Indian Philosophy

Author(s): Sukhlal Sanghavi
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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Sankhya-Yoga View on Soul Compared with Nyaya-Vaiseşika View
devoid of all qualities as it does according to the Sankhya-Yoga tradition. Thus on the Nyaya-Vaiseṣika view becomes an emancipated soul something akin to ether. In this connection the only difference is that ether is considered to be physical though incorporeal while the substance soul is incorporeal as well as non-physical. So far as the absence of inherent consciousness and that of the qualities or modifications like cognition etc. is concerned there is not the slightest difference between the element ether and the element soul. However, ether is one single substance while the emancipated souls are infinite in number; this difference as to number does draw attention,
In many other respects as well does the Nyaya-Vaiseṣika tradition bear a peculiar similarity with and dissimilarity from the Jaina and SankhyaYoga traditions. Thus the Jaina tradition attributes inherent actorship and enjoyership to the element soul26; the same is done by the Nyaya-Vaiśeşika tradition. However, actorship and enjoy ership posited by the Jaina tradition in a soul remain there even in a pure and emancipated soul--which is not the case with the Nyaya-vaiseṣika tradition. So long as body remains there and the origination and destruction of the qualities like cognition, desire etc. go on there actorship and enjoyership continue to belong to a soul27; but no such actorship or enjoyership remains there in the state of emancipation. Thus in the state of emancipation it becomes akin to soul as conceived by the Sankhya-Yoga tradition.
Actorship-cum-enjoyership posited in the element soul by the NyayaVaiseṣika tradition is also of a different order. Since this tradition treats a soul as something eternal-undergoing-no-change it cannot directly attribute to it any kind of actorship-cum-enjoyership. Hence it attributes actorship-cum-enjoyership to it on the basis of the origination and destruction of the qualities belonging to it. Thus it submits that so long as the qualities cognitton, desire, effort etc. belong to a soul it behaves as an actor and an enjoyer, but when an utter absence of these qualities takes place in the state of emancipation actorship-cum-enjoyership no longer remains present in it in a direct sense-even if one might attribute the same to it in the sense that it was present in it in the past. Thus even if agreeing with the Jaina tradition the Nyaya-Vaiseṣika tradition attributes to a soul actorship-cum-enjoyership it can also go on to add that the element soul is something eternal-undergoing-no-change; for according to it, the qualities are utterly different from the element soul acting as their substratum. Thus even if it grants that the qualities originate and vanish it manages to defend its cherished doctrine that a soul is something eternal
26 Sanmatitarka 3.55
27 Nyayavārtika 3.1.6 and Introduction to 'Gaṇadharavada' p. 96.