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Notes
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(person). It may be noted that the arguments, given for refuting the positions of the Buddhists and the Prabhakaras, are altogether different and, therefore, the phrase "ata eva' (for this very reason) in lines 18-19, is redundant. (I have elaborat. ed this point in my article on Jaina-tarka-bhāsā, Journal of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Delhi, Vol. I, No. 1, December, 1971, pp. 110-111).
P. 2. L. 20-_3. The Naiyāyikas argue that recognition is possible only when there is direct perception and is not possi. ble when there is no direct perception; therefore, recognition is nothing but direct perception. The answer is that recognition becomes possible not when there is only direct perception but also recollection. Had direct perception (without recol. lection) been the only pre-condition for recognition, it (recognition) would have become possible at the very first sight of the object (when there is no question of its recollection).
P. 9 L. 24-27. Granting what has been said above, Vācaspati Misra in his Nyāyavārtikatatparyafika (p. 139) holds that recognition is produced by senses, the recollection or the latent impressions also being helpful in its production. It is with this help that direct perception cognises the present object as qualified by the past. Here, rasovijaya refutes this point of view. As direct perception is not dependent on memory, therefore this position is tenable. This refutation is not convincing. Nobody holds that direct perception is dependent on memory but it may precede certain direct perception. Vacaspati Mifra holds that recognition is the case where memory precedes direct perception. This cannot be denied even by the Jainas. The bone of contention is whether we accept these two, as independent cognitions, or as one synthetic cognition and if we accept them as one synthetic cognition, should it be termed as perception or recognition. (Compare my article, in the Journal of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Delhi, Vol. 1, No. 1, December, 1971, p. 111). Yasovijaya gives another argument to decide this dispute. If we accept this as direct perception, the cases of inference would also be decided by the help of direct perception, aided by the mind having the recollection of concomitance and there would be no necessity for inference. Here Ya sovijaya seems to have the
