ३. २३ ] इति ।
६४३. अत्र बौद्धः सत्तामात्रस्यानभीप्सितत्वाद्विशिष्टसत्तासाधने वानन्वयाद्विकल्पसिद्धे धर्मिणि न सत्ता साध्येत्याह; तदसत् ; इत्थं सति प्रकृतानुमानस्यापि भङ्गप्रसङ्गात् , वह्निमात्रस्यानभीप्सितत्वाद्विशिष्टबढेश्वानन्वयादिति । अथ तत्र सत्तायां
साध्यायां तद्धेतुः-भावधर्मः, भावाभावधर्मः, अभावधर्मो वा स्यात् ? । आधेऽसिद्धिः, 20 असिद्धसत्ताके भावधर्मासिद्धेः । द्वितीये व्यभिचारः, अस्तित्वाभाववत्यपि वृत्तेः । तृतीये च विरोधाभा(विरोधोऽभा)वधर्मस्य भावे क्वचिदप्यसम्भवात् , तर कम
"नासिद्धे भावधर्मोऽस्ति व्यभिचार्युभयाश्रयः । धर्मो विरुद्धोऽभावस्य सा सत्ता साध्यते कथम् ? ॥"
[प्रमाणवा० १. १९२] 25 इति चेत्, न; इत्थं वह्निमद्धर्मत्वादिविकल्पैधूमेन वह्वयनुमानस्याप्युच्छेदापत्तेः ।
४४. विकल्पस्याप्रमाणत्वाद्विकल्पसिद्धोधर्मी नास्त्येवेति नैयायिकः । तस्येत्धंवचनस्यैवानुपपत्तेस्तूष्णीम्भावापत्तिः, विकल्पसिद्धधर्मिणोऽप्रसिद्धौ तत्प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तेरिति ।
६४५. इदं क्यधेयम्-विकल्पसिद्धस्य धर्मिणो नाखण्डस्यैव भानमसत्ख्यातिप्रसशादिति, शब्दादेविशिष्टस्य तस्य [भा]नाम्युपगमे विशेषणस्य संशयेऽभावनिश्चये वा

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१. प्रमाणपरिच्छेदः । वैशिष्ट्यभा[ना]नुपपत्तेः विशेषणायंशे आहार्यारोपरूपा विकल्पास्मिकैवानुमितिः स्वीकर्तव्या, देशकालसत्तालक्षणस्यास्तित्वस्य, सकलदेशकालसत्ताऽभावलक्षणस्य च नास्तित्वस्य साधनेन परपरिकल्पितविपरीतारोपव्यवच्छेदमात्रस्य फलत्वात् ।
४६. वस्तुतस्तु खण्डशः प्रसिद्धपदार्थाऽस्तित्वनास्तित्वसाधनमेवोचितम् । अत एव "असतो नस्थिणिसेहो”[विशेषा० गा० १५७४] इत्यादि भाष्यग्रन्थे खरविषाणं 5 नास्तीत्यत्र 'खरे विषाणं नास्ति' इत्येवार्थ उपपादितः । एकान्तनित्यमर्थक्रियासमर्थ न भवति क्रमयोगपद्याभावादित्यत्रापि विशेषावमर्शदशायां क्रमयोगपद्यनिरूपकत्वाभावेनार्थक्रियानियामकत्वाभावो नित्यत्वादौ सुसाध इति सम्यग्निभालनीयं स्वपरसमयदत्तदृष्टिभिः । _[ १८. परार्थानुमानस्य प्रतिपादनम् । ]
____10 ६४७. परार्थ पक्षहेतुवचनात्मकमनुमानमुपचारात् , तेन श्रोतुरनुमानेनार्थवोधनात् । पक्षस्य विवादादेव गम्यमानत्वादप्रयोग इति सौगतः; तन्नः यत्किञ्चिद्वचनव्यवहितात् ततो व्युत्पन्नमतेः पक्षप्रतीतावप्यन्यान् प्रत्यवश्यनिर्देश्यत्वात् प्रकृतानुमानवाक्यावयवान्तरैकवाक्यतापन्नात्ततोऽवगम्यमानस्य पक्षस्याप्रयोगस्य चेष्टत्वात् । अवश्यं चाभ्यु. पगन्तव्यं हेतोः प्रतिनियतधर्मिधर्मताप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमुपसंहारवचनवत् साध्यस्यापि तदर्थ पक्ष- 15 वचनं ताथागतेनापि, अन्यथा समर्थनोपन्यासादेव गम्यमानस्य हेतोरप्यनुपन्यासप्रसङ्गात् , मन्दमतिप्रतिपत्त्यर्थस्य चोभयत्राविशेषादिति । किञ्च, प्रतिज्ञायाः प्रयोगानहत्वे शास्त्रादावप्यसौ न प्रयुज्येत, दृश्यते च प्रयुज्यमानेयं शाक्यशास्त्रेऽपि । परानुग्रहार्थ शास्त्रे तत्प्रयोगश्च वादेऽपि तुल्यः, विजिगीषूणामपि मन्दमतीनामर्थप्रतिपत्तेस्तत एवोपपत्तेरिति ।
20 $ ४८. आगमात्परेणैव ज्ञातस्य वचनं परार्थानुमानम्, यथा बुद्धिरचेतना उत्पत्तिमचात् घटवदिति सामव्यानुमानम् । अत्र हि बुद्धवावुत्पत्तिमत्वं साख्याने(ख्येन) नैवाभ्युपगम्यते इति; तदेतदपेशलम् ; वादिप्रतिवादिनोरागमप्रामाण्यविप्रतिपत्तेः, अन्यथा तत एव साध्यसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । परीक्षापूर्वमागमाभ्युपगमेऽपि परीक्षाकाले तद्भाधात् । नन्वेवं भवद्भिरपि कथमापाद्यते परं प्रति 'यत् सर्वथैकं तत् नानेकत्र सम्बध्यते, तथा च सामान्य- 25 म्' इति ? | सत्यम् ; एकधर्मोपगते(मे) धर्मान्तरसन्दर्शनमात्र(त्र)तत्परत्वेनैतदापादनस्य वस्तुनिश्चायकत्वाभावान् , प्रसङ्गविपर्ययरूपस्य मौलहेतोरेव तन्निश्चायकत्वात, अनेकवृत्तित्वव्यापकानेकत्वनिवृत्त्यैव तन्निवृत्तेः मौलहेतुपरिकरत्वेन प्रसङ्गोपन्यासस्यापि न्याय्य
1. Cf. Vădanyāya, p. 3-6 2. Cf. Syadvadaratnakara, p.553-554 3. Cl. Ibid., p. 554

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जैनतर्कभाषा त्वात् । बुद्धिरचेतनेत्यादौ च प्रसङ्गविपर्ययहेतोाप्तिसिद्धिनिबन्धनस्य विरुद्धधर्माध्यासस्य विपक्षबाधकप्रमाणस्यानुपस्थापनात् प्रसङ्गस्याप्यन्याय्यत्वमिति वदन्ति ।
६४९. हेतुः साध्योपपत्यल्यथानुपपत्तिम्यां द्विधा प्रयोक्तव्यः, यथा पर्वतो वलिमान् , सत्येव वहौ धूमोपपत्तेः असत्यनुपपत्तेर्वा । अनयोरन्यतरप्रयोगेणैव साध्यप्रतिप5 सौ द्वितीयप्रयोगस्यैकत्रानुपयोगः।।
६५०. पक्षहेतुवचनलक्षणमवयवद्वयमेव च परप्रतिपयङ्गं न दृष्टान्तादिवचनम् , पक्षहेतुवचनादेव परप्रतिपत्तेः, प्रतिबन्धस्य तर्कत एव निर्णयात्, तत्मरणस्यापि पक्षहेतुदर्शनेनैव सिद्धेः, असमर्थितस्य दृष्टान्तादेः प्रतिपत्त्यनङ्गत्वात्तत्समर्थनेनैवान्यथासिद्धेश्च ।
समर्थनं हि हेतोरसिद्धत्वादिदोषाभिराकृत्य स्वसाध्येनाविनाभावसाधनम्, तत एव 10 परप्रतीत्युपपत्तौ किमपरप्रयासेनेति ?।।
६५१. मन्दमतींस्तु व्युत्पादयितुं दृष्टान्तादिप्रयोगोऽप्युपयुज्यते, तथाहि-यः खलु क्षयोपशमविशेषादेव निर्णीतपक्षो दृष्टान्तस्मार्यप्रतिबन्धग्राहकप्रमाणस्मरणनिपुणोऽपरावयवाभ्यूहनसमर्थश्च भवति, तं प्रति हेतुरेव प्रयोज्यः । यस्य तु नाचापि पक्ष
निर्णयः तं प्रति पक्षोऽपि । यस्तु प्रतिबन्धग्राहिणः प्रमाणस्य न स्मरति, तं प्रति 15 दृष्टान्तोऽपि । यस्तु दार्टान्तिके हेतुं योजयितुं न जानीते, तं प्रत्युपनयोऽपि । एवमपि
साकाक्षं प्रति च निगमनम् । पक्षादिस्वरूपविप्रतिपत्तिमन्तं प्रति च पक्षशुध्यादिकमपीति सोऽयं दशावयवो हेतुः पर्यवस्यति ।
[१९. हेतुप्रकाराणामुपदर्शनम् ।] ६५२. स चायं द्विविधः-विधिरूपः प्रतिषेधरूपश्च । तत्र विधिरूपो द्विविधः20 विधिसाधकः प्रतिषेधसाधकश्च । तत्रायः पोढा, तद्यथा-कश्चिन्याप्य एव, यथा शब्दोऽ.
नित्यः प्रयत्ननान्तरीयकत्वादिति । यद्यपि व्याप्यो हेतुः सर्व एव, तथापि कार्याद्यनात्मव्याप्यस्यात् (त्र) ग्रहणाद्भेदः, वृक्षः शिंशपाया इत्यादेरप्यत्रैवान्तर्भावः । कश्चिकार्यरूपः, यथा पर्वतोऽयमनिमान् धूमवस्वान्यथानुपपत्तेरित्यत्र धूमः, धृमो ह्यग्ने कार्यभूतः तदभावेऽनुपपद्यमानोऽग्निं गमयति । कश्चित्कारणरूपः, यथा वृष्टिभविष्यति, 25 विशिष्टमेघान्यथानुपपत्तेरित्यत्र मेघविशेषः, स हि वर्षस्य कारणं स्वकार्यभृतं वर्ष गमयति । ननु कार्याभावेऽपि सम्भवत् कारणं न कार्यानुमापकम् , अत एव न वहिर्धमंगमयतीति चेत् सत्यम् । यस्मिन्सामाप्रतिबन्धः कारणान्तरसाकल्यं च निश्चेतुं शक्यते, तस्यैव कारणस्य कार्यानुमापकत्वात् । कश्चित् पूर्वचरः, यथा उदेष्यति शकटं कृत्तिको
1. Cf. Syadvadaratnakara, p. 554 2. Cf. Ibidi, p. 554-555 3. Cf. Ibid., p. 565

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२. प्रमाणपरिकहतेदः । दयान्यथानुपपत्ते रित्या कृत्तिकोदयानन्तरं मुहर्तान्ते नियमेन शकटोदयो जायत इति कृत्तिकोदयः पूर्वचरो हेतुः शकटोदयं गमयति । कश्चित उत्तरचरः, यथोदगाइरणिः प्राक , कृत्तिकोदयादित्यत्र कृत्तिकोदयः, कृत्तिकोदयो हि भरण्यूदयोत्तर चरस्तं गमयतीति कालव्यवधानेनानयोः कार्यकारणाभ्यां भेदः । कश्चित् सहचरः, यथा मातुलिङ्गं रूपबद्भवितुमर्हति रसवत्तान्यथानुपपत्तरित्यत्र रसः, रसो हि नियमेन रूपसहचरितः, 5 तदभावेऽनुपपद्यमानस्तद्गमयति, परस्परस्वरूपपरित्यागोपलम्भ-पौर्वापर्याभावाभ्यां स्व. भावकार्यकारणेभ्योऽस्य भेदः । तेपूदाहरणेषु भावरूपानेवाग्न्यादीन साधयन्ति धमादयो हेतयो भावरूपा एवेति विधिमाधयिधिरूपास्त एवाविरुद्धोपलब्धय इत्युच्यन्ते ।
५३. द्वितीयस्तु निषेधमाधको विरुद्धोपलब्धिनामा । स च स्वभावविरुद्धतयाप्याधुपलब्धिभेदात् सप्तधा । यथा नास्त्येव सर्वथा एकान्तः, अनेकान्त- 10 स्योपलम्भात् । नास्त्यस्य तचनिश्चयः, नत्र सन्देहात् । नास्त्यम्य क्रोधोपशान्तिः, बदनविकारादेः । नास्त्यस्यासत्यं वचः, रागाद्यकलाक्तज्ञानकलितत्वात् । नोदमिष्यनि मुहान्ते पुष्यतारा, रोहिणयुगमात् । नोदगान्मुहतात्पूर्व मृगगिरः, पूर्वका (फल्गुन्युदयात् । नास्त्यस्य मिथ्याज्ञान, सम्यग्दर्शनादिति । अत्रानेकान्तः प्रतिपध्यस्यकान्तस्य सभापतो विरुद्धः । तच्चसन्देहश्च प्रतिषेध्यतचनिश्रयविरुद्ध 15 तदनिश्चयव्याप्यः । वदनविकारादिच क्रोधोपशमविरुद्धतदनुपशमकायम् । रागाद्यकलतिज्ञानकलितस्वं चासत्यविरुद्भसत्यकारणम् । रोहिण्युद्गमश्च पुण्यतारोदमविरुद्ध मृगशीर्पोदयपूर्व चरः । पूर्वफल्गुन्युदयच मृगशीर्षादयविरुद्धमघोदयोत्तरचरः । सम्यग् दर्शनं च मिथ्याज्ञान विरुद्धसम्यग्ज्ञानसहचरमिति ।
५४. प्रतिषेधरूपोऽपि हेतुर्द्वि विधः-विधिसाधकः प्रतिषेधसाधकश्चेति । आंघो 20 विरुद्धानुपलब्धिनामा विधेयविरुद्धकायकारणस्वभावव्यापकसहचरानुपलम्भ भेदात्पश. धा । यथा अस्त्यत्र रोगातिशयः, नीरोगव्यापारानुपलब्धेः । विद्यतेऽत्र कष्टम, इएसंयो. गाभायात् । वस्तुजातमनेकान्तात्मकम् , एकान्त स्वभावानुपलम्भात् । अस्त्यत्र छाया, औष्ण्यानुपलब्धेः । अस्त्यस्य मिथ्याज्ञानम्, सम्यग्दर्शनानुपलब्धेरिति ।
५५. द्वितीयोऽविरुद्धानुपलब्धिनामा प्रतिषेध्याविरुद्ध स्वभावव्यापककार्यकारण 255 पूर्वनरोत्तरचरसहचरानुपलब्धिमेदात सप्तधा । यथा नास्त्यत्र भूतले कुम्भः, उपलब्धि लक्षणप्राप्तस्य तत्स्वभावस्थानुपलम्भात् । नास्त्यत्र पनसः, पादपानुपलब्धेः । नास्त्यत्राप्रतिहत शक्तिकम् बीजम् , अरानवलोकनात् । न सन्त्यस्य प्रशमप्रभृतयो भावाः, तत्यार्थश्रद्धानाभावात् । नोद्गमिष्यति मुहूर्तान्ते स्वातिः, चित्रोदयादर्शनात् । नोद
1. The varieties of different types of causes are given as four (Sthânăngasutra, p. 309-310), fifteen (Pramanasangraha 19:30) twenty eight (Pramānapariksă, pp. 72-75), twentytwo (Parikwimukh. 35710), sixty-four ( Pramananaya, 35010) clean (Pramin minimsti, 1.2.12) or nine (Vyavadipika, PP 95-99)

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जैनतर्क भाषा ।
गमत्पूर्वभद्रपदा मुहूर्तात्पूर्वम् उत्तरभद्रपदोद्गमानवगमात् । नास्त्यत्र सम्यग्ज्ञानम्, सम्यग्दर्शनानुपलब्धेरिति । सोऽयमनेकविधोऽन्यथानुपपश्येकलक्षणो हेतुरुक्तोऽतोऽन्यो हेत्वाभासः ।
१८
[ २०. हेत्वाभासनिरूपणम् । ]
९५६. स त्रेधा-असिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकभेदात् । तत्राप्रतीयमानस्वरूपो हेतुर5 सिद्धेः । स्वरूपाप्रतीतिश्वाज्ञानात्सन्देहाद्विपर्ययाद्वा । स द्विविधः - उभयासिद्धोऽन्यतरासिद्धश्व । आद्यो यथा शब्दः परिणामी चाक्षुषत्वादिति । द्वितीयो यथा अचेतनास्तरवः, विज्ञानेन्द्रियायुर्निरोधलक्षण मरणरहितत्वात्, अचेतनाः सुखादयः उत्पत्तिमत्वादिति वा ।
५७. नन्वन्यतरासिद्धो हेत्वाभास एव नास्ति, तथाहि परेणासिद्ध इत्युद्भाविते 10 यदि वादी न तत्साधकं प्रमाणमाचक्षीत, तदा प्रमाणाभावादुभयोरप्यसिद्धः । अथाचक्षीत तदा प्रमाणस्यापक्षपातित्वादुभयोरपि सिद्धः । अथ यावन्न परं प्रति प्रमाणेन प्रसाध्यते तावत्तं प्रत्यसिद्ध इति चेत्; गौणं तर्ह्यसिद्धत्वम्, न हि रत्नादिपदार्थस्तस्वतोऽप्रतीयमानस्तावन्तमपि कालं मुख्यतया तदाभासः । किञ्च, अन्यतरासिद्धो यद । हेत्वाभासस्तदा वादी निगृहीतः स्यात् न च निगृहीतस्य पश्चादनिग्रह इति युक्तम् । 15 नापि हेतुसमर्थनं पश्चाद्युक्तम्, निग्रहान्तत्वाद्वादस्येति । अत्रोच्यते यदा वादी सम्यग्घेतुत्वं प्रतिपद्यमानोऽपि तत्समर्थनन्यायविस्मरणादिनिमित्तेन प्रतिवादिनं प्राश्निकान् वा प्रतिबोधयितुं न शक्नोति, असिद्धतामपि नानुमन्यते, तदान्यतरा सिद्धत्वेनैव निगृह्यते । तथा, स्वयमनभ्युपगतोऽपि परस्य सिद्ध इत्येतावाने ( इत्येतावतै) वोपन्यस्तो हेतुरन्यतरासिद्धो निग्रहाधिकरणम्, यथा साङ्ख्यस्य जैनं प्रति ' अचेतनाः सुखादय उत्पत्ति20 मवात् घटवत्' इति ।
५८. साध्यविपरीत व्याप्तो विरुद्धः । यथा अपरिणामी शब्दः कृतकत्वादिति । कृतकत्वं ह्यपरिणामित्वविरुद्धेन परिणामित्वेन व्याप्तमिति ।
$५९. यस्यान्यथानुपपत्तिः सन्दिह्यते सोऽनैकान्तिकः । स द्वेधानिर्णीतविपक्षवृत्तिकः सन्दिग्धविपक्षवृत्तिकश्च । आद्यो यथा नित्यः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वात् । अत्र हि 25 प्रमेयत्वस्य वृत्तिर्नित्ये व्योमादौ सपक्ष इव विपक्षेऽनित्ये घटादावपि निश्चिता । द्वितीयो यथा अभिमतः सर्वज्ञो न भवति वक्तृत्वादिति । अत्र हि वक्तृत्वं विपक्षे सर्वज्ञे संदिग्ध - वृत्तिकम्, सर्वज्ञः किं वक्ताऽऽहोस्विनेति सन्देहात् । एवं स श्यामो मित्रापुत्रत्वादित्याद्यप्युदाहार्यम् ।
६ ६०. अकिञ्चित्कराख्यश्चतुर्थोऽपि हेत्वाभासमेदो धर्म भूषणेनोदाहृतो न श्रद्धेयः ।

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१. प्रमाणपरिच्छेदः । सिद्धसाधनो बाधितविषयश्चेति द्विविधस्याप्यप्रयोजकाह्वयस्य तस्य प्रतीत-निराकृताख्यपक्षाभासभेदानतिरिक्तत्वात् । न च यत्र पक्षदोषस्तत्रावश्यं हेतुदोषोऽपि वाच्यः, दृष्टान्तादिदोषस्याप्यवश्यं वाच्यत्वापत्तेः । एतेन कालात्ययापदिष्टोऽपि प्रत्युक्तो वेदितव्यः। प्रकरणसमोऽपि नातिरिच्यते, तुल्यबलसाध्य तद्विपर्ययसाधकहेतुद्वयरूपे सत्यस्मिन् प्रकृतसाध्यसाधनयोरन्यथानुपपत्यनिश्चयेऽसिद्ध एवान्तर्भावादिति संक्षेपः। 5
[२१. आगमप्रमाणनिरूपणम् । ] ६१. आप्तवचनादाविर्भूतमर्थसंवेदनमागमः । न च व्याप्तिग्रहणबलेनार्थप्रतिपादकत्वाद् धूमवदस्यानुमानेऽन्तर्भावः, कूटाकूटकार्षापणनिरूपणप्रवणप्रत्यक्षवदम्यासदशायां व्याप्तिग्रहनरपेक्ष्येणैवास्यार्थबोधकत्वात् । यथास्थितार्थपरिज्ञानपूर्वकहितोपदेशप्रवण आप्तः । वर्णपदवाक्यात्मकं तद्वचनम् । वर्णोऽकारादिः पोद्गलिकः । पदं सङ्केत- 10 बत् । अन्योऽन्यापेक्षाणां पदानां समुदायो वाक्यम् ।
६२. तदिदमागमप्रमाणं सर्वत्र विधिप्रतिषेधाभ्यां स्वार्थमभिदधानं सप्तभङ्गीमनुगच्छति, तथैव परिपूर्णार्थप्रापकत्वलक्षणतात्विकप्रामाण्यनिर्वाहात , क्वचिदेकभङ्गदर्शनेऽपि व्युत्पन्नमतीनामितरभङ्गाक्षेपध्रौव्यात् । यत्र तु घटोऽस्तीत्यादिलोकवाक्ये सप्तभङ्गीसंस्पर्शशून्यता तत्रार्थप्रापकत्वमात्रेण लोकापेक्षया प्रामाण्येऽपि तत्त्वतो न प्रामाण्यमिति 15 द्रष्टव्यम् ।
[२२. सप्तभङ्गीस्वरूपचर्चा ।) ६६३. केयं सप्तभङ्गीति चेदुच्यते - एकत्र वस्तुन्येकैकधर्मपर्यनुयोगवशादविरोधेन व्यस्तयोः समस्तयोश्च विधिनिषेधयोः कल्पनया स्यात्काराङ्कितः सप्तधा वाक्प्रयोगः सप्तभङ्गी । इयं च सप्तमङ्गी वस्तुनि प्रतिपर्याय सप्तविधधर्माणां सम्भवात् सप्तविध- 20 संशयोत्थापितसप्तविधजिज्ञासामूलसप्तविधप्रश्नानुरोधादुपपद्यते । तत्र स्यादस्त्येव सर्वमिति प्राधान्येन विधिकल्पनया प्रथमो भङ्गः । स्यात्-कथञ्चित् स्वद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावापेक्षयेत्यर्थः। अस्ति हि घटादिकं द्रव्यतः पार्थिवादित्वेन, न जलादित्वेन । क्षेत्रतः पाटलिपुत्रकादित्वेन, न कान्यकुब्जादित्वेन । कालतः शेशिरादिस्वेन, न बासन्तिकादित्वेन | भावतः श्यामादित्वेन, न रक्तादित्वेनेति । एवं स्यानास्त्येव सर्वमिति प्राधा- 25 न्येन निषेधकल्पनया द्वितीयः । न चासत्त्वं काल्पनिकम् ; सत्त्ववत् तस्य स्वातन्त्र्येणानुभबाद, अन्यथा विपक्षासत्त्वस्य तात्त्विकस्याभावेन हेतोस्रूप्यव्याघातप्रसङ्गात् । स्यादस्त्येव स्यानास्त्येवेति प्राधान्येन क्रमिकविधिनिषेधकल्पनया तृतीयः । स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति युगपत्प्राधान्येन विधिनिषेधकल्पनया चतुर्थः, एकेन पदेन युगपदुभयोर्वक्तुम

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जैनतर्कभाषा। शक्यत्वात् । शतृशानशौ सदित्यादौ साङ्केतिकपदेनापि क्रमेणार्थद्वयबोधनात् । अन्यतरस्वादिना कथञ्चिदुभयबोधनेऽपि प्रातिस्विकरूपेणैकपदादुभयबोधस्य ब्रह्मणापि दुरुपपादत्वात् । स्यादस्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति विधिकल्पनया युगपद्विधिनिषेधकल्पनया च पञ्चमः । स्यानास्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति निषेधकल्पनया युगपद्विधिनिषेधकल्पनया 5 च षष्ठः । स्यादस्त्येव स्यानात्स्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति विधिनिषेधकल्पनया युगपद्विधिनिषेधकल्पनया च सप्तम इति ।
६४. सेयं सप्तमङ्गी प्रतिभङ्ग(ज) सकलादेशस्वभावा विकलादेशस्वभावा च । तत्र प्रमाणप्रतिपनानन्तधर्मात्मकवस्तुनः कालादिभिरभेदवृत्तिप्राधान्यादभेदोपचाराद्वा
योगपद्येन प्रतिपादकं वचः सकलादेशः । नयविषयीकृतस्य वस्तुधर्मस्य भेदवृत्तिप्राधा10 न्याझेदोपचारादा क्रमेणाभिधायकं वाक्यं विकलादेशः । ननु कः क्रमः, किं वा
योगपद्यम् ? । उच्यते-यदास्तिस्वादिधर्माणां कालादिभिर्भेदविवक्षा तदैकशब्दस्यानेकार्थप्रत्यायने शक्यभावात् क्रमः। यदा तु तेषामेव धर्माणां कालादिभिरभेदेन वृत्तमात्मरूपमुच्यते तदैकेनापि शब्देनैकधर्मप्रत्यायनमुखेन तदात्मकतामापनस्यानेकाशेषरूप
स्य वस्तुनः प्रतिपादनसम्भवाद्योगपद्यम् । 15६६५. के पुनः कालादयः १। उच्यते-काल आत्मरूपमर्थः सम्बन्ध उपकारः
गुणिदेशः संसर्गः शब्द इत्यष्टौ । तत्र स्याजीवादि वस्त्वस्त्येवेत्यत्र यत्कालमस्तित्वं त्वत्(तत्)कालाः शेषानन्तधर्मा वस्तुन्येकडेति तेषां कालेनाभेदवृत्तिः। यदेव चास्ति. त्वस्य तद्गुणत्वमात्मरूपं तदेवान्यानन्तगुणानामपीत्यात्मरूपेणामेदवृत्तिः । य एव
चाधारे(रो)ऽर्थो द्रव्याख्योऽस्तित्वस्य स एवान्यपर्यायाणामित्यर्थेनाभेदवृत्तिः । य एव 20 चाविष्वग्भावः सम्बन्धोऽस्तित्वस्य स एवान्येषामिति सम्बन्धेनाभेदवृत्तिः । य एष
चोपकारोऽस्तित्वेन स्वानुरक्तत्वकरणं स एवान्येरपीत्युपकारेणाभेदवृत्तिः । य एवं गुणिनः सम्बन्धी देशः क्षेत्रलक्षणोऽस्तित्वस्य स एवान्येषामिति गुणिदेशेना भेदवृत्तिः । य एव चैकवस्त्वात्मनाऽस्तित्वस्य संसर्गः स एवान्येषामिति संसर्गेणाभेदवृत्तिः। गुणीभूत
भेदादभेदप्रधानात् सम्बन्धाद्विपर्ययेण संसर्गस्य भेदः । य एव चास्तीति शब्दोऽस्ति25 त्वधर्मात्मकस्य वस्तुनो वाचकः स एवाशेषानन्तधर्मात्मकस्यापीति शब्देनाभेदवृत्तिः,
पर्यायार्थिकनयगुणभावेन द्रव्यार्थिकनयप्राधान्यादुपपद्यते । द्रव्यार्थिकगुणभावेन पर्यायार्थिकप्राधान्ये तु न गुणानामभेदवत्तिः सम्भवति, समकालमेकत्र नानागुणानामसम्भवात् , सम्भवे वा तदाश्रयस्य मेदप्रसङ्गात् । नानागुणानां सम्बन्धिन आत्मरूपस्य च
मिन्नत्वात् , अन्यथा तेषां भेदविरोधात्, स्वाश्रयस्यार्थस्यापि नानात्वात् , अन्यथा 30 नानागुणाश्रयत्वविरोधात् । सम्बन्धस्य च सम्बन्धिभेदेन भेददर्शनात् , नानासम्बन्धि

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१. प्रमाणपरिच्छेदः ।
भिरेकत्रैकसम्बन्धाघटनात् । तैः क्रियमाणस्योपकारस्य च प्रतिनियतरूपस्यानेकत्वात्, अनेकैरुपकारिभिः क्रियमाणस्योपकारस्यैकस्य विरोधात् । गुणिदेशस्य च प्रतिगुणं भेदात्, तदभेदे भिन्नार्थगुणानामपि गुणिदेशाभेदप्रसङ्गात् । संसर्गस्य च प्रतिसंसर्गि भेदात्, तदभेदे संसर्गिभेदविरोधात् । शब्दस्य प्रतिविषयं नानात्वात्, सर्वगुणानामेकशब्दवाच्यतायां सर्वार्थानामेकशब्दवाच्यतापत्तेरिति कालादिभिर्भिन्नात्मनामभेदोप- 5 चारः क्रियते । एवं भेदवृत्तितदुपचारावपि वाच्याविति । पर्यवसितं परोक्षम् । तथ निरूपितः प्रमाणपदार्थः ।
२१
इति महामहोपाध्याय श्रीकल्याणविजय गणि शिष्यमुख्य पण्डित श्री लाभविजयगणिशिध्यावतंसपण्डित श्रीजीत विजयगणि सतीर्थ्य पण्डित श्रीनयविजयगणिशिष्येण पण्डित श्रीपद्मविजयगणिसहोदरेण पण्डितयशोविजयगणिना कृतायां जैनवर्कभाषायां प्रमाणपरिच्छेदः सम्पूर्णः ।
44444
२. नयपरिच्छेदः । [ १. नयानां स्वरूपनिरूपणम् । ]
६१. प्रमाणान्युक्तानि । अथ नया उच्यन्ते । प्रमाणपरिच्छिन्नस्यानन्तधर्मात्मकस्य वस्तुन एकदेशग्राहिणस्तदितरांशाप्रतिक्षेपिणोऽध्यवसायविशेषा नयाः । प्रमाणे- 15 कदेशत्वात् तेषां ततो भेदः । यथा हि समुद्रैकदेशो न समुद्रो नाप्यसमुद्रस्तथा नया अपि न प्रमाणं न वाsप्रमाणमिति । ते च द्विधा द्रव्यार्थिक पर्यायार्थिकभेदात् । तत्र प्राधान्येन द्रव्यमात्रग्राही द्रव्यार्थिकः । प्राधान्येन पर्याय मात्रग्राही पर्यायार्थिकः । तत्र द्रव्यार्थिकत्रिधा नैगमसहव्यवहारभेदात् । पर्यायार्थिक चतुर्धा ऋजुमूत्रशब्दसमभिरूदैवंभूतभेदात् । ऋजुत्रो द्रव्यार्थिकस्यैव भेद इति तु जिनअद्रगणिक्षमाश्रमणाः ।
६२. तत्र सामान्यविशेषाद्यनेकधर्मोपनयनपरोऽध्यवसायो नैगमः, यथा पर्याययोर्द्रव्ययोः पर्यायद्रव्ययोथ मुख्यामुख्यरूपतया विवक्षणपरः । अत्र सच्चैतन्यमात्मनीति
1. Cf. Tattvārthaślokavārtika, 1.6.21,5 नाप्रमाणं प्रमाणं वा नयो ज्ञानात्मको मतः स्यात्प्रमाणं कदेशस्तु सर्वपाप्यविशेषतः ॥ नायं यस्तु न चायन्तु मस्त्वंशः कम्यते ।
मासमुहः समुद्रो वा समुद्रांश मचोच्यते ।।
2. Cf. Visesāvaśyakabhāsyabrhadvrtti, Gāthās 75, 77,2262
10
20

