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P. 1. L. 1. Cf. Daśavaikälika, 1. 1., deva vi tam nammsamti jassa dhamme saya mano
'Even the gods bow down to him whose mind is always engaged in dhamma'.
P. 1. L. 2. For the partial point of view (naya) see supra p. 71. For the different ways of putting a thing see supra p. 77.
P. 4. L. 4. A glance at the definition of pramana, given by differant Jaina logicians and collected by Pandita Sukhalalaji in his notes on Pramāņa mīmāṁsā and also by Pandita Kailash Chandraji in his Jaina-nyaya (p. 45), would clarify that Yasovijaya has borrowed his definition directly from Vadidevas uri (Pramananayatattvälokālankara 1. 2.) Siddhasena (Nyayavatara, 1) and Samantabhadra (Apta mimämsä, 63) who say that pramaņa is illuminator (abhäsi and abhā saka) of the self and the others. Yasovijaya, following, Vadidevas üri replaced the word'illuminator' by definitive cognition, (vyavasay).
Following the Mimämsakas and the Buddhists, Bhatta Akalanka (Aştasali, Aştasahasri, p. 175) and Manikyanandi (Parikşamukha, 1.1) lay down the condition that the pramana should reveal an object, hitherto unknown (apurvärtha). Yasovijaya has followed the majority of the Jaina logicians in this connection and has not made any reference to the condition. He was of course conscious of this condition as is clear from his text p. 6 line 7.
Siddhasena quoted above, says that pramäna should be immune from contradictions (badhavarjitam). He is followed by Akalanka, quoted above. Yasovijaya shows his awareness of of this condition when he observes that recollection is also an organ of knowledge, because it is coherent like perception etc (Text, p. 9 line 1).
P. 1. L.4. The Naiyayikas hold that knowledge does not cognise itself. It has to be cognised by another knowledge called anuvyavasaya. The Jainas, like the Buddhists and the Vedäntists accept the self-illuminating nature of the knowledge. Therefore, the word 'self' in the definition is significant.
