Indian Philosophy

Author(s): Sukhlal Sanghavi
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 75

Sankhya-Yaga View on Soul Compared with Nyāya-Vaišeșika View
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quality or property but the Nyāya-Vaiseșika tradition, agreeing with the Jaina tradition, views the element soul as a substratum of numerous quelities and properties. 24 Nevertheless, it after all disagrees also with the view upheld by the Jaina tradition. Thus the Jaina tradition attributes to the element soul a number of inherent and ever-present capacities like consciousness, bliss, endeavour etc., capacities which are non-different from this element, and then posits in them such transformations or modifications as are different from moment to moment; on the other hand, the Nyaya-Vaišeşika tradition attributes to the element soul no such inherent capacities like consciousness etc. and yet posits in it qualities like cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, spiritual merit, spriritual demerit, etc. qualities which remain in a soul only so long as it is associated with a body while they also continue to come into existence and go out of existence. These nine qualities cognition, pleasure etc. posited by the Nvāya-Vaiseșika tradition are in a way akin to the modifications-undergone-by-an-joherent capacity posited by the Jaina tradition. Even so, the two traditions differ ipasmuch as according to the Jaina tradition at the time of disembodied emancipation when there obtains do association with a body the element soul experiences an uninterrupted cycle of the pure transformations or modifications undergone by the inherent capacities like consciousness, bliss, endeavour etc. while according to the Nyāya-Vaiseșika tradition at the time of disembodied emancipation there cannot possibly exist in the element soul any such quality like cognition etc.-- whether pure or impure, whether momentary or perd. urable25; for the latter does not basically posit in the element soul inherent capacities like consciousness etc. In this connection the Nyāya-Vaišeşika tradition agrees with the Sankhya-Yoga tradition in one respect and disagrees whith it in another. Thus according to the Sankhya-Yoga tradition, the conscious element is of the form of consciousness that is impartite, something eternal-undergoing-no-change and self-revelatory; hence on its view, in the state of emancipation this element is as much free from all association with the qualities cognition etc. as it is in the state of transmigration. On the other hand, according to the Nyāya-Vaiseșika tradition, the element soul is not something inherently conscious and yet in the state of transmigration it is possessed of the qualities like cognition etc. while in the state of emancipation, being devoid of all such qualities, this substance soul in a way becomes akin to the conscious element posited by the SankhyaYoga tradition, an element which too is devoid of all qualities. That is to say, in the state of emancipation it, being absolutely devoid of qualities that come into existence and go out of existence, becomes a substance
24 Vaiseşikadarśana 3.2.4; 5.3.5; 9.2.6 as also discussion on soul occuring in Prasasta
pădabhāşya, 25 Nyāyabhāşya 1.1.22 and Introduction to 'Ganadharavada' p. 105