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Capacity for Valid Cognition
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also sharply disagree as to their view of what constitutes an existing-element --as a result of which a number of pbilosophical trends have come into existence. For these the chief reason is that the different means-of-validcognition vary as to their working capacity. Thus when one philosopher establishes his view he bases himself on the capacity of a particular meansof-valid-cognition which he treates final; then comes another philosopher who proceeds basing himself on the capacity on a more developed meansof-valid-cognition. Thus if the philosophical schools have given consideration to the gross, the subtle, the subtlest and the incomprehensible forms of what constitutes an object-of-valid-cognition or an exiting-element that has happened just owing to the fact that the different means-of-valid-cognition are possessed of increasingly greater degress of working capacity.
Let us now consider as to how the capacity of different means-ofvalid-cognition lies at the basis of the views advocated by the different philosophers beginning with the materialist Cārvakas and ending with the spiritualists- particularly those upholding absolute-nondualism.
The materialist Cārvākas treat as final the capacity inherent in a sense-organ. Thus on their views, that entity is real which is arenable to sense-born cognition while as regards entities supposed to be not open to sense-born cognition one can only entertain imaginations. But what criterian can one apply to examine the genuineness or otherwise of such an imagination ? Thus chiefly basing themselves on the capacity inherent in a sense-organ they treat sense-born cognition as a meansof-valid-cognition and declare that the sole means-of-valid cognition is sense perception. True, they treat inference too as a means-ofvalid-cognition but go on to add that this means has got its own ilmitation. Thus they aver that inference regarding an object not open to sense-born cognition can attain the status of a means-of-valid-cognition only in case this object is as such capable of being open to sense-born cognition. This means that in the ultimate count the validity of an inference too is based on the capacity of sense-perception. Hence it is that the Cārvākas, even while admitting the validity of inference to a certain extent, are counted as an advocate of the doctrine that sense-perception is the sole means-of-valid-cognition. It is apparent that the means-of-valid-cognition called sense-perception cannot proceed beyond gross physical objects. That is why the Cārvāka trend is exlusively confined to the gross physical world.
9 Pratyakşam evaikam pramānam iti vacanam tat tantrikala kşapalaksitalokasāmvyay
ahāripratyakşāpekṣayā. Ata eva laksanalakṣitapratyakşapūrvakānumānasya 'Anumânam apramānam ityādigranthasandarbhenāprāmānyapratipādanam vidhiyate. Na punar gopālādyajñalokavyavahararacanãcaturasya dhūmadarsanamātrāvirbhütānala pratipattirūpasya-etc. Sanmatitarkatika, Volume 1, p. 73; the passage introducing Tattvasang rahakārikā 1482- Purandaras tv äha' etc.
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