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On the Symbol
83
is called the name-symbol of soul; the image-symbol of soul is the image of gods etc.; the real symbol of soul is one who is possessed of the subsidence of the knowledge-veiling karman. Thus, these three symbols are possible with reference to soul but not the substantial symbol. This would be possible, only if one who is not soul at present would become a soul in future, just as one who is not god in the present is to become god in future and that is called substantial symbol of god. But this cannot be accepted in the doctrine because the existence of knowledge in a soul is considered to be without beginning and without end. But if we were to imagine a soul, to be devoid of qualities and modes but possessed of a beginning-less knowledge, then this would be a non-existent thing, because the qualities and the modes of an existent thing cannot be eliminated by mental thinking. The objects do not show modifications depending on our knowledge but our knowledge is produced as the objects show modification. We cannot say the four-fold division of names etc. is disturbed by it, because it is possible in almost all other objects. There is no disturbance in the rule if it is not 'possible in one", say the ancient people. Some say that one who knows the meaning of the word 'soul' but is not devoted to it, is also a substantial soul. Others say that I myself, the soul of the man, should be known [as the substantial soul] because I will be the cause of the soul of the god who is yet to take birth, and because I myself will transform myself in the form of the god. Therefore I am now the substantial soul. Their intention is this that the prior soul is the substance of that which is yet to take birth and to follow. In this way, only a liberated soul would be a real soul and no other soul—there. fore, this point of view is also not free from defects; this is elaborated by the commentator of the Tattvārthal
*10. This should be kept in mind that in thisway thought all mundane souls would be substantial but they would not the contradictory to real because it is held that the names etc. of one object are invariably conconfitant with the real. So
1. Cf. Tattvārthabhāşyavștti, p. 48.
