Indian Philosophy

Author(s): Sukhlal Sanghavi
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 80

The Various Buddhist Views Regarding Soul
Thus in a way the basic nature or being of a thing was itself considered by Buddha to be of the form of time. Hence in place of the doctrine of an ete. rnal substance he established the doctrine of a momentary state or an aggregate-of-qualities. And the doctrine thus established he applied to the nonconscious element as also to the conscious element or soul. Hence those who were thoroughly immersed in the acceptance of the doctrine that soul is an eternal entity naturally formed the notion as if Buddha was repudi. ating the very existence of the element soul. This acceptance on their part impelled them to dub Buddha as an upholder of the doctrine of no-sou), and Buddha did become known among people as an upholder of the doctrine of no-soul..
However, Buddha's was not an ordinary view. Thus just as he saw no strong argument or cogent basis at the back of the doctrine of eternality, similarly he saw no congent argument at the back of an absoulte denial of the existence of a conscious element. Being an advocate of the doctrine of rebirth Buddha was not merely a suppoter of the doctrine of karman, the doctrine of endeavour, the doctrine of spiritual evolution but was an actual practiser thereof. Hence he also did not welcome and did not laud the annihilationist Lokāyata doctrine according to which consciousness pertains to physical elements. Thus within the body of his Middle Path he did find room for soul or the conscious element in the form of an independent elemet, but he did so in his own characteristic manner. If the rivals who do not view all this with a sympathetic eye or who are ignorant of all this should call his doctrine of no-soul, then that is only natural; but in fact bis doctrine is not a doctrine of no-soul29.
Among the lines of thinking positing soul in the form of an absolutely independent entity there obtains an extremely sharp difference of opinion as to the nature of this element, and yet none of them calls another one an advocate of the doctrine of 10-soul simply on the ground that latter upholds a view opposed to that upheld by the former. For example, the systems like Sānkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiseșika do not call the Jaina system an advocate of the doctrine of no-soul, nor does the latter calls the former so. Hence the Buddist line of thinking upholding an extermely diff erent opinion as to the nature of the conscious element cannot be called by any philosopher one advocating doctrine of no-soul-even if this line of thinking offers an account of the nature of soul in an absolutely different technical terminology. After all, what is the purpose behind one positing soul in the form of an indenendent entity ? And what is the basis
29 For Buddha's doctrine of no-soul see Introduction to Nyāyāvatāra-vārtikavștti pp.
6, 15, 18-9, 21; Gañadharaväda, p. 82 and 'The Tibetan Book of the Dead by Y.W. Evans-Wentz (publised by the Oxford University Press), p. 225.