Indian Philosophy

Author(s): Sukhlal Sanghavi
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 63

The Nature of the World Compared
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in the form of an ultimate cause the huge infinity of impartite atomic substances that are an eternal-element-undergoing-change, some posited an ipfinity of impartite atomic substances that are an eternal-element-undergoing-no-change, while some posited not any unchanging atomic substance but merely properties that undergo chage and are momentary; and the visible multiplicity of the gross and subtle effects was realistically accounted for by them all on the basis of the originating elements respectively posited by them and in their respective manners. That is to say on their view this multiplicity might well be subject to change in the form in which it is cognized by an internal-organ or by the sense-organs it is nevertheless real because it has in fact originated out of its originating cause. Thus even in the eyes of the person who is altogether rid of ignorance this visible multiplicity of the world retains the very same form as it does in the eyes of others. That is say, irrespective of whether the viewer is ignorant or otherwise the form of the world suffers no change whatsoever on account thereof. This has been an account of the realistic thought-current,
The Mahāyāna and the Kevaladvaita Views Regarding the Nature of the World Compared
However the Mahāyānist and the Sankarite thought-currents proceeded and were vindicated on the basis of an altogether different criterion -- this appears to be the case. Thus they have been of the view that the nature of the world and its originating cause cannot be correctly ascertained with the help of sense-organs. The sense-organs are indeed a very much imperfect and defective instrurment of cognition. They do not at all proceed beyond what is something present and is in contact with them. Not only that, the properties like colour, taste etc. belonging to one and the same object are grasped in absolutely different forms by the sense-organs belonging to the different species of living beings. Even confining ourselves to the human species we fiod that the capacity of a sense-organ is not of the same form in the case of each individual and these different capacities too do not function in one and the same form. Hence in the task of ascerta. iping the nature and the originating cause of the world the sense-born cognition cannot be an effective instrument of performance. As compared to the external sense-organs an internal-organ might well be a more competent instrument, but even on the basis of the experience of pleasure, pain and delusion had through it one cannot correctly ascertain the nature and the originating cause of the world. One and the same thing is experienced differently on the same occasion by different internal-organs and even the same internal-organ does not experience a thing in the same manner on different occasions. Besides, when an internal organ is in a controlled or discriminating state it experiences no state of pleasure, pain or delusion even if obiects of sensuous enjoyment and the instruments of sensuous enjoyment