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जैनतर्कभाषा पर्याययोर्मुख्यामुख्यतया विवक्षणम् । अत्र चैतन्याख्यस्य व्यञ्जनपर्यायस्य विशेष्यत्वेन मुख्यत्वात् , सचाख्यस्य तु विशेषणत्वेनामुख्यत्वात् । प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिनिवन्धनार्थक्रियाकारित्वोपलक्षितो व्यञ्जनपर्यायः। भूतभविष्यत्वसंस्पर्शरहितं वर्तमानकालावच्छिन्नं वस्तुस्वरूपं चार्थपर्यायः । वस्तु पर्यायवद्र्व्यमिति द्रव्ययोर्मुख्यामुख्यतया विवक्षणम्, पर्या
यवद्रव्याख्यस्य धर्मिणो विशेष्यत्वेन प्राधान्यात् , वस्त्वाख्यस्य विशेषणत्वेन गौण5 त्वात् । क्षणमेकं सुखी विषयासक्तजीव इति पर्यायद्रव्ययोर्मुख्यामुख्यतया विवक्षणम्, अत्र विषयासक्तजीवाख्यस्य धर्मिणो विशेष्यत्वेन मुख्यत्वात् , सुखलक्षणस्य तु धर्मस्य द्विशेषणत्वेनामुख्यत्वात् । न चैवं द्रव्यपयोयोमयावगाहित्वेन नेगमस्य प्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गः, प्राधान्येन तदुभयावगाहिन एव ज्ञानस्य प्रमाणत्वात् ।
६३. सामान्यमात्रग्राही परामर्शः सङ्ग्रहः-स द्वेधा, परोऽपरश्च । तत्राशेषविशेषे10 वौदासीन्यं भजमानः शुद्धद्रव्यं सन्मात्रमभिमन्यमानः परः सङ्ग्रहः । यथा विश्वमेकं
सदविशेषादिति । द्रव्यत्वादीन्यवान्तरसामान्यानि मन्वानस्तद्भेदेषु गजनिमीलिकामवलम्बमानः पुनरपरसङ्ग्रहः । सङ्ग्रहेण गोचरीकृतानामर्थानां विधिपूर्वकमवहरणं येनाभि. सन्धिना क्रियते स व्यवहारः। यथा यत् सत् तद् द्रव्यं पर्यायो वा । यद् द्रव्यं तजीवादि
पडिधम् । यः पर्यायः स द्विविधा - क्रमभावी सहभावी चेत्यादि । 15६४. ऋजु वर्तमानक्षणस्थायिपर्यायमा प्राधान्यतः सुचयन्नभिप्राय अजुसूत्रः। यथा सुखविवर्तः सम्प्रत्यस्ति । अत्र हि क्षणस्थायि सुखाख्यं पर्यायमात्र प्राधान्येन प्रद यते, तदधिकरणभूतं पुनरात्मद्रव्यं गौणतया नाlत इति ।
५. कालादिभेदेन ध्वनेरर्थभेदं प्रतिपद्यमानः शब्दः । कालकारकलिङ्गसङ्ख्यापुरुषोपसर्गाः कालादयः । तत्र बभूव भवति भविष्यति सुमेरुरित्यत्रातीतादिकालभेदेन 20 सुमेरोआंदप्रतिपत्तिः, करोति क्रियते कुम्भ इत्यादौ कारकभेदेन, तटस्तटी तटमित्यादौ
लिङ्गभेदेन, दाराः कलत्रमित्यादौ संख्याभेदेन, यास्यसि त्वम् , यास्यति भवानित्यादी पुरुषभेदेन, सन्तिष्ठते अवतिष्ठते इत्यादावुपसर्गभेदेन ।
६. पर्यायशब्देषु निरुक्तिभेदेन भिन्नमर्थ समभिरोहन् समभिरूढः । शब्दनयो, हि पर्यायभेदेऽप्यर्थामेदमभिप्रैति, समभिरूढस्तु पर्याय भेदे भिन्नाननभिमन्यते ।'
1. This suggests why synonyms are called paryāyavāci in Sanskrit. It means that no two words carry exactly the same meaning; they only indicate the different mode (paryāyas) of an object. Thus the word 'paryāya' of Jaina philosophy has been used in its technical sense, in the word 'paryayavāci'

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२. नयपरिच्छेदः ।
२३
अभेदं त्वर्थगतं पर्यायशब्दानामुपेक्षत इति, यथा इन्दनादिन्द्रः, शकनाच्छक्रः, पूर्दारणात्पुरन्दर इत्यादि ।
६७. शेंब्दानां स्वप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभूत क्रियाविष्टमर्थं वाच्यत्वेनाभ्युपगच्छन्नेवम्भूतः । यथेन्दनमनुभवन्निन्द्रः । समभिरूढनयो हीन्दनादिक्रियायां सत्यामसत्यां च वासवादेरर्थस्येन्द्रादिव्यपदेशमभिप्रैति, क्रियोपलक्षितसामान्यस्यैव प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तत्वात्, पशु- 5 विशेषस्य गमनक्रियायां सत्यामसत्यां च गोव्यपदेशवत्, तथारूढेः सद्भावात् । एवम्भूतः पुनरिन्दनादिक्रियापरिणतमर्थं तत्क्रियाकाले इन्द्रादिव्यपदेशभाजमभिमन्यते । न हि कश्चिदक्रियाशब्दोऽस्यास्ति । गौरश्व इत्यादिजातिशब्दाभिमतानामपि क्रियाश ब्दत्वात्, गच्छतीति गौः, आशुगामित्वादश्व इति । शुक्लो, नील इति गुणशब्दाभिमता अपि क्रियाशब्दा एव, शुचीभवनाच्छुक्को, नीलनाभील इति । देवदत्तो यज्ञदत्त 10 इति यदृच्छाशब्दाभिमता अपि क्रियाशब्दा एव, देव एनं देयात्, यज्ञ एनं देयादिति । संयोगिद्रव्यशब्दाः समवाय (वि) द्रव्यशब्दाचाभिमताः क्रियाशब्दा एव दण्डोऽस्यास्तीति दण्डी, विषाणमस्यास्तीति विषाणीत्यस्तिक्रियाप्रधानत्वात् । पञ्चतयी तु शब्दानां व्यवहारमात्रात्, न तु निश्चयादित्ययं नयः स्वीकुरुते ।
६८. एतेवद्यात्वारः प्राधान्येनार्थगोचरत्वादर्थनयाः अन्त्यास्तु त्रयः प्राधा- 15 न्येन शब्द गोचरत्वाच्छन्दनयाः । तथा विशेषग्राहिणोऽर्पितनयाः, सामान्य ग्राहिणश्चानर्पितनयाः । तत्रानर्पितनयमते तुल्यमेव रूपं सर्वेषां सिद्धानां भगवताम् । अर्पितनयमते त्वेकद्वित्र्यादिसमयसिद्धाः स्वसमानसमयसिद्धैरेव तुल्या इति । तथा, लोकप्रसिद्धार्थानुवादपरो व्यवहारनयः, यथा पञ्चस्वपि वर्णेषु भ्रमरे सत्सु श्यामो भ्रमर इति व्यपदेशः । तात्त्विकार्थाभ्युपगमपरस्तु निश्चयः, स पुनर्मन्यते पञ्चवर्णो भ्रमरः चादरस्कन्धत्वेन 20 तच्छरीरस्य पञ्चवर्णपुद्गलैर्निष्पन्नत्वात् शुक्लादीनां च न्यग्भूतत्वेनानुपलक्षणात् । अथवा एकनयमतार्थग्राही व्यवहारः, सर्वनयमतार्थग्राही च निश्वयः । न चैवं निश्वयस्य प्रमाणत्वेन नयत्वव्याघातः, सर्वनयमतस्यापि स्वार्थस्य तेन प्राधान्याभ्युपगमात् । तथा, ज्ञानमात्र प्राधान्याभ्युपगमपरा ज्ञाननयाः । क्रियामात्रप्राधान्याभ्युपगमपराय क्रियानयाः । तत्रर्जुमूत्रादयश्चत्वारो नया चारित्रलक्षणायाः क्रियाया एव प्राधान्यमभ्यु- 25 पगच्छन्ति, तस्या एव मोक्षं प्रत्यव्यवहितकारणत्वात् । नैगमसंग्रहव्यवहारास्तु यद्यपि चारित्रश्रुतसम्यक्त्वानां त्रयाणामपि मोक्षकारणत्वमिच्छन्ति, तथापि व्यस्तानामेव, न तु समस्तानाम्, एतन्मते ज्ञान्दादित्रयादेव मोक्ष इत्यनियमात्, अन्यथा नयत्वहानिप्रसङ्गात् समुदयवादस्य स्थितपक्षत्वादिति द्रष्टव्यम् ।
"

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जैनतर्कभाषा। ६९. कः पुनरत्र बहुविषयो नयः को वाऽल्पविषयः १, इति चेदुच्यते-सन्मात्र. गोचरात्संग्रहात्तावन्नैगमो बहुविषयो भावाभावभूमिकत्वात् । सद्विशेषप्रकाशकाध्यवहारतः संग्रहः समस्तसत्समृहोपदर्शकत्वादहुविषयः । वर्तमानविषयावलम्बिन ऋजुत्रा
त्कालत्रितयवर्त्यर्थजातावलम्बी व्यवहारो बहुविषयः । कालादिभेदेन भिन्नार्थोपदेशका5 च्छब्दात्तद्विपरीतवेदक ऋजुभूत्रो बहुविषयः । न केवलं कालादिभेदेनैवर्जुसूत्रादल्पार्थता
शब्दस्य, किन्तु भावघटस्यापि सद्भावासद्भावादिनाऽर्पितस्य स्याद् घटः स्यादघट इत्यादिभङ्गपरिकरितस्य तेनाभ्युपगमात् तस्य सूत्राद् विशेषिततरत्वोपदेशात् । यद्यपीदृशसम्पूर्णसप्तभङ्गपरिकरितं वस्तु स्याद्वादिन एव सङ्गिरन्ते, तथापि ऋजुत्रकृतेतद
भ्युपगमापेक्षयाऽन्यतरभङ्गेन विशेषितप्रतिपत्तिरत्रादुष्टेत्यदोष इति वदन्ति । प्रतिपर्याय 10 शब्दमर्थभेदमभीप्सतः समभिरूढाच्छब्दस्तद्विषया(द्विपर्यया)नुयायित्वादहुविषयः। प्रतिक्रियं विभिन्नमर्थ प्रतिजानानादेवम्भूतात्समभिरूढः तदन्यथार्थस्थापकत्वादहुविषयः ।
१०. नर्यवाक्यमपि स्वविषये प्रवर्तमानं विधिप्रतिषेधाभ्यां सप्तमङ्गीमनुगच्छति, विकलादेशत्वात् , परमेतद्वाक्यस्य प्रमाणवाक्याद्विशेष इति द्रष्टव्यम् ।
[२. नयामासानां निरूपणम् ।] 15११. अथ नयामासाः । तत्र द्रव्यमात्रग्राही पर्यायप्रतिक्षेपी द्रव्यार्थिकाभासः ।
पर्यायमात्रग्राही द्रव्यप्रतिक्षेपी पर्यायार्थिकाभासः। धर्मिधर्मादीनामे(मै)कान्तिकपार्थक्याभिसन्धि गमाभासः, यथा नैयायिकवैशेषिकदर्शनम् । सत्ताऽद्वैतं स्वीकुर्वाणः सकलविशेषानिराचक्षाणः संग्रहाभासः यथाऽखिलान्यद्वैतवादिदर्शनानि सांख्यदर्शनं च । अपार
मार्थिकद्रव्यपर्यायविभागाभिप्रायो व्यवहाराभासः, यथा चार्वाकदर्शनम्, चार्वाको हि 20 प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नं जीवद्रव्यपर्यायादिप्रविभागं कल्पनारोपितत्वेनापह्नतेऽविचारितरमणीयं
भूतचतुष्टयप्रविभागमानं तु स्थूललोकन्यवहारानुयायितया समर्थयत इति । वर्तमानपर्यायाभ्युपगन्ता सर्वथा द्रव्यापलापी ऋजुत्रामासः, यथा ताथागतं मतं । कोलादिभेदेनार्थभेदमेवाभ्युपगच्छन् शब्दाभासः, यथा बभूव भवति भविष्यति सुमेरुरित्यादयः
शब्दा भिन्नमेवार्थमभिदधति, भिन्नकालशब्दत्वात्ताकसिद्धान्यशब्दवदिति । पर्याय25 ध्वनीनामभिधेयनानात्वमेव कक्षीकुर्वाणः समभिरूढाभासः, यथा इन्द्रः शक्रः पुरन्दर
इत्यादयः शब्दा भिन्नाभिधेया एव, भिन्नशब्दत्वात् , करिकुरङ्गशब्दवदिति । क्रिया
1. The idea is that the non. Jaina systems of philosophy are also partly true, but they are false inasinuch as they overlook each other Cf. Gommatasaira, Karinakanda,805.
परमनया वयण मिच्छ खल होई सवहा बघणा । जेणाण पुण बयगं सम्म ख कहंचिपणादो।

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२५
३. निःक्षेपपरिच्छेदः । नाविष्टं वस्तु शब्दवाच्यतया प्रतिक्षिपन्नेवंभूताभासः, यथा विशिष्टचेष्टाशून्यं घटाख्यं यस्तु न घटशब्दवाच्यं, घटशब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभूतक्रियाशुन्यत्वात् , पटवदिति । अर्थाभिधायी शब्दप्रतिक्षेपी अर्थनयाभासः । शब्दाभिधाय्यर्थप्रतिक्षेपी शब्दनयाभासः । अर्पितमभिदधानोऽनर्पित प्रतिक्षिपन्नर्पितनयाभासः । अनर्पितमाभदधदर्पितं प्रतिक्षिपन्ननर्पितामासः । लोकव्यवहारमभ्युपगम्य तत्वप्रतिक्षेपी व्यवहाराभासः । तत्वमभ्युप-5 गम्य व्यवहारप्रतिक्षेपी निश्चयाभासः। ज्ञानमभ्युपगम्य क्रियाप्रतिक्षेपी ज्ञाननयाभासः। क्रियामभ्युपगम्य ज्ञानप्रतिक्षेपी क्रियानयाभास इति । इति महामहोपाध्यायश्रीकल्याणविजयगणिशिष्यमुख्यपण्डितश्रीलाभविजयगणिशिष्यावतंसपण्डितश्रीजीतविजयगणिसतीर्थ्यपण्डितश्रीनयविजयगणिशिष्येण पण्डितश्रीपद्मविजयगणिसहोदरेण पण्डितयशोविजयगणिना । विरचितायां जैनतर्कभाषायां नयपरिच्छेदः सम्पूर्णः।
३. निक्षेपपरिच्छेदः।
[ १. नामादिनिःक्षेपनिरूपणम् । ] ६१. नया निरूपिताः। अथ निःक्षेपा निरूप्यन्ते। प्रकरणादिवशेनाप्रतिपत्या(च्या)दिव्यवच्छेदकयथास्थानविनियोगाय शब्दार्थरचनाविशेषा निःक्षेपाः । मङ्गलादि- 15 पदार्थनिःक्षेपानाममङ्गलादिविनियोगोपपत्तेश्च निःक्षेपाणां फलवत्त्वम् , तदुक्तम्-"अप्रस्तुतार्थापाकरणात् प्रस्तुतार्थव्याकरणाच नि:क्षेपः फलवान्" [ लघी० स्ववि० ७.२] इति । ते च सामान्यतश्चतुर्धा-नामस्थापनाद्रव्यभावभेदात् ।
६२. तत्र प्रकृतार्थनिरपेक्षा नामार्थान्यतरपरिणतिर्नामनिःक्षेपः। यथा सङ्केतितमात्रेणान्यार्थस्थितेनेन्द्रादिशब्देन वाच्यस्य गोपालदारकस्य शक्रादिपर्यायशब्दानभि- 20 धेया परिणतिरियमेव वा यथान्यत्रावर्तमानेन यदृच्छाप्रवृत्तेन डित्थडवित्थादिशब्देन याच्या । तत्वतोऽर्थनिष्ठा उपचारतः शब्दनिष्ठा च । गेर्वादिनामापेक्षया यावद्रव्यभाविनी, देवदत्तादिनामापेक्षया चायावद्रव्यभाविनी, यथा वा पुस्तकपत्रचित्रादिलिखिता वस्त्वभिधानभृतेन्द्रादिवर्णावली ।
१३. यत्तु वस्तु तदर्थवियुक्तं तदभिप्रायेण स्थाप्यते चित्रादौ तादृशाकारम् , 25 अक्षादौ च निराकारम् , चित्राद्यपेक्षयेत्वरं नन्दीश्वरचैत्यप्रतिमाद्यपेक्षया च यावत्कथिकं स स्थापनानिःक्षेपः, यथा जिनप्रतिमा स्थापनाजिनः, यथा चेन्द्रप्रतिमा स्थापनेन्द्रः।
४. भृतस्य भाविनो वा भावस्य कारणं यन्निक्षिप्यते स द्रव्यनिःक्षेपः, यथा

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जैनतर्क भाषा ।
ऽनुभूतेन्द्रपर्यायोऽनुभविष्यमाणेन्द्रपर्यायो वा इन्द्रः, अनुभूतघृताधारत्व पर्यायेऽनुभविप्यमाणघृताधारत्व पर्याये च घृतघटव्यपदेशवत्तत्रेन्द्रशब्दव्यपदेशोपपत्तेः । क्वचिदप्राधान्येऽपि द्रव्यनिःक्षेपः प्रवर्तते, यथाऽङ्गारमर्दको द्रव्याचार्यः, आचार्यगुणरहितत्वात् अप्रधानाचार्य इत्यर्थः । कचिदनुपयोगेऽपि यथाऽनाभोगेनेह परलोकाद्याशंसा लक्षणे5 नाविधिना च भक्त्यापि क्रियमाणा जिनपूजादिक्रिया द्रव्यक्रियैव, अनुपयुक्तक्रियायाः साक्षान्मोक्षाङ्गत्वाभावात् | भक्त्याऽविधिनापि क्रियमाणा सा पारम्पर्येण मोक्षाङ्गत्वापेक्षया द्रव्यतामश्नुते, भक्तिगुणेनाविधिदोषस्य निरनुबन्धीकृतत्वादित्याचार्याः ।
२६
10
५. विवक्षित क्रियानुभूतिविशिष्टं स्वतश्वं यन्निक्षिप्यते स भावनिःक्षेपः, यथा इन्दनक्रियापरिणतो भावेन्द्र इति ।
६६. ननु भाववर्जितानां नामादीनां कः प्रतिविशेषस्त्रिष्वपि वृत्यविशेषात् 2, तथाहि - नाम तावन्नामवति पदार्थ स्थापनायां द्रव्ये चाविशेषेण वर्तते । भावार्थशून्यत्वं स्थापनारूपमपि त्रिष्वपि समानम्, त्रिष्वपि भावस्याभावात् । द्रव्यमपि नामस्थापनाद्रव्येषु वर्तत एव, द्रव्यस्यैव नामस्थापना करणात्, द्रव्यस्य द्रव्ये सुतरां वृत्तेश्वेति विरुद्धधर्माध्यासाभावान्नैषां भेदो युक्त इति चेत्; न; अनेन रूपेण विरुद्धधर्माध्यासामावेऽपि 15 रूपान्तरेण विरुद्धधर्माध्यासा तद्भेदोपपत्तेः । तथाहि नामद्रव्याभ्यां स्थापना तावदा काराभिप्राय बुद्धिक्रियाफलदर्शनाद्भियते, यथा हि स्थापनेन्द्रे लोचन सहस्राद्याकारः, स्थापनाकर्तुच सद्भूतेन्द्राभिप्रायो, द्रष्टुश्च तदाकारदर्शनादिन्द्रबुद्धिः, भक्तिपरिणतद्धीनां नमस्करणादिक्रिया, तत्फलं च पुत्रोत्पत्यादिकं संवीक्ष्यते, न तथा नामेन्द्रे द्रव्येन्द्रे चेति ताभ्यां तस्य भेदः । द्रव्यमपि भावपरिणामिकारणत्वानामस्थापनाभ्यां 20 भिद्यते, यथा ह्यनुपयुक्तो वक्ता द्रव्यम्, उपयुक्तत्वकाले उपयोगलक्षणस्य भावस्य कारणं भवति, यथा वा साधुजीवो द्रव्येन्द्रः सद्भावेन्द्ररूपायाः परिणतेः, न तथा नामस्थापनेन्द्राविति । नामापि स्थापनाद्रव्याभ्यामुक्तवैधर्म्यादेव भिद्यत इति । दुग्धतक्रादीनां श्वेतत्वादिनाऽभेदेऽपि माधुर्यादिना भेदवनामादीनां केनचिद्रूपेणाभेदेऽपि रूपान्तरेण भेद इति स्थितम् ।
25
,
६७. ननु भाव एव वस्तु, किं तदर्थशून्यैर्नामादिभिरिति चेत्; न; नामादीनामपि वस्तुपर्यायत्वेन सामान्यतो भावत्वानतिक्रमात् अविशिष्टे इन्द्रवस्तुन्युच्चरिते नामादिभेदचतुष्टयपरामर्शनात् प्रकरणादिनैव विशेषपर्यवसानात् । भावाङ्गत्वेनैव वा नामादीनामुपयोगः जिननामजिनस्थापनापरिनिर्वृतमुनिदेहदर्शनाद्भावोल्लासानुभवात् । केवलं नामादित्रयं भावोल्लासेनैकान्तिकमनात्यन्तिकं च कारणमिति ऐकान्तिकात्य

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३. निःक्षेपपरिच्छेदः । न्तिकस्य भावस्याभ्यर्हितत्वमनुमन्यन्ते प्रवचनवृद्धवाः। एतच्च भिन्नवस्तुगतनामाद्यपेक्षयोक्तम् । अभिन्नवस्तुगतानां तु नामादीनां भावाविनाभूतत्वादेव वस्तुत्वम् , सर्वस्य वस्तुनः स्वाभिधानस्य नामरूपत्वात् , स्वाकारस्य स्थापनारूपत्वात् , कारणतायाश्च द्रव्यरूपत्वान् , कार्यापन्नस्य च स्वस्य भावरूपत्वात् । यदि च घटनाम घटधर्मो न भवेत्तदा ततस्तत्संप्रत्ययो न स्यात् , तस्य स्वापृथग्भूतसंबन्धनिमित्तकत्वादिति सर्व नामा- 5 स्मकमेष्टव्यम् । साकारं च सर्व मति-शब्द घटादीनामाकारवत्वात् , नीलाकारसंस्थानविशेषादीनामाकाराणामनुभवसिद्धत्वात् । द्रव्यात्मकं च सर्व उत्फणविफणकुण्डलिताका. रसमन्वितसर्पवत् विकाररहितस्याविर्भावतिरोभावमात्रपरिणामस्य द्रव्यस्यैव सर्वत्र सर्व दानुभवात् । भावात्मकं च सर्व परापरकार्यक्षणसन्तानात्मकस्यैव तस्यानुभवादिति चतुष्टयात्मकं जगदिति नामादिनयसमुदयवादः ।
[ २. निःक्षेपाणां नयेषु योजना।] ६८. अथ नामादिनिक्षेपा नयैः सह योज्यन्ते । तत्र नामादित्रयं द्रव्यास्तिकनयस्यैवाभिमतम् , पर्यायास्तिकनयस्य च भाव एव । आद्यस्य भेदौ संग्रहव्यवहारो, नैगमस्य यथाक्रमं सामान्य ग्राहिणो विशेषग्राहिणश्च अनयोरेवान्तर्भावात् । ऋजुमूत्रादयश्च चत्वारो द्वितीयस्य भेदा इत्याचार्यसिद्धसेनमतानुसारेणाभिहितं जिनभद्रग- 15 णिक्षमाश्रमणपूज्यपादैः
"नामाइतियं दवट्टियस्य भावो अपज्जवणयस्स ।
संगहववहारा पढमगस्स सेसा उ इयरस्स ॥" [५] इत्यादिना विशेषावश्यके । स्वमते तु नमस्कारनिक्षेपविचारस्थले
"भावं चिय सद्दणया सेसा इच्छन्ति सव्वणिक्खेवे" [ २८४७ ] 20 इति वचसा त्रयोऽपि शब्दनयाः शुद्धत्वाद्भावमेवेच्छन्ति ऋजुसूत्रादयस्तु चत्वारश्चतुरोऽपि निक्षेपानिच्छन्ति अविशुद्धत्वादित्युक्तम् । ऋजुसूत्रो नामभावनिक्षेपावेवेच्छतीत्यन्ये; तत्र( तन्न); ऋजुसूत्रेण द्रव्याभ्युपगमस्य सूत्राभिहितत्वात्, पृथक्त्वाभ्युपगमस्य परं निषेधात् । तथा च सूत्रम्-"उज्जुसुअस्स एगे अणुव उत्ते श्रागमओ एगं दव्वावस्सयं, पुहत्तं नेच्छइ ति" [ अनुयो० 25 सू० १४] । कथं चाय पिण्डावस्थायां सुवर्णादिद्रव्यमनाकारं भविष्यत्कुण्डलादि. पर्यायलक्षणभावहेतुत्वेनाभ्युपाच्छन् विशिष्टेन्द्राद्यभिलापहेतुभूतां साकामिन्द्रादिस्था पना नेच्छेत् ?, न हि दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नं नामेति । किञ्च, इन्द्रादिसञ्ज्ञामात्रं तदर्थरहितमिन्द्रादिशब्दवाच्यं वा नामेच्छन् अयं भावकारणत्वाविशेषात् कुतो नामस्थापने

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जैनतर्कभाषा। नेच्छेत् । प्रत्युत सुतरां तदभ्युपगमो न्याय्यः । इन्द्रमूर्तिलक्षणद्रव्य-विशिष्टतदाकाररूपस्थापनयोरिन्द्रपर्यायरूपे भावे तादात्म्यसंबन्धेनावस्थितत्वात्तत्र वाच्यवाचकभावसंबन्धेन संबद्धान्नाम्नोऽपेक्षया सन्निहिततरकारणत्वात् । सङ्ग्रहव्यवहारौ स्थापनावर्जास्त्रीनिक्षेपानिच्छत इति केचित तन्नानवद्यं यतः संग्रहिकोऽसंग्रहिकोऽनर्पितभेदः परि5 पूर्णो वा नैगमस्तावत् स्थापनामिच्छतीत्यवश्यमभ्युपेयम् , सहव्यवहारयोरन्यत्र
द्रव्याथिके स्थापनाभ्युपगमावर्जनात् । तत्राद्यपक्षे संग्रहे स्थापनाभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गः, संग्रहनयमतस्य संग्रहिकनैगममताविशेषात् । द्वितीये व्यवहारे तदभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गः, तन्मतस्य व्यवहारमतादविशेषात् । तृतीये च निरपेक्षयोः संग्रहव्यवहारयोः
स्थापनाम युपगमोपपत्तावपि समुदितयोः संपूर्णनैगमरूपत्वात्तदभ्युपगमस्य दुर्निवारत्वम्, 10 अविभागस्था गमात्प्रत्येकं तदेकैकभागग्रहणात् । किञ्च, सङ्ग्रहव्यवहारयो गमान्तर्भा
वात्स्थापनाभ्युपगमलक्षणं तन्मतमपि तत्रान्तर्भूतमेव, उमयधर्मलक्षणस्य विषयस्य प्रत्येकमप्रवेशेऽपि स्थापनालक्षणस्यैकधर्मस्य प्रवेशस्य सूपपादत्वात् , स्थापनासामान्यतद्विशेषाभ्युपगममात्रेणैव सङ्ग्रहव्यवहारयोर्भेदोपपत्तेरिति यथागमं भावनीयम् । एतेश्च नामादिनिक्षेपेर्जीवादयः पदार्था निक्षेप्याः ।
[ ३. जीवविषये निःक्षेपाः ।] ६९. तत्र यद्यपि यस्य जीवस्याजीवस्य वा जीव इति नाम क्रियते स नामजीवः, देवतादिप्रतिमा च स्थापनाजीवः, औपशमिकादिभावशाली च भावजीव इति जीवविषयं निक्षेपत्रयं सम्भवति, न तु द्रव्य निक्षेपः । अयं हि तदा सम्भवेत् , यद्यजीवः
सम्बायत्यां जीवोऽभविष्यत् , यथाऽदेवः सन्नायत्यां देवो भविष्यत्(न्) द्रव्यदेव 20 इति । न चैतदिष्टं सिद्धान्ते, यतो जीवत्वमनादिनिधनः पारिणामिको भाव इष्यत
इति । तथापि गुणपर्यायवियुक्तत्वेन बुद्धथा कल्पितोऽनादिपारिणामिकभावयुक्तो द्रव्यजीवः, शून्योऽयं भङ्ग इति यावत् , सतां गुणपर्यायाणां बुद्धथापनयस्य कर्तुमशक्यत्वात् । न खलु ज्ञानायत्तार्थपरिणतिः, किन्तु अर्थो यथा यथा विपरिणमते
तथा तथा ज्ञान प्रादुरस्तीति । न चैवं नामादिचतुष्टयस्य व्यापितामङ्गः, यतः 25 प्रायः सर्वपदार्थेम्वन्येषु तत सम्भवति । यद्यत्रैकस्मिन्न सम्भवति नैतायता भवत्य
व्यापितेति वृद्धाः । जीवशब्दार्थज्ञस्तत्रानुपयुक्तो द्रव्यजीव इत्यप्याहुः । अपरे तु वदन्ति-अहमेव मनुष्यजीवो [द्रव्यजीवो]ऽभिधातव्यः उत्तरं देवजीवमप्रादुर्भूतमाश्रित्य अहं हि तस्योत्पित्सोदेवजीवस्य कारणं भवामि, यतश्वाहमेव तेन देवजीवभावेन भवि. प्यामि, अतोऽहमधुना द्रव्यजीव इति । एतत्कथितं तैर्भवति-पूर्वः पूर्वो जीवः
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२९
३. निःक्षेपपरिच्छेदः। परस्य परस्योत्पित्सोः कारणमिति । अस्मिश्च पक्षे सिद्ध एव भावजीवो भवति, नान्य इति-एतदपि नानवद्यमिति तत्त्वार्थटीकाकृतः ।
६१०. इदं पुनरिहावधेयं-इत्थं संसारिजीवे द्रव्यत्वेऽपि भावत्वाविरोधः, एकव.तुगतानां नामादीनां भावाविनाभूतत्वप्रतिपादनात् । तदाह भाष्यकार:
"अहवा वत्थूभिहाणं, नाम ठवणा य जो तयागारो।
कारणया से दव्वं, कजावनं तयं भावो ॥१॥".] इति । केवलमविशिष्टजीवापेक्षया द्रव्यजीवत्वव्यवहार एव न स्यात् , मनुष्यादेःवत्वादिविशिष्टजीवं प्रत्येव हेतुत्वादिति अधिकं नयरहस्यादौ विवेचितमस्माभिः ॥
॥ इति महामहोपाध्यायश्रीकल्याणविजयगणिशिष्यमुख्यपण्डितश्रीलाभविजयगणिशिध्यावतंस
पण्डितश्रीजीतविजयगणिसतीर्थ्यपण्डितश्रीनयविजयगणिशिष्येण पण्डितश्रीपद्म- विजयगणिसोदरेण पण्डितयशोविजयगणिना विरचितायां जैनतर्कभाषायां
निक्षेपपरिच्छेदः संपूर्णः, तत्संपूतौ च संपूर्णेयं जैनतर्कभाषा ।।
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॥ स्वस्तिश्रीश्रमणसङ्घाय ।।

