Indian Philosophy

Author(s): Sukhlal Sanghavi
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 82

The Various Buddhist Views Regarding Soul
itself manifest exhibiting the nature of nama and rūpa,33 Buddha on the other hand does not posit an independent basic element which manifests itself in the form of nama but views nama itself in the form of an independent element which is as much real as rupa (=physical element) and on account of bearing the character of an aggregate in the manner described and running its course in the form of a series is beginningless and endless. In this position maintained by Pitakas we can see that there flows in an uninterrupted manner the current of an aggregate whose constituent-elements are vedana, samjñā, samskära and vijñāna; of this current there is neither a beginning nor an end. Since in this current centred around vijñāna there is no place for the permanent individuality of a conscious element or subsfance-of-the-form-of-soul the position in question is known as the doctrine that soul does not exist in the form of a real entity,
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However, round about the Buddhist order there were in existence a number of circles upholding the doctrine of an eternal soul. So when were raised from objections against the doctrine of no-soul the side of these circles and when certain people working under the influence of their past adherence to some doctrine positing an eternal element entered the Buddhist order the doctrine of soul was once more advocated by these people in their own specific manner. In Kathavatthu and Tattvasangraha this doctrine of soul is referred to as a prima facie view maintained by a section of Buddhists. These advocates of the doctrine of soul mentioned under the title Sammitiya or Vätsiputriya submitted that the substance soul does exist in a real sense of the term, but when they were asked whether soul exists in the same fashion as does rūna (physical element) they answ ered in the negative. Thus the doctrine that there does exist a soul did gain entry in the Buddhist order, but it could not be made compatible with Buddha's basic viewpoint and ultimately retained a mere nominal existence.
The doctrine that soul does not exist in the form of a real entity was evolving itself in a number of ways. However, it was mainly concerned with the question as to how to retain a footing in confrontation with the advocates of the doctrine of an eternal soul as also with the question as to how besides answering other objections to offer an intelligible account of the phenomena like rebirth and bondage-cum-emancipation. Out of this concern
33 Taddhedam tarhy avyākṛtamāsit/Tannāmarūpābhyām eva vyākriyata.-Bṛhadāraṇy. akopanisad 1.4.7
34 Kaḥ punar atra samyujyate? (p. 254)..Paudgalikasyāpi avyākṛtavastuvādinaḥ pudgalo'pi dravyato'stiti (p. 258)..Nagnaṭapakṣe prakṣeptavyaḥ (p. 259)-Quoted from Abhidharmadipa and the notes thereon (p.254). In this text the procedure of vindicating the doctrine of no-soul favoured by the Buddhist has been elucidated on the basis of a number of texts. Besides, see Tattvasangraha, kārikās 336ff.