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P 2.L.7- The earlier Jaina scriptures mention five types of knowledge, which are classified here-as also elsewhere in the later Jaina philosophical works---- into two types of cogni. tion.
P. 2.L.13-Any knowledge born with the help of an instrument-like senses or mind-which is different from the soul, was originally held to be indirect, but as all the non-faina systems considered it to be direct, Jinabhadra (ViBhā, 95), who is here followed by Yaśovijaya, fell in line with other systems by according such knowledge the status of empirically direct knowledge. The original concept of direct knowledge was included in the concept of transcendentally direct knowledge. For reasons of such adjustment, sce Dr. Nathmal Tatia, Studies in faina Philosophy, pp. 28-29.
P. 2.L.15— Anīndriya means quasi-sensuous--- Cf line 20 below.
P. 2.L.17-Non-existent (asiddha) means that which does not exist in the thesis, inconclusive (anaikāntika) means that which exists in the heterologous also, and contradictory (viruddha) means that which co-exists with the absence of probandum Cf. Pramānasa graha, p. 111.
P. 2.L.20-Eyes, etc. include ear, eyes, smell, taste and touch-Nandisutra, 2-5.
P. 2.L.21-For a detailed discussion on whether mind is a sense or not, see Dr. Nathmal Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy, pp. 31-32.
P. 2.L.23-28. Dr Radhakrishnan's following remarks make the difference of the sensuous cognition ( matijnana) and scriptual knowledge ( śrutajñāna ) clear : "Mati is ordinary cognition, obtained by normal means of sense perception... Śruta or testimony is knowledge derived through signs, symbols or words. While matijñāna gives us knowledge by acquaintance, this gives only knowledge by description"-- Indian Philosophy Vol. I, pp. 294-95. The matter, however, is not so simple. The difference
ar as long as śrutajñāna actually stood for the scriptural knowledge. It was so only in the earlier