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जैनतर्कभाषा
सूरिश्रीविजयादिदेवसुगुरोः पट्टाम्बराहमणौ,
सूरिश्रीविजयादिसिंहसुगुरौ शक्रासनं भेजुषि । तस्सेवाऽप्रतिमप्रसादजनितश्रद्धानशुद्धया कृतः,
ग्रन्योऽयं वितनोतु कोविदकुले मोदं विनोदं तथा ॥१॥ यस्यासन गुरवोऽत्र जीतविजयप्राज्ञाः प्रकृष्टाशयाः,
भ्राजन्ते सनया नयादिविजयप्राज्ञाश्च विद्याप्रदाः। प्रेम्णां यस्य च सद्म पद्मविजयो जातः सुधीः सोदरः तेन न्यायविशारदेन रचिता स्तात्तर्कभाषा मुदे ॥ २ ॥ तर्कभाषामिमां कृत्वा मया यत्पुण्यमर्जितम् ।
माप्नुयां तेन विपुलां परमानन्दसम्पदम् ॥ ३ ॥ पूर्व न्यायविशारदत्वविरुदं काश्यां प्रदत्तं बुधैः ।।
न्यायाचार्यपदं ततः कृतशतग्रन्थस्य यस्यार्पितम् । शिष्यप्रार्थनया नयादिविजयप्राज्ञोत्तमानां शिशुः
तत्त्वं किश्चिदिदं यशोविजय इत्याख्याभृदाख्यातवान् ॥ ४ ॥
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Translation

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Mahāmahopādhyāya Sri Yasovijaya's JAINA-TARKA-BHĀSĀ
OR A Manual of Jaina Logic
1. On the Organ of Knowledge :
After bowing to Jina, who is saluted by the groups of Indras, and who gives instructions in the real nature of things, I compose the Manual of Logic, that consists of (three parts viz.) the organ of knowledge, the partial truth, and the different ways of putting a thing
[1. The investigation into the definition of the pramāna in general).
*1. Pramina is the definitive cognition of the self and the others.
Here 'self' is the very nature of the knowledge itself, the others' are objects other than that, and the definitive' is that, which ascertains both of them as they are.
Herc the word cognition is used to avoid undesirable extension to indeterminate intuition. The word 'definitive' is used to avoid that (undesirable extension) to doubt, error and indecision. The cpithet ‘self and the others' has been used to indicate the nature of the pramāņa) and by way of refutation of the Mimamsakas etc. who hold the non-perceptibility of knowledge and of those who believe in the non-dualistic exis. tence of knowledge etc. and deny the existence of external objects.
Now, if right cognition ( itself) is meant to be pramāņa, then what else is to be said as its resultant ? Correct; but its resultant is the definite cognition of the self and objects.

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Jaina-Tarka-Bhasă Now, in this way, the quality of being definitive cognition of the self and others, will not exist in the pramāņa; the pramāņa being definitive cognition of others and the resultant being definitive cognition of the self; if one argues like this, the answer is : no, because it will be rationalised by partial identity of the two) the pramāṇa and its resultant.
Thus, it is concluded that the function-sense only, when engaged in its conscious activity, is the pramāņa, because the self, unappropriated by its conscious activity, does not reveal its objects like touch etc., because (otherwise) a man in deep sleep would also have that cognition ) by the sense-objectcontact with soft cotton etc.
+2. Some say that the sense qua attainment, characterised by the capacity of apprehending the objects is the pramāņa, as "the capacity of the self, in the form of apprehension of the object, is mentioned as the instrument and this is not relatively contradictory". (TSV., 1.1.22) this is not correct, because the resultant of sense qua attainment is mediated by the instrument which is conscious activity, and because if by accepting the non-perceptibility of the capacities, the non-perceptibility and perceptibility of the knowledge of the instrument and the resultant (respectively) is accepted, it will amount to acceding to the view point of Prabhākara. If one argues that even the capacity of knowledge is perceptible, through the substance, in its substratum, which it pervades, i.e. the self, it cannot be so; if it were perceptible through the substance, it will not be in order to hold it as self-illuminating as is the case with happiness etc.; moreover the mention of instrument in (the sentence) I know the pitcher through knowledge' would be illogical; (for example) there is no mention of the neck and earthen bowl at the time of the perception of the pitcher, even though they are perceptible through the substance.
[2. Having defiined perceplual cognition, its division into two, empirical and transcendental:]
*3 That cognition is of two kinds: perceptual and nonperceptual. Perceptual is that which as an effect depends on the senses or the self which is called 'akşa', a stock-word in

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The Organ of Knowledge the category of Uņādi words, in the sense of “permeating i. e. pervading all objects in the form of knowledge.'
Not that in this way the title of “perceptual will not apply to visual intuition (of limited extension) and clairvoyance etc. and sensuous knowledge etc, because this is only its etymological meaning; its usage being in the sense of clarity, implied by it as one united word giving a single meaning. And 'clarity' means, revealing in a greater degree than that revealed by inference etc. ; (thus) there is nothing wanting here.
That which is hidden from sense is non-perceptual i. e. indistinct cognition.
*4. The perceptual cognition is of two types : the empirical and the transcendental. The empirical (sāṁvya vahārika) is based on unhindered transaction (samvyavahāra), characterised by day-to-day talk of engagements and withdrawals, e. g. perceptual cognition of ourselves. As it takes effect through the activity of the self, mediated by sense and mind in reality, it is non-perceptual, because the fact of mediation is here the same as in the knowledge of the fire by smoke. Moreover, it is in reality non-perceptual, because here also boubt, error and indecision are possible as in non-existent, inconclusive, and contradictory inference-fallacy and like a correct inference it also admits of the possibility of certainty preceded by agreement (intimation) and memory.
(3. The investigation into empirical perceptual cognition, and the distinction between sensuous and scriptural knowledge.]
*5. This (empirical perceptual cognition) is of two kinds : sensuous and quasi-sensuous. The sensuous is effected by eyes etc. and the quasi-sensuous is born of mind. Though mind functions even in the sensuous cognition, yet as it is the extraordinary cause there, it is no fault (to call it sensuous).
Both of these are of two kinds : sensuous cognition and scriptural knowledge. Sensuous cognition is conditioned by a sense and the mind and is not based on word, whereas that which is based on word is scriptural knowledge.
By the term 'based on word' is meant the knowledge in the form of the inward repetition of a word like 'pitcher is pitcher', having established the connection between the word

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Jaina-Tarka-Bhāṣā and its import either from the instruction of others about the intimated object or from the scriptural books. If one should say that in this way only perception would be sensuous cognition and not speculation etc. etc. because they are accompanied by the mention of word and are therefore to be included in the scriptural knowledge; it is not correct; because though at the time of intimation, speculation etc. are based on word, yet they are not based on that at the time of transaction, because by virtue of the skill through practice, it is found that even without basing on word, a variety of speech is preceded by the chain of manifold thinking. Since in Angas Upāngas etc. and in the perception of word etc. there is no basis of word, it is sensuous cognition, but inasmuch as there also the meaning is known on the basis of words, it is scriptural knowledge.
[4. Four divisions af sensuous cognition, viz. perception etc.]
*6. Sensuous knowledge is of four kinds : perception, speculation, perceptual judgment, and
ent, and retention. The lowest knowledge is perception. It is of two kinds : contact-awareness and object-awareness. Vyañjana is that which menifests the object; (in the first place) it is the physical sense-organ shaped like Kadamba flower etc. and characterised by the particular power of cognising the objects of sound etc., (secondly) the substance transformed into sense-data such as sound (-atoms) etc, and (thirdly) the relation of the two (mentioned just now). So it (vyañjanāvagraha) is a compound in which the middle word has been dropped i.e. contact of vyañjana with vyañjana. Then if one argues that this is ignorance because no knowledge is received at that time, like the contact of ear and sound in the case of a deaf;it is not so;it being the instrument of knowledge, is by transference of epithet, called knowledge, because at it's culmination is seen knowledge in the form of objectperception, or even at that time an indistinct knowledge can be inferred like the dream-knowledge etc. which can be inferred by particular type of gestures etc. (and ) because it cannot be marked-like one spark of fire-on account of its subtleness.
[6. In support of the non-contactory nature of mind and sight, while demonstrating the four types of contact-awareness.]

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The Organ of Knowledge
*7. That(contact-awareness) is of four kinds in accordance with the difference of senses except sight and mind, which bein of non-contactory nature cannot have any contact-awareness;or otherwise, if they were the subject of favour and injury of the object known, there should have been wetness and burning at the sight and thought of water and fire. If it is argued that favour and injury of the eye are found at the sight of the sun and the moon etc., it is not correct, because it is not found at the time of their first sight; and because when seen constantly the injury by the ray of the sun, which comes into contact can be accounted for, as also the sense of favour because of lack of injury at the sight of the moon etc. which are possessed of natural qualities of gentleness etc.
At the thought of the dead or lost things, and the thought of the union of the loved ones and procurement of riches, the injury and favour, indicated by weakness and emaciation of chest etc. and by the beaming face and horripilation etc., do not belong to the mind; but to the self through the help of mind-qua-substance in the form of multitude of desirable or undesirable material atoms transformed into mental form; just like through the checking of wind in the heart and medicine; the contactory nature of mind is not proved by them. If it is said that if the mind does not contact its object by approaching it, how does the feeling that 'my mind has gone to Meru mountain etc.' come to a sleeping man; it is not true; because the dream of going of mind to Meru mountain etc. is false like that of the body, or otherwise there would be (undesirable) situation of the occurrence of favour and injury caused by the fragrance of flower etc. and the fatigue caused by travel etc.
If it is said that favour and injury by the sight of the bathing of Jina, experienced in dream and by non-attainment of the desired object( respectively ) are seen with reference to the awakened person also, we answer that they may be seen because of the science of dream, but the result of the action, viz, satisfaction etc., is not there by the science of dream as to prove the contactory nature of mind in the form of contact. ing the object.

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Jaina-Tarka-Bhāsā
If it is said that the result of action in the form of discharge of semen virile is found in dream also; that is due to intensity of desire, and not due to the action of inter-course with the women, so where is the fault? If it is said that listening to song etc. in cases of somnambulism, there is contact-awareness of the mind also, it is not so, for in that stage though one thinks oneself to be dreaming, yet one perceives through ears etc. alone. Because, on the authority of the statement like 'one who is negligent, does not know' because all being involved in the world have their activity of consciousness spread over infinite time-points, and because at every time-point, it receives mind-substance, even though not contacting the object, how the mind without leaving the body, will not have contact-awareness at the time of thinking about heart etc. which are in its vicinity; listen; mind is cogniser and not cognitum; contact-awareness is there at the time of cognising the cognitum and it has no scope, therefore, at the time of receiving matter constituting mind, nor has it any scope at the time of thinking about heart etc. which are in its vicinity, because the distinction of working in close contact or otherwise (not working in close contact) is decided from the point of view of external objects, or also because of the skilled cessation and subsidence of karmic veils of mind, there is no cognition of the object, and because even at the time of functioning of the senses of ear etc., the funcioning of mind is accepted only after the contact-awareness, because the meaning of the word mind (manas) 'thinks over (manyate) the objects', or 'by it are thought over (manyante) the objects,' conforms to its etymology, and because just as the language cannot function without indicating the meaning, similarly mind cannot function without thinking over the object. Thus it is concluded that eyes and mind have no
contact-awareness.
[6. Treatment of object-perception.]
*8. Object awareness is the cognition of the general features without any distinction of form, name, genus, activity, quality, and substance. How then the scriptures say as 'he has cognised word', there is the non-existence of the absence of the

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The Organ of Knowledge
mention of 'word' etc.; no; because only the speaker says 'word', or because it is meant for not distinguishing it from the form and taste etc. If the determinate knowledge that 'this is word', were there in object perception, then since the word 'word' takes a period of less than forty-eight minutes (but more than one time point) to pronounce, the one timepointedness of object-perception would be shattered. One may say the cognition of both-the general and the specialmay be included in object-perception, and later on may be considered the beginning of speculation in the form that 'here are, generally speaking, sweetness etc. the qualities of the sound of bow-string;' it is not so; because if it is cognition of the special as distinguished from non-word, it would be perceptual judgement, because the cognition of the little cannot be firmly established from the point of view of the further and further species. Moreover, the knowledge 'this is word' is not logically justifiable without the speculation in the form of thinking of word, as distinguished from form etc. and speculation is not possible in uncognised object, and, therefore, its place would have to be accepted before the time of objectperception accepted by us, and that (time) is the time of contact-awareness, devoid of the knowledge of object, and so on and so forth. Afterwards-because the speculation regarding the qualities other than that of sound is mentioned as 'which word is this,' the object-perception should be accepted in this form alone that 'this is word,' if it be argued; no; the word' is said by the speaker only, at the time of object-perception, the scriptures mention only indeterminate learning of word, and because the indeterminate is general in form, and the formless conscious activity can cognise that much only. And if the cognition of indeterminate word is accepted in contact-awareness, it would also become object-perception, because it cognises the object.
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*9. Some say: from the point of view of a child who is just born and is devoid of the ideas of intimation etc., cognition is that of general nature, but for a man who is conversant with the object, the cognition is special, and therefore from this point of view it is not logically incoherent to

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Jaina-Tarka-Bhāşa say that he cognises the word', it is not so; in this way for more intimately conversant, it would be, beyond the determinate knowledge of word, a cognition of many-many specials. And we cannot say that 'this is desirable,' the scripture does not speak of any adjective (but says unqualifyingly) that 'one does not know which word is this,' even the wisest cannot cognise the further and further qualities without cognising the word, which is qualified.
*10. Others say that the scriptural statement is consistent because object-perception is said to be preceded by intuitional cognition, and intuitional cognition, cognises indistinct general features, whereas the object-perception cognises the form of the object as distinct from other objects; this is incorrect; Does the intuitional cognition precede contact-awareness, or is it identical with it ? The first alternative is not possible, because it (intuitional cognition) is not possible without the relationship of the object and its awareness. Nor is the second alternative possible, because at the last moment of the contactawareness, object-perception takes place and there is no place for intuitional cognition. Nor is the third alternative possible, because then it (intuitional cognition) would be just another name for contact-awareness, and because it is devoid of object -cognition, intuitional cognition is not possible in it. Moreover, how can intuitional cognition, without speculation, lead to object-perception ? And how can speculation and perception, which last separately for innumerable time-points (and one time-point) occur simultaneously? This should be thought over. If it be said that since even perception has been shown as having the varieties of quick and otherwise (slow) etc. it also lasts for innumerate time-points and is not incoherent with having the particulars as its object; it is not so; in reality, these are the varieties of perceptual judgement, and have been described as varieties of perception on the basis of secondary usage of the effect in the cause, because the particulars cannot be the subject in reality in such cases where particulars are not the subjects.
*I1. Or perception is classified into two : The transcendental and empirical. The former cognises only the gene

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The Organ of Knowledge
41 ral features, the latter has the particulars as its subject;because the speculation occurs in the form of curiosity regarding the further and further qualities over and above that; otherwise as it would lead to the non-occurrence of speculation without perception, it is here alone that the varieties of quick and otherwise (i. e. slow) can be justified, and it is because of this that the practice of the chain of further and further knowledge should be understood.
[7. Investigation of speculation, perceptual judgement and retention, respectively.)
*12. Speculation is inquisitive pursuit(for the knowledge) of specific details, i. e, it removes the points of disagreement and applies the points of agreement, e. g. this must be normally sound as being capable of reception through ears etc.' or 'this must be the sound of a conch as it is possessed of the qualities of sweetness etc.' This is not doubt, because that consists in knowledge of various objects of opposite nature in the same subject, and because this, being inclined towards definiteness, is different.
*13. Perceptual judgement is the determination of the specific characteristic of that which was speculated upon. e.g. 'This must be sound only,' or 'this must be the sound of conch only.'
*]4. That(perceptual judgement being firm-fixed is retention. It is classified into three: absence of lapse, memory and memory-impression. Absence of lapse is absence of removal of uninterrupted conscious activity on one object. Memory is the unfoldment of that very conscious activity on the object after an interval as it is the same.' Memory-impression is the impression which causes memory and is carried by perceptual judgement. Since both types of perceptions are included in perception and three types of retention in retention, the division (of sensuous cognition into four) is not disturbed.
*15. Others, who follow only the etymological meaning viz. that perceptual judgement (apāya) is removal (apanayana) and retention (dharaņa) is retaining (dhāraņā), say that perceptual judgement is the determination of distinction from the non-existent particular and retention is

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faina-Tarka-Bhāsa
the determination of the existent particular' ; this is not so, because perceptual judgement sometimes coming from thinking of the distinction from others, sometimes from agreement with existing qualities and sometimes from both, has no varieties, being only of one variety, which is certainty; otherwise memory (which being incapable of being included in 'retention', in the sense taken just now) would be excessive and there would be the incoherency of sensuous cognition having five varieties. Now, if it be said, that the retention, accepted by you, does not exist at all, and, therefore, the fourfold division is undisturbed; because on the cessation of conscious activity, what is retention ? Absence of lapse, defined as the uninterrupted conscious activity, does not differ from perceptual judgement. And what is accepted as memoryimpression for numerable or innumerable time at the conclusion of the conscious activity regarding pitcher etc., and the memory in the form of 'it is the same', it (both of them) is not retention, which is a variety of sensuous cognition, because the conscious activity of sensuous cognition has already ceased, and even in the case of conscious activity occurring after an interval of time, memory would be included in retention, where agreement with the existing qualities would predominate; it is not so; as after the working of perceptual judgement is seen, the working of its current for a moment, therefore, absence of lapse (will have to be accepted in addition to perceptual judgement), and as joining the indetcrminate intuition of the present and the past as 'this is the same', and the resultant of the previous perceptual judgement, mcmory (will also have to be accepted in addition to perceptual judgement) and also the memory-impression in the form of impressions causing that (memory) (will have to be accepted in addition to perceptual judgement).
*16. If it be said that the two forms of knowledge, the absence of lapse and the memory, as cogniser of the already cognised, are not organ of knowledge; and as for memoryimpression, these are the three options: is it destruction-cum subsidence of the knowledge-obscuring karman of memory, or is it the power to generate that knowledge or is it a thought about that object ? Now, the first two options are

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The Organ of Knowledge incompatible, because they are not (included) in the form of knowledge, the varieties of which are under discussion here. The third option is also incompatible because memory-impression is desired to last for numerable or innumerable time, but thought about an object cannot last for this much time, and, therefore, no retention is compatible; it is not so; being the cause of memory-impressions of different natures of clear, clearer and clearest type, and because of its being cogniser of newer and newer objects, absence of lapse is the cogniser of the uncognised) and so also, being the cogniser of previously uncognised oneness of the object, memory is the cogniser of the uncognised, and by transference of epithet of the effect to the cause, though itself the memoryimpression is not knowledge; yet its categorisation as the variety of knowledge is not incompatible, because it is the power which generates that knowledge in the form of destruction-cum-subsidence of the knowledge-obscuring karman of memory.
*17. And these determinate perception etc., do not occur either in a perverted or disturbed order, or deficiently, because it is the nature of the cognised to generate cognition in this very way. Sometimes, in case of a man who is habituated to it, only perceptual judgement, and in case of an object where the memory-impression is strong, only memory is noticeable; even there the order of determinate perception etc. is not noticeable on account of subtlety like the piercing of the hundred petals of a lotus. Thus sensuous knowledge has twenty-eight varieties; object-perception etc. (by etc. we include speculation, perceptual judgement and retention) being multiplied by six-mind and (five) senses, (thus twenty four) plus contact-awarenss having four varieties (there being no contact-awareness of mind and eyes). Or these varieties multiplied by the twelve varieties-many, multiplied, quick, independent, determined, and constant (these six) and their opposites--work out to be three hundred and thirty six in all. These varieties many etc., are from the point of view of cognizant; c. g.--some one knows much, listening to the

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group of different sounds, knows that there are 'so many sounds of conch and so many sounds of drums' i. e. in this way, he distinguishes separately between the different types, on account of the speciality of destruction-cum-subsidence of karmans. The other, on account of lesser destruction-cum-subsidence of karmans, even though in the same place, knows less. One, on account of the brilliance of the destruction-cum-subsidence of karmans, knows multi-typed, knowing even the single sound of conch etc. as possessed of many qualities of agreeableness etc. The other knows non-multi-typed, knowing as possessed of few qualities of agreeableness etc. One knows quickly,cognising immediately. The other knows slowly,cognising only after a long thought. One knows independently, cognising by its very form without any sign. The other knows dependently cognising only by the help of some sign. Sometimes it is determinate, being cognised as not possessed of contradictory qualities. The other is indeterminate, being cognised as possessed of contradictory qualities. One is constant, being cognised always as much etc., the other is inconstant, being cognised sometimes as much, sometimes not as much. The varieties of sensuous knowledge have been said.
44
[8. Investigation of verbal knowledge after classifying it into fourteen varieties].
+18. The varieties of verbal knowledge are given. Verbal knowledge is of fourteen types: alphabet, discursive, right, having beginning, having end, containing repetitions, and included in the main scripture (these) together with their opposites. Then the alphabet is three-fold: script, alphabet, and potential auditory attainment. The script alphabets are the different types of scripts, the alphabets are the spoken akāra etc.these two are called knowledge only by transference of epithet. The potential auditory attainment is the conscious activity towards listening through mind and senses or the destruction-cum-subsidence of the veil of that (verbal knowledge). This potential auditory attainment is not impossible even without receiving instruction from others, because attention is seen at hearing of a sound even amongst innocent children, who have received no instructions, and amongst

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The Organ of Knowledge cows etc. and because even the one-senscd creatures receive indistinct sounds. A non-alphabetical verbal knowledge is sighs etc. because it also causes real functioning knowledge because from it also arises the knowledge that one is in misery etc. Or being useful in knowledge, though all the activities are verbal knowledge, yet here (in sighs etc.) alone is fixed the conventional usage, as famous amongst those who are well versed in scriptures. The knowledge of those possessed of mind is discursive. The opposite of it is nondiscursive. What is included in the main and subsidiary scriptures, is right; the mundane is false. Thinking from the point of view of the knower, there is option-even the false knowledge acquired by a person of right vision is right knowledge, because of its suitable adjustment as an incorrect statement, whereas even the right knowledge, acquired by a man of perverted vision, is wrong knowledge. Having a beginning- (it has a beginning) substantially with reference to an individual, territorially, in Bharata and Airāvata, periodically, the ascending and descending rounds (of the circle of time),and psychically, the efforts etc. of those instructors. Having no beginning-(it has no beginning) substantially with reference to different individuals, territorially in Mahāvideha, periodically quasi - ascending and descending rounds (of the circle of Time) and psychically, desti uction-cum-subsidence in general. Similarly, the varieties having end and having no end should be thought of. Repetitive is the same reading, generally in the drşțivāda(the twelfth and the last, and now supposed to be lost, limb (anga) of the scripture). Non-repetitive is the unsimilar reading in the Kālikaśruta (a Jaina scripture). That is said to be included in the main scriptures, which is composed by the gañadharas (direct disciples of the Tirthankaras). That is said to be excluded from the main scriptures which is composed by the elders (of the monastaries). In this way, the empirical perception in the form of sensuous and verbal cognition together with their varieties, has been investigated into.
[9. After classifying the transcendental perception into three, the investigation of clairvoyance at the outset).

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Jaina-Tarka-Bhāṣā *19. That which for its genesis depends only on the activity of the soul is transcendental (perception). It is threcfold: clairvoyance, telepathy and perfect knowledge. Having all those objects which have forms as its subject and depending only on the Self is the clairvoyance type of knowledge. It is six-fold:following, augmenting, and extinguishing together with their opposites. Following is that which follows even to the place other than that of its genesis, like the light of the sun;just as the light of the sun arising in the east spreads to the west also and, illuminates the territory there, similarly this also though generated in one place, illuminates the objects to the man even when he moves. Non-following is that which illuminates the objects only in the place of its genesis, like the knowledge of an astrologer (who answers questions); just as an astrologer answers the question asked only at certain places, similarly it also illuminates objects only at authorised places. Gradually increasing from the place of its genesis is the augmenting, like the fire, placed in the multitude of dry and increasing fuel and en kindled by the burning of the lower and upper pieces of wood of Premna Spinosa; just as fire enkindled by effort, increases at gaining of fuel, similarly by virtue of extremely auspicious actions, this also sugments after genesis. Decreasing is that which gradually decreases in its scope after genesis, like the flame of fire on the removal of the mass of the fuelmatter; just as the flame of fire, with its fuel removed, decreases, this also decreases. Distinguishing is that which after its genesis, perishes absolutely like the wave of the water; just as the wave of water, just after its genesis, disappears completely similarly this also. Non-existinguishing is that which lasts upto death or upto the attainment of pure-knowledge, like the sex-consciousness; just as the male-sex-consciousness etc. lasts as long as the male form etc. of existence endures, similarly this also.
[10. Investigation into Telepathy) *20. That which has a direct cognition of mind only is telepathy. Here it should be noted that it can directly cognise only the psychic modes and cognises the external objects only

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The Organ of Knowledge through inference of the logical impossibility of the one in the absence of the other. It is two-fold : straight-intelligence and wide-intelligence. Straight i. e. cogniser of the general intelligence, is the straight-intelligence. Here 'general means lesser particulars than those (known) by wide-intelligence; otherwise, if we accept only cognition of the general (and no particulars), it would be the same as the indeterminate intuition of the psychic modes. Wide,-i. e. cogniser of the particulars, intelligence is the wide-intelligence. By straightintelligence is known that one has thought about pitcher etc. whereas wide-intelligence cognises it, as possessed of hundreds of modes. Both of these cognitions are called partial perceptions as having partial objects as its subject.
[11. Investigation into Pure-knowledge
*21. That which has a direct cognition of all substances with modes is called pure-knowledge. Therefore, it is called perfect perception. As its cause--the destruction of veil-is one; it has no variety. Here the veil is karman only, because our knowledge, which does not work in its sphere, is veiled (and) if all things cannot be its sphere, it would lead to the absence of the knowledge of necessary concomitance; and in the absence of veil, absence of lucidity would be incoherent. On the destruction of veil by right faith etc. which are opposite to karman, the pure knowledge is attained (or prov
ed).
*22. Some say, it is born of mind only purified by the qualities by spiritual practices'; it is not so; even the mind, purified by qualities, cannot generate it like the knowledge of the objects of five senses.
*23. The Digambaras (a sect of Jainism) say that a person who takes morsels of food, cannot have pure knowledge; it is not so; because the taking of morsels of food, is caused by hunger creating karman, and the rise of unpleasa nt-feeling karmans etc. have no contradiction with pure-knowledge, because it has contradiction only with destructive karmans. If it be said that it is not generated from that (karman) which is like a burnt rope, it is not so; for in this way there would be no mundane existence from the similar age-determining karman.

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Moreover, how can there be existence of gross-body of the Lord without the food of morsels? If its possibility without that be accepted on account of infinite energy, it would lead to the absence of taking of food even in the worldly state, because of the conviction of immeasurable power (in that state also); this all has been explained elsewhere. Thus perception has been described.
[12. After defining and classifying non-perceptual into five, investigation of recollection).
*24. Now non-perceptual is described-non-perceptual is that which is not clear. And it is of five kinds : recollection, recognition, reasoning, inference, and verbal testimony. Recollection is the cognition generated only by experience as 'that is the image of the Tirtharikara (Lord)'. This is not non-organ of knowledge, because of its coherency like perception etc. If it be said that it is non-organ of knowledge because it makes the part of the past indicated by 'that', as a subject of present; it is not so; because it is not a rule that the time of qualified be always felt in the qualification. If it be said that it is a non-organ of knowledge because of its dependence on the cognitive organ of experience; it is not so; because (in that case) even inference would not be organ of knowledge, on account of its dependence on the knowledge of necessary concomitance etc. If it be said that inference is dependent on the other only in its genesis, but it is independent in its cognition of the subject; it is not so; even recollection depends on experience in its genesis only, and as far as its cognition of the subject is concerned, it is also independent. If it be said that recollection, which knows only that which has already bcen a subject of experience, is not independent even in the cognition of the subject; then, as cognising the objects which have already been the subject of the knowledge of necessary concomitance etc., the inference also cannot be the cognitive organ in any case. If it be said that the inference invariably makes an uncognised object as its subject, then it is the same case with recollection which makes the object, hitherto unknown as 'this is that', as its subject.

