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P.1. L. 6 Yafovijaya will himself admit that object-awareness is the cognition of the general features only (Text p. 4 line 9) and yet object-awareness is obviously a pramana. So the question arises that how can he here exclude indeterminate intutions from cognition? Pandita Sukhalalaji in his commentary on text (p. 31), says that here Yasovijaya is only following the tradition of his predecessors like Manikyanandi and Vadidevas uri. In fact, as pointed out by Dr. Indra Chandra Shastri in his commentary on the text (p. 2), there is a difference of opinion about the nature of indeterminate intuition as to whether it is indentical or not with the object-awareness. May be that Yasovijaya considered the two as different and therefore really excluded the former form cognition while including the latter into it. For a detailed study of knowledge and inderminate intuition, see Nathmal Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy, pp 70-80.
P. 1. L. 7. The Bhatta Mimämsakas are said to be upholders of the non-perceptibility of knowledge, because they believe that knowledge cannot be known directly but can only be inferred from the object, which is known.
P. 1. 1. 8 The idealists traditions of the Yogacara Buddhists and the non-dualist Vedanta do not accept the reality of the external world. The Jainas, on the other hand, are realist. Therefore, the pramana is said to be definitive cognition of not only the self but of the others also.
Pandita Sukhalalajt comments (p. 31) that by saying that the epithet of 'self and the others' has been used to indicate the nature (of the pramana), Yasovijaya means to stress that one should not think that this epithet is superflous, as it is implied in the very nature of the knowledge, as accepted by the Jainas. It is meaningful not as excluding anything, but merely as indicator of the nature.
P. 1. L. 10-12 Vadi Devasuri in the sixth chapter of his Pramananayatattvälokālankara, has dealt with the problem of the resultant of pramana in detail. Resultants, he says, means that which is effected by pramāna (VI. I.). It is either direct or indirect (VI. 2.) The direct resultant of the pramāņa is the removal of ignorance (VI. 3). The indirect resultant of all the
