Indian Philosophy

Author(s): Sukhlal Sanghavi
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 32

The Relation of Cause and Effect
them, the generic is not the same thing as the similar inasmuch as no similarity is at all possible in the absence of a real difference; the conclusion is that the generic is the same thing as the siogle or impartite. On this view it is supposed that at the basis of the world phenomena there exists one single impartite and undifferentiated real element which is possessed of no constituent-units whatsoever and no qualities whatsoever. This real element, since it is impartite and undifferentiated, is something eternalundergoing-no-change; in it a transformation or a change is not at all possible. This real element alone is what is ultimetely real. What particular worldly phenomena spread out in time are apparently observable there carry nothing whatsoever in the form of an underlying substance - these particular phenomena in fact being but a superimposition caused merely by ignorance or nescience. The realness apparent in these phenomena pertains not to themselves but to that basic element which acts as their substratum and is itself something undifferentiated and impartite. Hence it is that the multiplicity of phenomenal effects, even if devoid of a real existence, appears to be real owing to the existence pertaining to what acts as the substratum of this multiplicity. Thus this line of consideration culminates in the view that the particular phenomenal effects are not something real but merely ignorance-born - something of the form of a mere apparent transformation, a view according to which the real or ultimate existence pertains to what acts as the substratum of these effects. This monistic doctrine positing the reality of something eternal-undergoing-no-change is upheld by Sankara alone.
Nor was there unanimity about oifering an explanation of what a piece of cognitive operation views as something specific. Thus what a piece of cognitive operation views as something generic was understood either as something exhibiting similarity or as something exhibiting identity and thus respectively came into existence the doctrines positing a real-undergoingchange and one positing a real-undergoing-no-change;4 the same thing
4
The Nyaya-Vaišeşikas advocate neither the doctrine which posits real-undergoingchange nor one which posits a real-undergoing-no-change. Thus according to them. so many substances like atoms, ākāśa (=ether), etc. are something real-undergoingno-change and something absolutely different from one another. And yet they also somehow posit similarity, a position elucidated by them as follows: even elements which are real-undergoing-no-change and which are absolutely different from one another carry in common an impartite element called 'universal (=sāmānya)' and one accounting for the similarity exhibited in individual things different from one another: thus the universal earthness is common to all the earth-atoms, the universal substance-ness to all the substances, the universal real-ness to all the substances, qualities and actions. Such a permanent element accounting for similarity is not posited by the philosophical schools like Jainism etc.