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The Organ of Knowledge
[13. Investigation into recognition )
*25. Recognition is the synthetic knowledge, caused by experience and recollection, and cognising the similarity (between the two) and identity (of one person at different ages) etc., e.g. "This body of the cow is the same,''gavaya (the Gayal) is like cow', 'he is the same Jinadatta','he is saying the same thing', 'a buffalo is different from the cow', 'this is away from that', 'this is near that', 'this is longer or shorter than that' etc.
*26. The Buddhists hold that there is no one knowledge as recognition because it consists of two varieties in the form of this and that which are obvious and obscure respectively; it is not correct: because it is experienced as one like the knowledge of the picture even though it differs in form, and because, in fact, this is one as being obscure in form and generated from its own source and because the indication this' is the cause of recognition. If it is said that this recognition does not exist because of the absence of its subject; we say: no; because it has as its subject the particular object which is one consisting of the former and the latter modes. Therefore, the view that this is, in fact, a couple of knowledge in the form of experience and memory not touching anything unperceived hitherto' is refuted; because in this way there would be the unacceptable position of the elimination of all qualifying knowledge. Yet some hold the view that this is perceptual cognition, because it conforms to the concomitance in agreement and disagreement with the senses; this is also not so; because the confirmation to the concomitance in agreement and disagreement with direct perception cannot be proved, because the confirmation to the direct perceptual cognition and memory (both) of the recognition is experienced, otherwise, there would be an undesirable occasion of its occurrence at the time of first sight of the object.
*27. And, if this be said that recognition is produced by senses with the help of the memory, produced by the awakening of the latent impressions, born at the time of first sight, at the time of the next sight; it is incorrect; because direct perception is not dependent on memory.

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Otherwise, if we accept its mental cognition depending on the memory of concomitance etc., there would be an undesirable occasion for the elimination of the inferential knowledge of fire in the mountain. Moreover, it is an additional type of cognition because we have a different feeling of 'I recognise here,' this refutes the view that 'this is a qualified direct perception with the knowledge of its qualification at the approximity of the senses with the objects qualified'; because we don't have it in 'he is like this' etc, and because we experience a synthetic order in memory and experience.
*28. Here, the Bhatta school holds, "Let recognition be one knowledge, but the knowledge of similarity at the sight of gavaya and at the memory of cow is analogical. It is said:
"Therefore, whatever is remembered is qualified by similarity. Therefore, the similarity of the standard or the standard of similarity itself is its subject. Though the similarity is directly perceived and the cow is remembered yet the quality of being qualified cannot be proved from any other organ of knowledge and, therefore, analogy is an organ of knowledge;"(SV., up., 37-38)
this is not so; there is a synthesis between the body qualified by similarity and seen and between the cow which is remembered, and the synthetic knowledge that 'gavaya is similar to cow' does not overlap the limit of recognition. Otherwise, in such cases as 'the buffalo is dissimilar to cow' there would be an excess to analogy because this is not the subject of similarity and, therefore, there would be disturbance in the number of organs of knowledge.
*29. This refutes the view point of Naiyayikas also who hold analogy to be cognition of the relationship of word and its meaning as this is to be indicated by the word gavaya caused by the knowledge of the meaning of the analogical sentence 'gavaya is like cow' and based on the act of looking at a body qualified by similarity, because it does not exceed the limits of the recognition being synthetic of the indicativeness of the word 'gavaya' in the object by saying that whatever qualities were

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The Organ of Knowledge described in the analogical sentence are found in the indicativeness of that word. Therefore, those who have a knowledge of the meaning of the sentence that "swan is one which discriminates between the water and the milk" can have the knowledge that this is to be indicated by the word 'swan' at the sight of an individual qualified by discrimination between water and milk. If we were to accept an extra organ of knowledge except recognition for the knowledge that this is to be indicated by the word 'gavaya', then we would have to search for another organ of knowledge to know that 'this is subtler than that,' at the sight of a bigger fruit-bilva (Aegle Marmelos)-of a person who has the impression of the sight of a smaller fruit—āmalaka (Emblic Myrobalan). If these were to be accepted as mental(cognition) then there would be an occasion for accepting even analogy as mental. Therefore, in short, recognition should be accepted in the knowledge "I recognise".
[14. Investigation into Reasoning)
*30. Reasoning is the logic about the probandum and probane relationship etc. with reference to all places and types, for example, wherever there is smoke it is always when there is fire or it is not without fire; all words of 'pitcher' indicate pitcher; all pitchers are indicated by the word pitcher etc. Thus, the direct perception does not work—simply because it is not within its jurisdiction even with the help of the concomitance in agreement and disagreement together with repeated sight-in the concomitance, characterised by no exception, and caused by the innate nature of the object; and, certainly it can be known by summarising all the individual cases of the probandum andt he probane, therefore, only reasoning caused by the sight, memory and recognition of the probandum and the probane is capable of making it known.
*31. Now if this be said that since the concomitance characterised by co-existence in its own probandum is capable of that, therefore, by the senses helped by repeated sight and by non-observation of any exception, the concomitance may be said to be perceived because it is possible
a Bhatar
Insti

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Jaina-Tarka- Bhāṣā to summarise all individual cases of the probandum and the probane by the relationship of generalisation; it is not so; because, all individual cases of the probandum and the probane are summarised by reasoning alone which is experienced as 'I reason', and because there is no proof to assume the relationship of generalisation in knowing the concomitance, and also because without logic even if the general is known, it cannot bring to mind all individuals. The relationship of the word and its meaning is also known through reasoning, because only it can cover all the words and their meanings. It is seen that a man, who comprehends the word, looking at the efforts of an elderly person, who is asked to do a thing and who proceeds to do it hearing another elderly person, who asks him to doi t, as the cause of the knowledge caused by it and remembering at the time of the last syllable, the previous syllables also and having recognition in the form of a synthetic knowledge in the form of words and sentences by process of elimination and addition by summarising all individual cases, gets the knowledge of the relationship of the word and its meaning. And as this reasoning does not depend on the relation of any other knowledge and by its own capability it leads to the knowledge of the relation, therefore, there is no case of regressus ad infinitum.
*32. The Buddhists say that this is not an organ of knowledge as being in the form of an after-thought coming after the direct perception; this is not so; even an after-thought coming after direct perception can know only that which is known by direct perception, and therefore, cannot grasp the concomitance by generalising all. And this is an organ of knowledge like an inference, even though its subject is general; just as you accept validity from practical point of view of inference) which, though dealing with no object(i.e. general), is indirectly connected with an object. They hold the doctrine that in a place where there is neither fire nor smoke, a person has non-observation of smoke first, then having observation of fire and smoke, (thus) with one non-observation and with two observations, afterwards having non-observation of fire and then non-observation of smoke also, by these two non-obser

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The Organ of Knowledge vations, he grasps the concomitance by direct perception with the help of five non-observations ; for it is said:
(1) No knowledge of smoke, (2) knowledge of fire, (3) knowledge of smoke and (4) no knowledge of fire and (5) smoke, thus by direct perception and by nonobservation by these five there is the adjustment (of the knowledge of the concomitance); this is wrong; even the two types of direct perception-observation and non-observation--can perceive an object which is at hand and cannot have any imagination (of the past or the future) and therefore, is not capable of observing all objects mediated by distance etc.
*33. As regards the view point of the Naiyāyikas who hold that reasoning is the reference to determinant concomitant when there is a doubt about determinate concomitant and this is like a particular observation only helpful in the organ of knowledge at the time of the opponents or is only just its concurrent as remover of the doubt of the opponent and is not in itself an organ of knowledge; this is not so; because reasoning is in itself an organ of knowledge in the form of grasping the concomitance and giving definitive knowledge of the self and others, and the logic, as assumed by the opponents also sometimes being a part of this thinking or as being the remover of the doubt of one who wants to conclude peryersely or even independently, being a remover of the doubt in general, is used. In this way, the validity of reasoning asserted by Dharmabhūşaņa as remover of ignorance is justified inasmuch as it is the remover of false knowledge concluding in the definitive knowledge of the self, on which (definitive knowledge) depend the usage of the knowledge of the objects in knowledge; it is the resulta nt in general.
[15. The definition of the inference for one self, after classifying inference into two]
*31. Inference is the knowledge of probandum from probane. It is of two varieties : for oneself and for others. The inference for oneself is the probandum caused by the recollection of the relationship and the knowledge of the probane, e.g. the knowledge, that "the mountain contains fire', arising in a

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person who has perceived the smoke and has (also) recollected the concomitance. Here the knowledge of the probane and the recollection of the relationship should be jointly accepted as the cause, otherwise there would be an occasion for occurence of inference with reference to a person who has forgotten or not grasped the relationship and has not perceived the probane.
54
[16. Discussion about the nature of the cause]
*35. The cause is characterised by the certainty of logical impossibility (of the one) in the absence of the other and not characterised by the three etc. The Buddhists, nevertheless, say that the cause has three characteristics. In the absence of subsistence in the subject the non-existent will not be eliminated and in the case of no subsistence in the homologous instance, there will be no removal of contradiction and there would be no possibility of the negation of inconclusive in the absence of the necessary absence in heterologous cases and, thus, the inference will not be without obstacles; it is not so; even in the absence of subsistence in the subject, the inference is seen in such cases as the 'sakata will rise because kṛttikā has arisen', 'the sun is above because the earth is enlightened', 'there is moon in the sky because there is the moon in the water. It should not be said that here also subsistence in the subject can be established by saying that the time and space is possessed of the śakata which would rise in the future, because it is possessed of the rise of the kṛttikā because if we were to accept subsistence in the subject, in this way, with reference to a subject which is not experienced, then with reference to the subject of the world, the blackness of the crow would be established as a means to the whiteness of the palace also.
*36. If the subsistence in the subject is not a part of the inference in this way, then how is the rule of the knowledge of the subject-if this be asked; sometimes the subject is known as an epithet of the logical impossibility in the absence of other e.g. the existence of the moon in water cannot be established without the existence of the moon in sky and sometimes, the subject is known as the substratum of the cause which is

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The Organ of Knowledge grasped, e. g., the mountain has fire because it has smoke; if smoke is here grasped in the mountain, the fire is also felt there. At the time of grasping the concomitance, as there is not always the feeling of the mountain, it is not grasped.
*37. As for the view that association of the subject with the probandum is felt by grasping the relationship of the probandum and the probane of the subject in the internal concomitance as it is said that "in the subject which is treated as thesis, the concomitance of the probane with the probandum is the internal concomitance, at other places it is external concomitance (Pra. Na. 3. 38)”; it is not so; by the internal concomitance if the cause is capable of giving the knowledge of the probandum, the external concomitance would have to be accepted as a futile invention. The concomitance being defined as innate without any exception and the external concomitance being only an associate, the concomitance of universal nature can hardly be said to have any variety only on account of its subject. If it be not so, then only at the time of grasping an internal concomitance, there would be the experience of the relationship of the subject and the probandum and the inference would be futile without the knowledge, 'the mountain has fire', this should be thought upon by the scholars in accordance with the scriptures. In this way what the Naiyāyika holds as the thesis being hindered as in the inference that these mango fruits are ripe because they are grown on the same branch, like the other mango fruits', and where there is an inconclusive reason in such examples as 'this Devadatta is a fool, being his son, as are his other sons'; in order to avoid undesirable extension in such cases, the three characters given above together with the subject as unhindered and the reason as non-inconclusive, the five characteristic: form the definition of cause; this is also refuted because the sustenance in the thesis cannot be established in such cases as 'sakata will rise' etc. and because these five characteristics exist in cases of fallacies also as 'he is black, because he is his son'. So a definite logical impossibility in the absence of the other is always the proper characteristic of the cause.

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[17. the discussion of the nature of the probandum].
*38. Certainly, the probandum is to be inferred by the cause. Now, if it is asked: what is the definition of the probandum, our answer is: a probandum is that which is neither known, nor reíuted and is desirable. The epithet of 'neither known' is given to establish that those objects which are doubted or grasped contradictorily are probandum. The epithet 'nor refuted' has been given here to avoid the acceptance of that as probandum, which is contradictory to direct perception etc. The epithet of 'desirable' is given to prove that an undesirable thing cannot be a probandum.
*39. Some say that only a doubtful thing can be established as a probandum in a debate; it is not so; because even a man who is perverted or ignorant may also engage himself in a debate with a desire to know the views of the opponents and because it can be used to remove the perversion and the indecision just like the removal of doubt, and, because it is seen that father etc. engage themselves in educating the son etc. who are perverted or ignorant. It cannot be said that in such case, inference cannot be used in a debate which is held for victory, because the other person, being proud, is perverted in that case also.
*40 The epithet of 'nor refuted'is given in connection with both the speaker and the opponent because only that which is not proved otherwise by an organ of knowledge can be a probandum in a debate. The epithet of being desirable is said only with reference to the speaker, because it is only the speaker who can possibly desire to support his own point of view. So, in inferences as 'eyes etc. are meant for others', even though only this much has been said that they are meant for others, yet only this can be established as probandum that they are meant for the self. Otherwise, because the Buddhists accept the eyes etc. to be meant for others, which are a collection, the inference being futile; this inference of the Sänkhya would be fallacious as possessed of incoherence etc. The subject which is useful in the inference for others is shown even at the time of the inference for the self, to show that there is not much difference between the two, because

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The Organ of Knowledge the inference for others is always preceded by the inference for the self.
*41. From the point of view of grasping the concomitance, the quality itself is the probandum, otherwise it cannot be established, whereas from the point of view of inference, the subject, together with its quality to be proved is the probandum. This subject is called the thesis also and this thesis is always well known. Thus, there are three parts of an inference meant for the self-the subject, the probandum and the probane. The probane is the part as indicator, the probandum as indicated and the subject as the substratum of the quality to be proved, because the purpose of the inference is to prove the probandum as residing in a particular substratum. Or the thesis and the cause—these are the two parts in the inference for the self, because the thesis is the object which is qualified by the quality to be proved and, thus, two alternatives can be seen with reference to the desire to express the difference and the identity of the quality and the qualified object.
*42. The qualified object is sometimes proved, sometimes optional and sometimes both. That which is proved by a definite organ of knowledge as direct perception etc., is said to be the proved one. That which is the subject of such knowledge which is indefinite and neither valid nor invalid, is optional. That which is the subject of the both is the proved and the optional both. For example, the proved qualified object is the mountain, in case the probandum is being possessed of fire' on account of being possessed of smoke, because the mountain is experienced by direct perception. An optionally qualified object is the omniscient when his (of the omniscient) existence is the probandum, as in the inference that 'an omniscient exists because there are no definite proofs to prove the contrary in the inference: or just as the horn of the donkey, when its non-existence is the probandum in the inference, 'the horns of the donkey do not exist'. Here, the omniscient and the horns of the donkey are optionally proved before the proof of their existence or non-existence. In the inference 'the word is changeable, because it is produced', the word is a

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qualified object, proved both ways. That word in the present is perceived directly but its knowledge in the past and the future is optional and since that all (the word of the present, past and future) is the qualified object, it is proved as well as optional. Anything can be probandum in a qualified object which is proved or is both proved and optional but in an optionally qualified object it is a rule that only the existence or the non-existence is the probandum, as it is said "in that when it is optional the existence and its opposite are the probandum” (Pari. 3. 23).
*43. Here the Buddhists say that existence cannot be the probandum in the qualified subject which is optional because it is not consistent to prove its particular existence, as existence in general is undesirable; it is wrong; if this be so, there would be an occasion for elimination of all inference, as when fire in general is undesirable, it will not be consistent with a particular fire. Now, when the existence is the probandum, its cause would either be a positive quality or a negative quality or a quality which is both positive and negative; in the first case it cannot be proved because a positive quality cannot be established in an object whose existence is not proved. In the second case, there would be an over-lapping because that characteristic would be present even where existence is absent. In the third case, there would be a contradiction because a negative quality cannot be there in an object which exists, as it is said, “there is no positive quality in a thing which is not true, because then there will be over-lapping both ways, and a non-existent thing is contradictory of any quality so how can that existence be proved ?"(Pramāņavārtika, 1.192); if this be said; no; in this way there would be no inference of the fire by the smoke because of the optional quality of being possessed of the fire.
*44. The Naiyāyikas say that there is no qualified object which is optionally proved, because an optional thing cannot be valid. If this be accepted, this very reasoning cannot be held good and he (the Naiyāyika) should remain silent because a qualified object which is optionally provel is itself not proved, and there cannot be any logical negation of it.

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The Organ of Knowledge
*45. This should be borne in mind-the qualified object which is proved optionally is not experienced in toto, because then there would be a knowledge of a non-existent thing. And, if we accept its knowledge qualified by the words etc. then in case of doubt or certainty of absence of the epithet, there would be no knowledge of the qualification and then the inference of the optional only in the form of imposition of the necessary concomitance, will have to be accepted in the part of the epithet, because the only purpose of this is to negate the contrary imposition assumed by the opponent by proving the existence, characterised by the existence in a particular territory and time and by proving the non-existence, characterised by the absence of the existence in all territories and times.
*46. In fact, it is proper to prove the existence or non-existence, in part, of the well-known object. It is because of this that while commenting on there is no negation of the non-existence” (Višeşāvasyakabhāşya, 1574) the sentence-there is no donkey-horn'-has been interpreted as "there is no horn in the donkey." In the inference of the particulars that an object, which is absolutely eternal, is not capabale of performing any action, because there is no simultaneity or order', it is easy to prove the absence of the power to perform any action in the absence of order and simultaneity, in things which are eternal : this should be thoroughly examined by those who have a knowledge of the doctrines of their own as well as of others.
[18. The Discussion of Inference for Others]
*47. By transference of epithet, an inference for others, consisting of the statement of the cause and the subject, is called inference, because it gives the knowledge of the object through inference to the listener. The Buddhists say that the subject is known by the discussion itself and, therefore, should not be expressively said; it is not so; being obstructed by certain statements, even though those who are more intelligent can know the subject, yet it should be indicated necessarily to others, and because only that subject is not to be expressed which is known by being one with the other sentences of the syllogism in question. And even the Buddhists must accept the statement of the subject necessary, like the concluding

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statement, to indicate that the quality is a qualification of a certain qualified object; otherwise, there would be an occasion for not stating even the cause which can be known only by the statement of the support, and as far as the condition of making known to the people of dull wit is concerned, it is the same in both the cases. Moreover, if the statement was not to be stated, it should not have been stated even in the beginning of the scriptures, whereas this is found stated even in the Buddhist scriptures, and if this is said to be stated in the scriptures for favouring others, its use would be equally justified in a debate for those who want victory, for making it known to the person of dull wit.
*48. It is said that only that where a statement is given from the scriptures of the opponent to prove a thing, is the inference for others e. g. the inference of the Sānkhya that 'the intelligence is unconscious because it is created like the pitcher'. In this inference of the Sānkhya, the quality of being produced is not accepted by the Sānkhyas themselves in the intelligence, so only here, it is a case of inference for others; this is not correct; because there is a difference of opinion regarding the validity of the scriptures between the two opponents, otherwise, the probandum would be proved by that (scripture) alone. And even if we accept the scripture before examining it, it would be obstructed at the time of examination. If it is so, how you yourself state this to others “which is absolutely one, cannot be connected with many as generality" ? True; but here we do not use it as a deciding factor of the object but rather as a means to establish that where one quality is there, another quality will also have to be accepted, because the deciding factor is the original cause which perverts this inference (namely, generality is multiformed because it is connected with many and that which is connected with many is multiformed), and because it is justifiable to use this inference as an aid to the original cause as by the removal of that which is coexistent with manifoldness, it (manifoldness) is also removed. And as regards the inference that the intelligence is unconscious etc.' it is not justifiable to use it, because we do not place any proof which obstructs the opponent

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The Organ of Knowledge view and which imposes the opponent qualities and which proves the concomitance of the cause of the perversion of the inference.
*49. The cause should be used in two ways : as concomitant with the probandum and as being one impossible without the other e. g. the mountain consists of fire because the smoke can be there only when there is fire or because the smoke cannot be there if fire is not there. Since the probandum can be proved by the use of either of these two, the two are not used simultaneously.
*50. Only two-the statement of the thesis and the cause -are the parts of inference for others and not the statement of illustration etc. because the other can understand by the use of the thesis and the cause alone and the relationship of concomitance is decided by reasoning alone, and that concomitance is reminded by the statement of the thesis and the cause alone and because an illustration which is uncorroborated cannot lead to knowledge, and if the illustration is corroborated, it becomes a case of one which is already proved otherwise. Corroboration means proving the concomitance of the cause with its probandum, having proved it free from the fallacy of unproven etc. and if the other men can understand by this alone what is the use of making any other effort ?
*51. The use of the illustration etc. is justified to make the dull-witted persons understand; thus one who is definite about the thesis by the destruction-cum-subsidence (of the veil) and is capable of understanding the other parts being expert in remebering the reasoning, which leads to concomitance and which is reminded of by the illustration, to such a person the cause alone should be stated. To one who is not definite about the thesis as yet, the thesis should also be stated, and the illustration should also be stated to one who does not remember the reasoning leading to the remembrance of concomitance. Even the application should be stated for a person who does not know how to apply the cause in the thesis and the conclusion should be stated to one whose curiosity is still unfulfilled. The puri

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Jaina-Tarka-Bhasa fication of the thesis etc. should be stated to a man who does not agree with regard to the nature of the thesis etc. and thus, the cause can have even ten parts.
[19. Treatment of the Varieties of Cause]
*52. This cause is two-fold: positive and negative. The positive is also two-fold: that which proves something positive and that which proves something negative. The former of these is of six types, to elaborate-some cause is determinate concomitant only e.g. the word is non-eternal because it is created by effort. Though all causes are determinate concomitant, yet here this variety has been separately accepted as being different from the rest of the varieties as cause viz. effect etc. Thus, the inference that this is tree because it is simšapā'(Dalbergia sissoo) will also be included in it. Some causes are effect e.g., this mountain consists of fire because, otherwise the fact of containing smoke cannot be justified. Here smoke which is the effect of the fire and cannot be justified in its absence, makes the fire known. Some causes are in the form of cause (as against the effect) e. g., there would be rain because otherwise a particular type of cloud could not have been there; here that particular cloud being the cause of the rain makes the rain, which is its effect, known. Certainly, if it is said that the cause is possible even without its effect and is, therefore, not an indicator of the effect and, therefore, the fire does not indicate the smoke; it is true; but where it is possible to ascertain that all other causes are also co-operating and there is no hindrance in its capability, there alone the cause can also be the indicator of the cffcct. Some cause precedes e. g., sakața would rise because otherwise the rise of krttikā would not have been there. Here, after the rise of the křttikā the rise of the sakata takes place immediately after it without exception and, therefore, the krttik. indicates the rise of the sakata as its predecessor cause. Some cause is the successor e. g., Bharaṇi rose before, because krttikā is rising. Here, the rise of the křttikā, which succeeds the rise of the Bharaṇī, indicates it. These two (the predecessor and the successor) are different from the cause and the effect

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The Organ of Knowledge
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as they are mediated by the obstacle of time. Some cause is simultaneous e. g., the fruit of bijora (a species of citron) should be possessed of form because the fact of being possessed of taste cannot be justified otherwise. Here taste which is always simultaneous with the form, being not justifiable in its absence, indicates it. It differs from the nature, cause and effect because it is different in its nature and has no priority and successiveness. In these examples, the positive cause like smoke etc. prove the positive thing like fire etc., therefore, they are positive proving a positive thing, and they are also known as availability of non-contradictory.
*53. The second is that which proves negation and which is called the availability of the contradictory. It is of seven types: contradiction in nature and availability of concomitant with that etc. e.g., there is no absolute absolutism because non-absolutism is found. He has no certainty of the reality because there is doubt. He has no pacification of anger because there are signs of agitation on his face etc. He cannot tell a lie because he is possessed of a knowledge which is not polluted by attachment etc. The Puşya constellation will not rise because Rohini has arisen. The Mrgasirṣa did not arise a moment before because Purva-phalguni has arisen. He has no false knowledge because he has right attitude. Here non-absolutism is contradictory in nature to absolutism which is to be negatived. The doubt in the reality is concomitant with uncertainty which is contradictory to certainty of the truth which is to be negatived. The signs of agitation etc. on the face constitute the effect of non-pacification which is contradictory to the pacification of the anger. Possession of a knowledge not polluted by attachment etc. is the cause of truthfulness which is contradictory to a lie. The rise of Rohini is predecessor of the rise of the Mrgasirṣa which is contradictory to the rise of Pusya tärä. The rise of Purvaphalguni is a follower of the rise of Magha which is contradictory to the rise of Mrgasirşa. Right faith is the concomitant of right knowledge which is contradictory to false knowledge.
*54. The negative cause is also twofold: that which proves something positive and that which proves something

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negative. The first is called non-availability of the contradictory and is of five types: non-availability of the effect contradictory to the probandum, non-availability of the cause contradictory to the probandum, non-availability of the nature contradictory to the probandum, non-availability of the determinant concomitant contradictory to the probandum and non-availability of a concomitant tontradictory to the probandum. For example, this man is extremely sick because we do not find the activities of a man free from sickness. Here is trouble because the desired object is not available. The objects are multisided because the nature of onesidedness is not found. Here is shade because heat is not available. Here is false knowledge because right attitude is not available.
*55. The second is the non-availability of the non-contradictory which is of seven types : non-availability of the nature, non-availability of the determinant concomitant, nonavailability of the effect, non-a yailability of the cause, nonavailability of the predecessor, non-availability of the follower, non-availability of one which is simultaneous. For example, 'here is no pitcher on the earth because there is no availability of its nature which is due if it were available'. There is no panasa(Artocarpus integrifolia) because there is no trec available. This seed is not with its power un obstructed, because a sprout is not seen in it. He has no peacefulness etc. because there is no faith in the true nature of things. Svāti will not arise after a moment because the rise of citrā is not seen. Purvabhādrapada did not rise a moment before because we have no knowledge of the rise of Uttara-bhādrapada. He has no right knowledge because we do not find any right attitude. Thus, though of many types, the cause is characterised by the only quality of not being coherent otherwise, and other than that are fallacies.
[20. Description of fallacies.]
*56. This fallacy is three-fold: unproved, contradictory and inconclusive. That whose nature is not determined is unproved. Indetermination of knowledge is either through ignorance or through doubt or through perversion. It is two

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fold: unproved for both and unproved for either of the two. As an example of the former we can say the word is changeable, because it can be perceived by the eyes.' As an example of the latter, we can say "the trees are unconscious because they are devoid of knowledge, senses and death in the form of stoppage of age', or 'happiness etc. are unconscious because they are created'.
*57. If it is said that there is no fallacy unproved for both, because when once one says that it is unproved and if the opponent does not state a proof to prove it, then it will be unproved for both, because of the absence of any proof, and if he states a proof, then, because of the proof being impartial, it will prove it for both. Moreover, as long as he cannot produce a proof for the other to prove it, it is unproved to him also; it this be argued, then this is secondarily unproved because the jewel etc. are not primarily called false jewels as long as they do not appear to be so. Moreover, if the fallacy is unproved for one of the debator, the opponent would be defeated and if he is defeated, it is difficult to free him from defeat. Nor it is proper to support it afterwards by cause, because the debate lasts only as long as there is defeat. Here, it is to be said that just as a debator even though accepting the propriety of the cause, cannot make the other debator or those who ask question, understand it, because of their forgetfulness etc. of the logic given for its support, similarly, he does not accept the unproved also and is defeated by the cause which is unproved for both. Moreover, even if not accepting it himself, if a cause is placed, because it is proved for the opponent, it is the unproved for one of the two and a place for defeat, e. g., the following arguments of the sāmkhya towards the Jainas: *happiness etc. are unconscious because they are created like pitcher etc.'
*58. That which is concomitant with the contrary to the probandum is called the contradictory cause e. g., the word is not changeable because it is produced. Here the quality of being a product is concomitant with changeability, which is contradictory to unchangeability.
*59. That whose consistency otherwise is doubted is

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Jaina-Tarka-Bhasa inconclusive. It is of two types: that whose existence in the heterologous is decisive and that whose existence in the heterologous is doubtful. The example of the former is the word is eternal because it is knowable, Here the quality of knowablity etc. is decided in the example of sky and is similarly decided in the heterologous example of the non-eternal pitcher etc. The example of the latter is that the person under discussion is not an omniscient, because he is a speaker. Here this quality of being a speaker is doubtful in the omniscient, because it is doubtful whether the omniscient is a speaker or not. Similarly, the example that the son of Mitra is black, should also be given.
*60. A fourth type of fallacious cause, given by Dharmabhūşaņa, "immaterial" by name, should not be accepted. This immaterial or purposeless is of two types--the means to prove that which is already proved and that which is obstructed; but these two are not different from the varieties of the appearance of the known thesis and the appearance of the thesis which has been refuted. It should not be said that where there is a fallacy in the thesis, there should be fallacy in the cause also, because then we will have to accept the fallacy of the examples etc. also. By this, mis-timed should also be taken to be refuted. Similarly, inconclusive is also not additional which is there where there are two causes of equal force and of opposite nature and this is included in the unproved fallacy, because the logical impossibility of one without the other-the cause and the probandum under discussion-is not decided.
[21. Investigation of the Organ of Knowledge, viz: Scriptures.]
*61. Scripture is that knowledge which is manifested in the statement of some authentic personalities. It cannot be said that it is included in the inference because like smoke it also supports the truth by the force of the cognition of the invariable concomitance, because a man who is habituated can know the truth (by it) without depending on the cognition of the concomitance, just like a man, who is expert in knowing the real or false coin, distinguishes between the two as though by perception. One, who is expert in advising beneficial things, preceded by the knowledge of the

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The Organ of Knowledge
real state of affairs, is authentic. His statements consist of letters, words and sentences. The letters etc. are the alphabets which are material. One, which has a particular meaning, is word and a collection of the words, which are inter-related with each other, forms a sentence.
*62. This organ of knowledge of scriptures, states its meaning always positively as well as negatively and follows the sevenfold way of statement, because it can be valid and real in that very way, giving us the full truth and because even when only one way of stating a thing is used, the other ways of stating the truth are always supplied by those who have intelligent understanding. In sentences like 'there is a pitcher', there is no seven-fold statement, and it is considered valid from worldly point of view, only because it can convey the sense, but, in reality, it should be noted that it is not valid.
[22. Discussion about the Seven-fold Statement]
*63. If it is asked: what is this seven-fold statement; the answer is: keeping in view the enquiries regarding each and every aspect of an object, the statement in seven ways, which is not self-contradictory and is marked by syat (from one point of view) and states negatively and positively,separately, and both ways, collectively, is the seven-fold statement. This seven-fold statement arises in accordance with the seven types of questions, arising out of seven types of curiosities, arising out of seven types of doubts; there being seven types of qualities possible with reference to each mode of an object. The first statement, amongst these, is that from a particular point of view every thing does exist, taking primarily the positive aspect. Here from a particular point of view, means relatively from the point of view of its own form, territory, time and nature. All pitchers etc. exist in their form of being made of clay and not of water etc.; from the point of view of territory, in Pataliputra etc. and not in Kanyakubja etc.; from the point of view of time, in autumn etc. and not in spring etc.; and from the point of view of nature, as black and not as red. Similarly, the second statement is that anything, from a point of view, does not exist, taking primarily the negative aspects.

