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further specific characteristic, he has a new speculation (tha) and in this case the former perceptual judgment serves as the base and as such it is metaphorically called perception. Now, it is obvious that this perception can have the abovementioned varieties. Also Cf. Siddhasenagani's Commentary on the Tattvārthasūtra, 1.16.
It is notable here that out of all the Jaina logicians like Akalanka, Vidyānandi, Vādi Devas īri, and Hemacandra, it is only rašovijaya who sticks to the original position of the Jaina canons in holding perception to be indeterminate; the others regard it to be determinate.
P. 5. L. 17-18. Though speculation (iha) is also preceded by doubt (samsaya), yet it is different from doubt, because doubt cannot exclude the false from the true out of mutually contradictory objects, whereas speculation strives for the ascertainment of the truth and ultimately succeeds in doing soViBha, 183-84. Also cf. Siddhasena's Commentary on Tattvārthabhāşya, 1.15.
P. 5. Para 15. Jinabhadra holds the view that perceptual judgment cognizes the existing characteristics and excludes the non-existing ones. It is by way of refutation of an opinion which holds that it only excludes the non-existing characteristics and the existing characteristics are cognized by retention (dhāraņā)-ViBhā, 185-186. As all the synonyms of perceptual judgment, given by Umāsvāti are negative, it seems that he is more inclined towards the opinion, refuted by Jinabhadra, whereas the Nandisutra, which gives positive synonyms also for perceptual judgment, seems to agree with Jinabhadra-Cf. Dr. Nathmal Tatiu, Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 42.
P.5. L. 28–P. 6. L. 6. A difficulty in accepting the view, given by the opponents, is raised. Suppose we accept that retention cognizes the existing characteristics, then memory will not be included in retention, and will have to be accepted as an independent 'variety of sensuous cognition (mat ijñāna). Thus there will be five varieties of sensuous cognition, whereas the scriptures accept only four varieties. It has been shown here that none of the three varieties of retention, mentioned in the previous paragraph, can be included in the perceptual judgment and, therefore, they have to be accepted as independent varie
