Indian Philosophy

Author(s): Sukhlal Sanghavi
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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Capacity for Valid Cognition
However, other philosophers consider the matter proceeding still further. Thus they submit that the capacity possessed by an internal-organ (=manas) is greater than that possessed by a sense-organ. For while each and every sense-organ grasps the object that is specific to it the internal-organ takes cognizance of all such objects grasped by a sepse-organ. Hence it is not proper to say that the internal-organ can consider over such objects alone as belong to the present time and lie in a nearby place. Just as with the help of external instruments like microscope etc. a sense-organ can see or listen more than what is ordinarily possible for it, similarly depending on an appro. priate past impression an internal-organ too can form an idea of things far past and far future. Of course, even in case an internal-organ considers over things which are not present but past or future the basis of the consideration concerned is some rule of invariable concomitance arrived at in connection with things present. With the help of repeated observations and cogitation related thereto an internal-organ can formulate, definitively and without the likelihood of contradiction, a rule of invariable concomitance valld for all the three phases of time. The philosophers positing such special capacity inherent in an internal-organ treat inference too as an independent meansof-valid-cognition -- independent in the sense that even in such cases where the corroboration of sense-perception is not available inference can operate and make a true decision possible. Barring Cārvakas, all the philosophers treat inference as an independent means-of-valid-cognition. With the help of this means-of-valid-cognition called inference they established the existence of a subtle physical element lying beyond the gross physical world. In connection with their employment of inference these philosophers chiefly recognized the principle of causal relationship alongside that of similarity. That the cause must be similar to the effect and that if there be an effect there must also be its cause — this is the relation of invariable concomitance on whose basis they establish the existence of a subtle physical element. Of course, even despite equally recognizing the principle of invariable concomi. tance not all the philosophers treating inference as an independent means-ofvalid-cognition arrived at one and the same final conclusion. Thus on the basis of the very sapie invariable concomitance one philosopher concluded that the gross physical world has for its basic cause some one element while another on that it has for its basic cause a multiplicity of such elements. However, the two are certainly akin insofar as both concluded that there does exist a suprasensuous element-call it unmanifest (=avyakta ), call it atom.
The supposition that the means-of-valid-cognition called inference is possessed of a special capacity proceeded beyond even that. Thus to a number of philosophers the question occurred as to whether the world consists of just a physical element-gross or subtle-or there also exists some