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This non-existence is not imaginary because this is experienced independently like the existence, otherwise, the three-fold characters of the cause would be disturbed, because non-existence in the heterologous example would not be real. From a particular point of view it exists and from a particular point of view it does not exist-this is the third statement taking positive and negative aspects into account, respectively. The fourth is that from a particular point of view it is indescribable--where the negative and the positive aspect have been given predominance simultaneously, because both cannot be simultaneously expressed in one word, because even by the continuous participles like being' etc. the two meanings are shown one by one and because by such words as 'one of the two', even though somehow both of them may be known, yet each one of them cannot be expressed by one word even by the Lord creator. The fifth is : from one point of view it does exist and from another point of view it is indescribable --here the positive aspects and the positive and the negative aspects have been kept in view simultaneously. The sixth is that from one point of view it does not exist and from another point of view it is indescribable-here the negative aspect and the positive and the negative aspects have been kept in view simultaneously. The seventh is that from one point of view it does exist, from another point of view it does not exist, and from yet another point of view it is indescribablehere the positive aspect and the negative aspect (respectively) and the positive aspect and the negative aspect simultaneously, have been kept in view.
*64. This seven-fold statement is the full and the partial with reference to each statement. The statement is full which is made simultaneously about an object whose infinite aspects have been proved by an organ of knowledge, identifying by transference of epithet or by making the identical aspect pre-dominant by times etc. That statement is partial which states one by one about an object, which has been made the subject of one point of view by differentiating by transference of epithets or by making the aspects of difference dominant. What is this order and what is this simultaneity? We explain it-when the difference is desired to be expressed by means of times etc. of

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The Organ of Knowledge the qualities of existence etc. then there is order, because one word cannot have the power of conveying many meanings. When those very aspects are spoken of as identical by means of times etc. and then by making one aspect expressed even by one word, the expression of the whole of the object becomes possible which assumes identity with it and this is simultaneity
*65. What are these time etc.? We explain; they are time, form, object, relationship, effect, an aspect, an aspect of the object, contact and word. Now, when we say that from a particular point of view the objects soul etc. do exist, then we identify by time taking that all other infinite qualities in the object are there in the same time in which there is existence, And whatever is the innate nature of the existence of its own, similar is the innate nature of other infinite qualities of their own, and, therefore, they are identified with it on account of the fact of innate nature; and whatever object is the substratum, viz. the matter, of the existence that is also the substratum of other modes and, thus, there is identity with reference to the object. and whatever relationship of all pervasiveness is of existence, the same is the relationship of the others also, and, thus, there is identity from the point of view of relationship. And whatever effect has existence in sustaining object in its own form, similar is the effect of the other aspects, and, thus there is identity from the point of effect. And whatever is the place of the qualified object, viz. the territory of the existence, the same is that of other aspects, and, thus there is identity from the point of view of the territory of the qualified object. And whatever contact is of existence with the soul as being one with it, similar is that of other aspects and, thus, there is identity from the point of view of contact. In relationship, the difference is subordinate and the identity is predominant, whereas in contact, the order changes and this is the difference between the two. The word 'is', which is indicative of the quality of existence, is also indicative of all other infinite qualities, and, thus there is identity through word which is justified by giving a secondary place to the point of view of the mode and by giving predominance to the point of the matter. The identity

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of the qualities is not possible, by subordinating the point of view of the matter and by predominating the point of the modes, because it is not possible for many qualities to be at one place simultaneously, or if at all it is possible, we would have to accept the difference of their substratum. And because there are the different qualities or, otherwise, there would be no difference in them and because the matter which is the substratum is also different, there would be a contradiction in its being the substratum of different qualities and because there is difference in the relationship on account of the difference of these which are related, because it is not consistent that many related things be related by one relation. The effect of each one of them, which is determined separately, is also different, because the effect of many effects cannot be one. The territory of one qualified object is different with reference to each quality, because if it is one there would be the inconsistency in identifying the territory of the qualified objects of the qualities of different objects. There is difference in the contact with reference to the contact, because if there is no difference in the contact to each, there would be no difference in those also which come in contact. There is difference in the word with reference to each subject, because if all qualities were to be indicated by a single word, then all objects of the world would be indicated by a single word; thus identity is secondarily imposed on qualities differentiated by times etc. Similarly, the attitude of difference and the secondary use of it should also be stated. Here ends the discussion of non-perceptible. And the object of organs of knowledge has been described by it.
Here ends the chapter on the organ of knowledge in the manual of Jaina logic, written by Pandita Yasovijayagani, the brother of Pandita Sri Padmavijayagani and the disciple of Pandita Śri Nayavijayagani, the class-fellow of Pandita Śrī Jitavijayagani, the best amongst the disciples of Pandita Sri Labhavijayagani, the chief disciple of Mahamahopadhyaya Sri Kalyāṇavijayagani

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The Partial Point of View
2. On The Partial Point of View.
[1. Investigation into the Nature of the Partial Point of View.]
*1. The organs of knowledge have been described. Now we describe the partial point of view. The partial point of view is the effort of cognising a part of an object, possessed of infinite qualities, cognised by the organ of knowledge, but not over-looking the other parts of it. This is different from the organ of knowledge as cognising only a part of it. Just as one part of an ocean is neither ocean nor non-ocean, similarly, partial point of view is neither organ of knowledge nor non-organ of knowledge. They are of two types of the modes and of the substance. That which cognises only the substance primarily, is that of substance, and that which cognises only the mode primarily, is that of modes. The substantial is of three types : the non-distinguished, the gencric and the empirical. The modal is of four types: the straightexpressed, the verbal, the subtle and the such-like. Jinabhadragaņikşamāśramana holds the straight-expressed to be a variety of substantial.
*2. The non-distinguished is the effort to grasp all the aspects whether general or particular e. g., the desire to make one subordinate and the other predominant out of the two substances and out of the mode and the substance, e.g., there is existence and consciousness in the self. Here out of two modes one is intended to be predominant and another is intended to be subordinate. Here consciousness which is the manifest mode, is the object qualified and as such, is predominant, whereas the existence is the epithet, and as such, is subordinate. That which is characterised by the capacity to do something positive or negative is called the manifest mode, and that which is the nature of the object, limited only to the present, and having no contact with the past and the future, is the mode of the object. In the example that 'the object is that which is characterised by the mode of the object, two objects have been intended to be indicated as predominant and subordinate, because here the qualified object viz., the

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object consisting of modes is predominant and the object as an epithet is subordinate. In the example that a man devoted to passion is happy for a moment', the person devoted to passion as being an object, which is qualified, is primary, whereas the quality of happiness, as an epithet, is subordinate. It should not be said that the non-distinguished is an organ of knowledge as it deals with both the object and its mode, because only that, which deals with them both as predominant, is an organ of knowledge.
*3. That, which deals only with the general qualities, is the generic. It is of two types: ultimate and nonultimate. The ultimate generic it that which takes into consideration only the pure existence of the substance, being indiff-. erent to all particulars e. g. the universe is one because it has the common quality of existence. That which, though, accepting the general substance etc., adopts the attitude of closing of eye like an elephant in regard to its varieties, is known as non-ultimate generic. That, which distinguishes methodically in the objects, cognised by generic, is empirical e.g., that, which is existence, is either the matter or the mode. The matter is of six types-the soul etc. The mode is of two types-the simultaneous and that which comes in order.
*4. Analytic stand point is that which primarily indicates only that mode, which is of the present moment e.g., there is the mode of happiness at present. Here, the temporary mode of happiness is shown primarily. Its substratum, the soul, is not said as the subordinate.
*5. That, which accepts the difference in the meaning of the word on account of time etc., is known as verbal. Time etc. include time, case, gender, number, person and preposition, e. g., there was, is and will be Sumeru-here, it accepts the difference in the Sumeru from the difference of the time etc; 'the pitcher is made' and 'he makes the pitcher'-here (it accepts the difference) by the difference of the case; tața, tați and tatam (coast)-here (it accepts difference) by the difference of the gender; dārāḥ and kalatram (wife)-here (it accepts difference) by the difference of number; thou goest and you go-here (it accepts difference) by the difference of

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person; santisthate and avatişthate (he stands)-here it accepts (difference) by the difference of preposition.
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*6. Subtle is that which accepts different meaning of the synonym words by the difference of their etymology. The verbal stand-point accepts identity in the object, even though there is difference in the modes. Subtle accepts difference of objects when the modes are different. It overlooks the identity of the meaning of the synonyms e. g. he, who has great power, is Indra; he, who is capable, is sakra; he, who pierces the city, is Purandara. etc.
*7. Such-like point of view. is that which accepts the meaning of the words indicated by them only when the object is engaged in the action, indicated by those words. e. g. Indra is so (only) when he has great power. The subtle point of view accepts the use of Indra etc. for whether the action of having great power is present or not, because the word is used to indicate an object which is possessed of the action in general just as the word 'cow' is used for a particular animal, whether there is the action of going in it or not, because such is the convention. But such-like point of view accepts the word Indra etc. only when it is performing that action and is engaged in the action of having great power etc. From this point of view there is no word which is not the indicator of some action because the words indicating a class, like cow and horses etc., are also root-words e. g., a cow is that which goes and a horse is that which goes swiftly. Even the words indicating qualities like white and blue-are also root-word, white being that which purifies, and the word 'blue' meaning that which makes blue. The words, which are proper names like Devadatta and Yajñadatta, are also root-words meaning 'may god give it' or 'may the sacrifice give it'. The word indicating a union or a collection is also root-word because here also the action of the existence of the staff in the dandi and of the horns in an animal possessed of horns, predominates. This point of view accepts that the five types of words are only from practical point of view and not in reality.
*8. Out of these the first four dealing primarily with the meaning are the points of view of the meaning whereas, the last

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three dealing primarily with the words, are the points of view of words. Those points of view which cognise only the particular, are called implied points of view, whereas those who cognise the general are called unimplied. From the point of view of the unimplied view-point, all the Siddhas have the same nature. From the point of view of implied view-point, the Siddhas, who get liberation in one or two or three times, are equal to only those who get liberation in the same period. The empirical point of view is that which follows the famous conventional meaning e. g., even though there are five colours in the bee, yet the bee is called black. That point of view, which accepts the real nature of the things is real. It accepts that there are five colours in the bee because its body, which is gross, is made of material of five colours, but the other colours white etc, being subordinate, are not felt. Or we can say that one, which takes into consideration only one point of view, is empirical, whereas that which takes into consideration all points of view, is real. We should not say that in this way the real point of view would become an organ of knowledge and thus, its nature as a particular point of view would be disturbed, because it accepts the predominance of (only) that point of view which is under its jurisdiction, even though taking into consideration all point of views. Those points of view are called the points of view of knowledge, which accept predominance of knowledge only. Those points of view which accept only the predominance of the action, are called points of view of action. The four points of view, analytic etc.,accept the predominance of action, characterised by conduct, because it is the immediate cause of liberation. Though the non-distinguished, the generic and the empirical accept all the threeconduct, knowledge and faith-as the cause of liberation, but separately and not collectively, because this point of view does not accept that liberation is necessarily effected by the three, knowledge etc. alone, otherwise, they would not be the points of view, because the acceptance of them collectively is the real doctrine.
*9. Which point of view again here covers much and which less? We state it—the non-distinguished covers more

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The Partial Point of View
75 than the generic, which covers only the existence, because, it (the non-distinguished) covers both existent and non-existent. The generic, as it shows all the existent object collectively, covers more than the empirical, which manifests only a particular existence. The empirical covers more, being related with the objects of all the three times -- past, present and future-than the analytic which deals with only the objects of the present. The analytic covers more as it cognises the opposite of the verbal, which accepts different objects, differentiated by time etc. The verbal is less than the analytic not only by the difference of time, etc. but also because it accepts only one aspect of the existence of the existent pitcher also as- it is pitcher from a particular point of view' and 'it is not pitcher from a particular point of view'; and, thus, it is more particularised than the analytic. Though, the object, possessed of seven aspects, is accepted only by one who accepts nonabsolutism, yet there is no fault in accepting that it propounds a particularised object than accepted by the analytic verbal point of view. The verbal point of view coveres more than the subtle as it accepts the difference of meaning of synonym words and it does not accept the difference in the object on account of the difference of the synonym. The subtle covers more than the such-like which accepts the difference in the object on the basis of the difference in the action.
*10. A statement from a particular point of view is also affirmation with reference to its object, but it is only a partial statement and it should be observed that this is its difference from the statement of the organ of knowledge.
[2. Discussion of the False Points of View.]
*11. Now we deal with the false points of view. That which covers only object and overlooks the mode, is the false point of view of substance. That, which covers only the mode and overlooks the substance, is the false point of view of mode. That, which accepts absolute independence of the quality and the qualified object, is the false point of view of the non-distinguished e. g., the philosophy of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaišeşikas. That which accepts the non-duality of the exis

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Jaina-Tarka-Bhasa tence and refutes all individuals is the false generic point of view e. g., all systems of non-dualism and the Sārkhya philosophy. That, which intends an unreal division of the substance and its mode, is the false empirical point of view e. g., the Cārvāka system. Cārvāka refutes the division of substance and the modes, etc. of the soul, supported by the organ of knowledge and supports, as a follower of the rough common usage, only the division of four matters. That which refutes the substance altogether and accepts the present mode only, is the false analytical view-point e. g., the philosophy of the Buddhists. That which accepts only the difference in the objects on the basis of difference of times etc., is the false verbal view-point e.g., the Sumeru 'was,' 'is' and 'will';(these words) indicate altogether a different meaning because they are words belonging to different times and are like the other words which are proved to be so. That which accepts only the difference of the objects indicated by the synonym words, is the false subtle view e. g., Indra, Sakra aud Purandra etc. indicate altogether different objects, because they are different words like other words as, "elephant' and 'deer.' That which accepts that a word cannot indicate an object which is not possessed of the action, is the false such-like view-point e. g., a pitcher which is devoid of a particular action is not to be indicated by the word 'pitcher', because it is not possessed of the action, which is the cause of using that word, just like another word. That which indicates only the meaning and negates the word, is the false point of view of meaning. That which indicates the word only and negates the meaning, is the false point of view of word. That which indicates the implied and refutes that which is not implied, is the false implied point of view. That which accepts that which is not implied and refutes that which is implied, is the false unimplied point of view. Negating the reality and accepting only the common place thing, is the false empirical point of view. Accepting the reality and negating the practical point of view, is the false real point of view. Accepting knowledge and refuting action, is the false point of view of knowledge. Accepting the action and refuting the knowledge, is the false point of view of action.

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On the Symbol
Here ends the chapter on the partial point of view in the manual of Jaina logic, written by Pandita Yasovijayagani,the brother of Pandita Sri Padmavijayagani and disciple of Pandita Sri Nayavijayagani, the class-fellow of Pandita Śrī Jītavijayagani, the best amongst the disciples of Pandita Sri Labhavijayagani, the chief disciple Mahamahopadhyaya Sri
of
Kalyāņavijayagani
77
3. On the Symbol
[The Discussion of the Symbols of name etc.]
*1. The points of view have been discussed. Now, we discuss the symbol. Symbol is that which is particular type of composition of words or objects for proper adjustment and removal of the lack of understanding, in accordance with the context etc. The symbols are useful because they adjust the benediction of name etc. in the auspicious objects etc. as is said: "symbol is fruitful because it removes the irrelevant and adjusts the relevant. (Laghi. Svavi. 7.2") Generally speaking, they are of four types-name, replacement, substance and nature.
*2. The symbol of name is that which indicates the object not caring for the relevant meaning of the word e. g., the words like Indra etc., which indicate some child of a cow-man, are not indicated by the synonym words Sakra etc., and the words which are evolved accidentally and are not used in any other sense like Dittha and Davittha. This indentity of the name and its object is in reality dependent on the meaning, bu secondarily it is dependent on the words. From the point of view of the Meru etc., the symbols of name last as long as the objects, whereas in case of the names 'Devadatta' etc. they do not last as long as the object, or the

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script Indra' etc, which are names of a particular object, inscribed on a book, paper or picture etc., is also the symbol of name.
*3. The object, which is devoid of the essence of that object but is replaced with that intention, is called replacement; it is of the same type in the picture but is formless in the dice etc; it lasts for a short period in picture etc. but lasts as long as the object in the image of the natural temples; just as the image of Jina is the symbol of Jina and just as the image of Indra is the symbol of Indra.
*4. That which is the cause of the past or the future, is the symbol of substance, as the use of the word Indra for one who has once experienced the state of Indra or will experience the state of Indra in future; here, the use of the word Indra being justified like the use of the word 'pitcher of ghee' with reference to one, which has once been the substratum of the ghee or would be the substratum of ghee in future. Sometimes, the symbol of substance is used to indicate the sense of secondary, just as one who crushes the charcoal is called the nominal ācārya, i. e. he is an acārya, because he is not possessed of the qualities of the ācārya. Sometime, it is used in the sense, in which it is not in actual use e. g., the worship of Jina even though done with devotion yet done unmethodically and characterised by the desire for this world and the other world and not free from the desire, is called the pseudo-action because the improper action is not the way to liberation directly. It is called 'material' because done with devotion even though unmethodically, it is the way to liberation indirectly because the acaryas proclaim that the quality of devotion renders, the fault of being unmethodical, powerless.
*5. That which is symbolised as experience of the action which one called actual symbol e. g., one who is of having great power, is actual Indra.
itself characterised by desires to convey, is engaged in the action
*6. What is the difference between the names etc. excepting the actual, because all (the three) are found in all the

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79
On the symbol three ? The name, for example, is common in every object, which is named, and in its image and in the substance. The absence of the real object, in the form of image, is also found equally in all the three, because all the three are devoid of the real. The substance also exists in the name, the image and the substance, because it is the substance which is named and of which the image is made, and, of course, the substance in the substance itself is present by its very nature; therefore, it is not proper to distinguish between these as there are no contradictory qualities in them; if this be said; no, their difference is justified, because even though they are not possessed of contradictory qualities in this way, yet in another way, contradictory qualities can be proved in them; e. g. the image is different from the name and the substance, because there we have the form, intention, conception, action and the resultant e. g., in the image of Indra, the form as being possessed of thousand eyes etc. and the intention of that person, who made the image, as to make it real Indra and the conception of Indra, of one who sees it, by looking at that form, and the action of bowing etc. of those, whose minds are engaged in devotion, and the resultant in the form of the birth of son etc., is also seen. These things are not so in the name 'Indra' and the potential Indra, and, therefore, it is different from these two. Similarly, the substance being the potential cause of the real is also different from the name and the image, e. g., a speaker, without attention, is a potential one, as at the time of attention, he becomes the cause of the real, characterised by attention, or just as the soul of a monk is potential Indra, as it is the cause of the real Indra. This is not the case with the name and the image of Indra. Similarly, the name is also different on account of the above said differences from the image and the substance. Therefore, even though the milk and the butter-milk etc. are identical from the point of view of whiteness yet, they are different from the point of view of sweetness etc. Similarly, the name etc., though identical from one point of view, are different from another point of view.
*7. One can say that only the real is the object; what is

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the use of accepting name etc. which are devoid of the substance; it is not so; even the name etc. are the characteristics of the object and, therefore, in general, they also are not excluded from the real. When one says 'Indra', without any qualification, the qualified thing is known only by context etc. by thinking over all the four-the names etc. Or these names ete. are used as the part of the real itself, because the emotions are aroused even at the name of Jina or the image of Jina or at the sight of the body of a dead sage. Of course, the three-the names etc. alone are not the immediate and the unfailing cause of exciting the emotion and therefore, the old acāryas accept the superiority of the real which is the immediate and the unfailing cause. This has been said from the point of view of the names of different objects. The names etc., which are in the same object, are the object because they invariably accompany the real, because every object is a name itself in the form of the word, the image in itself in its form, a substance in its cause, and it assumes the reality when it becomes the effect. If the name of the pitcher were not the characteristic of the pitcher, then it would not be an indicator of it; because it is the cause of relation of identity with one which is not different from itself and, therefore, everything is in the form of the name. And, everything has a form because all-the intelligence, words, pitcher etc.-have a form of their own, and the form of the blue etc. and of particular postures etc. are proved by experience. Everything is substantial because everywhere the substance is experienced as the cause of the manifestation and the concealment and as free from all modifications like the snake which is sometimes with raised hood, sometimes without hood and sometimes circular. Everything is real, because it is experienced as being the cause and effect in the form of modification. Therefore, the world is made of these four and thus we have a combination of the points of view of names etc.
[2. The Adjustment of the Symbols in the Points of View]
points of view with the symbols names etc. are accepted by the
*8. Now we adjust the of names etc. The three,

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On the Symbol
81
material point of view only, whereas the real is experienced by the point of view of the mode only. The first has two varieties-the generic and the empirical, because the nondistinguished which cognises the general is included in the generic and the non-distinguished which cognises the particular is included in the empirical point of view. The fourthe analytic etc.-are the varieties of the second. This has been said in accordance with ācārya Siddhasena by the reverend Jinabhadra Gani kşamā śramana in the Višesāvasyaka : names etc. belong to the substantial and the real to the modal point of view. The generic and the empirical are the varieties of the first and the rest of the second (75)
He expresses his own point of view at the time of discussing the symbol of salutation etc: the verbal point accepts all the symbols [2847], By this statement, he means to say that all the three verbal points of view accept only the real, as being pure, and the other four-analytic etc.-accept all the four symbols because of impurity. Some others hold that the analytic point of view accepts the name-symbol and the real only; this is not so; because the Sūtra scriptures declare that the substantial symbol is accepted by the analytic point of view, but it negates the acceptance of difference. Thus, the sutra says: 'from the analytic point of view a person, who is not engaged in its conscious activity, is essentially pne object, because this point of view does not accept the difference' [Anuyoga sutra, 14] And how will it now accept the image symbol, which has the shape of Indra and by looking at whom, the word 'Indra is uttered; while it accepts even the gold, which has not assumed any shape, in the from of a lump, as being the cause of the real modes of would-be necklace etc.? The name, of course, is not illogical with reference to the visible. Moreover, why shall it not accept the name and the image symbols, which are not different from the cause of the real, while it accepts only the word 'Indra' etc. or only that which is indicated by the word 'Indra' etc. even when there is no reality ? Their acceptance would rather be more justificable; because of the reason that the substance in the form

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of the image of Indra and the image-symbol in the form of a particular shape, have the relationship of identity with the real, the mode of Indra, and as such are more closely related with it in comparison to the name which is related (only) through the relationship of the indicated and the indicator. Some say that the generic and the empirical accept three symbols except the image; this view is not free from faults, because it must be accepted that either the generic or the non-generic or the non-distinguished in general, accept the image, because the acceptance of the image is not prohibited in (other) substantial point of view except in the generic and the empirical. (Now which of the above mentioned three types of the non-distinguished accepts the image ?). In the first case, the generic (also) will have to accept the image, because the generic point of view is not different from the generic non-distinguished. In the case of the second (alternative), the empirical will have to accept that (i. e. the image) because that (i. e. the non-generic) is not different from the empirical point of view. And in the case of the third (alternative), even if accepting that the generic and the empirical separately do not accept the image; it would be difficult to avoid its acceptance jointly by them in the form of the full non-distinguished point of view, because each one of them (the generic and the empirical) cognise one part each of the undivided non-distinguished. Moreover, because the generic and the empirical are included in the non-distinguished, therefore, its attitude should also be included in them, because though the scope, characterised as the characteristic of both of them (viz. the general and the particular) cannot be included in one of them, yet the characteristic of one, viz. the image-symbol, can be easily held to be included, because the division of the generic and the empirical can be justified merely by accepting the general and the particular image-symbol-all this should be thought over in accordance with the scriptures. The objects, soul etc., should be symbolised by the symbols of names etc.
[3. The Symbols with reference to soul]. *9. That which, whether a soul or not, is named as soul,

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On the Symbol
83
is called the name-symbol of soul; the image-symbol of soul is the image of gods etc.; the real symbol of soul is one who is possessed of the subsidence of the knowledge-veiling karman. Thus, these three symbols are possible with reference to soul but not the substantial symbol. This would be possible, only if one who is not soul at present would become a soul in future, just as one who is not god in the present is to become god in future and that is called substantial symbol of god. But this cannot be accepted in the doctrine because the existence of knowledge in a soul is considered to be without beginning and without end. But if we were to imagine a soul, to be devoid of qualities and modes but possessed of a beginning-less knowledge, then this would be a non-existent thing, because the qualities and the modes of an existent thing cannot be eliminated by mental thinking. The objects do not show modifications depending on our knowledge but our knowledge is produced as the objects show modification. We cannot say the four-fold division of names etc. is disturbed by it, because it is possible in almost all other objects. There is no disturbance in the rule if it is not 'possible in one", say the ancient people. Some say that one who knows the meaning of the word 'soul' but is not devoted to it, is also a substantial soul. Others say that I myself, the soul of the man, should be known [as the substantial soul] because I will be the cause of the soul of the god who is yet to take birth, and because I myself will transform myself in the form of the god. Therefore I am now the substantial soul. Their intention is this that the prior soul is the substance of that which is yet to take birth and to follow. In this way, only a liberated soul would be a real soul and no other soul—there. fore, this point of view is also not free from defects; this is elaborated by the commentator of the Tattvārthal
*10. This should be kept in mind that in thisway thought all mundane souls would be substantial but they would not the contradictory to real because it is held that the names etc. of one object are invariably conconfitant with the real. So
1. Cf. Tattvārthabhāşyavștti, p. 48.

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Jaina-Tarka-Bhāşă “Or the name of the object is the name, its form is its image, its being cause to the coming mode is the substance and the object in its effective form is the real”. (Višeş vaşyaka, 60).
If we accept so, it would not be possible to accept any substantial soul from the point of view of soul in general, because the man etc. are the particular soul of god etc.all this has been discussed by us in detail in the Nayarahasya etc. Here ends the chapter on the symbol in th manual of Jaina logic, written by Pandita Yaśovijayagani, the brother of Pandita Sri Padmavijayagani and the disciple of Pandita Šri Nayavijayagani, the class-fellow of Pandita Sri Jitavijayagani, the best amongst the disciples of Pandita Sri Lābhavijayagani, the chief disciple of Mahāmahopadhyāya Sri
Kalyāņavijayagani

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On the Symbol
85 May this work, composed by the purity of faith, engendered by the unequalled favour of his service, when he, a noble teacher and scholar, Sri Vijayādisimha, who was like the sun in the sky of the spiritual lineage of the noble teacher and scholar, Sri Vijayādideva, has attained the throne of Indra, cause happiness and recreation amongst the groups of the learned. (1)
He, the most expert in the science of logic, who had received lore from Jitavijaya of lofty ideas as well as from the modest, learned teacher Nayādivijaya, and who had the wise Padmavijaya as his loving brother-has composed this treatise on Jaina logic. May it render pleasure to the reader. . Whatever merit I may have earned by composing this epitome of logic, may I attain the great wealth of the highest happiness thereby. (3)
On whom previously, the scholars in Kasi had conferred the title of 'expert in logic and who, when he had composed a hundred works, was awarded the degree of the ‘ācārya of logico; he, Yasovijaya, an infant -pupil of the learned Nayādivijaya, has related this knowledge at the request of the disciples. (4)

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NOTES

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P. 1. L. 1. Cf. Daśavaikälika, 1. 1., deva vi tam nammsamti jassa dhamme saya mano
'Even the gods bow down to him whose mind is always engaged in dhamma'.
P. 1. L. 2. For the partial point of view (naya) see supra p. 71. For the different ways of putting a thing see supra p. 77.
P. 4. L. 4. A glance at the definition of pramana, given by differant Jaina logicians and collected by Pandita Sukhalalaji in his notes on Pramāņa mīmāṁsā and also by Pandita Kailash Chandraji in his Jaina-nyaya (p. 45), would clarify that Yasovijaya has borrowed his definition directly from Vadidevas uri (Pramananayatattvälokālankara 1. 2.) Siddhasena (Nyayavatara, 1) and Samantabhadra (Apta mimämsä, 63) who say that pramaņa is illuminator (abhäsi and abhā saka) of the self and the others. Yasovijaya, following, Vadidevas üri replaced the word'illuminator' by definitive cognition, (vyavasay).
Following the Mimämsakas and the Buddhists, Bhatta Akalanka (Aştasali, Aştasahasri, p. 175) and Manikyanandi (Parikşamukha, 1.1) lay down the condition that the pramana should reveal an object, hitherto unknown (apurvärtha). Yasovijaya has followed the majority of the Jaina logicians in this connection and has not made any reference to the condition. He was of course conscious of this condition as is clear from his text p. 6 line 7.
Siddhasena quoted above, says that pramäna should be immune from contradictions (badhavarjitam). He is followed by Akalanka, quoted above. Yasovijaya shows his awareness of of this condition when he observes that recollection is also an organ of knowledge, because it is coherent like perception etc (Text, p. 9 line 1).
P. 1. L.4. The Naiyayikas hold that knowledge does not cognise itself. It has to be cognised by another knowledge called anuvyavasaya. The Jainas, like the Buddhists and the Vedäntists accept the self-illuminating nature of the knowledge. Therefore, the word 'self' in the definition is significant.

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P.1. L. 6 Yafovijaya will himself admit that object-awareness is the cognition of the general features only (Text p. 4 line 9) and yet object-awareness is obviously a pramana. So the question arises that how can he here exclude indeterminate intutions from cognition? Pandita Sukhalalaji in his commentary on text (p. 31), says that here Yasovijaya is only following the tradition of his predecessors like Manikyanandi and Vadidevas uri. In fact, as pointed out by Dr. Indra Chandra Shastri in his commentary on the text (p. 2), there is a difference of opinion about the nature of indeterminate intuition as to whether it is indentical or not with the object-awareness. May be that Yasovijaya considered the two as different and therefore really excluded the former form cognition while including the latter into it. For a detailed study of knowledge and inderminate intuition, see Nathmal Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy, pp 70-80.
P. 1. L. 7. The Bhatta Mimämsakas are said to be upholders of the non-perceptibility of knowledge, because they believe that knowledge cannot be known directly but can only be inferred from the object, which is known.
P. 1. 1. 8 The idealists traditions of the Yogacara Buddhists and the non-dualist Vedanta do not accept the reality of the external world. The Jainas, on the other hand, are realist. Therefore, the pramana is said to be definitive cognition of not only the self but of the others also.
Pandita Sukhalalajt comments (p. 31) that by saying that the epithet of 'self and the others' has been used to indicate the nature (of the pramana), Yasovijaya means to stress that one should not think that this epithet is superflous, as it is implied in the very nature of the knowledge, as accepted by the Jainas. It is meaningful not as excluding anything, but merely as indicator of the nature.
P. 1. L. 10-12 Vadi Devasuri in the sixth chapter of his Pramananayatattvälokālankara, has dealt with the problem of the resultant of pramana in detail. Resultants, he says, means that which is effected by pramāna (VI. I.). It is either direct or indirect (VI. 2.) The direct resultant of the pramāņa is the removal of ignorance (VI. 3). The indirect resultant of all the

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pramāņas, other than pure knowledge, is a spirit of appropriation, avoidance or indifference whereas the indirect resultant of pure knowledge is only a spirit of indifference (VI. 4-5). Here the Jainas show a better understanding of the problem by stating the resultant of the pure knowledge separately, while the Naiyāyikas do not do so. The argument that the resultant of pramāṇa in the form of the spirit of appropriation, etc., should be different from the pramäna itself. does not hold good (VI. 7) because both, the pramāņa and its resultant, belong to the one and the same cogniser (VI. 8). Therefore, the difference between the two is only partial (VI. 6). As far as the direct resultant, viz., the removal of ignorance is concerned, it is obviously identical with pramāna, which is knowledge (VI. 12). Thus, this is one way of proving that the pramana and its resultant are partly identical and partly different. Even the direct resultant is not absolutely identical with the pramāna, because the latter is the instrument whereas the former is its effect and the two cannot be obsolutely identical (V1. 15).
Vadi Devas üri (VI. 16) accepts that the resultant is the knowledge of the self as well as the non-self. This is the view of the traditional Jaina logicians. racovijaya, however, does not follow the Jaina tradition but adopts the view of the Vijñānavādı Buddhists in accepting the knowledge of the self only as the resultant. Pandita Sukhalalaji has suggested that the knowledge of the self is, in reality, the resultant; the knowledge of the non-self is automatically implied therein [Commentary on the Text, p. 32).
The way for Yasovijaya has already been paved by Akalanka who held that each succeeding member of determinate perception, speculation, perceptual judgment, retention, memory recognition, reasoning and inference is the resultant of each antecedent ntember (Laghiyastrayī, 1.6). If we accept this, each member, except the first and the last, would be pramāna as well as resultant and thus the identity-cum-difference between the two is established. This position was further strengthened, as shown above, by Vadi Devasūri. rasovijaya took the advantage of this background and interpreted the identity-cum

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difference in his own way to bring in an alien concept into Jaina logic.
P. 1. L 12-14. The above problem of the resultant of the pramāna assumes a new dimension in Jaina philosophy because other systems accepted the means of knowledge-i.e. senseobject contact (sannikarsa)-as pramana and knowledge as its resultant. The Jainas, on the other hand, accepted knowledge itself to be pramāṇa.
The non-Jaina systems define pramana as the cause of valid cognition. If we accept this, it would mean that immediate antecedent of knowledge-i. e. senses, may be called as pramāņa. Now, the Jainas, when faced with this contention, held that the material sense-organ (dravyendriya) is not the immediate antecedent of knowledge. Amongst the actual organ of sensing (bhavendriya) also it is only the function-sense, engaged in conscious activity, which can bec onsidered as the immediate antecedent of knowledge and not the sense qua attainment (labdhindriya). If we were to accept sense qua attainment as the immediate antecedent of knowledge, a man in deep sleep will also have cognition.
The first reason for not accepting the sense qua attainment as pramāna (i.e means of valid knowledge) is this that it does not lead to knowledge directly but only through conscious activity. So conscious activity and not the sense qua attainment should be accepted as the means (karana) of valid knowledge, as it immediately preceds it. The second argument is this that as we have seen in the beginning, the pramāņa cognises itself as well as the others (the objects of knowledge); but as the capacities, which in this case are the senses qua attainment, are non-perceptible, if we accept them as pramana, it will also have to be accepted that pramana does not perceive itself. This will amount to accepting what the Mimämsakas accept and rejecting what the Jainas accept.
If it is argued that the capacities be also accepted as perceptible through their substratum, then we will have to accept that just as knowledge is to be accepted as self-illuminating because of its perceptibility through substance, happiness will also be accepted as self-illuminating in the same way.

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P 2.L.7- The earlier Jaina scriptures mention five types of knowledge, which are classified here-as also elsewhere in the later Jaina philosophical works---- into two types of cogni. tion.
P. 2.L.13-Any knowledge born with the help of an instrument-like senses or mind-which is different from the soul, was originally held to be indirect, but as all the non-faina systems considered it to be direct, Jinabhadra (ViBhā, 95), who is here followed by Yaśovijaya, fell in line with other systems by according such knowledge the status of empirically direct knowledge. The original concept of direct knowledge was included in the concept of transcendentally direct knowledge. For reasons of such adjustment, sce Dr. Nathmal Tatia, Studies in faina Philosophy, pp. 28-29.
P. 2.L.15— Anīndriya means quasi-sensuous--- Cf line 20 below.
P. 2.L.17-Non-existent (asiddha) means that which does not exist in the thesis, inconclusive (anaikāntika) means that which exists in the heterologous also, and contradictory (viruddha) means that which co-exists with the absence of probandum Cf. Pramānasa graha, p. 111.
P. 2.L.20-Eyes, etc. include ear, eyes, smell, taste and touch-Nandisutra, 2-5.
P. 2.L.21-For a detailed discussion on whether mind is a sense or not, see Dr. Nathmal Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy, pp. 31-32.
P. 2.L.23-28. Dr Radhakrishnan's following remarks make the difference of the sensuous cognition ( matijnana) and scriptual knowledge ( śrutajñāna ) clear : "Mati is ordinary cognition, obtained by normal means of sense perception... Śruta or testimony is knowledge derived through signs, symbols or words. While matijñāna gives us knowledge by acquaintance, this gives only knowledge by description"-- Indian Philosophy Vol. I, pp. 294-95. The matter, however, is not so simple. The difference
ar as long as śrutajñāna actually stood for the scriptural knowledge. It was so only in the earlier

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period. In the later period, however, śrutajñāna came to mean all verbal knowledge. Now arose the difficulty. If mati is held to be bereft of association with words, how speculation (ihā) etc. can be included in it, because they are associated with words ? All perceptions are not dumb. The śruta, on the other hand, is also classified into two : associated with words (sākşara) and bereft of words (anakşara). So there is no fundamental difference between the two. Therefore, Siddhasena Divākara observes that śruta is not anything in addition to mati, because to accept it as an additional type of knowledge is futile as well as it involves undesirable extension-vaiyarthyātiprasangabhyäm na matyabhyadhikaṁ śrutam-Niscayadvātrimśikā, 12. This view is supported by rasovijaya for the first time in the history of Jaina Logic, in his jñānabindu. Here, however, Yasovijaya tries to mention the traditional difference between the two after the fashion of Jinabhadra. This view is quoted verbatim by Pandita Sukhalalaji in his commentary. Dr. Nathmal Tatia has summarised the position as follows: "Simple verbal association is not considered sufficient to raise a cognition to the status of śruta. In our ordinary perceptions we associate the object with its name as soon as we perceive it. But we do not go any further. But there are cases of perceptual cognition which do not stop at simple verbal association, but continue further into discursive thought with the help of language. This continuation leads them to the category of śrut ajñāna.--Studies in Jaina Philosophy p. 56.
P. 2.L.28-30. As explained by Dr. Indra Chandra $astrī, in his Hindi notes (p. 6) on the Jaina-tarka-bhaşā, we have two simultaneous experiences while reading a book (1) the visual experience of the shape of the letters, etc, this is mati; (2) the meaning conveyed by the words; this is śruta. The first is included in written script and spoken alphabet whereas the second is the conscious activity through verbal knowledge. Cf. Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā, 18.3-5.
P. 3.L.2. Siddhasenaganin gives three categories of sensuous knowledge (1) born with the help of the sense organs only, (2) born with the help of the mind only and (3) born with the help of the sense organs and the mind both. To these may be

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added the fourth category of the intutive knowledge of the plant world and un leveloped animals where cognition is born without the help of either of the mind or the sense-organs-Bhāsya, Tattvärthasūtra, 1.14
P. 3 L.2. Nandisutra, 35 illustrates the contact-awareness (vyrjanāvagraha) giving the example of a sleeping man who is awakened by a number of calls. Now the sound comes into contact with the ears of the sleeping man in succession for a considerable period before the person concerned actually realises that somebody is calling him. All this is an example of contact-awareness. As soon as the man is awakened to consciousness, the contact-awareness develops into object-awareness (arthāvagraha.)
P. 3.L.6-10. Contact-awareness is not unconscious as it develops, as shown above, into object-awareness. It is only due to its undeveloped state that its existence cannot be directly known though it can be inferred just as dream-knowledge can be inferred by gestures etc.--Cf Vibha 195----198. Having summarised the position of Jinabhadra, Yasovijaya suggests another alternative, viz., contact-awareness may be accepted as conscious only by transference of epithet, as it brings about object-awareness, which is conscious.
P. 3. para 7. Pandita Kailash Chandra Shastri in his book, Jaina Nyāya, has given some more arguments, collected mainly from the Digambara works, to prove the non-contactory nature of sight. We give below some of these arguments, as they further support the arguments given by rasovijaya:
(1) The eyes cannot know the collyrium applied in the eyes Had the eyes power to know by contact, they would have known the collyrium.
(2) It cannot be argued that since the eyes do not know the covered things, they are not non-contactory. The eyes can know things covered by glass, etc.
(3) The magnet though contactory--cannot attract iron, which is either at long distance or is obstructed by some other object. The same applies to the eyes also.
(4) The supposition that some rays shoot from the eyes

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( 96 ) proves nothing. The rats are never seen illuminated by such rays, so as to prove the contactory nature of eyes.
P. 4. Para 8. The problem is this that the Nandisūtra (36) says that object-awareness (arthāvagraha) consists of such cognition as 'this sound. Now this cognition is perceptual judgment ( apāya ) and not object-awareness according to scriptures. So how to reconcile this with the statement of the Nandisātra ? The answer is that the word 'sound' is being said from the point of view of the speaker and not from the point of view of the cogniser(ViBhā,253). The word 'sound' takes more than one time-point to pronounce, the objectperception will exceed its one time-pointedness.
Once we accept that even the grossest form of particularity can be an object of object-perception, there would be no scope for perceptual judgment, because there being no end to the subtler forms of particularity, all particularities would be grosser in relation to another particularity.
P. 4. Para 9. The problem, presented above, cannot be solved by saying that a man, with familiarity with the object can know its particulars even in the one time-pointed objectawareness, though the unfamiliar child may not be able to know them. It would lead us to the undesirable position of accepting that a man with richer knowledge can know greater number of particulars in his object-awareness. But the scriptures are clear on this point in holding that one does not know by object-awareness the nature of the sound etc.
P. 5. L. 7-9. The problem is that even perception is said to have varieties like quick and slow (see page 6 lines 23-21 of the text). If perception lasts only for one time-point, how can we say that it has the varieties of quick and slow? The answer is that these varieties in fact belong to perceptual judgment, but are said to be belonging to the perception by tranference of epithet and treating the cause as the effect.
P. 5. Para 11. We can also solve the problem raised in the above paragraph by accepting two types of perception : the genuine perception and the metaphorical perception. We have explained the position of the genuine perception. One genuine perception, which has no varieties, leads to one perceptual judgment. Now if the cogniser wants to ascertain about a

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further specific characteristic, he has a new speculation (tha) and in this case the former perceptual judgment serves as the base and as such it is metaphorically called perception. Now, it is obvious that this perception can have the abovementioned varieties. Also Cf. Siddhasenagani's Commentary on the Tattvārthasūtra, 1.16.
It is notable here that out of all the Jaina logicians like Akalanka, Vidyānandi, Vādi Devas īri, and Hemacandra, it is only rašovijaya who sticks to the original position of the Jaina canons in holding perception to be indeterminate; the others regard it to be determinate.
P. 5. L. 17-18. Though speculation (iha) is also preceded by doubt (samsaya), yet it is different from doubt, because doubt cannot exclude the false from the true out of mutually contradictory objects, whereas speculation strives for the ascertainment of the truth and ultimately succeeds in doing soViBha, 183-84. Also cf. Siddhasena's Commentary on Tattvārthabhāşya, 1.15.
P. 5. Para 15. Jinabhadra holds the view that perceptual judgment cognizes the existing characteristics and excludes the non-existing ones. It is by way of refutation of an opinion which holds that it only excludes the non-existing characteristics and the existing characteristics are cognized by retention (dhāraņā)-ViBhā, 185-186. As all the synonyms of perceptual judgment, given by Umāsvāti are negative, it seems that he is more inclined towards the opinion, refuted by Jinabhadra, whereas the Nandisutra, which gives positive synonyms also for perceptual judgment, seems to agree with Jinabhadra-Cf. Dr. Nathmal Tatiu, Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 42.
P.5. L. 28–P. 6. L. 6. A difficulty in accepting the view, given by the opponents, is raised. Suppose we accept that retention cognizes the existing characteristics, then memory will not be included in retention, and will have to be accepted as an independent 'variety of sensuous cognition (mat ijñāna). Thus there will be five varieties of sensuous cognition, whereas the scriptures accept only four varieties. It has been shown here that none of the three varieties of retention, mentioned in the previous paragraph, can be included in the perceptual judgment and, therefore, they have to be accepted as independent varie

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ities of sensuous cognition.
P. 6. Para 16. Absence of lapse makes our memory-impressions clearer and clearer, and as such, cannot be dismissed as cogniser of the already cognised. Similarly memory cognises the oneness, uncognised by any other means, of the object of the past and the present and has to be admitted as an organ of knowledge. Memory impression, of course, is not knowledge in itself.
P. 6 L.16. Perverted order (utkrama) means the latter in order, coming prior to the former in order, whereas the disturbed order (vyatikrama) means leaving some in between the two or more. Thus speculation (iha) occurring before perception (avagraha) is the example of perverted order whereas perceptual judgment (avāya) occurring after perception (avagraha) omitting speculation (iha) in between the two, is the example of disturbed order. It may, however, be noted that it is not necessary here that the first may necessarily lead to the second or the second may necessarily lead to the third and so on and so forth.
P. 6 L.18. The example of the piercing of the hundred petals of a lotus is common in Sanskrit literature. Cf. Sahityadarpana (Ed. Jivānanda, Calcutta 1934) Explanation of IV. 258—utpalapatra atavyatibhedavallāghavānna samlakṣyate.
P. 6 L. 19. The mind and eyes have no contact-awareness (vyañjanāvagraha). This has already been dealt with at length in the text itself on page 3 para 7.
P. 6 L. 20. The difference between many (bahu) and multiplied (bahuvidha) is that the former consists of knowledge of many individuals like knowledge of many cows whereas the latter consists of knowledge of many varieties like the knowledge of various kinds of cows-Sarvärthasiddhi on Tattvārthasūtra, 1.16.
P.6L. 27. Pandita Kailash Chandraji in his Jaina Nyāya (p.156) gives an alternative explanation of quick (kşipra) and slow (akşipra) knowledge. According to this explanation, quick knowledge may be explained as knowledge of a quickly falling current of water whereas slow knowledge is the knowledge of a slowly moving horse.

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P. 6 L.27-28. There seems to be a difference regarding the name of the fifth variety. Yasovijaya mentions it as nisrita whereas the Digambara tradition mentions it as nisīta. The example of nisȚta, according to Digambara tradition, is the knowledge of an elephant, whose body is hidden in water, by the sign of its trunk, visible out of the water. Thus the Digambars explain this variety literally as 'raised' (=nissta).
P. 6 L: 29. The Digambara tradition mentions (=said) and anukta (=not said) in place of niścita and aniscita. Ukta means knowledge through one's words whereas anukta means knowledge by implication.
P. 6 L. 30. Here also, as in the case of kşibra and aksipra, an alternative explanation is given in the Jaina Njaya (p.156). The constant knowledge (dhruva) is the knowledge of the constant object like mountain.
P. 7 L. 2. Srutajñana (verbal knowledge) has already been defined in the text (para 5) as knowledge. Avaiyakaniryukti (942) explains it as scriptural knowledge. Later it came to indicate all symbols, written or spoken and even inarticulate verbal knowledge came to be included in it. To quote Dr. Nathmal Tatia, "this development of meaning is not, strictly speaking, chronological.... The self-same thinker could have started from the conception of śruta as scripture and reached the conception of śruta as inarticulate verbal knowledge"--Studies in Jaina Philosophy : p. 53. It is in the light of the above, that the varieties of frutajñāna are to be understood.
P. 7 L. 3-4. The written form of a letter is sañjñaksara, whereas its spoken form is vyañjanākṣara. These two are called knowledge only by transference of epithet. In other words, these two are drapyaśruta or only material symbol, whereas the potential auditory attainment is bhāvairuta or śruta-jñāna proper.
P. 7 L. 5-7. Labdhyaksara is the potential verbal thinking arising out of perceptual cognition, received through the medium of any of the sense-organs of sight, smell etc. and mind. Vibha (102) explains that just as internal sensuous cognition is possible even without the existence of corresponding external physical sense organ, which only enhances the power of the internal sensuous cognition, similarly the

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one-sensed can have potential verbal knowledge in the absence of dravyasruta. It is by the same logic possible for the plants to experience the objects of five senses, even without having such senses. All this is possible due to the destruction-cum-subsidence of the veil of knowledge; otherwise the plants and the one-sensed would have become omniscient (ViBha, 103). The essence of the discussion is that the is capable of having all knowledge without any external aid of senses etc.; the real obstacle in having knowledge is the veil of knowledge and not the absence of external senses. Moreover, no soul in whatsoever form, is completely devoid of knowledge, or otherwise there would be no distinction between the soul and non-soul. The one-sensed, however, do not possess any articulate speech but receive only an indistinct sound. Without the internal capacity of verbal thinking, however, the one-sensed organisms cannot have any instincts of hunger, fear, sex etc., which depend upon some such thinking that 'such and such object would be good for me'.
P. 7 L. 8. The basic idea is, as explained in ViBhā (502), quoted by Pandit Sukhalalji, that whatever causes the bhāvaśruta is the dravyasruta and as such, sighs etc. as indicator of misery etc., are also a sort of a non-alphabetical verbal knowledge.
P. 7 L.10. Dr. Tatia has (Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 50 and pp. 53-55) beautifully analysed the position of the Jaina scriptures on the nature of sanjñi and asañjni śruta, which we summarise as follows: sanjña has three connotations (i) Discursive thinking, taking into account the past, the present and the future. This is called dirghakalika (ii) Discriminative power between good and bad only with reference to the present. This is called hetūpadesika, (iii) Knowledge of right scriptures. This is called dr tivādopadeśiki. The word asañjñā has also three connotations: (i) Weak mind, (ii) Absence of mind, (iii) Perverted knowledge. Besides üha or instinct is also called sanjña in comparison to that which has no instinct either.
Thus the first sañña is that of instincts possessed by one-sensed organisms, the second is the discriminative power between good and bad, possessed by the two or more sensed organisms, the third is discursive thinking which takes into

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account the past, the present and the future and the fourth is the right knowledge. The beings possessed of these saññās are relatively called saññis in comparison to those possessed of the lower type or types of saññās. The omniscient are beyond any sanjñā, because they are free from all functioning of matijñāna.
P.7.L.11-14. Objectively speaking, Jaina scriptures are right whereas non-Jaina scriptures as well as books on secular subjects are wrong, but subjectively speaking, a person with right attitude can get benefit out of wrong scriptures whereas another person with perverted attitude may draw wrong conclusions from the right type of books al:o. Thus, from the pragmatic point of view, it is the attitude of the knower and not the nature of the knowledge, which makes the knowledge right or wrong. Cf. Nandisütra, 41.
P. 7 L.14-19. It is a common practice amongst the Jainas to analyse things from the four-fold points of view of substance territory, period and the essence. From the point of view of substance, śruta (which in the present context means right knowledge and not verbal thinking) has a beginning and also an end with reference to a particular individual. It has a beginning when an individual ascends the fourth stage of spiritual development viz. samyagdr ti gunasthana. It has an end when the individual either reverts back to the first stage viz. mithyādīstigunasthāna or attains omniscience, which is beyond śruta. With reference to different individuals, it has neither beginning nor end; because persons, possessed of right knowledge, always exist.
From the point of view of territory, it has a beginning and an end in the territories of Bharata and Airāvala, where it appears at the time of first Tirthankara and disappears at the end of the Tirtha of the last Tirthankara. It has neither a beginning nor an end in the territory of mahāvideha, where it is always present, because it is believed that right knowledge never disappears in that territory.
From the point of view of period, it has a beginning and an end in the Bharata and Airāvata territories, as it appears in the third time-period of the ascending and descending ages and disappears in the beginning of the fourth time-period of
va Bharari
Institur

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the ascending age and in the end of the fifth time-period of the descending age. It has neither a beginning nor an end in the Mahāvideha, where there is no distinction of ascending or descending age and where it exists in all times.
From the point of view of essence, it has a beginning and end with reference to the teacher or the scripture, responsible for its creation. It has no beginning and no end as far as destruction-cum-subsidence of veil of knowledgeobstructing karman is concerned, because it is always there in a smaller or greater degree.
It would be observed that in the above description, Sruta has stood for right knowledge and not verbal knowledge in general, but in the last case while showing the beginningless and endless variety psychically, śruta stands for verbal knowledge in general.
It may also be mentioned that except the varieties of alphabetical and non-alphabetical and the varieties of included in-the-main-scriptures and excluded-from the-main-scriptures, the other varicties are mentioned only in the Svetambara tradition and not in the Digambar a tradition.
P. 7 L.24. Yasovijaya has mentioned only three varictics of clairvoyance, whereas the Jaina scriptures generally give many more varieties and sub-varieties. At the outset, clairvoyance can be due to birth (bhava-pratyaya) or due to merit (guna-pratyaya). Denizens of heaven and hell are possessed of clairvoyance from their very birth. The clairvoyance of human and sub-human beings, however, is due to special merit.
Another classification of clairvoyance is from the point of view of its subject. It may, in its lowest stage of the lower form (deśāvadhi), extend to a small fraction of an angula (a small measure) and may know the things having form, within that space. It may penetrate only a small fraction of an avalika (a small measure of time) and may know infinite number of modes. The highest stage of the lower form knows all the loka (the universe inhabited by living beings), penetrates into palya (a large measure of time) lesser by a samaya (the smallest fraction of time) and knows the innumerable modes.
The highest type of clairvoyance (sarvāvadhi) knows all the things having form in space of the size of countless number

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of loka and penctrates into countless number of cycles, past and present. Only it cannot know all the modes, which can be known only by the omniscient. In between the lowest and the highest type, lies the middle type (paramāvadhi).
The clairvoyance of the following' type is further classified into three (i) that which follows to the other place ksetrānugāmi) (ii) that which follows to the other birth (bhavānugāmi) and that which follows to the other place as well as the other birth (k etrabhavānugimi). We get the three subvarieties of non-following' type by taking the opposites of the above three.
There are some more types of clairvoyance. One classification is into that of stable (avasthita) and unstable (anavasthita). The stable stays till the whole of life-time or till attainment of omniscience. The unstable continues to increase or decrease after its genesis.
Another classification is into that of one-symboled (ekakşetra) and many-syinboled (aneka-k elra). Sometimes, some symbols like that of śrivatsa etc. (cluster of hair of a peculiar form) appear in the upper part of the body with the emergence of clairvoyance. These symbols are many in cases of gods, denizens of hell and Tirtha ikaras, and one in case of others. Hence this classification.
Thus we have four more types. Added with the six, given in our text, the total number comes to ten. In case it is due to birth, out of these ten, only five, viz. stable, unstable, following, non-following and many-symboled, are possible. In case it is due to merit, all the ten types are possible. In the lower form, all the ten types are possible. In the middle form, all types except decreasing, extinguishing and onc-symboled, are possible. In the highest form, only the following five types are possible: following, non-following, stable, non-extinguishing, and many-symboled. In the cases of middle form and highest form, non-following means not following in the other birth, because those possessed of these two forms get emancipated and do not get re-birth.
P. 8 L.7-8. Here mind stands either for objects thought by the mind or modes of mind. According to Umāsvāli (Tattv - ārthasūtra-bhāsya, 1.24) telepathy knows the objects thought by

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the minds of others. ViBhā (814), however, holds that it is the mind-substance which is directly known by the telepathy and the objects, thought by the mind, are known only through inference. Yasovijaya has followed this latter tradition, which, according to Pt. Kailashchandraji, is the Svetāmbara tradition. ViBhā (814) argues that the objects, thought by the mind can be either material or non-material. Now non-material objects cannot be directly known by one who is not omniscient. Hence the objects, thought by the mind, can be known only indirectly and not directly. Akalanka, however, criticises this position (Rajava. 1.23.6-7) by saying that telepathy, being a case of pratyakşa, should not depend on the sense-organs and the mind, and, therefore, cannot include inference.
P.8 L.10. Pūjyapīda holds (SarSi. 1.24) that vipulamati knows lesser objects in number but with a greater lucidity. Vipulamati is infallible and is possessed by one who is ascending the spiritual ladder, while rjumati can falter and is possessed by one who is falling down.
Telepathy is possessed only by the human beings, born in the karmabhūmis (lands of the birth of Tirtharikaras) and possessed of right faith, self-control, and freedom from passion.
P. 8. L 15. This definition of pure knowledge is the one accepted by almost all the Jaina thinkers and yet this does not seem to be the original concept of omniscience. In the Acārānga (1.3.4) a sentence which says 'one who knows one knows all, and one who knows all knows one' occurs. This has been quoted in support of the concept of omniscience, as presented in our text and in other Jaina texts. (e.g. see Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p.70. Also Syadvādamañjari, I) Pandita Sukhalalji has, however, correctly pointed out that if we keep the context in mind, this sentence hardly implies knowledge of all substance with all modes (Darsana aura cintana. p. 555). This sentence simply means that one who knows the one root-cause of all evils, viz., passion, knows all its varieties viz. anger, pride, greed and deceitfulness. It is clear from the following sentence, which says 'one who controls one controls many and one who controls many controls one. The conclusive portion of this topic also says that one who knows anger knows pride, one who knows pride

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knows deceitfulness and so on and so forth.
Pandita Sukhalalaji has quoted an incident from the Bhagavatis ülra (9.6) also to prove that omniscience, in the original tradition, meant only knowledge of an object from both the points of view of the modis (dravyarthikanaya) and the point of view of the modes (paryayarthikanaya). Knowledge of all the substance with all modes, is only a later develop
ment.
105
Kundakundacārya reconciled the original meaning with the popular meaning by ascertaining that from the real point of view omniscience means knowledge of the self whereas from the empirical point of view omniscience means knowledge of all the substance with all their modes (Niyamasāra, 166). It becomes all the more important when we keep into mind that Kundakundacārya has himself spoken of the empirical point of view as unreal (samayasara, 11).
Haribhadra in his Yogadṛstis amuccaya (102-108) has also spoken of sugata, kapila etc. as omniscient. He has himself said in his works on logic that sugata, kapila etc. are not possessed of omniscience. These two contradictory positions also appear to be the result of the two meanings of omniscience -the original and the popular. Our author has himself supported Haribhadra in Kutarkagrahanivṛtti dvatrimsika. So the original meaning of omniscience seems to be a balanced view between the point of view of modis (which is emphasised by the Vedanta by taking into account only the unchangeable) and the point of view of modes (which is emphasised by the Buddhists by taking into account only the transitory phase of existence).
I have the occasion of discussing the issue with some of the Jaina ascetics. One interesting interpretation of omniscience, given by an ascetic, was that it means knowledge of all the possibilities, inherent in the substance. All this shows that there is an attempt on the part of the Jainas to re-interpret the conventional concept of omniscience, which appears as mere dogma to the modern mind and as such is not acceptable. The interpretation of Pandita Sukhalalji has, however, one defect. If we accept his interpretation, the Jaina theory of karman and nature of soul will have to

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Faina-Tarka-Bhasa be considerably changed. Knowledge is the nature of soul. It is the veil of knowledge-obstructing karman which hinders our knowledge. That all karmans disappear at the attainment of perfection is also evident. The inevitable conclusion would be that a perfect soul should know everything. Hence it is perhaps not possible to re-interpret the nature of omniscience without corresponding re-interpretation of the connected concepts, which are inherent in the Jaina system.
P. 8 L. 17. There seems to be much of hair-splitting with regard to the reasons given for and against the existence of omniscient. One argument for the acceptance of omniscience is given by Acārya Ya ovijaya in his jñānabindu. The argument is that since knowledge has gradation inasmuch as it is greater and lesser with reference to different persons, it must have perfection also with reference to somebody. This argument was first given by Patañjali in his Yogasutra (1.25). Mallavādi was the first Jaina author to advance this argument (cf. Darśana aura Cintana, p. 429).
The second argument is that all objects are interrelated. Knowledge of one, therefore, implies knowledge of all. This argument is advanced in the Syadvadamañjari.
Here Yasovijaya has given two other arguments. Unless we accept omniscience, there would be no knowledge of necessary concomitance. It is not clear to me what Yasovijaya really means. It appears that perhaps he has this idea in his mind: necessary concomitance implies universal knowledge, which is not possible without omniscience. Another argument is that when the veil of knowledge-obstructing karman has been removed, there is no reason why there should not be the emergence of omniscience.
P.8 L. 20. The Naiyāyikas believe that no knowledge is possible without mind and soul. The mind of some yogis attain such power which makes them omniscient (Prasasta-padabhāşya on Vaise ikasūtras, 1.11-13, p. 187). Naturally this knowledge disappears on the attainment of liberation, when mind ceases to exist.
Yasovijaya refutes this by saying that just as practice of yoga does not make any other of the five senses capable of knowing all, similarly the yogic practice cannot make mind

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capable of knowing all.
P. 8 L. 22-27. The question is sectarian and, therefore, we refrain from making any comments. This is one of the major points of difference between the Digambaras and the Svetambaras. The other major difference is on the question of liberation of women, which is held possible by the Svetambaras and impossible by the Digambaras. For the Digambara view of these problems, one may refer to Nyayakumudacandra (pp. 852-878).
107
P. 9 L. 1-2. The opponents, who believed that recollection is non-organ of knowledge, advance certain arguments in support of their contention. The first of these arguments has been advanced by the author of Cintamani (p. 845), who says that in recollection either of the two-the qualified and the qualification-is not present, whereas the recollection makes it a subject of present, thus making an unreal assertation. We recollect on the form of 'that pitcher' etc., whereas the part of the knowledge indicated by 'that' belongs to the past. Now, 'that' is the qualification, and it indicates past but it is not necessary that this time indicated by qualification should necessarily be connected with the qualified. Here 'that' indicates the time (past) of the previous experience and not of the pitcher.
P. 9 L. 2-4. Udayanacarya (Nyayakusumanjali, 4. 1) says that recollection's validity depends on the validity of the experience and as such it cannot be said to be the organ of knowledge, even though it may be real. The answer to this objection is that if we were to apply this criteria, inference's validity also depends upon the validity of concomitance, and as such inference would also be a non-organ of knowledge.
P. 9 L. 4-7. Here Yasovijaya has shown some originality, inasmuch as the arguments, advanced here, go deeper than that of any other Jaina logician.
P. 9 L. 7-8. Compare para 16 on page 6., where the objection that recollection knows only that which has been already known, has been answered.
P.9 L.15.17. The Buddhists hold that the recognition is in the form of 'this is that' or 'that is this'. Here the object

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indicated by this', is the subject of direct perception whereas the object, indicated by that', is the subject of indirect knowledge i.e. recollection. (Nyayamañjari, p. 442). Therefore, in the cognition this is that we have, in fact, two knowledges, the direct and indirect; the one of them being clear and the other being obscure. It is, therefore, wrong to accept one cognition in recognition. The answer is two-fold : in the first place just as the Buddhist accept the knowledge of a pitcher as one knowledge, though we have the knowledge of many colours in it, similarly we feel recognition as one knowledge though it consists of knowledge of this' and 'that'. Secondly, recognition is really an obscure knowledge, concerned with the object, indicated by 'that', the use of this is only to help recognition. Just as knowledge of the picture arises out of picture, similarly recognition arises out of its own source.
P. 9. L. 17-18. The Buddhist believe in the transitory nature of things and hold that the Devadatta of to-day is not the same Devadatta as of yesterday. From their point of view, therefore, the recognition he is the same Devadatta', is wrong. For them, in fact, there is no question of recognition. The Jainas, on the other hand, believe in 'change in permanance'. An object, according to them, changes but does not loose its identity. The change is, therefore, partial and not absolute and thus recognition is possible. In fact, the very fact that we do recognise things in practice, has been used by the fainas as well as the Brahmanical philosophers to refute the theory of transitory nature of things.
P. 9 L. 18-20. The Prabhakara school holds that all knowledge is valid. When we mistake conch-shell for silver, we have two knowledges-the perception and the recollection; we only confuse the two. Similarly, in the recognition also, we have two knowledges, the perception and the recollection, and we confuse the two, not making the distinction between the two.
Now, this assumption is wrong; because if we were to accept this, all such qualifying knowledge as that of dandi' (=a person possessed of staff) would become impossible because here also we would have two knowledges-the knowledge of the qualification (staff) and the knowledge of the qualified

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(person). It may be noted that the arguments, given for refuting the positions of the Buddhists and the Prabhakaras, are altogether different and, therefore, the phrase "ata eva' (for this very reason) in lines 18-19, is redundant. (I have elaborat. ed this point in my article on Jaina-tarka-bhāsā, Journal of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Delhi, Vol. I, No. 1, December, 1971, pp. 110-111).
P. 2. L. 20-_3. The Naiyāyikas argue that recognition is possible only when there is direct perception and is not possi. ble when there is no direct perception; therefore, recognition is nothing but direct perception. The answer is that recognition becomes possible not when there is only direct perception but also recollection. Had direct perception (without recol. lection) been the only pre-condition for recognition, it (recognition) would have become possible at the very first sight of the object (when there is no question of its recollection).
P. 9 L. 24-27. Granting what has been said above, Vācaspati Misra in his Nyāyavārtikatatparyafika (p. 139) holds that recognition is produced by senses, the recollection or the latent impressions also being helpful in its production. It is with this help that direct perception cognises the present object as qualified by the past. Here, rasovijaya refutes this point of view. As direct perception is not dependent on memory, therefore this position is tenable. This refutation is not convincing. Nobody holds that direct perception is dependent on memory but it may precede certain direct perception. Vacaspati Mifra holds that recognition is the case where memory precedes direct perception. This cannot be denied even by the Jainas. The bone of contention is whether we accept these two, as independent cognitions, or as one synthetic cognition and if we accept them as one synthetic cognition, should it be termed as perception or recognition. (Compare my article, in the Journal of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Delhi, Vol. 1, No. 1, December, 1971, p. 111). Yasovijaya gives another argument to decide this dispute. If we accept this as direct perception, the cases of inference would also be decided by the help of direct perception, aided by the mind having the recollection of concomitance and there would be no necessity for inference. Here Ya sovijaya seems to have the

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argument of Jayanta (Nyāyamañjari, p. 461) in his mind. Jayanta has conceived of a mental perception responsible for recognition. There is, in fact, no difference between the procedure laid down by Jayanta on the one hand and by the Jaina logician on the other; the difference is only that of name.
P. 9 L. 27-30. The Naiyāyikas hold that the senses do come into contact with the qualified object in the case of recognition, hence it is a case of direct perception, the qualification of the qualified also being known through the help of recollection. Now, this contention is also wrong; for in experiences such as 'he is like this' the qualified object (he) does not come into contact with the senses, though this is also a case of recognition. Here also it is doubtful whether experiences like 'he is like this should really be called recognition. The Naiyāyikas are correct if we accept what the common man understands from recognition. The definition of recognition, as given by the Jaina logicians, includes much more than what the prevalent meaning of the term indicates.
P. 10. L. 3-6. Even the Mimāṁsakas and Naiyāyikas, who hold recognition to be vaild, do not extend the scope of recognition to be cognition of similarity or to be the cognition qualified by similarity. These two are, according to them, the subject of analogy, which is an independent organ of knowledge. The similarity is perceived directly and the cow is the subject of recollection, yet the qualified gavaya is the subject of analogy.
P. 10 L. 8-10. The Jainas hold any synthetic knowledge caused by experience and recollection to be recognition. The cognition, based on analogy, according to the Mimāṁsakas, is also a synthetic knowledge caused by experience and recollection and as such is perfectly within the limits of recognition, as conceived by the Jainas. The objection-if we were to accept an independent organ of knowledge for such cognitions as 'gavaya is like cow', we have to accept another organ of knowledge for such cognitions as 'a buffalo is different from the cow'-is not valid. In fact Yasovijaya missed the point that those who believed in analogy as an independent organ of knowledge, include dissimilarity also as the subject of a nalogy. Not only this, they include the knowledge of an object, quali

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fied by any particularity of its own, under the subject of analogy (compare Siddhanta Chandro daya p. 30. Also my article in the Journal of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Delhi, Vol. 1, No. 1, December, 1971, pp. 111-112). It is, therefore, evident that the cognitions such as 'a buffalo is different from the cow' would be the subject of analogy and that there would be no disturbance as alleged by Talovijaya in the number of the organs of knowledge.
P. 10 L. 11-14. The Naiyayikas accept analogy in a slightly changed sense. The subject of analogy, according to them, is neither similarity nor the object qualified by the similarity, but the relationship of word and its meaning. Now this relationship between the word and its meaning is also the subject of recognition, which being a synthetic knowledge, can cognise the experience of an individual object and its nature of being indicated by a particular term.
P.10 L. 15-17. The idea is that the indicativeness of the word is known by the quality which is described in the analogical sentence. The idea that such a sentence should convey similarity is not correct. Take, for example, a sentence 'swan is one which discriminates between the water and the milk'. This sentence can also become the source of the knowledge of the relationship between the word 'swan' and its meaning when one observes an animal discriminating between water and milk. Now, will the Naiyayikas accept this as an example of analogy, is the important question. From what we have said above in the preceding paragraph of our notes, it becomes obvious that Yasovijaya has overlooked the exact scope of analogy. According to Siddhant a Candrodaya (p. 30), this knowledge of the relationship of the word 'swan' with its meaning is also possible through analogy.
P. 10. L. 17-20. Yasovijaya has raised another objection against the independence of analogy as an organ of knowledge. Granting that similarity, dissimilarity or particularity and the knowledge, based on them, is the subject of analogy, what about the knowledge based on the relatively largeness or smallness of objects? Obviously, one would have to accept a separate organ of knowledge for such cognitions. Then why not include these cognitions together with those gained
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through analogy, under one organ of knowledge, recognition? All these cognitions have one thing in common, they are based on synthetic knowledge, caused by experience and recollection, and as such can be grouped together under the subject of recognition.
P. 10 L. 23. Umāsvāti (Tattvärtha Bhāya 1. 15) has used the words tarka (reasoning) and üha (logic) as synonyms of second variety of sensuous knowledge, the speculation. It was Akalanka (Laghiyastrayi suavivști, 3.2) who first of all offered a logical definition of reasoning. Since then, the Jaina logicians have been defining reasoning as an independent organ of knowledge for cognising all such concepts as are universal like that of the concomitance of probandum and probane. Another such universal relationship is that of the relationship of word and its meaning. It is for including such relationships that the word 'etc.' has been used in this definition.
P. 10. L. 25. By the phrase "concomitance, cha by no exception, and caused by the innate nature of the object' is meant a concomitance without associate adjunct (upadhi). The example of such concomitance is where there is smoke, there is fire. If we reverse the order and say where there is fire, there is smoke it would become example of concomitance with associate adjunct, as this concomitance is not universal and is true only when the fire has the contact of wet fuel. This wet fuel is called the associate adjunct (upādhi). It is only the concomitance without associate adjunct which forms the subject of reasoning.
P. 10. L. 26-28. The concomitance does not fall within the jurisdiction of direct perception because it is an accepted fact that direct perception can cognise only those objects which are present, whereas concomitance has jurisdiction over past, present and future.
Direct perception is incompetent to have commerce with remote occurrences. The concomitance, therefore, can be cognised only by reasoning which is helped by the observation of probandum and probane and also by recollection and recognition. We repeatedly observe that the probandum is associated with probane. We generalise this association with the help of recollection of previous associations

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of the probane and probandum and by recognising that the present association is of the same nature as the previous ones. This gives rise to the reasoning that the concomitance between the probandum and probane is universal.
P.10. L.29-P.11.1.2. Granting that universal concomitance cannot be the subject of direct perception, it may be argued that the co-existence of an individual data in its own probandum can be directly perceived. The Naiyayikas hold that even the general (samanya) can be perceived by means of supra-mundane direct perception (alaukika pratyaksa). It is through this that all individual cases of the probandum and probane can be generalised. Thus reasoning can be replaced by supra-mundane direct perception. The answer to this is two-fold. In the first place, the Naiyayikas themselves are not unanimous regarding the principle of the perception of the general (samanya). It is accepted in the Cintamani but not in the Didhiti. Secondly, even if we accept that the general can be perceived, the reasoning shall be essential for including all the individual dates. Even if we know the generals, we will have to reason that the general is valid only when it includes all individual datas. Here, again, reasoning is essential for including all individual data.
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P. 11.L.5-7. A word has many syllables. Recollection, therefore, has to be used for connecting the whole word. It is on account of repeated observation and recollection that the synthetic knowledge of recognition is used in getting the meaning of a word. The process of elimination and addition can be explained thus: an elderly person asks another person to bring a cow and then he asks again to take away the cow and bring a horse. Now this gives rise to the comprehension of the meaning of the word 'cow', because a particular animal is brought and taken away at the utterance of the word 'cow'. P.11.L.7-8. The regressus ad infinitum, which can be objected to in the present case, can be explained as follows: reasoning leads to the removal of doubts regarding the knowledge of the relationship of the two-the probane and the probandum or the word and it meaning. Now there may be a doubt again regarding the relationship of the two and we may require the knowledge of another concomitance to

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remove it. If we produce another concomitance there may be again a doubt and again another concomitance may be required to remove it and so forth.
This regressus ad infinitum does not arise because the reasoning has the inherent capacity of leading to the knowledge of the relation without depending on any other knowledge of relation.
P.11. L.9.-12. The Buddhist do not accept the validity of any after-thought and as such also the validity of reasoning, which is only an after-thought coming after the direct perception.
Now there are two alternatives; either reasoning cognises as an after-thought only what has been already cognised by direct perception or it cognises the general which has not been cognised by direct perception previously.
In the first case it cognises only what has already been cognised by direct perception and, therefore, can cognise concomitance, as has been already explained above in the text in para no. 30. Therefore, reasoning will have to be accepted as an additional organ of knowledge. In the second case if it is to be accepted that reasoning cognises the general also then it cannot be said to be invalid for this reason alone. The Buddhist themselves accept the validity of inference even though it cognises the general which is unreal. They hold that it is valid from practical point of view because just as there is coherence between what is perceived and what is found through direct perception, similarly there is coherence between what is found and what is inferred by inference. If inference could be valid even though it deals with the general, reasoning could also be valid even though it deals with the general.
P. 11. L. 12-19. The Jainas hold that perception, either through observation or through non-observation, can perceive an object which is at hand and cannot have any imagination of the past or the future and, therefore, gives insight into the universality and necessity of the relationship of two terms by mere observation of their co-presence or non-observation of them out of relation.

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P. 11.L.20-25. The Naiyayikas maintain that reasoning is only helpful in removing doubts about concomitance and is not independent organ of knowledge (Cintamani, Anumana Khanda, p. 210). Fire is inferred from smoke, here smoke is determinate concomitant (Vyapya) and fire is determinant concomitant (Vyapaka). If there is any doubt about the universality of the concomitance it is asserted that where determinant concomitant is absent determinate concomitant is also absent. This is known as aharya knowledge which has no subject of its own.
The purpose of the reasoning according to the Naiyayikas is two-fold: it is helpful in the organ of the knowledge at the time of the doubt raised by the opponent, or to be brief, it removes the doubt of the opponent.
In either case it is only helpful in the organ of knowledge. The position is clarified by means of an example. Suppose, there is doubt about an object as to whether it is man or the trunk of a tree. When we settle this doubt we have two types of decisions :
I. This is the trunk of the tree.
II. This is not man.
According to the Jainas, this is for the second decision that we require reasoning. According to the Naiyayikas even this second decision can be arrived at by perception which cognises the absence (abhava) also through contact of the qualifications through the contact of the qualified.
The Jainas accept reasoning as an independent organ of knowledge because it fulfils all the conditions laid down at the beginning of our text in para I. The form of reasoning as accepted by the Naiyayikas is also useful in three ways: I. When there is doubt about the universality of the concomitance.
II. When an opponent, who wants to arrive at perverse conclusion, raises doubt.
III. When there is doubt independent of the conditions laid down in number I and II above.
P. 11. L. 25-27. A doubt arises as to how the position of Dharmabhusana, who maintained reason as remover of ignorance, could be reconciled with that of the Naiyayikas who main

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tained reasoning as the remover of doubt. The answer is that Dharmabhusana used the term 'ignorance' in the sense of wrong knowledge. Wrong knowledge is the same thing as doubt. It may again be objected that an organ of knowledge according to the Jainas must remove ignorance and if we accept reasoning only as the remover of doubt, how can we hold it to be an organ of knowledge. The answer is two-fold. In the first place knowledge means definite cognition which is not possible without the removal of doubt. Therefore, reasoning does remove ignorance when it removes doubt. Secondly, all organs of knowledge lead to the definitive cognition of the self and reasoning is no exception to it. Therefore, the general resultant of the organ of knowledge, viz. the removal of ignorance, is not wanting in the case of reasoning either.
P. 12. L. I. The definition of inference has been directly taken from Hemacandra. The first to define inference was Siddhasena who used the word Linga in place of sadhana (Nyayavatāra, 5). The first author to use the terminology of our. text was Akalanka (Nyayaviniscaya, part II, 2.1) who was followed by other Jaina logicians.
It was Dharmabhusana who offered a criticism of the definition of inference as given by Uddyotakara and followed by other Naiyayika (Nyayadipika, p. 66). The Naiyayikas hold that inference consists in the comprehension of the probane (Lingaparamarsa). This comprehension has been defined as the knowledge of the subsistence of the probane in the subject qualified by the knowledge of universal concomitance. Obviously this definition cannot be tenable for the Jainas who, as would be clear from the following para of the text, do not maintain subsistence in the subject as the necessary condition for inference. Dharmabhusana objected to the definition of the Naiyayikas on the basis that it defines only the probane and not the probandum. The comprehension of the probane is only the cause of inference and not inference itself (Nyayadipikā, p. 67).
It may be mentioned here that while Abhayadevasūri amongst the Svetambaras and Akalanka amongst the Digambaras criticise three varieties of inference given in the Nyayasutra (1. 1. 5), Yasovijaya, following Hemacandra, kept silence

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about it. Pandit Sukhalalji has pointed out that it may be due to the fact that a great Svetāmbara Ācārya Aryarakṣita had previously supported the three varieties of inference. (Anuyogadvāra, p. 212. 1).
P. 12. L. 9-11. The argument (Cf. Pramānavārttika, 1.17) given in these lines has been elaborated by Hemacandra as follows: if we do not accept the subsistence in the subject, such inferences as 'sound is perishable since it is visible' would be valid whereas they are not so on account of non-existent middle term (as the probane 'visible' does not subsist in the subject 'sound'). The example of contradiction on account of nonsubsistence in the homologous instance is : X is omniscient because he is a speaker. Here 'being speaker' does not subsist (necessarily) in the homologue 'omniscient'. This very example is an instance of inconclusive also because the attribute of being a speaker is not necessarily absent in the heterologue 'non-omniscient.
P.12.L.15. A better counter-example than that of crow and palace would be : "the ocean in the world has fire because there are kitchens in the world which have smoke".
P.12.L. 16-20. Here Yasovijaya has raised a subtle but a serious objection against the Jaina view, viz. subsistence of the probane in the subject is not necessary. Perhaps Yašovijaya is the only author to deal with this objection in such details. The objection is that if the probane does not necessarily subsist in the subject how the subject is invariably known in all the inferences. If a valid necessary concomitance is the only condition for a valid inference, then there must be some cases of inference where the subject may remain altogether unknown. As there are no such cases it can be argued that the subject becomes known because the probane subsists in it. The answer is that it is not only through the subsistence of the proban: in the subject that the subject is known but the subject can be known also as a qualification of the necessary concomitance. For example, in the inference "there is moon in the sky because there is moon in the water, the subject 'sky' is known as a qualification of 'moon', which has necessary concomitance with the reflection of the moon in the water. Sometimes, the subject

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may be known as the substratum of the probane. For example, in the inference, 'the mountain has fire because it has smoke', the probandum 'mountain' is known as the substratum of the probane 'smoke'. It would be observed that in this second example, there is not much of difference between the Jainas and the Naiyāyikas. It is only in the first example that they differ.
P.12.L.21-26. Yašovijaya raises another objection to the solution given above.
This second objection can be understood by understanding the three types of necessary concomitance as given in the books on Jaina logic.
I. External Concomitance-This concomitance is valid with respect to the homologue.
II. Complete concomitance—This concomitance is valid with respect to both the subject and the homologue.
III. Internal concomitance-This concomitance is valid with reference to the subject only. (Siddhiviniscayaţika, pp. 345-347 and Pramānanaya-lattvalokālankāra, 3.39).
It is only this last type of concomitance, the internal concomitance, which makes an inference valid. Out of the first two types, the external concomitance is superfluous because it is valid only if accompanied by internal concomitance also (Nyāyāvatāra, 20 and also Pramānanayatattvālokalankāra, 3.38). As for the complete concomitance, it automatically includes the internal concomitance (Siddhi-viniscaya, 5.15). It is, therefore, the internal concomitance only which makes an inference valid. The external concomitance, at best, can be only an aid to the internal concomitance.
rašovijaya here shows a keen insight and observes that in fact necessary concomitance is of universal application and as such cannot be classified into different types, only on the basis of its validity with reference to any particular data, such as the subject or the homologue. He, therefore, is against classifying necessary concomitance into different categories as has been done by his predecessors.
Coming to the point that the subject is known on account of its associations with the probane, it may be argued that in an internal concomitance where the necessary con

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comitance is valid with reference to subject only, the association of the subject with the probandur the time of grasping the concomitance itself. This objection is answered by saying that if it were so, the very exercise of inference would be futile because the knowledge desired by the inference would be attained at the time of the cognition of concomitance.
P. 13.L.1-6. Nyayakumudacandra (p. 442 ), gives some details about the invalid inference where the thesis is hindered or where the reason is inconclusive. In the first case, it would be observed that there is no logical impossibility of the one in the absence of the other (avinābhāva and therefore, the question of any valid concomitance does not arise. In the second case of inconclusive reason, the counter-argument would contradict the argument only when it is stronger. But the fact that it is stronger cannot be proved, when the conditions laid down for a valid cause are fulfilled in both the cases. It would, therefore, lead to the fallacy of interdependence (anyonyāśraya); the inference would be inconclusive if the counter-argument is stronger and the counter-argument would prove to be stronger if the inference is inconclusive.
The definition of the Naiyayikas it too narrow (avyāpta) because, as explained above, there are examples of valid inference, where the conditions, laid down by the Naiyā yikas are not fulfilled and it is also over-lapping (ativyāpta) because there are examples where the five-fold conditions are fulfilled and yet the inference is not valid. The example as given in the text is as follows: 'He is black, because he is his son': The other sons of the same persons are known to be black and hence this inference. This inference is held to be invalid even by the Naiyāyikas on account of the presence of condition (upādhi) and is therefore, an example of non-existent concomitance (vyāpyatvasiddha).
P. 13. L. 9-11. The definition of probandum has been taken verbatum from Pramānanayatattvälokālankara (3. 15). The purpose of each epithet as given in this definition has also been almost taken verbatum from that very book (3. 15-17). The paras 39 and 40, however, offer additional explanation regarding this definition.

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P. 13. L. 12-16. It has been said above that the probandum are those objects which are either doubted or grasped contradictorily. Now in this para it is explained that a contradictorily grasped object may also become a probandum The reason is simple. It is not necessary that only a person full of doubts may enter into a debate; it is equally possible that even an ignorant or a perverted person may do so. Now if the opponent is in doubt, the probandum would be a doubtful object but if he is ignorant or perverted, the probandum would be a contradictorily grasped object. It is also not necessary that a debate be always aimed at the attainment of knowledge. Sometimes, the debates may be aimed at victory. In such cases one of the disputants is perverted and is proud. In such cases also the probandum is not doubted but contradictorily grasped.
P. 13. L. 17-23. Both the parties in a debate must agree that the probandum is not refuted by any other organ of knowledge or otherwise there is no point in proceeding with the inference at all. As far as the quality of desirability goes, the probandum is desirable to the person, who uses the inference. In the autocommentary on Pramananayatattvālokālankara, Syādvadaratnakara (p. 538), an inference is quoted to prove the point. This inference is repeated in the text also. The Sankhya uses an inference for the Buddhist to prove the existence of soul: 'eyes etc. are meant for others'. Now, how do we interpret the term, 'for others'? If, for others' is not taken to mean 'soul', it may mean anything which is not eyes etc.
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The Buddhists also accept that the eyes etc. are not meant for themselves but for something which is a collection. This would mean the agreement of the two and consequently the futility of the inference. The Buddhists on the contrary do not accept this inference and point out the fallacy of incoherence etc. in it. This implies that they also accept that here the probandum is the soul. This goes to prove our point that the probandum should be such as is desirable to one who uses the inference.
All this discussion is relevent in cases of inferences-forothers. Here, however, the context is that of inferences-for-theself. Yet the problem has been discussed because there is not

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much of difference between the two; the inference-for-others being always the follower of inference-for-the-self.
P. 13. L. 24-25. When the probandum is to be explained with reference to necessary concomitance, the quality alone is the probandum, whereas from the point of view of inference, the subject together with the quality is probandum. If we do not accept this distinction and insist on the subject together with its quality as probandum, no necessary concomitance would be possible when we speak of the smoke and the fire in the necessary concomitance 'where there is smoke, there is fire', where there is no reference to the thesis, 'mountain.' Compare Pramānanayat attvā lokalankāra (3.19).
P. 14. L. 2-3. The idea is that the thesis consists of the two-the qualified and the quality. We may take them together as one thesis or may mention them separately as two constituents of one thesis.
P. 14. L. 8-10. The inference 'an omniscient exists because there are no definite proofs to prove the contrary in the inference' is used by the Jainas to prove the existence of omniscient to the Mimāṁsakas, who do not believe in the existence of omniscient. Now the qualified object, omniscient, is accepted for the sake of argument; it may prove to be existing or otherwise only after the inference has been conclusively decided. This type of qualified object is said to be optionally proved. The Naiyāyikas, who do not mention this type of qualified object, would change the form of the inference to 'somebody is omnicient thereby making somebody' the qualified object. As regards the second inference 'the horns-of-thedonkey do not exist', rašovijaya also accepts, following ViBha (1574), that here it is the existence of horns in the donkey which is denied, because the non-existent, the horns-of-thedonkey, cannot be denied.
P. 14. L. 16-18. The objection of the Buddhists of making existence the probandum is of a fundamental nature. The Buddhists accept only the particular object which is momentary, without parts and independent of each other, as the only reality. They do not accept the general (Sāmānya). When we say that the existence is the probandum, the question arises that whether we want to prove the particular existence or the

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general existence. The question of proving the general existence does not arise because it simply does not exist. If it is said that we want to prove particular existence, it would simply not be possible to have any concomitance with reference to the particular existence which is momentary.
The answer to this objection is that if we were to uphold it, any inference would become impossible. For example, in the stock-example, the fire in general would not be the probandum because it is non-existent and it would not be possible to have any concomitance.
P. 14.L. 18-25. The objection raised in the Pramanavarattika (1.192) has been explained by Tasovijaya himself. The answer is that if existence cannot become probandum, because it cannot be proved through a probane which is either positive or positive-cum-negative or negative, then the stock example of inference would also be invalid because the quality of 'possessed of the fire' is also optional.
P. 14. L. 26-27. The answer of the Jainas to the Naiyayikas can be explained as follows: In the contention of Naiyayikas, the qualified object is the optionally proved qualified object. This contention itself proves that optionally proved qualified object can also serve as qualified object.
Ratnakarāvatārikā on the Pramananayatattvälokālankara (3.22) discusses the supposed answers of the Naiyayikas that here the qualified object, the optionally proved qualified object, is admitted because it is accepted by the opponents. The objection is answered by saying that if the opponent accepts this on the basis of valid cognition then the Naiyayikas should also accept it. If, on the other hand, the opponent did not accept it on valid cognition, the Naiyayikas should not accept it even hypothetically. But the very fact that they accept it leads to that a thesis in some cases can be accepted for the sake of argument.
P. 14.L. 27-28-P. 15. L. 1-3. The objection, raised above, regarding the contention of the Naiyayika, may also be true with reference to the Jainas, who hold that the non-existence is never negated. Now, if a non-existent object is not to be negated, how can non-existence be proved of an optionally proved qualified object?

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The answer to this objection is that this would be valid only if the qualified object, which is optionally proved, were to be experienced in toto. Once an object has been experienced in toto, there is no question of its denial. The question is then how do we experience the optionally proved qualified object. One answer can be that optionally proved qualified object is experienced as qualified by words etc. Now in such cases, the inference would have the limited purpose of removing any doubt about the qualifications etc. or of removing any perverted knowledge about the existence of the qualification. This type of inference is conditional and has only a limited purpose. Therefore, this position also can be only partially acceptable.
The correct position, therefore, is that the non-existent object is experienced only in parts, which are existent.
P. 15. L. 6-8. To take another example, "an absolutely external object is not capable of performing any action, because there is no simultaneity or order'; here the qualified objectabsolutely eternal object-is not accepted by the fainas themselves, who infer and yet the fainas make absolutely eternal object as qualified object for the sake of argument, because it is easier to prove the non-existence of an absolutely eternal object in this way. The argument would proceed in this way: in an absolutely eternal object, there is no order or simultaneity and when there is no order or simultaneity, there is no capability of performance of any action and in the absence of capability of any action, the existence of an absolutely eternal object cannot be proved. It may, however, be pointed out here that Yasovijaya has positively said (The Text, p. 14. 1. 13-14) earlier that in the case of an optionally proved qualified object, the probandum is limited to existence, and non-existence whereas in the inference, under discussion, this rule appears to have been violated inasmuch as the qualified object (absolutely eternal object) is optionally proved and yet the probandum is neither existence nor non-existence but absence of capability of performing any action.
P.15.L.11. The three parts of inference meant for the self (or alternatively two parts) have already been discussed in the text in para 41 on page 13. The Fainas hold

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that the same are the parts of an inference-for-others. The earlier Jaina logicians suggested the use of illustration also as the third part. Compare Apta Mimaṁsā (6, 17, 18, 27) and Nyāyāvatāra (13, 19). Akalanka and other Jaina logicians including Yarovijaya, who followed him, did not consider illustration as a part of syllogism. Devasüri went to the extent of accepting that in cases of exceptionally intelligent person the use of the probane only may also suffice (Syadvādaratnākara, p. 548). This is, however, the position which is held generally by the Buddhist and is refuted here. Amongst the Buddhists also Dharmakirti had accepted two parts in Vadanyāya (p.61). In the Pramāņavārttika (1.128), however, he accepted only probane as the part of syllogism. All this shows a tendency to reduce the number of the parts of syllogism. The fact, that the Jaina logicians including rasovijaya (the text p.16, para 51) accepted the utility of other parts of syllogism also with reference to persons of dull wit, shows that the Jaina view has not been rigid about the parts of syllogism. The stand of Devasūri, who even agreed with the Buddhists, shows the liberality of the faina approach, which is based on relativity.
rasovijaya and majority of the faina logicians have, however, refuted the position of the Buddhists, who hold that thesis may also be eliminated from the syllogism as it may be known from the context itself.
P.15. L. 12-20. The arguments of rašovijaya against the Buddhists' view-point can be explained as follows: the probane can also be presumed from the context. When one says that the word is transitory, the probane of being produced by effort is also known impliedly, at least, to some intelligent persons; and, therefore, may be eliminated in such cases. It is, in fact, not a question of knowing impliedly, but of making the validity of the relationship of the qualified object and the quality, explicitly clear. For this, the mention of the qualified object is as necessary as that of the probane.
P. 15. para 48. Here we find very strange view-point of the Sāňkhya school. Everybody accepts inference forothers as inference, where persons other than the self are conveyed the conclusion of the inference by using syllogism.

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125
The Sankhya, on the other hand, says that the inference, where the probane is acceptable only in the scriptures of the opponents, is inference-for-others.
Now, how can a disputant use the probane, which is acceptable only in the scriptures of the opponents, unless he himself accepts the validity of those scriptures. Now, if one accepts the validity of the scriptures of the opponent as against one's own, there is no point in carrying on the debate any more; everything would be decided by the scriptures, upheld by the disputant and his opponent jointly. If the disputant does not uphold the validity of the opponents' scriptures, how can he advance an argument based on the assumptions, which are upheld only in the scriptures of the opponents ? A probane, acceptable to the opponent only, can, however, be used in an inference for the sake of argument aiming at proving the very unacceptability of the probane. For example, the Jainas use the following inference : 'that which is absolutely one, cannot be connected with many as generality. Now, this inference has been used only to show the relationship of the two, the oneness and being connected with many. It does not prove anything more. Now, if we accept 'that which is one cannot be connected with many', we will have to refute the existence of generality, which, according to the Naiyāyikas, is one but connected with many. That which is connected with many cannot be one. This proposition makes generality impossible. Thus the inference takes an altogether contradictory form. Such being not the case in the example, given by the Sankhyas viz. the intelligence is unconscious because it is created like the pitcher, the inference, given as an example of inference-for-others by the Sankhya, cannot be accepted.
P. 16. L. 3. The Naiyāyikas accept positive (anvaya) and negative (vyatireka) concomitance. The Buddhists also accepted it (Hetubindutikā, p. 19). The Jainas do not accept these two as the varieties of concomitance, but only as two ways of putting the cause.
P. 16. L. 17. This tradition of accepting ten parts of the syllogism has its origin in the Niryukti of Bhadrabahu (Dasavaikālika Niryukti, Gatha, 137). It may be mentioned that

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126
Jatn-Tarka-Bha sa
the Yuktidipikā on the Sankhyakarikā also mentions ten parts (Yuktidipika on Kārikā, 6) of inference. Besides the well-known five parts, the Yukti dipika says that curiosity (jijñasa), doubt (samsaya), purpose (prayojana), attainment of the possible (sakya-prapti) and removal of doubt (samsayavyudasa) are also the parts of inference. These five parts are said to be explanatory of the first five parts and as such serve the same purpose as the last five (the purity of the thesis etc.) parts, mentioned by Bhadrabāhu.
P. 16. Sub-topic 19 (Varieties of cause). Yašovijaya has given 25 varieties of causes. The earlier authors, the Jainas as well as the non-fainas, have given lesser number of varieties of causes. The most famous of these varieties are, in fact, the three varieties of inference. Compare Nyāyasūtra (1.1.5). Anuyogadvāra (p. 212 A), a Jaina scripture, also supports this view though other Jaina logicians like Abhayadeva criticise it. Compare Sanmatiļikā (p. 559). We have already pointed out that Yasovijaya preferred to keep silence on such a controversial point. Amongst the Jaina works, Sthanänga (p. 309-310) mentions only four varieties of cause. Amongst the Buddhists, Dharmakirti mentions only three varieties of causes (Hetubindu, p. 54). All this goes to prove that the tendency to multiply the number of varieties of causes, is quite later. The first Jaina logician to give 15 varieties of causes was Akalanka (Pramānasaṁgraha, 29-30). Vidyānanda raised this number to 28 (Pramāņapariksa, pp. 72–75). Yasovijaya has followed Devasüri (Pramānanayatattvalokalankāra, 3. 50-95) as far as the main varieties are concerned, but Devasūri gives some sub-varieties also, raising the total number of varieties to 41. Hemacandra and Dharmabhūsana have, however, kept the number only to 5 and 9 respectively. It may also be mentioned that rasov ijaya has not shown any tendency to contradict the views of the opponents on this issue; though in other Jaina works like Nyāyakumudacandra, we do find a refutation of the view-point of the Buddhists, who hold only two varieties of causes, and of the viewpoint of the Naiyayikas and Sankhyists who hold five and seven varieties of causes respectively; compare Jaina Nyaya of Kailash Chandra Shastri (pp. 218-224).
The basic fact regarding the Jaina classification of the

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127
causes is that they hold necessary concomitance to be based on two factorsnecessity of synchronal and successive occurence of simultaneous events (Pramānamīmāṁsā, 2. 10). Out of these two, the latter—the successive occurrence appears to have caught the imagination of the Jaina logicians and may be said to be their original contribution in the field of Indian logic. For the clearer understanding of the details of the varieties of causes, as given by Yasovijaya, we produce below five charts.

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Determinate concomitant
as cause e. g. The word is non-eternal because it is created by effort. [The cause of 'created by effort' is the determinate concomitant of the probandum non-eternal'.]
II POSITIVE CAUSE
Which proves something positive (availability of non-contradictory)
By giving 1
Effect
as cause e. g.
This mountain consists of fire because otherwise the fact of containing smoke cannot be justified. [The cause of smoke' is the effect of the probandum 'fire'.]
Cause
as cause e.g. There would be rain because otherwise a particular type of cloud could
Sakata would rise because otherwise the rise of kṛttika would not have
not have been been there. there. [The cause 'rise [The cause 'parti- of kṛttikä' is cular type of the predeccloud' is the essor of the cause of the probandum probandum 'rise of Sakata'.] 'rain'.]
Predecessor
as cause e.g.
Successor
as
cause
e.g. Bharant rose before because kṛttika is rising. [The cause rise of kṛttika' is the successor of the probandum 'rise of Bharani'.]
Simultaneous as cause e.g.
Fruit of bijoră should be possessed of form because the
fact of being possessed of taste cannot be justified otherwise.
[The cause 'taste' is the simultaneous of the probandum 'form'.]

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III POSITIVE CAUSE
Which proves something negative (availability of contradictory)
By giving
c.g.
Contradictory Contradictory Contradictory Contradictory Contradictory Contradictory Contradictory in in
effect cause predecessor successor simultaneous nature concomitant e.g. He has no He cannot
The Puşya The Puşya
The Mīgast. He has no
The MrgastThere is no He has no pacification of tell a lie be- constellation isa did not
false knowabsolute certainty ofanger because cause he is will not rise arise a mo
ledge because absolutism the reality there are signs possessed of because Rohini ment before he because because of agitation knowledge has arisen.
because Pürda-attitude. non-absolutism there is doubt. on his face. which is not [The cause phalguri has is found. [The cause (The cause polluted by rise of Rohini arisen.
‘right attitude [The cause 'doubt' is 'sign of agi- attachment is the
The cause is the contra'non-absolutism' contradictory tation on etc.
contradictory "the rise
"the rise of dictory simul
of is contradic- in concomitant f ace' is [The cause predecessor Parva-phalgu
taneous of tory in nature to certainty contradictory 'possession of to
i is the con- the 'false to absolute of reality'.] effect to knowledge the rise of tradictory
knowledge') absolutism.)
pacification not polluted pusya'.] follower of of anger'.) by attach
'the rise of ment' is the
Mrgasirsa.) contradictory cause to 'telling a lie'.)

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IV NEGATIVE CAUSE Which proves something positive (non-availability of the contradictory)
By giving
e.g.
c.g.
Non-availability Non-availability Non-availability of Non-availability Non-availability of the effect of the cause
the nature
of the determinant of the concomitcontradictory to contradictory
contradictory concomitant contra- ant contradictory the probandum to probandum to the probandum dictory to the proba- to the probandum
e.g.
e.g.
dum This man is extre- Here is trouble The objects are multimely sick because because the desired sided because the Here is shade Here is false knowwe do not find object is not availa- nature of one-sided
because
ledge because the activities of ble.
ness is not found. heat is not available. right attitude is a man free from [Here the cause is the [Here the cause is [Here the cause is not available. sickness.
non-availability of the non-availability the non-availability (Here the cause [Here cause is the the desired object of nature of one-sid- of 'heat' which is a is the non-avainon-availability which is the cause edness' which is a determinant conco- lability of fright of the activities contradictory to nature contradictory mitant-contradictory to attitude' which of a man free the probandum
to the probandum the probandum is contradictory from sickness 'trouble'.) 'multi-sidedness'.) 'shade'.)
concomitant to which is the effect
the probandum contradictory to
'false knowthe probandum
ledge'.] 'extreme sickness'.]

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V NEGATIVE CAUSE Which proves something negative-negative (non-availability of the non-contradictory)
by giving
e.g.
Non-availa- Non-availabi- Non-availa- Non-availabi- Non-availa. Non-availa- Non-availability of lity of bility of lity of bility of bility of bility of the nature the determi- the effect the cause the precedent the successor the simultae.g. nant concomi- e.g.
e.g. neous Here is no tant
The seed is He has no Sváti will not Purvabhadra pitcher on
not with its peacefulness rise after a pada did not He has no the earth There is no power unob- because moment be- arise a mo- right knowbecause there panasa tree structed be there is no cause the rise ment before ledge because is no availa- because there cause a sprout faith in the of citra is not because we we do not bility of its is no tree is not seen true nature seen.
have no know- find any right nature which available. in it.
of things. [Here the ledge of the attitude. is due if it
[Here the [Here the cause is the rise of uttara (Here the were availa- cause is the cause is the cause is the non-availabi- bhadrapada. cause is the ble.
non-availabi- non-availa- non-availa- lity of rise of [Here the non-availa[Here the lity of tree' bility of bility of "faith Citra which cause is the bility of right cause is the which is the sprout in the true is the prede- non-availabi-attitude' non-availabi- determinant which is the nature of cessor of "riselity of ‘rise of which is simlity of 'natu- concomitant effect of ‘un- things,' which of Svāti after uttarabhadra ultaneous of re of pitcher of panasa obstructed is the cause a moment'.) pada', which right knowwhich is a tree.] power of the of 'no peace
is the succes- ledge'.] nature of the
seed'.] fulness']
sor of ‘rise of pitcher.]
Pūrvabhadrapada'.]

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Notes
133
P. 18. L. 2-3. The Jaina logicians believe that the cause is characterised by the only quality of not being co-herent otherwise. A question arises that if cause is characterised by one quality only, the fallacy should also be only one (Nyāyaviniscaya vivarana 2. 196). Akalanka says that in fact there is only one fallacy, akiñcitkara, which is classified into three as shown in the following para of the text (Nyāyaviniscaya vivarana, 2. 202). It may be mentioned that the text also mentions akiñcitkara in para 60 as a variety of fallacy given by Dharmabhūşana. Tasovijaya refutes this variety. Obviously the akiñcitkara of Akalanka is different from that of Dharmabhūşana.
P. 18. L. 4-8. Devas üri's definition of unproved is more specific : 'the probane, whose quality of not being coherent otherwise is not proved through an organ of knowledge, is unproved'. Pramānanayatattvalokālaňkāra (. 48).
The first example of unproved gives visibility as a quality of sound; as it is admitted neither by the disputant nor the opponent; it is said to be unproved for both. The second example asserts that trees have no death. This is a probane advanced by the Buddhists who hold it but the opponents, namely the Jainas, do not accept this. Therefore it is a probanc unproved for the one, namely the opponent. The third is the example where the probane is unproved for the disputant. This inference is advanced by a Sankhya philosopher. Now the Sankhya philosopher does not maintain that anything can be created; it can only have manifestations. Therefore the probane is here unproved to the disputant.
The Naiyāyika accepts three types of unproved cause. In the first case the subject is non-existent. In the second case, the cause, advanced in the inference, is not factual with reference to the subject. In the third case the concomitance involves a condition (upadhi) (Tarka-sangraha, p. 46).
The Ratnakarāvatārikā (6.51) has given as many as 25 varieties of the unproved cause advanced by the non-faina system.
The Jainas include all these varieties in the two, given above.
P. 18. L. 9-20. It may be argued that there is no fallacy

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Jaina-Tarka-Bhaşa
of 'unproved-for-either', because when something is held to be unproved for either of the two, the disputant and the opponent, it becomes the duty of the one party, who maintains it to be proved, to prove it to the other party also. If he gives a proof, it becomes proved for both and if he cannot give a proof, it remains unproved for both. In either case the fallacy of unproved-for-either cannot be proved. The argument that it can be said to be 'unproved-for-either' as long as the other party advances a proof to prove it, is not valid, because nobody can declare a jewel as artificial (ratnābhāsa) unless it is proved to be so. The idea is that no object under discussion or examination, can be said to be false unless the result of the discussion or examination is known. That object can, at the best, be said to be unproved only secondarily. An object becomes primarily unproved only when it is proved to be so conclusively.
Another objection against holding, “unproved-for-either' as fallacy would be that if we accept it, the disputant would be defeated without any difficulty, as the opponent can conveniently say that the cause, advanced by the disputant, is unproved for him and as such is fallacious. The disputant cannot get rid of this difficulty by proving the cause, challan. ged by the opponent, as when once the fallacy has been shown, the disputant gets defeated and he cannot continue the arguments any more. The answer in that 'unproved-for-either' is a fallacy and it does not lead to an easy defeat of the disputant as shown above. The fallacy 'unproved-for-either' leads to the defeat not just by the opponent declaring it to be so, but only either when the convinced disputant, even though himself adopting a correct probane, is unable to prove it to the opponent on account of forgetfulness about the arguments in its support, and at the same time does not accept that the probane is unproved or when the disputant advances a cause, which he himself does not hold to be correct and yet advances it only because the opponent accepts it.
The essence of this discussion is that the cause becomes fallacious if one party, which advances it, cannot prove it on account of forgetfulness even though it is itself convinced of its correctness. The cause is, obviously, fallacious if its correct

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135
ness is not believed by the one who advances it, even though the opponent may hold it to be correct.
P. 18. L. 21-22. The definition of the contradictory is the same as that given by the Naiyāyikas (Tarkasangraha, p. 45). Even the illustration of this fallacy is the same as given by the Naiyāyikas.
Ratnākarävatārikā on Pramānanayatattvälokalankāra (6. 53., gives eight sub-varieties of the contradictory cause. The first of these is that which pervades the subject as well as the hcterologue. The second pervades the subject as well as a part of the heterologue. The third resides in a part of the subject and part of the heterologue. The fourth resides in a part of the subject and pervades the heterologues. These very four fallacies are duplicated when we apply them with reference to those inferences where homologues are not available.
P. 18. L.23-28. The Naiyāyikas define inconclusive cause as one that co-exists partially. (Tarkasangraha, p. 44). They speak of its three varieties, over-wide (sādhārana), peculiar (asādhārana) and non-exclusive (anupasamhärin). That which coexists both with the probandum and its negation is the overwide type of inconclusive cause. It is similar to the first variety of our text. That which exists neither in the homologue nor in the heterologue is the peculiar. That which has neither a homologous illustration nor a heterologous illustration is the non-exclusive.
Ratnākarāvatārika on Pramānanayalattvalokalankära (6. 57) gives eight sub-varieties of that type whose existence in the heterologous is doubtful. These varicties consist of probanes (1) pervading the subject, the homologous, and the heterologous, (2) pervading the subject and existing in a part of the homologous and the heterologous, (3) pervading the subject and the homologous and existing in a part of the heterologous, (4) pervading the subject and the heterologous and existing in a part of homologous (5) existing in a part of the subject, a part of the homologous and a part of the heterologous, (6) existing in a part of the subject and a part of homologous and pervading the heterologous, (7) existing in a part of the subject and a part of the heterologous and pervading the homologous, and (8) pervading the homologous and heterologous

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Faina-Tarka-Bhāşa
and existing in a part of the subject.
P. 19. L. 1-2. The two types of the 'immaterial cause can be illustrated as follows: (1) sound is audible, because it has the class-essence of sound (Here the audibility of sound is very well known). (2) Fire is cold, because it is a substance (Here the probandum 'coldness' is contradicted by perception). The first of these is an example of fallacious thesis. known as pratita-sadhyadharmavisesana. We have already noted in the text above (para 38, page 13) that the probandum should not be already known. The second is the example of pratyakşa-nirākṣtasādhya-dharma-viseşana.
The argument against any other fallacy, except the three mentioned above, is this that the necessary concomitance can remain unknown either through indecision or through error or through doubt. If it is through indecision, it is unproved; if it is through error, it is contradictory; if it is through doubt, it is inconclusive. So the question of accepting any other fallacy does not arise.
P. 19. L. 3-4. What is called as 'mis-timed' here, is generally known as 'obstructed' (bädhita) and is accepted in a case 'where the negation of the thing to be proved is established by another (stronger) proof'. (Tarkasangraha, p. 48). It is the same as the second variety of the 'immaterial', illustrated above; it, therefore, needs no separate refutation.
P. 19. L. 4-5. What is called as 'inconclusive' here is generally known as satpratipaksa amongst the Naiyāyikas and is accepted in a case 'wherein there is another reason proving the negation of the thing to be proved' (Tarkasangraha, p. 43). Its example is : 'sound is eternal, because it is audible like any other sound; and sound is non-eternal, because it is a creation like jar.' It may be pointed out that in the case of an inconclusive cause, the counter-argument is of equal force; if it becomes stronger, it becomes a case of obstructed (badhita).
Now it is clear that if two contradictory reasons of equal force were to be given, the necessary concomitance, on which the inference stands, would stand, unproved and hence, it would be included in the unproved type of fallacious cause.
P. 19. L. 7-9. The objection that the scriptures are not

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137
an independent organ of knowledge but are included in the inference has been raised by the Vaiseșikas. (Prasastapāda bhāsya, p. 576).
P. 19. L. 9-10. The definition of scripture (Agama) given here is subjective. According to this definition the first authenticity goes to the Tirthankaras, the second to the ganadharas and the third to the Acāryas. The primary authenticity goes to the scriptures, whose ideas are those of the Tirthankaras and words those of the Ganadharas. Other scriptures, whose ideas originated from Ganadharas and their disciples, are of secondary authenticity; their authenticity depending on their coherence with the scriptures of primary authenticity just as the authenticity of Smộtis in Hinduism depends on their coherence with the Srutis.
Besides this objective criteria of the authenticity of the scripture there is subjective criteria also which has been explained in the text (p. 7, L. 12-14) and notes on it.
P. 19. para 62. It appears that the authenticity of faina scriptures is believed to be somewhat of an object nature. It is the relativity of the statements, which make it authentic because the nature of the things is such that they are not possessed of any absolute characteristic. Gommaļasāra (Karmakānda, 895) says that the non-faina scriptures are wrong as their intention is to attribute absolute characteristics whereas the Jaina scriptures are right because they attribute non-absolute quality to an object. Yasovijaya emphatically asserts that any statement is correct only when it is seven-fold. Such statement is made from a particular point of view and yet it does not lose sight of the fact that statements can be made from other angles also. Thus all statements are impliedly relative even though they may not be so explicitly.
P. 19. L. 18. Dalsukha Bhai Malanniya in his book Āgama yuga kā Jaina darśana (pp.94-114) has traced the origin of the seven-fold statement. The Nasadiya Sukta (Rgveda 10. 121) has spoken of the state before creation as neither existent nor non-existent. It is a statement in which the origin of seven-fold statement can be partially traced. The statement like 'it moves and it moves not' (Isopani sad, 5) clearly proves that the thinkers of the Upanişads were conscious of

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Jaina-Tarka-Bhaja
the fact that opposite qualities can be attributed to one object from different angles. From this evolved the four-fold statement of existence, non-existence, existence, and non-existence both, and inexplicability. The Jaina scriptures also show sometimes this four-fold statement(e.g. Bhagavatisütra, 1.1.17). These very four-fold statements were later on evolved into seven-fold statements by permutation and combination. The Buddhists (Samyutta Nikāya, XL. IV.) and the agnosticists led by Samjayavelațțhiputta (Dīghanikāya, Samāññaphalasutta) have also shown some tendency for four-fold statement and yet their attitudes differ from those of the Jainas inasmuch as the Jainas accept the validity of every statement from a particular point of view, whereas the Buddhists preferred to keep silence about the validity of any of the statements and the agnosticists also proclaimed their ignorance about the validity or otherwise of the statements. Thus the peculiarity about the theory of their seven-fold statement is the theory of partial point of view (nayavāda) which Yašovijaya has explained separately in the second chapter of the Text.
P.19. L. 18-20. Though an object is possessed of infinite attributes, yet the seven-fold statement is to be made with reference to one attribute only. The seven-fold statement is the permutation and combination of affirmation and negation, separately and simultaneously. Asfasahasri (p. 125) explains it thus :
(1) Afirmation, (2) negation (3) affirmation and negation separately, (4) affirmation and negation simultaneously (5) affirmation and simultaneous affirmation and negation, (6) negation and simultaneous affirmation and negation, and (7) separately and simultaneously affirmation and negation. Here there is some difference regarding the order of the third and the fourth statement. The order, which is given here, is generally followed by the Jaina logicians, though ViBhā (2232) changes the order, Compare Jaina Nyāya (pp. 318-319).
P. 20. L. 7-10. Akalanka (Tattvärthavārttika, p.252), was the first Jaina logician to notice the distinction between the full and the partial seven-fold statement. There seems to be some difference of opinion regarding the nature of full

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Notes
139
and the partial seven-fold statement but we do not go into that detail as it does not help us in understanding the text any better.
P.20-L.16-25. The Ratnakarävatārika on Pramānanayatattvälokālankara, IV.44) explains this 'identity' in an easier way.
The sentence 'soul etc. exist from a particular point of views means that (1) at the time when existence inheres in the soul the other qualities also do so, (2) the other qualities are as much the qualities of soul as existence because all of them have the form of qualities in them, (3) other qualities have the same object as substratum, as existence, (4) the same relationship of identity (in some sense) subsists between the other qualities and the soul as that between existence and the soul, (5) other qualities also effect the soul in the same way as does existence, (6) other qualities inhere in the same place of the soul wherein existence inheres, (7) other qualities have contact with the soul in the same way as existence has contact with it, and (8) the word, existence, which here indicates soul which has existence, also indicates the soul which has other qualities. Now these meanings are possible when the point of view of the mode is secondary and the point of view of the matter is given predominance.
P. 20. L. 26-27 F. W. Thomas in his notes to the translation of Syadvādamañjari (p.140, note 32) remarks ".e. if what is being said to actual is a state (='mode') e.g. 'a bracelet,' it cannot be credited with all the qualities belonging to the general substance, gold.”
P.20. L.28—P. 21. L. 6. We explain below the difference, following Ratnakarāvatārika (on Pramānanayatattvalokālaikāra, IV. 44). When we say "an object has existence, it means (1) at the time when existence inheres in the object qualities other than existence cannot inhere in it, (2) other qualities cannot have the same form as that of existence, (3) other qualities cannot have the same object as a substratum as existence, (4) the same relationship that subsists between existence and the object cannot subsist between the other qualities and the object, (5) other qualities do not effect the object in the same way as does existence (6) other qualities do not inhere the same place of the object wherein existence inheres

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Jaina-Tarka-Bhāsā
(7) other qualities do not have contact with the object in the same way as existence has contact with it and (8) the word, existence, which here indicates the object which has existence cannot signify the object which is possessed of qualities other than existence.
The text in para 65 follows Syadvadmanjari (pp. 193-194).
140
CHAPTER 2
ON THE PARTIAL POINT OF VIEW
P. 21. L. 14-15. This chapter deals with the nature of the partial point of view as cogniser of a part of an object but not overlooking the other parts of it. Amṛtacandra Suri says that the Jaina doctrine of naya gives prominence to a particular aspect leaving aside the other aspect, thereby churning the nectar of reality first as a milkmaid draws part of the rope of the churning rod by one hand loosening the other part to get butter out of curd (Puruşarthasiddhyupaya, 225).
Naya has been defined as the intention of the knower. (Nyayakumudacandra, p. 606).
The fallacious partial point of view has been explained in the text itself (pp. 24-25).
P. 21. L. 15-16. The Slokavarttika (1. 6) argues, "if the part of the sea only be looked upon as the sea, the remaining part of the sea would be a non-sea or the sea becomes a conglomerate of countless seas and there would be none who knows the sea fully." So a part of an object is neither the object nor a non-object. It is interesting to note that Malayagiri (Avasyakaniryukti, p. 369A) holds that all partial points of view are false because the partial point of view which takes into account the other partial points of view into account, is really an organ of knowledge. So the partial point of view is only that which takes into account the part of the object. This point of view of Malayagiri is exceptional and is not accepted by logicians. Yasovijaya falls in line with the general view when he defines false point of view.

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P. 21. L. 17. The two types of partial point of viewthe modal and the substantial-are the basic varieties (Siddhiviniscayaţika p.521.1).
P.21.L.19-20. Tattvarthasūtra (1.34) mentions only the first five nayas, the last two being included into the fifth, the verbal. Anurogadvāra (148, 151) also says that the last three nayas are verbal nayas. Since Tattvārthas ülra mentions the last three nayas as verbal it mentions the verbal nara of our text as the present (Samprata).
P.21 para 2. Here in all the examples of the nondistinguished partial point of view, mode or substance, which is qualified, is predominant whereas the other mode or subs. tance, which is the qualification, is subordinate.
Literally Naigama means 'one which does not cognise one (but both, though one as predominantly and the other as subordinately). 'naikarn gamah' For other etymologies of the word one may refer to Vibha, 2657, 2658.
Another meaning of naigama is 'intention'. (Sarvārthasiddhi, 1.33.) A man, with intention of cooking says that he is cooking even though he is only collecting fuel, water etc.
P. 22. Para 3. The difference between the generic and empirical is that the former takes into account only generic whereas the latter takes into account particular alone. The empirical does not take into account the generic because it cannot be demonstrated; it is only the particular which can be demonstrated (Syādvādamañjari, pp. 211-212). For example, neither existence, taken into account by the ultimate generic, nor the substance, taken into account by non-ultimate generic, can be demonstrated; it is only the particular, soul or matter for example, which can be demonstrated.
P. 22. para 4. The logic behind the analytic standpoint is given in the Syadvadamañjari (p. 213) as follows: The past has perished; the present has not assumed form. Both of them, are, therefore, as non-existent as asses' horns. They have no practical efficacy and have, therefore, no reality. It is only the entity of the present, which is used in all practical efficacy and which is real.
P. 22. para 5. The verbal makes difference because

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of time etc. but does not make difference amongst synonyms. It is the subtle which makes difference amongst synonyms. Compare Syā dvadamañjart (p.214) which says that since all the synonyms indicate one and the same object, it does not make any distinction amongst them.
P. 22. para 6. F. W. Thomas (Syadvādamañjari, p. 156, f.n.15) raises an interesting question : since rūdha in ordinary Sanskrit denotes 'conventional', 'current', as opposed to etymological (augika) meaning, this Jaina term is somewhat surprising, as signifying the opposite; but the verb-form samabhirohana occurs infra, p. 158, v. 36.
The subtle takes synonyms, on the basis of their etymologies, as distinct words like any other two words like 'Indra', 'cattle', 'man' etc. This means that it overlooks the fact that two or more synonyms, after all, indicate one and the same object.
P. 23. para 7. The such-like point of view insists that a word can be used for an object only at a time when the object is engaged in the activity, indicated by the word etymologically. As to the question how such-like point of view will decide about the use of words which are conventional and not etymological the answer would be that the proposition of raska that every word is derived from root, is correct.
P.23. L.15. Compare Nyāyakumudacandra, pp. 793-794. P.23 L. 16-18. Compare Tattvärthas ātra. P.23. L.18-21. ViBhā, 2691.2692.
P.23.L.24-29. Here is an attempt to connect the logical theory of naya with the ethical theories of means of liberation, That conduct is the immediate cause of liberation is supported by Pujyapada in his commentary on Tattvärthasūtra (9.18). He also asserts that the three-right faith, right knowledge and right conduct are collectively the cause of liberation. (Sarvarthasiddhi on T. S. 1. 1). I have discussed the problem in the fourth chapter of my work, Jaina Ethics.
P.24.L.16. Quality and qualified object, etc. include the part and the whole, the cause and the effect, and the general and the particular. Compare Nyayakumudacandra (p. 123). According to Nyāyakumudacandra (p. 627, L. 7) not only the

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Vaiseșika but Särikhya system of philosophy is also included in the false point of view of non-distinguished.
P.24.L.18. Compare Laghiyastrayalankāra (5.38). The fact that the non-Jaina systems are shown as false points of view should not be interpreted as meaning that the doctrine of points of view has essentially anything to do with the nonJaina systems. The nature of things is such that it admits of the doctrine of points of view (Auto-commentary on Tattvārthasūtra, 1. 35).
CHAPTER 3
ON SYMBOLS
P.25. L. 14-15. The purpose of the symbols is to make distinction of words and objects which indicate the object which are cognised either through organ of knowledge or through partial point of view. Sometimes these objects are indicated not by words but by objects themselves. (Nyāyakumudacandra, p. 799. L.5-8). Therefore the text in its definition of symbol includes both word and the object.
P.25.L.16-17. Pūjyapada also says that the purpose of the symbol is to exclude the irrelevant and depict the relevant (Sarvārthasiddhi, 1. 5). Dhavala (p. 30) says that the listeners are either ignorant or partially aware or fully aware of the object which is to be discussed. The ignorant listener does not know the meaning of the word. If he mistakes substantial symbols for modal symbol or vice versa the symbols are to be used to correct him. A man who is partially aware or fully aware of the object under discussion may also have doubts and symbols are used to remove that.
P. 25. L. 18. A symbol (consisting of word or object) can be used in four ways: (1) It may be used without any regard for the qualities possessed by the object which it indicates e.g. a poor man may be named as Rājā (king). (2) An object may be used as symbol for another object without any regard for the shape of the two, e.g. a wooden chessman is called king even though it has no resemblance with the king

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in shape (3) A word may be used with reference to an object without any regard for the present position it occupies, e.g. an ascetic, who was king before renouncing the world, may be called a king. (4) A word may be used paying due regard to the qualities, shape and present position of the object it indicates e.g. the word king may be used, for a person who is really a king. These four symbolic uses are respectively called-name, replacement, substance and nature.
P. 25. L. 19. Dhavali (p.18) speaks of eight types of names based on the fact whether the name indicates the generic or a collection of two objects or a quality or an action etc.
P.25 L.23-24. The name is a symbol not only in its spoken form but in its written form also.
P.25. L.25-26. In our notes above we have spoken of the symbolic replacement without any regard for the shape. It, however, does not mean that all symbolic replacements are such. In representing a great man through his idol, we do pay attention to his shape also.
Anuyogadvāra (sūtra 10) mentions different types of ways of symbolic replacement by means of idols or pictures which are made by using the wood, the walls, the cloth, the clay and the stone etc.
P.25.L.28. Nyayakumudacandra (p. 806) raises a doubt as to how the concept of symbol of substance is to be reconciled with the concept of the substance as possessed of qualities and modes. The solution is that a substance can be said to be possessed of modes only when it adopts the present mode and leaves the past mode preparing for the future mode. So substance is always inclined toward the coming modes. It is in this sense that we take substance in the chapter dealing with symbols. In the text we have more uses of the symbol of substance—one when a word is used in the secondary sense and the object is to be called so nominally and second when the word is used for pseudo-object or pseudo-action. Besides we have other types of sombols of substance. In the first place, the substance, which is symbol, may either be sentient (agama) or connected with the sentient (no-agama). A person who knows the reality but is not engaged at present in thinking

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Notes 145 about it or in explaining it to others, is known as sentient substance-symbol. The body of person who is not engaged in the conscious activity is the semi-sentient substance-symbol. If the person is not engaged in the conscious activity at present, his body is the knower's semi-sentient substancesymbol. If the person concerned does not know at present but would know in future, his body is known as would-be semi-sentient substance-symbol. The Karmic material (consisting of karma or no-karma) which is also connected with the person is known as the third semi-sentient substance-symbol (Nyayakumudacandra, pp. 806-807). P. 25. Para 6. The basic idea is that the four symbols are partly identical and partly different. The replacement symbol differs from name and substance inasmuch as one behaves with the replacement-symbol as it were real whereas one does not do so with the name-symbol and substancesymbol. The substancc-symbol, on the other hand, has the capacity to assume reality, which the name-symbol and replacement-symbol do not have. Compare ViBha, 53-54. P. 26. para 7. The doubt raised in this para and the answers offered are taken from ViBha 55-72. The Jaina philosophy accepts all of them removing mutual contradiction, if any, whereas the non-Jaina systems insise on one of the other aspects (ViBha, 72). P. 27. para 8. The name-symbol is said to be accepted by the point of view of substance. The reason is that naming of an object is not possible if we view it from the modal point because the modes change every moment and if we keep the modes in view it is not possible to give any name to it. The difference of opinion expressed in line 15 has already been given in the text p. 21, line 20. The replacement-symbol is also to be accepted by substantial point of view only because it does not take into account the shape and identifies one object with the other which is not possible in case of mode. As regards the substance-symbol, it is obviously to be accepted by the substantial point of view, because it presumes unity amongst the modes of past, present and future. It is only the real which is to be accepted by the modal points of view.